

PREFACE

In 1998 Congress passed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act [P.L. 105-246] as part of a series of efforts to identify, declassify, and release federal records on the perpetration of Nazi war crimes and on Allied efforts to locate and punish war criminals. Under the direction of the National Archives the Interagency Working Group [IWG] opened to research over 8 million of pages of records - including recent 21st century documentation. Of particular importance to this volume are many declassified intelligence records from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army Intelligence Command, which were not fully processed and available at the time that the IWG issued its Final Report in 2007.

As a consequence, Congress [in HR 110-920] charged the National Archives in 2009 to prepare an additional historical volume as a companion piece to its 2005 volume *U. S. Intelligence and the Nazis*. Professors Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda note in *Hitler's Shadow* that these CIA & Army records produced new "evidence of war crimes and about wartime activities of war criminals; postwar documents on the search for war criminals; documents about the escape of war criminals; documents about the Allied protection or use of war criminals; and documents about the postwar activities of war criminals".

This volume of essays points to the significant impact that flowed from Congress and the Executive Branch agencies in adopting a broader and fuller release of previously security classified war crimes documentation. Details about records processed by the IWG and released by the National Archives are more fully described on our website iwg@nara.gov.

William Cunliffe, Office of Records Services,
National Archives and Records Administration

INTRODUCTION

At the end of World War II, Allied armies recovered a large portion of the written or filmed evidence of the Holocaust and other forms of Nazi persecution. Allied prosecutors used newly found records in numerous war crimes trials. Governments released many related documents regarding war criminals during the second half of the 20th century. A small segment of American-held documents from Nazi Germany or about Nazi officials and Nazi collaborators, however, remained classified into the 21st century because of government restrictions on the release of intelligence-related records.

Approximately 8 million pages of documents declassified in the United States under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act added significantly to our knowledge of wartime Nazi crimes and the postwar fate of suspected war criminals. A 2004 U.S. Government report by a team of independent historians working with the government's Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group (IWG), entitled *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, highlighted some of the new information; it appeared with revisions as a 2005 book.¹ Our 2010 report serves as an addendum to *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*; it draws upon additional documents declassified since then.

The latest CIA and Army files have: evidence of war crimes and about the wartime activities of war criminals; postwar documents on the search for or prosecution of war criminals; documents about the escape of war criminals; documents about the Allied protection or use of Nazi war criminals; and documents about the postwar political activities of war criminals. None of the

declassified documents conveys a complete story in itself; to make sense of this evidence, we have also drawn on older documents and published works.

The Timing of Declassification

Why did the most recent declassifications take so long? In 2005–07 the Central Intelligence Agency adopted a more liberal interpretation of the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. As a result, CIA declassified and turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) additional documents from pre-existing files as well as entirely new CIA files, totaling more than 1,100 files in all. Taken together, there were several thousand pages of new CIA records that no one outside the CIA had seen previously.

A much larger collection came from the Army. In the early postwar years, the Army had the largest U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations in Europe; it also led the search for Nazi war criminals. In 1946 Army intelligence (G-2) and the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) had little competition—the CIA was not established until a year later. Even afterwards, the Army remained a critical factor in intelligence work in central Europe.

Years ago the Army facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, turned over to NARA its classified Intelligence and Security Command Records for Europe from the period (approximately) 1945–63. Mostly counterintelligence records from the Army’s Investigative Records Repository (IRR), this collection promised to be a rich source of information about whether the United States maintained an interest in war crimes and Nazi war criminals.

After preserving these records on microfilm, and then on a now obsolete system of optical disks, the Army destroyed many of the paper documents. But the microfilm deteriorated, and NARA could not read or recover about half of the files on the optical disks, let alone declassify and make them available. NARA needed additional resources and technology to solve the technological problems and transfer the IRR files to a special computer server. Declassification of these IRR files only began in 2009, after the IWG had gone out of existence.

This new Army IRR collection comprises 1.3 million files and many millions of pages. It will be years before all of these Army files are available for researchers.

For this report we have drawn selectively upon hundreds of these IRR files, amounting to many thousands of pages, which have been declassified and are already available at NARA.

Intelligence Organizations and War Crimes

American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations each had its own *raison d’être*, its own institutional interests, and its own priorities. Unfortunately, intelligence officials generally did not record their general policies and attitudes toward war crimes and war criminals, so that we hunted for evidence in their handling of individual cases. Despite variations, these specific cases do show a pattern: the issue of capturing and punishing war criminals became less important over time. During the last months of the war and shortly after it, capturing enemies, collecting evidence about them, and punishing them seemed quite consistent. Undoubtedly, the onset of the Cold War gave American intelligence organizations new functions, new priorities, and new foes. Settling scores with Germans or German collaborators seemed less pressing; in some cases, it even appeared counterproductive.

In the months after the war in Europe ended Allied forces struggled to comprehend the welter of Nazi organizations. Allied intelligence agencies initially scrutinized their German intelligence counterparts for signs of participation in underground organizations, resistance, or sabotage. Assessing threats to the Allied occupation of Germany, they thought first of Nazi fanatics and German intelligence officials. Nazi officials in the concentration camps had obviously committed terrible crimes, but the evidence about the Gestapo was not as striking. The Allies started by trying to find out who had been responsible for what.

NOTES

1 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Argyle E. Mackay
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

SUBJECT: Mykola LEBED

Dear Sir:

inestimable value to this Agency in its operations. In connection with future Agency operations of the first importance, it is urgently necessary that subject be able to travel in Western Europe. Before subject undertakes such travel, however, this Agency must be in a position to assure his reentry into the United States without investigation or incident which would attract undue attention to his activities. Your Service has indicated that it cannot give such assurance because of the fact that subject was convicted in 1936 of complicity in the 1934 Assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior and sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment. Subject's trial by the Polish court was largely influenced by political factors and this Agency has no reason to disbelieve subject's denial of complicity in this assassination. However, the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude raises the question of subject's admissibility to the United States under the Immigration laws. Your Service has indicated that, if the subject reenters the United States on a reentry permit, an investigation must then be conducted. Such investigation

In order to remove the obstacles to the fulfillment of this Agency's projected operations and pursuant to the authority granted under Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, I approve and recommend for your approval, the entrance of this subject into the United States for permanent residence under the above Act because such entry is essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission and is in the interest of national security. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 8 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval. There is attached a memorandum of biographical information and Form I-125 in duplicates.

In line with the suggestion made in your letter of 31 March 1952, it will be appreciated if you will record the subject's admission for permanent residence as of the date of his original entry, 4 October 1949, to coincide with date of entry of his wife and daughter.

In view of the urgency in this case, it would be appreciated if you would give it your expeditious consideration.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
Deputy Director



5 MAY 1952

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DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disbarment Act
E.O. 12958-2/6

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Nazi War Crimes Disbarment Act
E.O. 12958-2/6

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CHAPTER FIVE

Collaborators: Allied Intelligence and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

Newly released Army and CIA records have many thousands of pages on Nazi collaborators during and after World War II. The records are especially rich concerning Allied relationships with Ukrainian nationalist organizations after 1945. This section focuses on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Stephen Bandera and the exile representation of the Ukrainian underground government (ZP/UHVR), which was dominated by Bandera's one-time followers-turned-rivals, including Mykola Lebed. The level of detail in the new records allows a fuller and more accurate picture of their relationships with Allied intelligence over several decades.¹

Background

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929 by western Ukrainians from East Galicia, called for an independent and ethnically homogenous Ukraine. Its prime enemy was Poland, which then controlled the ethnically mixed regions of East Galicia and Volhynia. The OUN assassinated Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934. Among those tried, convicted, and imprisoned for the murder in 1936 were young OUN activists Stephan Bandera and Mykola Lebed. The court sentenced them to death, and the state commuted the sentences to life imprisonment.² The convicted Ukrainians escaped when the Germans invaded Poland in 1939.

The CIA moved to protect Ukrainian nationalist leader Mykola Lebed from criminal investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1952. RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency.

After the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 awarded Eastern Galicia and Volhynia to the USSR, the OUN turned its hopes toward the Germans. In late 1939 the Germans housed OUN leaders in Krakow, then the capital of the German-occupied General Government. In 1940 the OUN split over political strategy. The older wing under Andrei Melnik (OUN/M) aimed to work closely with the Germans while waiting patiently for Ukraine's independence. Bandera's wing (OUN/B) was a militant fascist organization that wanted Ukrainian independence immediately.

After the Germans invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941, Bandera's teams moved into East Galicia. On reaching the East Galician capital city of Lwów on June 30, 1941, his closest deputy Jaroslav Stetsko proclaimed a "sovereign and united" Ukrainian state in the name of Bandera and the OUN/B. Stetsko was to be the new prime minister and Lebed, having trained at a Gestapo center in Zakopane, the new minister for security.³

Determined to exploit Ukraine for themselves, the Germans insisted that Bandera and Stetsko rescind this proclamation. When they refused, they, along with other OUN/B leaders, were arrested. Bandera and Stetsko were held initially in Berlin under house arrest. After January 1942 they were sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp but in comparatively comfortable confinement. Administrative and senior auxiliary police positions in western Ukraine went to Melnik's group.⁴ German security police formations, meanwhile, were ordered to arrest and kill Bandera loyalists in western Ukraine for fear that they would rise against German rule.⁵

After Lebed escaped, he assumed control of the OUN/B in western Ukraine, which now operated underground. Eventually the OUN/B dominated the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a guerrilla force originally formed in 1942 to engage all political and ethnic enemies including Germans and Soviets. Eastern Ukrainians later claimed that the Bandera's group took over the UPA by assassinating the original leaders.⁶ By 1944 the terms "UPA" and "Baderovsty" became interchangeable, though not all UPA fighters came from the OUN/B. The OUN/B relationship with the Germans in western Ukraine was complicated. On the one hand, it fought German rule, and the Gestapo put a price on Lebed's head. On the other, it pursued its own ethnic cleansing policies complementing German aims.

A Banderist proclamation in April 1941 claimed that "Jews in the USSR constitute the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the

vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine."⁷ Stetsko, even while under house arrest in July 1941, said that "I...fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine.... I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine...."⁸ In Lwów, a leaflet warned Jews that, "You welcomed Stalin with flowers [when the Soviets occupied East Galicia in 1939]. We will lay your heads at Hitler's feet."⁹ At a July 6, 1941, meeting in Lwów, Bandera loyalists determined that Jews "have to be treated harshly.... We must finish them off.... Regarding the Jews, we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction."¹⁰ Indeed pogroms in East Galicia in the war's first days killed perhaps 12,000 Jews.¹¹ Back in Berlin, Stetsko reported it all to Bandera.¹²

Nazi authorities mobilized Ukrainians into auxiliary police units, some of which cleared ghettos. Few such auxiliary police belonged to Bandera's group, which operated independently. But Banderist guerrillas in western Ukraine often killed Jews. Historian Yehuda Bauer writes that Banderists "killed all the Jews they could find," surely "many thousands" in all.¹³ Moshe Maltz, a Jew living in hiding in Sokal, heard from a friendly Polish contact "about 40 Jews who were hiding out in the woods near his home ... the Bandera gangs came and murdered them all."¹⁴

When the Soviets reconquered East Galicia in November 1944, there were few Jews there left alive. But Maltz recorded that, "When the Bandera gangs seize a Jew, they consider it a prize catch. The ordinary Ukrainians feel the same way.... they all want to participate in the heroic act of killing a Jew. They literally slash Jews to pieces with their machetes...."¹⁵

When the war turned against the Germans in early 1943, leaders of Bandera's group believed that the Soviets and Germans would exhaust each other, leaving an independent Ukraine as in 1918. Lebed proposed in April to "cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population," so that a resurgent Polish state would not claim the region as in 1918.¹⁶ Ukrainians serving as auxiliary policemen for the Germans now joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Maltz recorded that "Bandera men ... are not discriminating about who they kill; they are gunning down the populations of entire villages.... Since there are hardly any Jews left to kill, the Bandera gangs have turned on the Poles. They are

literally hacking Poles to pieces. Every day ... you can see the bodies of Poles, with wires around their necks, floating down the river Bug.”¹⁷ On a single day, July 11, 1943, the UPA attacked some 80 localities killing perhaps 10,000 Poles.¹⁸

As the Red Army moved into western Ukraine (it liberated Lwów in July 1944) the UPA resisted the Soviet advance with full-scale guerrilla war. Maltz noted that, “Most of the Bandera gangs, men and women, from the villages ... are still hiding out in the woods, armed to the teeth, and hold up Soviet soldiers. The Soviets may be the rulers of the towns, but the Bandera gangs reign supreme in the surrounding countryside, especially at night. The Russians...have their hands full.... Hardly a day passes without a Soviet official being killed....”¹⁹ The Banderists and UPA also resumed cooperation with the Germans. Though the SD was pleased with the intelligence received from the UPA on the Soviets, the Wehrmacht viewed Banderist terror against Polish civilians as counterproductive.²⁰

In July 1944 nationalists in Ukraine formed the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR), which served as an underground Ukrainian government in the Carpathian mountains. The UPA, now operating against the Soviets in smaller groups, was its army. The dominant political party in the UHVR was the Bandera group.²¹ In September 1944 the Germans released Bandera and Stetsko from Sachsenhausen. Berlin hoped to form a Ukrainian National Committee with both OUN factions and other Ukrainian leaders. The Committee was formed in November, but Bandera and Stetsko refused to cooperate. They escaped from Berlin in December and fled south, emerging after the war in Munich.²²

By 1947 some 250,000 Ukrainians were living as displaced persons in Germany, Austria, and Italy, many of them OUN activists or sympathizers.²³ After 1947 UPA fighters began crossing into the U.S. zone, having reached the border on foot through Czechoslovakia. They tended to be Banderist in their sympathies. We cannot describe here the background of most UPA men who reached the U.S. zone.²⁴ But Mykola Ninowskyj’s story, which comes from a 1956 West German arrest report obtained by the CIA, may be typical. Born in 1920, Ninowskyj joined one of the Ukrainian battalions that advanced into East Galicia under German command in 1941. Later in the year he joined the 201st Schutzmannschaft (Auxiliary Police) Battalion, which conducted what he

described as “anti-partisan” operations in Belorussia. Under German direction, many of these battalions murdered Jews. In 1944 he returned to Galicia as a Banderist guerrilla fighter until 1948 when he made his way west as a courier. “I am on the Bandera side,” he told police in 1956.²⁵

In the early postwar years Ukrainian DP camps were hotbeds of nationalist proselytizing. Bandera was determined to assert control over the émigré community. In February 1946 he formed the Foreign Section OUN (ZCh/OUN), an exile branch of the Bandera group, in which he maintained “a firm line on all questions, political education, ideological and political unity, and discipline of the membership.”²⁶ Bandera intended to create a dictatorship in exile, which he would then transfer to a liberated Ukraine. According to U.S. Army CIC observers, the Foreign Section OUN routinely used intimidation and even terror against political enemies. CIC reports listed Bandera as “extremely dangerous” because he was willing to use violence against Ukrainian rivals in Germany.²⁷

In July 1944, before the Soviets took Lwów, the UHVR sent a delegation of its senior officials to establish contact with the Vatican and Western governments. The delegation was known as the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (ZP/UHVR). It included Father Ivan Hrinioch as president of the ZP/UHVR; Mykola Lebed as its Foreign Minister; and Yuri Lopatinski as the UPA delegate. Hrinioch was a Ukrainian Catholic priest and nationalist, who was in Krakow with Bandera and Lebed in 1940. He served as liaison between Archbishop Andrei Shepstitski of Lwów and Bishop Ivan Buczko, the Uniate Church’s representative at the Vatican. When the Germans invaded East Galicia, Hrinioch also had a relationship with Fritz Arlt, a “Jewish expert” in the SD, who worked under General Governor Hans Frank in 1940 and was charged with contacting Soviet émigrés to serve as German-allied volunteers during the invasion in 1941.²⁸ Until 1948, all three envoys were members of the OUN/B party and loyal to Bandera.

In its initial manifesto of July 1944, the UHVR had called for unity of “all leading political elements, irrespective of their ideological convictions or political affiliation, who uphold the political sovereignty of the Ukrainian state [and] a popular democratic mode of determining the political system....”²⁹ If nothing else, western Ukrainians learned during the war that they would have to appeal

to eastern Ukrainians, from whom they had been separated by geography and religion for centuries. The UHVR later rejected “attempts by western Ukrainian chauvinists, including Stephen Bandera, to erect a Ukrainian state on a narrowly religious, mono-party, totalitarian basis, since the Eastern Ukrainian nationalists find such a political philosophy unacceptable.”³⁰

A feud erupted in 1947 between Bandera and Stetsko on the one hand, and Hrinioch and Lebed on the other. Bandera and Stetsko insisted on an independent Ukraine under a single party led by one man, Bandera. Hrynioch and Lebed declared that the people in the homeland, not Bandera, created the UHVR, and that they would never accept Bandera as dictator.

At an August 1948 Congress of the OUN Foreign Section, Bandera expelled the Hrinioch-Lebed group from the party and ordered his own followers in their organization to resign. Bandera still controlled 80 percent of the party and claimed exclusive authority to direct the Ukrainian national movement at home and in the emigration. He also continued terror tactics against anti-Banderist Ukrainian leaders in Western Europe and maneuvered for control of Ukrainian émigré organizations. U.S. intelligence officials estimated that up to 80 percent of all Ukrainian DPs from Eastern Galicia were loyal to Bandera. But Lebed, Hrinioch, and Lopatinky remained the official UHVR representation abroad.³¹

By this time, the split was no longer just an issue for Ukrainian émigrés. Owing to the Berlin Blockade, the Cold War between the western Allies and the USSR threatened to erupt into fighting, and Allied intelligence organizations, which were interested in Ukrainian contacts, had to choose sides.

Allied Intelligence and Stephen Bandera

The CIC first became interested in Stephen Bandera in September 1945. As UPA guerrillas made their way by foot into the U.S. Zone of Germany, the CIC interrogated them as to the military situation in western Ukraine, the makeup of UPA units, their contacts in the U.S. zone, and their connection with Bandera himself.³² In 1947 the flow of UPA fighters increased owing to Operation Vistula, a Polish army effort to destroy the UPA in southeastern Poland, and more information became available.

The guerrillas said that most UPA fighters were “ordinary” Banderists, but others also listed Slovak Hlinka Guards, Ukrainian SS from the 14th Grenadier Waffen-SS (Galicia) Division, and “escaped German SS men” as those among the UPA forces. Most UPA fighters recognized Bandera as their leader.³³ UPA refugees also viewed themselves as refitting rather than quitting. One source said in September 1947 that Banderists were recruiting more members in DP camps, their main recruiter being Anton Eichner, a former SS officer.³⁴ Other interrogations revealed that, “the UPA foresees an end to communism within the very near future... Once the war comes... they hope to... fight either as front shock troops or gain in their old capacity, as guerilla fighters behind the Russian lines....”³⁵

By August 1947 Banderists were represented in every Ukrainian DP camp in the U.S. zone as well as in the British and French zones. They had a sophisticated courier system reaching into the Ukraine. The CIC termed Bandera himself, then in Munich, as “extremely dangerous.” He was “constantly en route, frequently in disguise,” with bodyguards ready to “do away with any person who may be dangerous to [Bandera] or his party.” UPA fighters said that Bandera was “looked upon as the spiritual and national hero of all Ukrainians....”³⁶

Banderists represented themselves as fighting a “heroic Ukrainian resistance against the Nazis and the Communists” which had been “misrepresented and maligned” by “Moscow propaganda.” Bandera, they never tired of saying, had been arrested by the Nazis and held in Sachsenhausen. Now he and his movement fought “not only for the Ukraine, but also for all of Europe.”³⁷ As for Banderist activities before and during the war, U.S. intelligence officials seemed to understand little beyond Bandera’s implication in the Pierecki assassination. They understood nothing of the Banderist role in ethnic cleansing during the war.

CIC agents also used UPA informants to ferret out Soviet spies from Ukrainian DP camps who slipped into Germany with UPA partisans. The Soviets had penetrated the UPA bands that made their way west.³⁸ Yuri Lopatinski travelled to the Ukrainian camp in Deggendorf in October 1947 to find Soviet agents.³⁹ UPA members could also provide intelligence on the Soviets since, according to UPA officers, they had “done a fairly thorough job

of penetrating MVD and Polish intelligence units.”⁴⁰ “Don’t you think,” said one CIC memo, “that this is a H[ell] of a good opportunity to recruit some high class informants?”⁴¹

In November 1947 the Soviet military authorities in Berlin insisted that UPA members in the U.S. zone be handed over. “Almost all of them, said Lt. Col. Igor Bantsyrev (the Chief Soviet Repatriation Representative), “are Soviet citizens who participated in the war ... against the Allied nations on the side of the German fascist Army.”⁴² CIC officers recommended against it. Extradition of the UPA partisans, said one, could “destroy for years the confidence all anti-Bolshevist forces have in the USA.”⁴³

The Soviets learned that Bandera was in the U.S. zone and demanded his arrest. A covert Soviet team even entered the U.S. zone in June 1946 to kidnap Bandera.⁴⁴ The Strategic Services Unit, the postwar successor to the OSS and predecessor to the CIA, did not know about the Soviet team. Nonetheless, they feared the “serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from open US connivance in the unhampered continuance of [Bandera’s] anti-Soviet activities on German soil.”⁴⁵ Since Bandera himself was not trustworthy, they were just as pleased to get rid of him.

Despite “an extensive and aggressive search” in mid-1947 that included regular weekly updates, CIC officials could not locate Bandera.⁴⁶ Few photos of him existed. One CIC agent complained that Bandera’s agents in Germany “have been instructed to disseminate false information concerning the personal description of Bandera.”⁴⁷ Bandera’s agents misled CIC as to his location as well. “Aware of our desire to locate Bandera,” read one report, “[they] deliberately attempt to ‘throw us off the track’ by giving out false leads.”⁴⁸ CIC suspended the search. Zsolt Aradi, a Hungarian-born journalist with high Vatican contacts and the chief contact at the Vatican for the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), warned that Bandera’s handover to the Soviets would destroy any relationship with the UHVR, which at the time was headed by Banderist members, and with Ukrainian clerics at the Vatican like Buczko, who were sympathetic to Bandera.⁴⁹

The CIA never considered entering into an alliance with Bandera to procure intelligence from Ukraine. “By nature,” read a CIA report, “[Bandera] is a political intransigent of great personal ambition, who [has] since April 1948,

opposed all political organizations in the emigration which favor a representative form of government in the Ukraine as opposed to a mono-party, OUN/Bandera regime.” Worse, his intelligence operatives in Germany were dishonest and not secure.⁵⁰ Debriefings of couriers from western Ukraine in 1948 confirmed that, “the thinking of Stephan Bandera and his immediate émigré supporters [has] become radically outmoded in the Ukraine.” Bandera was also a convicted assassin. By now, word had reached the CIA of Bandera’s fratricidal struggles with other Ukrainian groups during the war and in the emigration. By 1951 Bandera turned vocally anti-American as well, since the US did not advocate an independent Ukraine.⁵¹ The CIA had an agent within the Bandera group in 1951 mostly to keep an eye on Bandera.⁵²

British Intelligence (MI6), however, was interested in Bandera. MI6 first contacted Bandera through Gerhard von Mende in April 1948. An ethnic German from Riga, von Mende served in Alfred Rosenberg’s Ostministerium during the war as head of the section for the Caucasus and Turkestan section, recruiting Soviet Muslims from central Asia for use against the USSR. In this capacity he was kept personally informed of UPA actions and capabilities.⁵³ Nothing came of initial British contacts with Bandera because, as the CIA learned later, “the political, financial, and tech requirements of the [Ukrainians] were higher than the British cared to meet.” But by 1949 MI6 began helping Bandera send his own agents into western Ukraine via airdrop. In 1950 MI6 began training these agents on the expectation that they could provide intelligence from western Ukraine.⁵⁴

CIA and State Department officials flatly opposed the use of Bandera. By 1950 the CIA was working with the Hrinioch-Lebed group, and had begun to run its own agents into western Ukraine to make contact with the UHVR. Bandera no longer had the UHVR’s support or even that of the OUN party leadership in Ukraine. Bandera’s agents also deliberately worked against Ukrainian agents used by the CIA. In April 1951 CIA officials tried to convince MI6 to pull support from Bandera. MI6 refused. They thought that Bandera could run his agents without British support, and MI6 were “seeking progressively to assume control of Bandera’s lines.”⁵⁵ The British also thought that the CIA underestimated Bandera’s importance. “Bandera’s name,” they said, “still carried considerable weight in the Ukraine and ... the UPA would look to him first and foremost.”⁵⁶

Moreover, MI6 argued, Bandera's group was "the strongest Ukrainian organization abroad, is deemed competent to train party cadres, [and] build a morally and politically healthy organization...."⁵⁷

British officials considered "the possibility and desirability of engaging in clandestine operations in the Soviet Union other than those of a purely intelligence-gathering character."⁵⁸ But the CIA and State Department officials were "very strongly opposed" to London's idea of returning Bandera to the Ukraine. Bandera, the Americans said, had "lost touch with feelings in the Ukraine, particularly in the former Polish territories where... the Soviet government had been successful to a remarkable degree in transforming the mentality of the younger generation."⁵⁹ For the CIA, the best solution for intelligence in the Ukraine was the "political neutralization of Bandera as an individual...."⁶⁰ The British argued that such "would lead to a drying up of recruits" and "would disrupt British operations...."⁶¹ MI6 disregarded the CIA statement that "Bandera...is politically unacceptable to the US Government."

British operations through Bandera expanded. An early 1954 MI6 summary noted that, "the operational aspect of this [British] collaboration [with Bandera] was developing satisfactorily. Gradually a more complete control was obtained over infiltration operations and although the intelligence dividend was low it was considered worthwhile to proceed...."⁶² Bandera was, according to his handlers, "a professional underground worker with a terrorist background and ruthless notions about the rules of the game.... A bandit type if you like, with a burning patriotism, which provides an ethical background and a justification for his banditry. No better and no worse than others of his kind...."⁶³

From inside the Ukraine, the UHVR rejected Bandera's authoritarian approach and demanded unity in the emigration. In messages brought from the Ukraine by CIA agents, UHVR insisted in the summer of 1953 that Lebed represented "the entire Ukrainian liberation movement in the homeland."⁶⁴ American and British officials tried to reconcile Bandera to Lebed's leadership, but Bandera and Stetsko refused. In February 1954 London had enough. "There appeared," reported Bandera's handlers, "to be no alternative but to break with Bandera in order to safeguard the healthy ZCh/OUN elements remaining and be able to continue using them operationally.... The break between us was complete." MI6 dropped all agents-in-training still loyal to Bandera.⁶⁵ In July MI6 informed Lebed that it

"would not resume [its] relationship with Bandera under any circumstances." MI6 maintained its four wireless links in Ukraine, now run by a reconstituted ZCh/OUN, and shared intelligence from the links with Lebed and the CIA.⁶⁶ The degree to which MI6's links into Ukraine were compromised all along owing to the insecurity of Bandera's lines is not clear.⁶⁷

Bandera remained in Munich. He had two British-trained radio operators, and he continued to recruit agents on his own. He published a newspaper that spewed anti-American rhetoric and used loyal thugs to attack other Ukrainian émigré newspapers and to terrorize political opponents in the Ukrainian emigration. He attempted to penetrate U.S. military and intelligence offices in Europe and to intimidate Ukrainians working for the United States. He continued to run agents into the Ukraine, financing them with counterfeit U.S. money. By 1957 the CIA and MI6 concluded that all former Bandera agents in Ukraine were under Soviet control.⁶⁸ The question was what to do. U.S. and British intelligence officials lamented that "despite our unanimous desire to 'quiet' Bandera, precautions must be taken to see that the Soviets are not allowed to kidnap or kill him ... under no circumstances must Bandera be allowed to become a martyr."⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Bandera searched for new sponsors. For a brief time in early 1956, Italian Military Intelligence (SIFAR) sponsored him, surely not understanding that his lines were compromised.⁷⁰ The BND, the West German intelligence service under former Wehrmacht Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, formed a new relationship with Bandera. It was a natural union. During the war, Gehlen's senior officers argued that the USSR could be broken up if only Germany wooed the various nationalities properly. Bandera had continued lines into the Ukraine, and in March 1956 he offered these in return for money and weapons.⁷¹ The CIA warned the West Germans that "against any [operative] relationship with Bandera," noting that, "we [are] convinced [that] all alleged Bandera assets in CSR, Poland, and Ukraine [are] non-existent or non-effective. We also note rapidity and thoroughness of [Soviet] rollups [of] his past ops indicate weak OUN/B security."⁷²

The Bavarian state government and Munich police wanted to crack down on Bandera's organization for crimes ranging from counterfeiting to kidnapping. Von Mende, now a West German government official, protected him. Bandera gave von Mende political reports, which von Mende relayed to the West German

Foreign Office. Von Mende routinely intervened with the Bavarian government on Bandera's behalf for residency permits and the like, and now intervened with the Bavarian authorities for "false passports and other documentation."⁷³ The exact results of von Mende's help are not clear, but Bandera was left alone.

In April 1959 Bandera again asked West German intelligence for support and this time Gehlen was interested. The CIA noted that, "It [is] apparent that Bandera [is] seeking support for illegal ops into Ukraine." The West Germans agreed to support at least one such mission based on the "fact [that] Bandera and group no longer the cut throats they were" and because Bandera "supplied proof [of] existing contact with inside assets." A team trained and funded by the BND crossed from Czechoslovakia in late July, and the BND promised Bandera support for future operations if this one were to be even "moderately successful."⁷⁴

Bandera's personal contact in West German intelligence was Heinz Danko Herre, Gehlen's old deputy in Fremde Heere Ost who had worked with the Gen. Andrei Vlassov's army of Russian émigrés and former prisoners in the last days of the war and was now Gehlen's closest adviser.⁷⁵ CIA officials in Munich repeated the usual warnings. Herre was not dissuaded. "Bandera," Herre said, "has been known to us for about 20 years [!].... Within and without Germany he has over half a million followers." Herre, reported the CIA base in Munich is aware of Bandera's earlier reputation [but] is aware that nothing has happened, during the period of [BND's] association, indicating that Bandera still is using his earlier rough tactics.... [Herre] also feels that, in principle, Bandera has more to offer operationally than most if not all other Russian (sic) émigré groups in the West today.⁷⁶

Herre admitted that West German use of Bandera was a "closely held" secret even within the BND and that the relationship was "not cleared with Bonn due to political overtones."⁷⁷ By September Herre reported that the BND was getting "good [foreign intelligence] reports on the Soviet Ukraine" as a result of their operations.⁷⁸ He offered to keep CIA fully informed as to Bandera's activities in return for a favor. Bandera had been trying to obtain a U.S. visa since 1955 in order to meet with Ukrainian supporters in the United States and to meet with State Department and CIA officials. Herre thought that a visa procured with West German help would improve his own relationship with Bandera. CIA officials in Munich actually recommended the visa in October 1959.⁷⁹

But on October 15, 1959, only 10 days after the CIA Munich base made the request, a KGB assassin named Bogdan Stashinskiy murdered Bandera with a special gun that sprayed cyanide dust into the victim's face. The Soviets, who had penetrated Bandera's organization and the BND years before, evidently decided that they could not live with another alliance between German intelligence officers and Ukrainian fanatics. Stashinskiy received the Order of the Red Banner for the job.⁸⁰

U.S. Consul General in Munich Edward Page noted that "assassinations are nothing new in the Ukrainian nationalist movement." Though Bandera's death was demoralizing in the sense that the Soviets managed it under the noses of Bandera's bodyguards, Page noted that "many émigré figures do not personally lament his passing," given Bandera's strong-arm tactics with his political rivals in the Ukrainian emigration, particularly those leaning toward democratic institutions.⁸¹ Bandera's faction continued to exist but was thoroughly penetrated by the KGB even at the highest levels.⁸² Regardless, Herre maintained contact with Bandera's deputies in West Germany until 1961.⁸³

The United States and Mykola Lebed

Mykola Lebed's relationship with the CIA lasted the entire length of the Cold War. While most CIA operations involving wartime perpetrators backfired, Lebed's operations augmented the fundamental instability of the Soviet Union.

Attempts to build a relationship in 1945 and 1946 between the SSU and the Hrinioch-Lebed group never materialized owing to its initial mistrust.⁸⁴ In December 1946 Hrinioch and Lopatinsky asked for U.S. help for operations in the Ukraine ranging from communications to agent training to money and weapons. In return, they would create intelligence networks in the Ukraine. Zsolt Aradi, the SSU's contact in the Vatican, approved the relationship. He noted that the "UHVR, UPA, and OUN-Bandera are the only large and efficient organizations among Ukrainians," and that Hrinioch, Lebed and Lopatinsky were "determined and able men.... resolved to carry on...with or without us, and if necessary against us."⁸⁵ The SSU declined. A later report blamed the Ukrainians for "ineptitude in arguing their case and factionalism among the emigration."⁸⁶

A CIC report from July 1947 cited sources that called Lebed a “well-known sadist and collaborator of the Germans.”⁸⁷ Regardless, the CIC in Rome took up Lebed’s offer whereby Lebed provided information on Ukrainian émigré groups, Soviet activities in the U.S. zone, and information on the Soviets and Ukrainians more generally. In Munich, Hrinioch became a CIC informant as well. In November 1947 Hrinioch requested on behalf of Bandera himself that the U.S. authorities move Lebed from Rome to Munich to protect him from Soviet extradition requests when American military government in Italy ended the following month. CIC in Munich was gaining Hrinioch’s confidence and hoped to set up a meeting with Bandera himself.⁸⁸ The Army moved Lebed and his family to Munich in December. In the meantime, Lebed sanitized his wartime record and that of the Bandera group and UPA with a 126-page book on the latter which emphasized their fight against the Germans and Soviets.⁸⁹

The Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the threat of a European war prompted the CIA to scrutinize Soviet émigré groups and the degree to which they could provide crucial intelligence. In Project ICON, the CIA studied 30 groups and recommended operational cooperation with the Hrinioch-Lebed group as the organization best suited for clandestine work. Compared with Bandera, Hrinioch and Lebed represented a moderate, stable, and operationally secure group with the firmest connections to the Ukrainian underground in the USSR. A resistance/intelligence group behind Soviet lines would be useful if war broke out. The CIA provided money, supplies, training, facilities for radio broadcasts, and parachute drops of trained agents to augment slower courier routes through Czechoslovakia used by UPA fighters and messengers.⁹⁰ As Lebed put it later, “the ... drop operations were the first real indication ... that American Intelligence was willing to give active support to establishing lines of communication into the Ukraine.”⁹¹

CIA operations with these Ukrainians began in 1948 under the cryptonym CARTEL, soon changed to AERODYNAMIC. Hrinioch stayed in Munich, but Lebed relocated to New York and acquired permanent resident status, then U.S. citizenship. It kept him safe from assassination, allowed him to speak to Ukrainian émigré groups, and permitted him to return to the United States after operational trips to Europe. His identification in New York by other Ukrainians as a leader responsible for “wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Poles and Jewish (sic),” has been discussed elsewhere.⁹²

Once in the United States, Lebed was the CIA’s chief contact for AERODYNAMIC. CIA handlers pointed to his “cunning character,” his “relations with the Gestapo and ... Gestapo training,” that the fact that he was “a very ruthless operator.”⁹³ “Neither party,” said one CIA official while comparing Bandera and Lebed, “is lily-white.”⁹⁴ Like Bandera, Lebed was also constantly irritated that the United States never promoted the USSR’s fragmentation along national lines; that the United States worked with imperial-minded Russian émigré groups as well as Ukrainian ones; and that the United States later followed a policy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviets.

On the other hand, Lebed had no personal political aspirations. He was unpopular among many Ukrainian émigrés owing to his brutal takeover of the UPA during the war—a takeover that included the assassination of rivals.⁹⁵ He was absolutely secure. To prevent Soviet penetration, he allowed no one in his inner circle who arrived in the West after 1945. He was said to have a first-rate operational mind, and by 1948 he was, according to Dulles, “of inestimable value to this Agency and its operations.”⁹⁶ The CIA’s AERODYNAMIC files contain tremendous operational detail on AERODYNAMIC, most of which cannot be recounted here.

AERODYNAMIC’s first phase involved infiltration into Ukraine and then exfiltration of CIA-trained Ukrainian agents. By January 1950 the CIA’s arm for the collection of secret intelligence (Office of Special Operations, OSO) and its arm for covert operations (Office of Policy Coordination, OPC) participated. Operations in that year revealed “a well established and secure underground movement” in the Ukraine that was even “larger and more fully developed than previous reports had indicated.” Washington was especially pleased with the high level of UPA training in the Ukraine and its potential for further guerrilla actions, and with “the extraordinary news that ... active resistance to the Soviet regime was spreading steadily eastward, out of the former Polish, Greek Catholic provinces.”⁹⁷

The CIA decided to expand its operations for “the support, development, and exploitation of the Ukrainian underground movement for resistance and intelligence purposes.” “In view of the extent and activity of the resistance movement in the Ukraine,” said OPC Chief Frank Wisner, “we consider this to be a top priority project.”⁹⁸ The CIA learned of UPA activities in various Ukrainian districts; the Soviet commitment of police troops to destroy the UPA; the UPA’s

resonance with Ukrainians; and the UPA's potential to expand to 100,000 fighters in wartime. The work was not without hazards. Individual members of teams from 1949 to 1953 were captured and killed. By 1954 Lebed's group lost all contact with UHVR. By that time the Soviets subdued both the UHVR and UPA, and the CIA ended the aggressive phase of AERODYNAMIC.⁹⁹

Beginning in 1953 AERODYNAMIC began to operate through a Ukrainian study group under Lebed's leadership in New York under CIA auspices, which collected Ukrainian literature and history and produced Ukrainian nationalist newspapers, bulletins, radio programming, and books for distribution in the Ukraine. In 1956 this group was formally incorporated as the non-profit Prolog Research and Publishing Association. It allowed the CIA to funnel funds as ostensible private donations without taxable footprints.¹⁰⁰ To avoid nose-y New York State authorities, the CIA turned Prolog into a for-profit enterprise called Prolog Research Corporation, which ostensibly received private contracts. Under Hrinioch, Prolog maintained a Munich office named the *Ukrainische-Gesellschaft für Auslandsstudien, EV*. Most publications were created here.¹⁰¹ The Hrinioch-Lebed organization still existed, but its activities ran entirely through Prolog.¹⁰²

Prolog recruited and paid Ukrainian émigré writers who were generally unaware that they worked in a CIA-controlled operation. Only the six top members of the ZP/UHVR were witting agents. Beginning in 1955, leaflets were dropped over the Ukraine by air and radio broadcasts titled *Nova Ukraina* were aired in Athens for Ukrainian consumption. These activities gave way to systematic mailing campaigns to Ukraine through Ukrainian contacts in Poland and émigré contacts in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Spain, Sweden, and elsewhere. The newspaper *Suchasna Ukraina* (Ukraine Today), *information bulletins*, a Ukrainian language journal for intellectuals called *Suchasnist* (The Present), and other publications were sent to libraries, cultural institutions, administrative offices and private individuals in Ukraine. These activities encouraged Ukrainian nationalism, strengthened Ukrainian resistance, and provided an alternative to Soviet media.¹⁰³

In 1957 alone, with CIA support, Prolog broadcast 1,200 radio programs totaling 70 hours per month and distributed 200,000 newspapers and 5,000 pamphlets. In the years following, Prolog distributed books by nationalist

Ukrainian writers and poets. One CIA analyst judged that, "some form of nationalist feeling continues to exist [in the Ukraine] and ... there is an obligation to support it as a cold war weapon." The distribution of literature in the Soviet Ukraine continued to the end of the Cold War.¹⁰⁴

Prolog also garnered intelligence after Soviet travel restrictions eased somewhat in the late 1950s. It supported the travel of émigré Ukrainian students and scholars to academic conferences, international youth festivals, musical and dance performances, the Rome Olympics and the like, where they could speak with residents of the Soviet Ukraine in order to learn about living conditions there as well as the mood of Ukrainians toward the Soviet regime. Prolog's leaders and agents debriefed travelers on their return and shared information with the CIA. In 1966 alone Prolog personnel had contacts with 227 Soviet citizens. Beginning in 1960 Prolog also employed a CIA-trained Ukrainian spotter named Anatol Kaminsky. He created a net of informants in Europe and the United States made up of Ukrainian émigrés and other Europeans travelling to Ukraine who spoke with Soviet Ukrainians in the USSR or with Soviet Ukrainians travelling in the West. By 1966 Kaminsky was Prolog's chief operations officer, while Lebed provided overall management.

In this guise, AERODYNAMIC was one of the most effective CIA operations in approaching disaffected Soviet citizens. In the 1960s Prolog's leaders provided reports on Ukrainian politics, dissident Ukrainian poets, individuals connected with the KGB as well as identities of KGB officers, Soviet missiles and aircraft in western Ukraine, and a host of other topics. Official Soviet attacks on the ZP/UHVR as Banderists, German collaborators, American agents, and the like were evidence of Prolog's effectiveness, as were Soviet crackdowns on Ukrainian writers and other dissidents in the mid to late 1960s. By that time Prolog influenced a new Ukrainian generation. By 1969 Ukrainians traveling from the USSR were instructed by dissidents there to take informational materials on Soviet repression in Ukraine only to ZP/UHVR personnel. Travelers to Ukraine even reported seeing ZP/UHVR literature in private homes. Prolog had become in the words of one senior CIA official, the sole "vehicle for CIA's operations directed at the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and [its] forty million Ukrainian citizens."¹⁰⁵

Lebed overtly distanced himself and the Ukrainian national movement from the overt anti-Semitism of his Banderist days. In 1964 he publicly condemned in the name of the ZP/UHVR the appearance of *Judaism without Embellishment*, published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. The book was typical of the anti-Semitic diatribes of the early 20th century with the exception that it actually linked Jews with the Nazis in the attack on the USSR. The book signaled growing Soviet repression of dissident Jews, including the closing of synagogues and prohibitions on Passover Matzoh.¹⁰⁶ Lebed actually saw the book as a Soviet attempt to paint Ukrainians with a broad anti-Semitic brush. More to protect the name of Ukrainian nationalism, he publicly condemned the “provocative libel” and “slandorous statements” against Jews, adding in a particularly forgetful note that, “the Ukrainian people...are opposed to all and any preaching of hatred for other people.”¹⁰⁷ Ironically, the CIA had Prolog translate sections of the book into French for distribution to left-wing groups in Europe who had been sympathetic to the Soviets. Former Banderists, in other words, now attacked the Soviets for anti-Semitism rather than with it.¹⁰⁸

Lebed retired in 1975 but remained an adviser and consultant to Prolog and the ZP/UHVR. Roman Kupchinsky, a Ukrainian journalist who was a one-year-old when the war ended, became Prolog’s chief in 1978. In the 1980s AERODYNAMIC’s name was changed to QRDYNAMIC and in the 1980s PDDYNAMIC and then QRPLUMB. In 1977 President Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski helped to expand the program owing to what he called its “impressive dividends” and the “impact on specific audiences in the target area.”¹⁰⁹ In the 1980s Prolog expanded its operations to reach other Soviet nationalities, and in a supreme irony, these included dissident Soviet Jews.¹¹⁰ With the USSR teetering on the brink of collapse in 1990, QRPLUMB was terminated with a final payout of \$1.75 million. Prolog could continue its activities, but it was on its own financially.¹¹¹

In June 1985 the General Accounting Office mentioned Lebed’s name in a public report on Nazis and collaborators who settled in the United States with help from U.S. intelligence agencies. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in the Department of Justice began investigating Lebed that year. The CIA worried that public scrutiny of Lebed would compromise QRPLUMB and that failure to protect Lebed would trigger outrage in the Ukrainian émigré community. It thus

shielded Lebed by denying any connection between Lebed and the Nazis and by arguing that he was a Ukrainian freedom fighter. The truth, of course, was more complicated. As late as 1991 the CIA tried to dissuade OSI from approaching the German, Polish, and Soviet governments for war-related records related to the OUN. OSI eventually gave up the case, unable to procure definitive documents on Lebed. Mykola Lebed, Bandera’s wartime chief in Ukraine, died in 1998. He is buried in New Jersey, and his papers are located at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University.

NOTES

- 1 On Allied relationships with the OUN/B see Stephen Dorril, *MI6*, pp. 222–48; Jeffrey Burds, *The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948*, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies No. 1505 (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2001). On cleavages in the Ukrainian emigration see Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2002). On the OUN’s legacy on Ukrainian memory, see David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (New York: Central European University Press, 2007).
- 2 [Redacted] Report on the assassination of Minister Pieracki, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, Mykola Lebed Name File, v. 1.
- 3 On Lebed’s post SSU Operational Memorandum No. MGH-391 on Operation Belladonna, December 27, 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1. Lebed only privately admitted years later having trained at Zakopane in 1940. See RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, Mykola Lebed Name File, v. 3.
- 4 Frank Golczewski, “Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*, ed., Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. 133, 136.
- 5 See the Einsatzgruppe C order of November 1941 printed in *Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), p. 175.
- 6 See the “The Ukrainian Element,” undated, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 58, QRPLUMB, v. 1, n.1.
- 7 Quoted Tadeusz Piotrowski, *Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign against Poles During World War II* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2000), p. 177.
- 8 Quoted in Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude Toward Germans and Jews: Jaroslav Steśko’s 1941 *Zhyttiepys*,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, v. 23, n. 3–4, p. 152.
- 9 Quoted Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “Organization,” p. 154.
- 10 Quoted Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “Organization,” p. 154.

- 11 Figure in Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich, 1997), p. 67.
- 12 Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "Organization," p. 154.
- 13 Yehuda Bauer, *The Death of the Shtetl* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 99.
- 14 Moshe Maltz, *Years of Horror–Glimpse of Hope: The Diary of a Family in Hiding* (New York: Shengold, 1993) [hereafter Maltz Diary], December 1943, p. 109.
- 15 Maltz Diary, November 1944, p. 147.
- 16 Quoted in Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569–1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 165.
- 17 Maltz Diary, November 1943, p. 107.
- 18 Timothy Snyder, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and For All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, v. 1, n. 2 (1999): 99.
- 19 Maltz Diary, November 1944, p. 147.
- 20 See the document excerpts printed in Piotrowsky, *Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn*, p. 211–13.
- 21 On the relationship between the UHVR, the OUN/B and the UPA in 1946, see the SSU Operational Memorandum No. MGH-391 on Operation Belladonna, December 27, 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 22 SR/W2 to SR/WC, SR/DC, EE/SSS, January 13, 1952, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 1. Also see Stetsko's accounts in NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, Name File Yaroslav Stetsko, v. 1, 2.
- 23 Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, pp. 92, 96.
- 24 Rough data is in NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity, Czechoslovakia, v. 2.
- 25 For this and other interrogations see NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 13.
- 26 Quoted Myroslav Yurkovich, "Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics," 1945–50, in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed., Wsevolod W. Isajiz, et. al., (Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), p. 135.
- 27 Special Agent Fred A. Stelling, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, August 1, 1947, TS Organization of Banderist Movement, RG 319, IRR Bandera, Stephan, D 184850.
- 28 AC, MOB to Chief, FBM, MGM-A-1148, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 57, Ivan Hrinioch Name File.
- 29 "Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council," July 15, 1944, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 58, QRPLUMB, v. 1, n. 2.
- 30 "Summary – Joint OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, December 12, 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 31 Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, Project ICON, MGM-A-793, October 20, 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1; SR/W2 to SR/WC, May 22, 1952, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, Aerodynamic, v. 10, f. 2. Background of ZPUHVR-ZChOUN Relations, undated, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2. See also the summary of the break in "The Ukrainian Element," undated, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 58, QRPLUMB, v. 1, n. 1.
- 32 EEIs for Interrogation of UPA Refugees, September 11, 1945, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 33 See partial reports designated as follows: Preliminary Reports I and Informant Report 35520 [undated], NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425. See also Special Agent M.L. Boraczek to Commanding Officer, 970th CIC Detachment, Region V, September 29, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity, Czechoslovakia, v. 2, D 190425. See also Special Agent William E. Larned, VI-4464.1, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 34 Special Agent William E. Larned, VI-4464.1, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 35 Special Agent Eugene J. Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, UPA Activities, Interrogation of Four UPA Officers, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 36 Special Agent Fred A. Stelling, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, August 1, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Organization of Banderist Movement, D 184850; Special Agent Eugene J. Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, UPA Activities, Interrogation of Four UPA Officers, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 37 Undated Ukrainian statements, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity Czechoslovakia, v. 2, D 190425.
- 38 Lt. Col. John L. Inskeep to Commanding Officer, 430th CIC Detachment, September 26, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425, v. 1; Special Agent Eugene J. Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, UPA Activities, Interrogation of Four UPA Officers, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425, v. 1; Special Agent William E. Larned, VI-4506.2, September 22, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425; Special Agent Fred A. Stelling, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, August 1, 1947, RG 319, IRR TS Organization of Banderist Movement, D 184850.
- 39 Special Agent Daniel Osadchuk, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, IV-2633, October 31, 1947, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity Czechoslovakia, v. 2, D 190425.
- 40 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, UPA Activities, Interrogation of Four UPA Officers, September 14, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425, v. 1.
- 41 Brand telegram, November 25, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity Czechoslovakia, v. 2, D 190425.
- 42 Bantsyrev to Brig. Gen T. L. Harrold, Director Civil Affairs, HQ EUCOM, No. 143, November 22, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity Czechoslovakia, v. 2, D 190425.
- 43 Counterintelligence Report No. Z-70, September 16, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR TS Banderist Activity CSR, v. 1, D 190425.
- 44 Burds, *The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine*, p. 12. This report does not follow Burds's conclusion that CIC hid Bandera from the Soviets.
- 45 AB-51, Amzon to AB-43, Munich, FSRO-656, October 28, 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 1.
- 46 Bandera, Stephan A., June 4, 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 1; XII Bandera, Stefan Andrejevich, Memo of July 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR Bandera Movement, v. E, D 137656.
- 47 Special Agent Vadjia V. Kolombatovic, III-M-943, May 6, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR Bandera Movement, v. E, D 137656.
- 48 Maj. Earl S. Browning, to Commanding Officer, CIC Region I, May 1, 1947, NARA, RG 319, IRR Bandera Movement, v. E, D 137656.
- 49 On early contacts with the UHVR, see Operational Memorandum, Operation Belladonna, No. MGH-391, December 27, 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 50 Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief FBM, MGM-A-793, October 28, 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.
- 51 SR/W2 to SR/WC, SR/DC, EE/SSS, January 13, 1952, NARA, RG 663, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 1.

52 CIA/State Department-SIS/Foreign Office Talks On Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

53 See the report of November 1944 printed in Piotrowsky, *Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn*, p. 213.

54 This information comes from the notebook of Hermann Baun, a former Abwehr officer whose war-time operations were aimed at the USSR. After the war he became a section chief in the Gehlen Organization but fell out of favor. He was continually interested using ethnic groups in the Soviet Union to weaken it. See MGLA-11061, March 27, 1952, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, Jaroslav Stetsko Name File, v. 1.

55 CIA/State Department – SIS/Foreign Office Talks of Operations Against the USSR, Exchange of Operational Data, Restricted Annex to Minutes of Session IV, April 24, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

56 CIA/State Department – SIS/Foreign Office Talks On Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

57 Ukrainian Resistance: SIS Comment on CIA Intelligence Appreciation, April 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

58 CIA/State Department – SIS/Foreign Office Talks On Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

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60 CIA/State Department – SIS/Foreign Office Talks On Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

61 CIA/State Department-SIS/Foreign Office Talks On Operations Against the USSR, April 23, 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 2.

62 “Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Crisis over Bandera,” Attached to EGQA-37253, March 12, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2.

63 “Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Crisis over Bandera,” Attached to EGQA-37253, March 12, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2.

64 Quoted in “Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Crisis over Bandera,” Attached to EGQA-37253, March 12, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2.

65 “Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Crisis over Bandera,” Attached to EGQA-37253, March 12, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2. For the entire effort at reconciliation, see the contents of this entire folder. On Bishop Ivan Buczko’s threats to excommunicate Hrinioch, see SR/3 W-2 to Chief, SR/3, July 27, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 11, f. 1.

66 SR/3 W-2 to Chief, SR/3, July 27, 1954, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 11, f. 1.

67 See the assessment in Dorril, *MI6*, pp. 244–45.

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70 Director, CIA to [Redacted], DIR 00782, March 2, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 13.

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73 Munich to Director, MUCO 033, September 5, 1956, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 14, f. 1.

74 Munich to Director, MUNI 5527, July 23, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 12, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 17.

75 The CIA cryptonym used in the records for Herre was HERDAHL. See Munich to Director, September 24, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2.

76 Memorandum by Herre, Attachment to EGMA-45003, August 27, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2.

77 Munich to Director, MUNI 5527, July 23, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 12, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 17.

78 Memorandum for Chief, SR/3, September 4, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 12, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 17.

79 Chief of Base, Munich to Chief, SR, EGMA-45003, October 5, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2.

80 The full West German investigative story is in Memorandum for the Record, April 22, 1976, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2.

81 Page to Department of State, October 26, 1959, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, Stephen Bandera Name File, v. 2.

82 See especially NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 20, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 36, f. 1.

83 [Redacted], Meeting with UPHILL [BND] Representative, May 26, 1961, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 14, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 21, f. 2.

84 [Redacted] to Chief, FDM, Cartel 2 Debriefing Report, December 16, 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.

85 SSU Operational Memorandum No. MGH-391 on Operation Belladonna, December 27, 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.

86 Joint OSO-OPC Report on Ukrainian Resistance Movement, December 12, 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.

87 Card Ref. D 82270, July 22, 1947, NARA, RG 319, E 134B, B 757, Mykola Lebed IRR Personal File, Box 757.

88 Special Agent Camille S. Hajdu, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, November 17, 1947, NARA, RG 319, E134B, Box 757, Mykola Lebed IRR Personal File.

89 Norman J.W. Goda, “Nazi Collaborators in the United States: What the FBI Knew,” in Richard Breitman, et. al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (New York: Cambridge, 2005), pp. 251–52.

90 Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief, FBK, Project ICON, MGM-A-793, October 20, 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1; Attachment to EGOW-1653, June 30, 1960, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 13, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 19, f. 1. The Hrinioch-Lebed group by this time was also insolvent and needed the help. Hrinioch was convinced that the Ukraine could only become independent with U.S. aid. See AC, MOB to Chief, FBK, MGM-A-1148, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 57, Ivan Hrinioch Name File.

- 91 [Redacted] to Chief, FDM, Cartel 2 Debriefing Report, December 16, 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 92 CIA Assistant Director Allen Dulles's personal intervention in his case with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which saw in Lebed "a clear-cut deportation case" owing to his wartime activities. See Goda, "Nazi Collaborators in the United States," pp. 251-55. The second release of the CIA File on Lebed has the relevant documentation on Dulles's role. See NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Box 80, Mykola Lebed Name File, v. 1.
- 93 [Redacted] to Chief, FDM, Cartel 2 Debriefing Report, December 16, 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1. Memorandum for the Record, February 15, 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 94 SR/W2 to SR/WC, May 21, 1952, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ 19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 10, f. 2.
- 95 Special Agent Daniel Barna, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, April 19, 1949, NARA, RG 319, E 134B, Box 757, Mykola Lebed IRR Personal File.
- 96 Goda, "Nazi Collaborators in the United States," p. 253.
- 97 Joint OSO-OPC Report On the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, December 12, 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 98 Operations into Ukraine, November 28, 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1. Wisner to Director of Central Intelligence, Joint OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement," January 4, 1951, and attachments, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 9, f. 1.
- 99 Ukrainian Resistance, April 1953, NAA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 11, f. 1; Questionnaire, June 30, 1957, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 15, f. 1.
- 100 Tentative Plan of Cover for Ukrainian Study Group, December 2, 1953, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 10, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 11, f. 1; Attachment B to EGMA-[redacted], Operational Matters and Comments, undated, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 14, f. 2; Chief, Soviet Bloc Division, Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director of Plans, June 12, 1968, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Development and Plans, v. 5.
- 101 Aerodynamic Renewal, FY 1970, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Development and Plans, v. 7; IG Survey Group on Proprietaries, December 8, 1966, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 35, f. 1. Memorandum for the 303 Committee, October 30, 1967, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 20, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 37, f. 1.
- 102 On the exact relationship between ZH UHVR, Prolog, and Aerodynamic, see Memorandum for IG Survey Group on Proprietaries, December 8, 1966, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 35, f. 1.
- 103 Questionnaire, June 30, 1957, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 11, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 15, f. 1; Project Aerodynamic, Renewal FY 1959, September 28, 1958, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, Aerodynamic, v. 3.
- 104 Project Aerodynamic, Renewal FY 1959, September 28, 1958, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 8, Aerodynamic: Development and Plans, v. 3.
- 105 Project Aerodynamic, Renewal FY 1959, September 28, 1958, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 34; Project Aerodynamic, Renewal FY 1961, October 7, 1960, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 34; Memorandum for Chief, SR/3, August 16, 1961, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 34; David Murphy, Chief, SR Division, to Deputy Director for Plans, April 15, 1966, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 35; Project Aerodynamic Renewal, FY 67, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic:

- Operations, v. 35; Aerodynamic Project Renewal, FY 70, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, Aerodynamic: Development and Plans, v. 7; Memorandum for the 303 Committee, October 30, 1967, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 20, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 37, f. 1. On spotting operations see NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 15-15, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 21-24, and especially IG Survey Response Group on Proprietaries, December 8, 1966, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 19, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 35, f. 1 for Kaminsky's identity. Kaminsky was also a Ukrainian émigré writer.
- 106 Zvi Y. Gittelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001) pp. 165-66.
- 107 Declaration of the Foreign Representation," April 6, 1964, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 16, Aerodynamic, v. 28, f. 1.
- 108 See NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 16-17, Aerodynamic: Operations, v. 28-31.
- 109 Brzezinski to Director of Central Intelligence, March 20, 1979, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 59, QRPLUMB, v. 3.
- 110 FY 1982 Renewal of Activity PDDYNAMIC, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 59, QRPLUMB, v. 4.
- 111 NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 5, QRPLUMB, v. 5, f. 2.

CONCLUSION

This report discusses only a sample of newly released records, hinting at their overall richness. The 1.3 million Army files include thousands of titles of many more issues regarding wartime criminals, their pursuit, their arrest, their escape, and occasionally, their use by Allied and Soviet intelligence agencies. These include files on German war criminals, but also collaborators from the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, and elsewhere. These files also include information on Allied and non-aligned states that had an interest in Axis personalities, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Argentina, and Israel.

The 1,110 re-released or newly released CIA name files are in most cases far more detailed than the files of the initial CIA release in 2001 and after. They contain a trove of information on Nazis who eventually worked for the Gehlen Organization or as Soviet spies after the war. They hold information about important Nazi officials who escaped and became figures of security interest in other countries spanning the globe from the Middle East to South America. Together, the Army and CIA records will keep scholars of World War II and the Cold War busy for many years.

The new files also have postwar intelligence on other subjects. The CIC kept close watch on other suspect groups, such as German communists, and kept thousands of files on them. They kept watch on politically active Jewish refugees in displaced persons camps. Indeed, there are many hundreds of newly released files concerning the remnant of European Jews who searched for a new life in Palestine or the United States. Thus the new records are of great interest to those

researching a very broad range of topics from international Communism to the Jewish diaspora to the history of mass migration.

The declassification of intelligence-related material is a controversial subject, involving as it does the release of records formerly of national security interest. The current releases show, however, that the passage of years lessens the information's sensitivity while providing researchers access to raw information that is simply not available elsewhere. By their very nature, intelligence agencies attain and record information that other government or non-government organizations cannot. None of the chapters in this report could have been written without declassified intelligence records, nor could the many articles and books that will emerge as a result of the current release. The funding for declassification and the assurance that intelligence records are opened to the public thus preserve key aspects of world history. In the interest of understanding our past Congress should, in our view, ensure that such openness continues.

ACRONYMS

BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (West Germany's domestic intelligence agency) Office for the Protection of the Constitution
BND	German Secret Service
CIC	U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps
KPD	German Communist Party
KPÖ	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs
IRR	Investigative Records Repository
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi Party)
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office)
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (SS Intelligence Organization)
SDECE	Documentation and External Counterespionage Service (French Intelligence)
SIFAR	Italian Military Intelligence
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
SRP	Socialist Reich Party
SSU	Strategic Services Unit
UHVR	Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
VdU	Verband der Unabhängigen
VVN	Union of Nazi Persecutees
WJC	World Jewish Congress