



Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists

The **Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists** (OUN; Ukrainian: Організація українських націоналістів, romanized: *Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv*) was a Ukrainian nationalist organization established in 1929 in Vienna, uniting the Ukrainian Military Organization with smaller, mainly youth, radical nationalist right-wing groups. The OUN was the largest and one of the most important far-right Ukrainian organizations operating in the interwar period on the territory of the Second Polish Republic.^{[9][17]} The OUN was mostly active preceding, during, and immediately after the Second World War. Its ideology was influenced by the writings of Dmytro Dontsov, from 1929 by Italian fascism, and from 1930 by German Nazism.^{[18][19][20][21][22][23]} The OUN pursued a strategy of violence, terrorism, and assassinations with the goal of creating an ethnically homogeneous and totalitarian Ukrainian state.^[22]

During the Second World War, in 1940, the OUN split into two parts. The older, more moderate members supported Andriy Melnyk's OUN-M, while the younger and more radical members supported Stepan Bandera's OUN-B. On 30 June 1941 OUN-B declared an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv, which had just come under Nazi Germany's control in the early stages of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union.^[24] OUN-B pledged to work closely with Germany, which was described as freeing the Ukrainians from Soviet oppression, and OUN-B members subsequently took part in the Lviv pogroms.^[25] In response to the OUN-B declaration of independence, the

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Організація українських націоналістів



Left: Emblem of OUN-M / Right: Emblem of OUN-B

Leader	Andriy Melnyk (conservative) ^[1] Stepan Bandera (militant)
Foundation	1929
Dissolved	1945
Ideology	Ukrainian nationalism Integral nationalism ^{[2][3][4]} Anti-communism Ethnocracy ^{[7][8]} <ul style="list-style-type: none">Anti-Polish sentiment^[5]Anti-Romanian sentimentAnti-Hungarian sentimentAnti-Russian sentiment^[6]Antisemitism^[6]
Political position	Far-right ^{[9][nb 1]}
Slogan	"Slava Ukraini! Heroiam slava!" ^[11]
Anthem	<div>▶ 0:00 / 0:00 — 🔊 ⋮</div>
Major actions	Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
Notable attacks	Killing of Bronisław Pieracki
Size	20,000 (1939 est.) ^{[12][13]}
Part of	Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (1943–45)
Allies	🇩🇪 Nazi Germany (1941, 1944–1945) ^[nb 2]
Opponents	🇵🇱 Poland 🇷🇺 Soviet Union

Nazi authorities suppressed the OUN leadership. Members of the OUN took an active part in the Holocaust in Ukraine and Poland. In October 1942, OUN-B established the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).^[nb 4] In 1943–1944, in an effort to prevent Polish efforts to re-establish prewar borders,^[32] UPA units carried out massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.^[24]

 Nazi Germany (1942-1943)^[nb 3]

Battles and wars Invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine
World War II
OUN Uprising of 1939
Anti-Soviet resistance by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

In the course of the war, with the approaching defeat of Nazi Germany, the OUN-B changed its political image, exchanging fascism for democratic slogans.^[33] After World War II, the UPA fought Soviet and Polish government forces. In 1947, in Operation Vistula, the Polish government deported 140,000 Ukrainians as part of the population exchange between Poland and Soviet Ukraine.^[34] Soviet forces killed 153,000, arrested 134,000, and deported 203,000 UPA members, relatives, and supporters.^{[24][nb 5]} During the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, covertly supported the OUN.^[35] A contemporary organization that claims to be the same Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is still active in Ukraine.

History

Background and creation

In 1919, with the end of the Polish–Ukrainian War, the Second Polish Republic took over most of the territory claimed by the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the rest was absorbed by the Soviet Union. One year later, exiled Ukrainian officers, mostly former Sich Riflemen, founded the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrainian: Українська Військова Організація; *Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiia*), an underground military organization with the goals of continuing the armed struggle for independent Ukraine.^[36] The UVO was strictly a military organization with a military command structure. Originally the UVO operated under the authority of the exiled government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, but in 1925 following a power struggle all the supporters of the exiled president Yevhen Petrushevych were expelled from the organization.^[37]



Yevhen Konovalets, the OUN's leader from 1929 to 1938

The UVO leader was Yevhen Konovalets, the former commander of the Sich Riflemen. West Ukrainian political parties secretly funded the organization. The UVO organized a wave of sabotage actions in the second half of 1922, when Polish settlers were attacked, police stations, railroad stations, telegraph poles and railroad tracks were destroyed. An attempt to assassinate Poland's Chief of State Józef Piłsudski was made in 1921. In 1922, they organized 17 attacks on Polish officials, 5 of whom were killed, and 15 attacks on Ukrainians, 9 of whom died, among them Sydir Tverdokhlib.^[38]

UVO continued this type of activity, albeit on a smaller scale later. When the League of Nations recognized Polish rule over western Ukraine in 1923, many members left the UVO. The Ukrainian legal parties turned against the UVO's militant actions, preferring to work within the Polish political system. As a result, the UVO turned to Germany and Lithuania for political and financial support. It established contact with militant anti-Polish student organizations, such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. After preliminary meetings in Berlin in 1927 and Prague in 1928, at the founding congress in Vienna in 1929 the veterans of the UVO and the student militants met and united to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Although the members consisted mostly of Galician youths, Yevhen Konovalets served as its first leader and its leadership council, the *Provid*, comprised mostly veterans and was based abroad.^{[39][40]}



Symon Petliura (center) and Colonel Yevhen Konovalets (to Petliura's right) taking the oath of office of the Sich Riflemen training school in Starokostiantyniv, 1919

Pre-war activities

Prior to World War II, the OUN was smaller and less influential among the Ukrainians minority in Poland than the moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance.^{[41][42]} The OUN sought to infiltrate legal political parties, universities, and other political structures and institutions.^{[43][24][nb 6]} OUN ideology was influenced by several political theorists,^[18] such as Dmytro Dontsov, whose political thought was characterised by totalitarianism, national chauvinism, and antisemitism, as well as Mykola Stsiborskyi and Yevhen Onatsky, and Italian fascism and German Nazism.^{[44][45][46]} OUN nationalists were trained by Benito Mussolini in Sicily jointly with the Ustase, they also maintained offices in Berlin and Vienna.^[47] Before the war, the OUN regarded the Second Polish Republic as an immediate target, but viewed the Soviet Union, although not operating on its territory, as the main enemy and greatest oppressor of the Ukrainian people.^[48] Even before the war, impressed by the successes of fascism, OUN radicalised its stance, and it saw Nazi Germany as its main ally in the fight for independence.^[49]

In contrast to UNDO, the OUN accepted violence as a political tool against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause. Most of its activity was directed against Polish politicians and government representatives. Under the command of the Western Ukrainian Territorial Executive (established in February 1929), the OUN carried out hundreds of acts of sabotage in Galicia and Volhynia, including a campaign of arson against Polish landowners (which helped provoke the 1930 Pacification), boycotts of state schools and Polish tobacco and liquor monopolies, dozens of expropriation attacks on government institutions to obtain funds for its activities, and assassinations. From 1921 to 1939 UVO and OUN carried out 63 known assassinations: 36 Ukrainians (among them one communist), 25 Poles, 1 Russian and 1 Jew.^[50] This number is likely an underestimate because there were likely unrecorded killings in rural regions.^{[51]:45}

The OUN's victims during this period included Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish promoter of Ukrainian-Polish compromise, Emilian Czechowski, Lwow's Polish police commissioner, Alexei Mailov, a Soviet consular official killed in retaliation for the Holodomor, and most notably Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish interior minister. The OUN also killed moderate Ukrainian figures such as the respected teacher (and former officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army) Ivan Babii. Most of these killings were organized locally and

occurred without the authorization or knowledge of the OUN's emigre leaders abroad.^[51] In 1930 OUN members assaulted the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society Kyryl Studynsky in his office.^[52] Such acts were condemned by the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, who was particularly critical of the OUN's leadership in exile who inspired acts of youthful violence, writing that they were "using our children to kill their parents" and that "whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of the people."^[53] OUN's terrorist methods, fascination with fascism, rejection of parliamentary democracy and acting against Poland on behalf of Germany did not find support among many other Ukrainian organizations, especially among the Petlurites, i.e. former activists of the Ukrainian People's Republic.^[54]



The corpse of Bronisław Pieracki on 18 June 1934

As the Polish state's repressive policies with respect to Ukrainians during the interwar period increased, many Ukrainians (particularly the youth, many of whom felt they had no future) lost faith in traditional legal approaches, in their elders, and in the western democracies who were seen as turning their backs on Ukraine. The young were much more radical, calling for the use of terror in political struggle, but both groups were united by national radicalism and advocacy of a totalitarian system.^[55] The leader of the "old" group Andriy Melnyk claimed in a letter sent to the German minister of foreign affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop on 2 May 1938 that the OUN was "ideologically akin to similar movements in Europe, especially to National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy".^[56] This period of disillusionment coincided with the increase in support for the OUN. By the beginning of the Second World War, the OUN was estimated to have 20,000 active members and many times that number of sympathizers. Many bright students, such as the talented young poets Bohdan Kravtsiv and Olena Teliha (executed by the Nazis at Babi Yar) were attracted to the OUN's revolutionary message.^[40]

As a means to gain independence from Poland and the Soviet Union the OUN accepted material and moral support from Nazi Germany before World War II. The Germans, needing Ukrainian assistance against the Soviet Union, were expected by the OUN to further the goal of Ukrainian independence. Although some elements of the German military were inclined to do so, they were ultimately overruled by Adolf Hitler, whose racial prejudice against the Ukrainians and desires for economic exploitation of Ukraine precluded formal cooperation. The interwar Lithuanian government had particularly close ties with the OUN.^[57]

During World War II

Split in the OUN

In September 1939 Poland was invaded and split by Germany and the Soviet Union. On 1 November 1939, Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union (i.e. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia) were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Initially, the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland was met with limited support from the ethnic Ukrainian population. Repression was directed mainly against the ethnic Poles, and the Ukrainisation of education, land reform, and other changes were

popular among the Ukrainians. The situation changed in the middle of 1940 when collectivisation began and repressions hit the Ukrainian population. There were 2,779 Ukrainians arrested in 1939, 15,024 in 1940 and 5,500 in 1941, until the German invasion of the Soviet Union.^[58]

The situation for ethnic Ukrainians under German occupation was much better. About 550,000 Ukrainians lived in the General Government in the German-occupied portion of Poland, and they were favoured at the expense of Poles. Approximately 20 thousand Ukrainian activists escaped from the Soviet occupation to Warsaw or Kraków.^[59] In late 1939, Nazi Germany accommodated OUN leaders in the city of Kraków, the capital of the General Government and provided a financial support for the OUN.^{[60][61]} The headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Committee headed by Volodymyr Kubiyovych, the legal representation of the Ukrainian community in the Nazi zone, were also located in Kraków.^{[62][63]}

Despite the differences, the OUN's leader Yevhen Konovalets was able to maintain unity within the organization. Konovalets was assassinated by a Soviet agent, Pavel Sudoplatov, in Rotterdam in May 1938. He was succeeded by Andriy Melnyk, a 48-year-old former colonel in the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and one of the founders of the UVO. He was chosen to lead the OUN despite not having been involved in activities throughout the 1930s. Melnyk was more friendly to the Church than any of his associates (the OUN was generally anti-clerical), and had even become the chairman of a Ukrainian Catholic youth organization that was regarded as anti-nationalist by many OUN members. His choice was seen as an attempt by the leadership to repair ties with the Church and to become more pragmatic and moderate. However, this direction was opposite to the trend within western Ukraine.^[64]




In Kraków on 10 February 1940 a revolutionary faction of the OUN emerged, called the OUN-R or, after its leader Stepan Bandera, the OUN-B (Banderites). This was opposed by the current leadership of the organization, so it split, and the old group was called OUN-M after the leader Andriy Melnyk (Melnykites). The OUN-M dominated Ukrainian emigration and the Bukovina, but in Ukraine itself, the Banderists gained a decisive advantage (60% of the agent network in Volhynia and 80% in Eastern Galicia).^[65] Political leader Transcarpathian Ukrainians Avgustyn Voloshyn praised Melnyk as a Christian of European culture, in contrast to many nationalists who placed the nation above God.^[66] OUN-M leadership was more experienced and had some limited contacts in Eastern Ukraine; it also maintained contact with German intelligence and the Germany army.^[67]

Early years of the war and activities in central and eastern Ukraine

On 25 February 1941, the head of Abwehr Wilhelm Franz Canaris sanctioned the creation of the "Ukrainian Legion". Ukrainian Nachtigall and Roland battalions were formed under German command and numbered about 800 men.^[68] OUN-B expected that it would become the core of the future Ukrainian army. The OUN-B already in 1940 began preparations for an anti-Soviet uprising. However, Soviet repression delayed these plans and more serious fighting did not occur until after the German invasion of the USSR in July 1941. According to OUN-B reports, they then had about 20,000 men grouped in 3,300

locations in Western Ukraine.^[69] The NKVD was determined to liquidate the Ukrainian underground, according to Soviet reports 4435 members were arrested between October 1939 and December 1940.^[70] There were public trials and death sentences were carried out. In the first half of 1941, 3073 families (11329 people) of members of the Polish and Ukrainian underground were deported from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.^[71] Soviet repression forced about a thousand members of the Ukrainian underground to take up partisan activities even before the German invasion.^[72]

After Germany's invasion of the USSR, on 30 June 1941, OUN seized about 213 villages and organized diversion in the rear of the Red Army. In the process, it lost 2,100 soldiers and 900 were wounded.^[73] The OUN-B formed Ukrainian militias that, displaying exceptional cruelty, carried out antisemitic pogroms and massacres of Jews.^{[74][75][76]} The largest pogroms in which Ukrainian nationalists were complicit took place in Lviv in two waves in June–July 1941, involving OUN-B activists, German military and paramilitary personnel, Ukrainian, and to a lesser extent Polish urban residents and peasants from the nearby countryside, and in the later wave the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police.^{[77][78]} Estimates of Jewish deaths in these events range between 4,000 (Dieter Pohl),^[79] 5,000 (Richard Breitman),^[80] and 6,000 (Peter Longerich).^[81] The involvement of OUN-B is unclear, but certainly OUN-B propaganda fuelled antisemitism.^[82] The vast majority of pogroms carried out by the Banderites occurred in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.^[83]



Bandera's Second OUN Conference resolutions legalised the existence of Bandera's OUN. OUN leader Andriy Melnyk denounced it as "saboteur".



One of the versions of the "Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian State" signed by Stepan Bandera



An OUN-B leaflet from the World War II era

Eight days after Germany's invasion of the USSR, on 30 June 1941, the OUN-B proclaimed the establishment of Ukrainian State in Lviv, with Yaroslav Stetsko as premier. In response to the declaration, OUN-B leaders and associates were arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo (circa 1500 persons).^[84] Many OUN-B members were killed outright or perished in jails and concentration camps (both of Bandera's brothers were eventually murdered at Auschwitz). On 18

September 1941, Bandera and Stetsko were sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in "Zellenbau Bunker", where they were kept until September 1944. While imprisoned, Bandera received help from the financial assistance from the OUN-B. The Germans permitted the Ukrainian nationalists to leave the bunker for an important meeting with OUN representatives in Fridental Castle which was 200 meters from Sachsenhausen.^[85]

As a result of the German crackdown on the OUN-B, the faction controlled by Melnyk enjoyed an advantage over its rival and was able to occupy many positions in the civil administration of former Soviet Ukraine during the first months of German occupation. The first city which it administered was Zhitomir, the first major city across the old Soviet-Polish border. Here, the OUN-M helped stimulate the development of Prosvita societies, the appearance of local artists on Ukrainian-language broadcasts, the opening of two new secondary schools and a pedagogical institute, and the establishment of a school administration. Many locals were recruited into the OUN-M. The OUN-M also organized police forces, recruited from Soviet prisoners of war. Two senior members of its leadership, or *Provid*, even came to Zhitomir. At the end of August 1941, however, they were both gunned down, allegedly by the OUN-B which had justified the assassination in their literature and had issued a secret directive (referred to by Andriy Melnyk as a "death sentence") not to allow OUN-M leaders to reach Ukrainian SSR's capital Kiev (now Kyiv, Ukraine). In retaliation, the German authorities, often tipped off by OUN-M members, began mass arrests and executions of OUN-B members, to a large extent eliminating it in much of central and eastern Ukraine.^[86]

According to the Nuremberg Trials documents, on 25 November 1941, Einsatzkommando 5 received an order to "quietly liquidate" members of "Bandera-Movement" as it was confirmed that they were preparing a rebellion in the Reichskommissariat with the goal of establishing independent Ukraine.^[87]

As the Wehrmacht moved East, the OUN-M established control of Kiev's civil administration; that city's mayor from October 1941 until January 1942, Volodymyr Bahazyi, belonged to the OUN-M and used his position to funnel money into it and to help the OUN-M take control over Kiev's police.^[88] The OUN-M also initiated the creation of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, which was to become the basis for a future Ukrainian government.^[89] At this time, the OUN-M also came to control Kiev's largest newspaper and was able to attract many supporters from the central and eastern Ukrainian intelligentsia. Alarmed by the OUN-M's growing strength in central and eastern Ukraine, the German Nazi authorities swiftly and brutally cracked down on it, arresting and executing many of its members in early 1942, including Volodymyr Bahazyi, and the writer Olena Teliha who had organized and led the League of Ukrainian Writers in Kiev.^[88] Although during this time elements within the Wehrmacht tried in vain to protect OUN-M members, the organization was largely wiped out within central and eastern Ukraine.

A declassified 2007 CIA note summarised the situation as follows:

"The [German] army, which desired the genuine cooperation of the Ukrainians and was willing to allow the formation of a Ukrainian state, was quickly overruled by the [National-Socialist] party and the SS. The Germans used all means necessary to force the cooperation which the Ukrainians were largely unwilling to give. By summer 1941 a battle raged on Ukrainian soil between two ruthless exploiters and persecutors of the Ukrainian people [:] the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The OUN and the partisan army created in late 1942, the UPA, fought bitterly against both the Germans and the Soviets and most of their respective allies".^[90]

OUN-B's fight for dominance in western Ukraine

As the OUN-M was being wiped out in the regions of central and western Ukraine that had been east of the old Polish-Soviet border, in Volhynia the OUN-B, with easy access from its base in Galicia, began to establish and consolidate its control over the nationalist movement and much of the countryside. Unwilling and unable to openly resist the Germans in early 1942, it methodically set about creating a clandestine organization, engaging in propaganda work, and building weapons stockpiles.^[91] A major aspect of its programme was the infiltration of the local police; the OUN-B was able to establish control over the police academy in Rivne. By doing so the OUN-B hoped to eventually overwhelm the German occupation authorities ("If there were fifty policemen to five Germans, who would hold power then?"). In their role within the police, Bandera's forces were involved in the extermination of Jewish civilians and the clearing of Jewish ghettos, actions that contributed to the OUN-B's weapon stockpiles. In addition, blackmailing Jews served as a source of added finances.^[92] During the time that the OUN-B in Volhynia was avoiding conflict with the German authorities and working with them, resistance to the Germans was limited to Soviet partisans on the extreme northern edge of the region, to small bands of OUN-M fighters, and to a group of guerrillas known as the UPA or the Polesian Sich, unaffiliated with the OUN-B and led by Taras Bulba-Borovets of the exiled Ukrainian People's Republic.^[91]

By late 1942, the status quo for the OUN-B was proving to be increasingly difficult. The German authorities were becoming increasingly repressive towards the Ukrainian population, and the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such actions. Furthermore, Soviet partisan activity threatened to become the major outlet for anti-German resistance among western Ukrainians. By March 1943, the OUN-B leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German police in 1941–1942, numbering between 4,000 and 5,000 trained and armed soldiers, to desert with their weapons and to join the units of the OUN-B in Volyn.^[93] Borovets attempted to unite his UPA, the smaller OUN-M and other nationalist bands, and the OUN-B underground into an all-party front. The OUN-M agreed while the OUN-B refused, in part due to the insistence of the OUN-B that their leaders be in control of the organization.

After negotiations failed, OUN commander Dmytro Klyachivsky coopted the name of Borovets' organization, UPA, and decided to accomplish by force what could not be accomplished through negotiation: the unification of Ukrainian nationalist forces under OUN-B control. On 6 July, the large OUN-M group was surrounded and surrendered, and soon afterward most of the independent groups disappeared; they were either destroyed by the Communist partisans or the OUN-B or joined the latter.^[91] On 18 August 1943, Taras Bulba-Borovets and his headquarters were surrounded in a surprise attack by an OUN-B force consisting of several battalions. Some of his forces, including his wife, were captured, while five of his officers were killed. Borovets escaped but refused to submit, in a letter accusing the OUN-B of among other things: banditry; of wanting to establish a one-party state; and of fighting not for the people but in order to rule the people. In retaliation, his wife was murdered after two weeks of torture at the hands of the OUN-B's SB. In October 1943 Bulba-Borovets largely disbanded his depleted force in order to end further bloodshed.^[94] In their struggle for dominance in Volhynia, the Banderists would kill tens of thousands of Ukrainians for links to Bulba-Borovets or Melnyk.^[95]

OUN-B near the end of World War II

26 high-ranking members of the OUN-B (alongside Greek Catholic priest Ivan Hrynokh) gathered in the village of Zolota Sloboda between 21 and 25 August, holding a Third Supreme Assembly. Termed "extraordinary" (Ukrainian: надзвичайний, romanized: *nadzvychnyi*; also read as "emergency") by the

organisers, the meeting rejected the policies of integral nationalism in Bandera's absence in favour of pro-democratic and pro-peasantry positions. This was combined with the beginning of an insurgency against the Germans simultaneously with fighting Soviet partisans and Polish civilians in an effort to secure the existence of a Ukrainian state.^[96]

The policies adopted at the Third Supreme Assembly had been spurred by the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad,^[97] as well as a desire to appeal to people in central and eastern Ukraine who were reluctant to support the OUN-B due to its authoritarian policy. While this resistance to Germany was strongly opposed by the OUN-B's older members, who were reluctant to reform, it was welcomed by younger members who viewed Ukraine's independence as their primary aim.^[98] Local western Ukrainians also positively assessed the OUN-B's anti-German activities, though the Soviets' Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive shortly after the insurgency began led to the expulsion of German forces from western Ukraine.^[99] Marples has argued that the anti-German activities of the UPA were primarily interested in preventing the Germans from totally assuming control over Volhynia and Polesia, which were the primary strongholds of the UPA at the time.^[100]

Besides armed struggle, according to ICJ documents, OUN-B (referred as "Banderagruppe") was spreading anti-German propaganda comparing German policy towards Ukrainians with Holodomor.^[101]

By the fall of 1943, the OUN-B forces had established their control over substantial portions of rural areas in Volhynia and southwestern Polesia. While the Germans controlled the large towns and major roads, such a large area east of Rivne had come under the control of the OUN-B that it was able to set about creating a "state" system with military training schools, hospitals and a school system, involving tens of thousands of personnel.^[102]

Beginning in 1944, the OUN began to ally with the Germans in exchange for arms and control of territory. In a top-secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadeführer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer General Hans-Adolf Prützmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that "The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into the enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group" on the southern front.^[103] By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for the UPA for their anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"^[104] In the latter half of 1944, Germans were supplying the OUN/UPA with arms and equipment in exchange for the end of attacks on German positions, along with further UPA attacks on the Soviets.^[105] In the Ivano-Frankivsk region, there even existed a small landing strip for German transport planes. Some German personnel trained in terrorist and intelligence activities behind Soviet lines, as well as some OUN-B leaders, were also transported through this channel.^[106]

Adopting a strategy analogous to that of the Chetnik leader General Draža Mihailović,^[107] the UPA limited its actions against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the Communists. Because of this, although the UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukraine and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine.^[107] Due to its focus on the Soviets as the principal threat, the UPA's anti-German struggle did not contribute significantly to the recapture of Ukrainian territories by Soviet forces.^[108]

The OUN-B was actively involved in the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, through the formally independent but heavily connected UPA.^[100] The majority of delegates at the Third Supreme Assembly expressed their formal approval the anti-Polish violence led by Dmytro Klyachivsky.^[109]

After the Second World War

After the war, the OUN in eastern and southern Ukraine continued to struggle against the Soviets; 1958 marked the last year when an OUN member was arrested in Donetsk.^[110] Both branches of the OUN continued to be quite influential within the Ukrainian diaspora. The OUN-B formed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, a group headed by Yaroslav Stetsko, in 1943. The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations it created and headed would include at various times emigre organizations from almost every eastern European country with the exception of Poland: Croatia, the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, anti-communist émigré Cossacks, Hungary, Georgia, Bohemia-Moravia (today the Czech Republic), and Slovakia. In the 1970s, the ABN was joined by anti-communist Vietnamese and Cuban organizations.^[111] The Lithuanian partisans had particularly close ties with the OUN.^[57] In 1956, Bandera's OUN split into two parts,^[112] the more moderate OUN(z) led by Lev Rebet and Zinoviy Matla, and the more ethno-nationalist OUN led by Bandera.^[112]

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both OUN factions resumed activities within Ukraine. The Melnyk faction threw its support behind the Ukrainian Republican Party at the time that it was headed by Levko Lukyanenko. The OUN-B reorganized itself within Ukraine as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) (registered as a political party in January 1993^[113]). Its conspiratorial leaders within the diaspora did not want to openly enter Ukrainian politics and attempted to imbue this party with a democratic, moderate facade. However, within Ukraine, the project attracted more nationalists who took the party to the right.^[114] Until her death in 2003, KUN was headed by Slava Stetsko, widow of Yaroslav Stetsko, who also simultaneously headed the OUN and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.



Euromaidan in Kyiv, December 2013. Protesters with OUN-B flag.

On 9 March 2010, the Kyiv Post reported that the OUN political party rejected Yulia Tymoshenko's calls to unite "all of the national patriotic forces" led by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc against Viktor Yanukovych. The OUN did demand that Yanukovych should reject the idea of cancelling the Hero of Ukraine status given to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, Yanukovych should continue the practice of recognizing fighters for Ukraine's independence, which was launched by (his predecessor) Viktor Yushchenko, and posthumously award the Hero of Ukraine titles to Yevhen Konovalets.^[115] On 19 November 2018, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, as well as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian nationalist groups Right Sector and C14, endorsed Ruslan Koshulynskiy's candidacy in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election.^[116] In the election Koshulynskiy received 1.6% of the votes.^[117]

Organization

The OUN was led by a *Vozhd* or Supreme Leader. Originally the *Vozhd* was Yevhen Konovalts; after his assassination he was succeeded by Andriy Melnyk resulting in a split where the Galician youths followed their own *Vozhd*, Stepan Bandera. Underneath the *Vozhd* were the *Provid*, or directorate. At the start of the second world war the OUN's leadership consisted of the *Vozhd*, Andrii Melnyk, and eight members of the *Provid*.^[118] The *Provid* members were: Generals Kurmanovych and Kapustiansky (both generals from the times of Ukraine's revolution in 1918–1920); Yaroslav Baranovsky, a law student; Dmytro Andriievsky, a politically moderate former diplomat of the revolutionary government from eastern Ukraine; Richard Yary, a former officer of the Austrian and Galician militaries who served as a liaison with the German intelligence services, the Abwehr; colonel Roman Sushko, another former Austrian and Galician officer; Mykola Stsiborsky, the son of a tsarist military officer from Zhytomir, who served as the OUN's official theorist; and Omelian Senyk, a party organizer and veteran of the Austrian and Galician armies who by the 1940s was considered too moderate and too conservative by the youngest generation of Galician youths.^[118] Yary would be the only member of the original *Provid* to join Bandera after the OUN split.^[119]

Ideology

The primary goal of OUN was to establish an independent and ethnically pure Ukrainian state.^{[120][121][22]} The OUN's leadership felt that past attempts at securing independence failed due to democratic values in society, poor party discipline and a conciliatory attitude towards Ukraine's traditional enemies. Its ideology rejected the socialist ideas supported by Petliura, and the compromises of Galicia's traditional elite. Instead, the OUN, particularly its younger members, adopted the ideology of Dmytro Dontsov, an émigré from Eastern Ukraine.

The OUN was formed from the UVO and several extreme right-wing organizations, including the Ukrainian National Association, the Union of Ukrainian Fascists and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine.^{[122][123]} Initially, it was led by war veterans who failed to establish a Ukrainian state in 1917–1920.^[122] According to Per Anders Rudling, the ideology of the organization was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Nietzsche, German Nazism, and Italian fascism, combining extreme nationalism with terrorism, corporatism, and antisemitism.^[122] Heorhii Kasyanov wrote that it manifested typical anti-democratic features.^[123]

Nationalism

The nationalists who emerged in Galicia following the First World War, much as in the rest of Europe, adopted the form of nationalism known as Integral nationalism.^{[124][nb 7]} According to this ideology, the nation was held to be of the highest absolute value, more important than social class, regions, the individual, religion, etc. To this end, OUN members were urged to "force their way into all areas of national life" such as institutions, societies, villages and families. Politics was seen as a Darwinian struggle between nations for survival, rendering conflict unavoidable and justifying any means that would lead to the victory of one's nation over that of others. In this context willpower was seen as more important than reason,^[40] and warfare was glorified as an expression of national vitality.

Integral nationalism became a powerful force in much of Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. The OUN's conceptualization of this idea was particular in several ways. Because Ukraine was stateless and surrounded by more powerful neighbors, the emphasis on force and warfare was to be expressed in acts of terrorism rather than open warfare, and illegality was glorified. Because Ukrainians did not have a state to glorify or serve, the emphasis was placed on a "pure" national language and culture rather than a State. There was a strain of fantastic romanticism, in which the unsophisticated Ukrainian rejection of reason was more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by German or Italian integral nationalists.^[125] The OUN viewed the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as a rival and condemned Catholic leaders as police informers or potential informers; the Church rejected integral nationalism as incompatible with Christian ethics. The conflict between the OUN and the Church eased in the late 1930s.^[126]

Dmytro Dontsov claimed that the 20th century would witness the "twilight of the gods to whom the nineteenth century prayed" and that a new man must be created, with the "fire of fanatical commitment" and the "iron force of enthusiasm", and that the only way forward was through "the organization of a new violence." This new doctrine was the *chynnyi natsionalizm* – the "nationalism of the deed".^[127] To dramatize and spread such views, OUN literature mythologized the cult of struggle, sacrifice, and emphasized national heroes.^[40] The OUN, particularly Bandera, held a romantic view of the Ukrainian peasantry, glorified the peasants as carriers of Ukrainian culture and linked them with the deeds and exploits of the Ukrainian Cossacks from previous centuries. The OUN believed that a goal of professional revolutionaries was, through revolutionary acts, to awaken the masses. In this aspect the OUN had much in common with 19th-century Russian Narodniks.^[128]

Fascism

Historian Per Anders Rudling described the OUN as having "the fascist attributes of anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism, and anticommunism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, 'Führerprinzip', and an adoption of fascist greetings. Its leaders eagerly emphasized to Hitler and Ribbentrop that they shared the Nazi 'Weltanschauung' and a commitment to a fascist New Europe."^[122] He described it as a "typical fascist movement" and wrote that it "cultivated close relations with Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Spanish Falange and the Croatian Ustaše".^[129]

According to political scientist Ivan Gomza, the "morphological structure" of the OUN's ideology in the 1930s and early 1940s could be defined as fascist because it had the following principles: (1) rebirth of the national community; (2) the search for some new form of political and economic organization, which transcends liberal democracy and collectivistic communism; and (3) the use of threats and violence during its political struggle.^[130] Gomza wrote that OUN writers rejected both Soviet communism and liberal democracy and wished to instill a single-party state, living in the unrealized glory of battles past and an economic system that aimed to avoid class conflict.^[130] He also argued that violence was an "extensive, widespread and frequent" occurrence and was central in the group's ideology and policy; the group took advantage of wartime chaos to eliminate Polish, Muscovite and Jewish activist groups. However, he wrote that after 1943 some "peripheral concepts" came to substitute the fascist core, which led to a splinter within the OUN and subsequent democratization of one of its factions.^[130]

The political scientist Ivan Katchanovski described it as "a semi-totalitarian organization which combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism".^[131] Historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe wrote that the OUN had "created its own form of fascism" and that it "attempted to become a mass movement and to

establish an ethnically homogenous Ukrainian state. It viewed and used mass violence as a political aim and killed civilians *en masse*.^[132] He also wrote that the members of the movement "claimed to be related to movements such as the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, the Ustasa, and the Iron Guard".^[47] Marples has described how some writers in the OUN tradition, as well as some later Ukrainian writers, have been "self-deceptive" in emphasizing the absence of racism from OUN ideology, downplaying its connection to western European fascism, and suggesting that the Ukrainian brand of nationalism was a product of domestic development.^[123]

Political scientist Alexander J. Motyl considered the OUN to have fascist inclinations, but viewed it to be a kind of nationalist movement, with differences from fascism arising from the goal of nationalists to create nations, rather than run existing nations. He compared it in its nature to other national liberation movements which had authoritarian inclinations, strong leaders, and engaged in violence and terrorism, such as the Algerian National Liberation Front or the Palestine Liberation Organization.^{[133][134]} According to historian Stanley Payne "there were elements in [the OUN] that favored fascism, but it was not so much a revolutionary movement as a composite radical nationalism". He said it was "highly authoritarian and violently antisemitic" but said that was "rather common in the East European politics of the era". According to him, it was on the "extreme end of the radical right but not fully fascist", and the ideology was comparable to Putinism, saying the only difference between them is the antisemitism.^[135]

Political scientist Luboš Veselý criticises Rossoliński-Liebe as intentionally painting all Ukrainian nationalists negatively. Per Veselý, Rossoliński-Liebe "considers nationalism in general to be closely related to fascism" and fails to put Ukrainian nationalism, as well as antisemitism and fascist movements, in context of their rise in other European countries at the time. Rossoliński-Liebe does not mention arguments of other Ukrainian historians, such as Heorhii Kasianov. Veselý rejects Rossoliński-Liebe's conclusion that Ukrainian nationalists needed the protection of Nazi Germany and therefore collaborated with them.^[136]

Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Zaitsev notes that Rossolinski-Liebe's approach ignores "the fundamental differences between ultra-nationalist movements of nations with and without a state". Zaitsev highlights that the OUN did not identify itself with fascism, but "officially objected to this identification". Zaitsev suggests that it would be more correct to see the OUN as the revolutionary ultranationalist movements of stateless nations, which were aiming not to "the reorganization of the existing state according to totalitarian principles, but to create a new state, using all available means, including terror, to this end." According to Zaitsev, Rossolinski-Liebe omits some facts, which do not fit into his "a priori scheme of 'fascism', 'racism' and 'genocidal nationalism'", and denies "the presence of liberatory and democratic elements" in Bandera movement.^[137]

Beyond World War II

Many Ukrainian historians, such as Peter Potichnyj, have argued that from 1941 and especially after the war, the OUN developed in a pro-democratic and anti-Nazi direction.^{[123][138]} After the Second World War, OUN émigrés and UPA members began to produce documents that emphasised this shift and downplayed the controversial aspects of the organization. For example, they published anti-Nazi texts by OUN activists.^[123] In some documents, they removed statements related to fascism or the Holocaust; in one case, they reprinted the April 1941 resolution in Kraków of the Second Great Congress of OUN, omitting that the organisation adopted an official salute consisting of the fascist salute while shouting "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!".^[11] OUN's denials of its role in the Holocaust began in 1943

after it became obvious that Germany would lose the war. What Rossolinski describes as a whitewashing of its history continued after the war, with OUN's propaganda describing its legacy as a "heroic Ukrainian resistance against the Nazis and the Communists".^{[139][140][141]}

In 1943, the OUN developed a new political program that focused on a "new order of a free individual. A man's free will should animate social life." The group also accepted a market economy, officially abandoned ethnic chauvinism, and accepted liberal democratic values.^[142]

Although the groups realized allegiance to these edits, and whether the group could in fact remove itself from the label of fascism is debated among historians, the result of these changes led to a split, which divided the faction into two groups, the fascists, and the liberals.^[130] The infighting of these groups was limited to diasporic communities in the US, Canada, and Germany.^[130] notably, the liberal faction became more powerful due to support from the United States Government which funded multiple thinktanks including the Prolog Research and Publishing Company.^[130]

Authoritarianism

The nation was to be unified under a single party led by a hierarchy of proven fighters. At the top was to be a Supreme Leader or *Vozhd*. In some respects the OUN's creed was similar to that of other eastern European, radical right-wing agrarian movements, such as Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael (more commonly known as the Iron Guard), Croatia's Ustashe, Hungary's Arrow Cross Party, and similar groups in Slovakia and Poland;^[40] however, there were significant differences within the OUN regarding its relationship to fascism. The more moderate leaders living in exile admired some facets of Benito Mussolini's Italian fascism but condemned Nazism, while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired the fascist ideas and methods as practised by the Nazis.^[143] The faction-based abroad supported rapprochement with the Ukrainian Catholic Church while the younger radicals were anti-clerical and felt that not considering the Nation to be the Absolute was a sign of weakness.^[66] The two factions of the OUN each had their own understanding of the nature of the leader. The Melnyk faction considered the leader to be the director of the *Provid* and in its writings emphasized a military subordination to the hierarchical superiors of the *Provid*. It was more autocratic than totalitarian. The Bandera faction, in contrast, emphasized complete submission to the will of the supreme leader.^[144]

At a party congress in August 1943, the OUN-B rejected much of its fascistic ideology in favor of a democratic model, while maintaining its hierarchical structure. This change could be attributed in part to the influence of the leadership of Roman Shukhevych, the new leader of UPA, who was more focused on military matters rather than on ideology and was more receptive to different ideological themes than were the fanatical OUN-B political leaders, and was interested in gaining and maintaining the support of deserters or others from Eastern Ukraine. During this party congress, the OUN-B backed off its commitment to private ownership of land, increased worker participation in the management of industry, equality for women, free health services and pensions for the elderly, and free education. Some points in the program referred to the rights of national minorities and guaranteed freedom of speech, religion, and the press and rejected the official status of any doctrine. Nevertheless, the authoritarian elements were not discarded completely and were reflected in the continued insistence on the "heroic spirit" and "social solidarity, friendship and discipline."^[145] In exile, the OUN's ideology was focused on opposition to communism.

Treatment of non-Ukrainians

The OUN intended to create a Ukrainian state with widely understood Ukrainian territories, but inhabited by Ukrainian people narrowly understood, according to Timothy Snyder. Its first congress in 1929 resolved that "Only the complete removal of all occupiers from Ukrainian lands will allow for the general development of the Ukrainian Nation within its own state." OUN's "Ten Commandments" stated "Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners",^[146] or "Thou shalt struggle for the glory, greatness, power, and space of the Ukrainian state by enslaving the strangers". This formulation was modified by OUN's theoreticians in the 1950s and shortened to "Thou shalt struggle for the glory, greatness, power, and space of the Ukrainian state".^[147] According to Door Karel C. Berkhoff, due to the influence of Roman Shukhevych on the OUN the organization in October 1943, issued a communication (in Ukrainian only) that condemned the "mutual mass murders" of Ukrainians and Poles.^[148]

Antisemitism

Antisemitism was a common attribute of agrarian radical right-wing Eastern European organizations, such as the Croatian Ustashe, the Yugoslav Zbor and the Romanian Iron Guard.^{[149][150]} The OUN's ideology, on the other hand, did not initially emphasize antisemitism - despite the presence of antisemitic writings.^[149] During the OUN's early years, there were many prominent Jewish members of the OUN, and the OUN broadly condemned antisemitic violence. In the 1930s, the OUN publically compared Jews to parasites and called for the violent removal of Jews from Ukrainian society.^[151] When the OUN allied with Nazi Germany in 1941 - the OUN-B called for the slaughter of Ukrainian Jewry, and the OUN praised the Germany for bringing their methods of segregating and executing Jews to Ukraine.^[152]

Three of its leaders, General Mykola Kapustiansky, Rico Yary (himself of Hungarian-Jewish descent), and Mykola Stsyborsky, who was the OUN's chief theorist,^[118] were married to Jewish women,^[153] and some Jews belonged to the OUN's underground movement.^[154] The OUN in the early 1930s considered Ukraine's primary enemies to be Poles and Russians, with Jews playing a secondary role as collaborators^[92] An article published in 1930 by OUN leader Mykola Stsyborsky denounced the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1918, stating that most of its victims were innocent rather than Bolsheviks. Stsyborsky wrote that Jewish rights should be respected, that the OUN ought to convince Jews that their organization was no threat to them and that Ukrainians ought to maintain close contacts with Jews nationally and internationally. Three years later, an article in the OUN journal *Rozbudova Natsii* ("Development of the Nation"), despite its focus on Jews' alleged exploitation of Ukrainian peasants, also stated that Jews, as well as Ukrainians, were victims of Soviet policies.^[151] Evhen Onatsky, writing in the OUN's official journal in 1934, condemned German Nazism as imperialist, racist and anti-Christian.^[155]

By the late 1930s, the OUN's attitude towards Jews changed to one of hostility. Jews were described in OUN publications as parasites who ought to be segregated from Ukrainians. For example, an article titled "The Jewish Problem in Ukraine" published in 1938 by the OUN, called for Jews' complete cultural, economic and political isolation from Ukrainians, rejecting forced assimilation of Jews but allowing that they ought to enjoy the same rights as Ukrainians. Despite the increasingly negative portrayal of Jews, for all of its glorification of violence, Ukrainian nationalist literature generally showed little interest in Nazi-like antisemitism during the 1930s.^[151] German documents from the early 1940s give the impression that extreme Ukrainian nationalists were indifferent to the plight of the Jews; they were willing to either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate, for their political goals.^[92] The OUN-B's

ambivalent early wartime attitude towards the Jews was highlighted during the Second General Congress of OUN-B (April 1941, Kraków) in which the OUN-B condemned anti-Jewish pogroms.^[156] and specifically warned against the pogromist mindset as useful only to Muscovite propaganda.^[157] At that conference the OUN-B declared "The Jews in the USSR constitute the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune and to channel them in a time of frustration into pogroms on Jews. The OUN combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and simultaneously it renders the masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow."^[158]

As the war progressed, the OUN's antisemitism descended into genocidal rhetoric and violence.^[152] Despite its official condemnation of pogroms in April 1941, when German official Reinhard Heydrich requested "self-cleansing actions" in June of that year - the OUN organized militias answered the call, murdering several thousand Jews in western Ukraine soon afterward that same year.^[159] During the German invasion of the USSR, Yaroslav Stetsko stated in a report to Bandera: "We are raising a militia that will assist in the extermination of Jews... I am of the opinion that the Jews should be annihilated by applying the German methods of extermination in Ukraine."^[160] The Ukrainian People's Militia under the OUN's command led pogroms that resulted in the massacre of 6,000 Jews in Lviv soon after that city's fall to German forces.^{[161][162][163]} OUN members spread propaganda urging people to engage in pogroms.^[164] A slogan put forth by the Bandera group and recorded in the 16 July 1941 Einsatzgruppen report stated: "Long live Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles behind the river San, Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows".^{[165][166]}

In instructions to its members concerning how the OUN should behave during the war, it declared that "in times of chaos... one can allow oneself to liquidate Polish, Russian and Jewish figures, particularly the servants of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism" and further, when speaking of Russians, Poles, and Jews, to "destroy in struggle, particularly those opposing the regime, by means of: deporting them to their own lands, eradicating their intelligentsia, which is not to be admitted to any governmental positions, and overall preventing any creation of this intelligentsia (e.g. access to education etc)... Jews are to be isolated, removed from governmental positions in order to prevent sabotage... Those who are deemed necessary may only work under strict supervision and removed from their positions for slightest misconduct... Jewish assimilation is not possible."^[167] Ivan Klymiv, the OUN-B leader in Volhynia, wrote a directive in August 1941 calling for the OUN-B to "wipe out Poles, Jews, professors, officers, leaders, and all established enemy elements of Ukraine and Germany."^[168] OUN members who infiltrated the German police were involved in clearing ghettos and helping the Germans to implement the Final Solution. Although most Jews were actually killed by Germans, the OUN police working for them played a crucial supporting role in the liquidation of 200,000 Jews in Volyn in the beginning of the war.^[169] OUN bands also killed Jews who had fled into the forests from the Germans.^[170] One of the UPA leaders reportedly compared the OUN's massacres of Poles to the Final Solution: "When it comes to the Polish question, this is not a military but a minority question. We will solve it as Hitler solved the Jewish question."^[171] The OUN did help some Jews to escape in isolated cases. According to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin, dated 30 March 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews."^{[172][173]}

Once the OUN was at war with Germany, anti-Jewish instances lessened, but never stopped. According to documents released from the Security Service of Ukraine, the OUN not only never gave up its antisemitic ideology and always associated Jews with communists. Among the documents released was this, giving

clear evidence of continued antisemitism.

"National minorities are divided into a / friendly to us ... b / hostile to us Muscovites, Poles, Jews ... a / They have the same rights as Ukrainians, we allow them to return to their homeland. b / Extermination in the struggle, in particular those that will fight the regime; extermination mainly of the intelligentsia, which is not free to admit to any government, and in general make it impossible to produce the intelligentsia, that is, access to schools, etc. Eg the so-called to assimilate Polish peasants, realizing to them that they are Ukrainians, only of the Latin rite ... To destroy leaders, to isolate Jews, to move from governments to avoid sabotage, especially Muscovites and Poles. If there was an irresistible need to leave a Jew in the household apparatus, put our policeman over his head and eliminate him for the slightest offence. Only Ukrainians can be leaders of individual spheres of life, not foreigners - enemies. Our government must be terrible for its opponents. Terror for foreign enemies and traitors. / Аpx.чup. № 376, v.6, ark.294-302 /.

—Reference of the Security Service of Ukraine № 113 "On the activities of the OUN-UPA" dated 30 July 1993


Legacy

A number of contemporary far-right Ukrainian political organizations claim to be inheritors of the OUN's political traditions, including Svoboda, Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self Defence, and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists.^{[24][nb 8][174]} According to historian Per Anders Rudling, one of the reasons the role of the OUN remains contested in historiography is the fact that some of these later political inheritors developed literature justifying or denying the organization's fascist political heritage and collaboration with Nazi Germany.^{[24][nb 9][175]}

On 1 October 2023, during the Defenders Day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy handed honorary titles, insignia and battle flags to military units, including a ribbon of honorary name to the 131st separate reconnaissance battalion of the Ground Forces, named in honor of OUN founder Yevhen Konovalets.^{[176][177][178]}

Symbols

The organization's symbols were established in 1932 and were published in a magazine 'Building a Nation' (Ukrainian: Розбудова Нації, *Rozbudova Natsii*). The author of the OUN emblem with a stylized trident (*tryzub*) was Robert Lisovskyi. The organization's anthem "We were born in a great hour" (Ukrainian: Зродились ми великої години) was finalized in 1934 and also was published in the same magazine. Its lyrics were written by Oles Babiy, and its music by composer Omelian Nyzhankivsky.



Flag of OUN-M

For a long time OUN did not officially have its own flag. However, during the Hungarian campaign against the Republic of Carpathian Ukraine in 1939, Carpathian Sich, a militarized wing of OUN, adopted its flag from the OUN's emblem – a golden trident on a blue background. The flag was finalized and officially adopted by the organization only in 1964 at the 5th Assembly of Ukrainian Nationalists. The blue and yellow colours have a strong association with Ukrainian nationalism, including the 1917 Ukrainian People's Republic.^[179]

When the organisation split in 1941, OUN-B refused to adopt the trident as a symbol and came up with its own heraldry. Lisovskyi created the organizational emblem for OUN-B as well. The central element of the new emblem was a stylized cross within a triangle. The flag and emblem consist of two colors: red and black. According to Bohdan Hoshovsky, the color combination of red and black was based on a concept of the OUN ideologue and veteran of the Ukrainian Galician Army Yulian Varanasi.^[180] According to some sources, the black color symbolizes the black earth ("Chornozem") that Ukraine is synonymous for, and the red color represents blood spilled for Ukraine.^[181] Rudling summarises this as symbolising blood and soil.^[182] Others, such as Natalia Khanenko-Friesen, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (and scholar of Ukrainian folklore), say the red is traditionally synonymous with "life" rather than with violence. "Blood as life, as blossom, and not as blood lost in battles."^[183] Jars Balan, head of the Ukrainian Canadian Studies Centre at the University of Alberta, says "The red is for love and the black is for sorrow and how they are intertwined", with references to those colours occurring in Slavic songs and poetry since the 12th century.^{[184][182]}



Flag of UNA and OUN-B

Veteran status of OUN members

In late March 2019 former OUN combatants (and other living former members of irregular Ukrainian nationalist armed groups that were active during World War II and the first decade after the war) were officially granted the status of veterans.^[185] This meant that for the first time they could receive veteran benefits, including free public transport, subsidized medical services, annual monetary aid, and public utilities discounts (and will enjoy the same social benefits as former Ukrainian soldiers Red Army of the Soviet Union).^[185] There had been several previous attempts to provide former Ukrainian nationalist fighters with official veteran status, especially during the 2005–2009 administration President Viktor Yushchenko, but all failed.^[185]

Leaders

Early OUN

No.	Picture	Name (Birth–Death)	Time in office	Citizenship/Allegiance
1		<u>Yevhen Konovalets</u> (1891–1938)	1929–1938	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Austria-Hungary</u> <u>Ukrainian People's Republic</u>
2		<u>Andriy Melnyk</u> (1899–1964)	1938–1940	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Austria-Hungary</u> <u>Ukrainian People's Republic</u>

OUN (Melnyk)

- Andriy Melnyk (1940–1964)
- Oleh Shtul (1964–1977)
- Denys Kvitkovskyyi (1977–1979)
- Mykola Plaviuk (1979–2012)
- Bohdan Chervak (2012–present)

OUN (Bandera)

- Stepan Bandera (1940–1959)
- Stepan Lenkavskyyi (1959–1968)
- Yaroslav Stetsko (1968–1986)
- Vasyl Oleskiv (1986–1991)
- Slava Stetsko (1991–2001)
- Andriy Haidamakha (2001–2009)
- Stefan Romaniw (2009–2022)^[186]
- Oleh Medunytsia (2022–present)^[187]

OUN (abroad)

- Zenon Matla (1954–1956)
- Lev Rebet (1956–1957)
- Roman Ilnytskyi (1957–?)
- Bohdan Kordyuk (?–1979)

- [Daria Rebet \(1979–1991\)](#)
- [Anatol Kaminskyi \(1991–present\)](#)

See also

- [Warsaw Process](#)

References

Notes

1. The OUN-B claimed to adhere to more centrist, democratic principles from 1943 to 1954. The renunciation of these policies led to a split between the OUN-B and a third group, known as [OUN-Z](#).^[10]
2. Prior to the end of 1941, both factions of the OUN pursued an alliance the Nazi regime - often fighting with each other to win the favor of Germany. However, no formal alliance was signed, and collaboration remained largely informal. OUN members joined collaborationist police regiments and anti-partisan formations. In 1941, the OUN-B and OUN-M both publicly declared the German occupiers to be their allies. In 1942, this arrangement collapsed as the Nazis began arresting leaders of the OUN en masse. In 1944, the collaborations between the OUN and Nazi Germany were restarted, and many Ukrainian nationalists joined the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, which the OUN-M leadership was involved in organizing.^[14] ^[15]
3. Starting in early 1942, the Germans began arresting leading members of the OUN, focusing on the OUN-B. The Germans sought out more moderate nationalist factions to collaborate with during the initial phases of the occupation. As the occupation wore on, OUN members were directed to desert the collaborationist police forces and join the UPA to fight the Germans. In early 1944, as the Nazis faced defeat in Ukraine, both sides renewed their collaboration. OUN and UPA leaders were released from prison, members joined the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, and participated in battles with the Soviets and mass killings of Jews and Poles.^[16]
4. The OUN and UPA were terrorist organisations,^[26]^[27] relying on terrorist tactics and collaboration with [Nazi Germany](#) that favoured the OUN at the expense of more moderate Ukrainian organizations, such as the [Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance](#); not all UPA soldiers were members of the OUN or shared OUN's ideology. The UPA was also responsible for the large-scale ethnic cleansing of Poles during the massacres of Poles in [Volhynia and Eastern Galicia](#) and the mass murders of Jews. The OUN also engaged in murders of Jews, such as during the [1941 Lviv pogroms](#),^[28]^[29] as well as of Ukrainians during the World War II and post-war anti-Soviet terror campaign in western Ukraine.^[30]^[14]^[31]
5. Rudling writes: "After the war, the UPA until 1953 continued a hopeless struggle against the Soviet authorities, in which they killed 20,000 Ukrainians. The Soviet authorities killed 153,000 people, arrested 134,000 and deported 203,000 UPA members, sympathizers and their families (Siemaszko, 2010: 93; Motyka, 2006: 649)."^[24]
6. Rudling writes: "OUN founder Evhen Konovalets' (1891–1938) stated that his movement was "waging war against mixed marriages" with Poles, Russians and Jews, the latter of whom he described as "foes of our national rebirth" (Carynnyk, 2011: 315). After Konovalets' was himself assassinated in 1938, the movement split into two wings, the followers of Andrii

- Melnyk (1890–1964) and Stepan Bandera (1909–1959), known as Melnykites, OUN(m), and Banderites, OUN(b). Both wings enthusiastically committed to the new fascist Europe."^[24]
7. From p. 523: "The term "integral nationalism" has emerged as the most accurate and least tendentious label for "active nationalism" in the scholarly literature on Dontsov and the OUN"^[124]
 8. Rudling writes: "After 1991, the OUN faced considerable difficulties re-establishing itself in independent Ukraine. It split between the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) in Ukraine and the émigré OUN(b), led by second-generation émigrés in Germany and Australia. Today, no fewer than four organizations claim to be the heirs to Stepan Bandera – KUN and the émigré OUN(b), the clandestine 'Tryzub imeni Bandery' ('Trident'), and VO Svoboda (Kuzio, 2011). The latter was initially founded in Lviv in 1991 as the Social-National Party of Ukraine through the merger of a number of ultranationalist organizations and student fraternities. Its ideology was inspired by Stets'ko's ideology of "two revolutions", one national and one social. As a party symbol, it chose a mirror image of the so-called Wolfsangel, or Wolf's hook, which was used by several SS divisions and, after the war, by neo-Nazi organizations. It organized a paramilitary guard and recruited skinheads and football hooligans into its ranks. Its appeal to Ukrainian voters was limited."^[24]
 9. Rudling writes: "The OUN wings disagreed on strategy and ideology but shared a commitment to the manufacture of a historical past based on victimization and heroism. The émigrés developed an entire literature that denied the OUN's fascism, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, and its participation in atrocities, instead presenting the organization as composed of democrats and pluralists who had rescued Jews during the Holocaust. The diaspora narrative was contradictory, combining celebrations of the supposedly anti-Nazi resistance struggle of the OUN-UPA with celebrations of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician) a Ukrainian collaborationist formation established by Heinrich Himmler in 1943 (Rudling, 2011a, 2011c, 2012a)."^[24]

Footnotes

1. Kuzio, Taras; D'Anieri, Paul J. (2002). *Dilemmas of State-led Nation Building in Ukraine* (<http://books.google.com/books?id=PbDPjfU-pZ8C&dq=OUN-B+radical&pg=PA166>). Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 166. ISBN 978-0-275-97786-3. "The OUN divided in 1940 into a radical wing under Bandera and a more conservative one under Melnyk ..."
2. Trevor Erlacher (2014). "The birth of Ukrainian 'active nationalism': Dmytro Dontsov and heterodox marxism before World war I, 1883–1914". *Modern Intellectual History*. **11** (3): 519–548. doi:10.1017/S1479244314000171 (<https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS1479244314000171>). S2CID 144888682 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:144888682>).
3. Myroslav Shkandrij (2015). "National democracy, the OUN, and Dontsovism: Three ideological currents in Ukrainian Nationalism of the 1930s–40s and their shared myth-system". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. **48** (2–3): 209–216. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.002 (<https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.postcomstud.2015.06.002>).
4. John A. Armstrong (1968). "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe" (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878147>). *The Journal of Modern History*. **40** (3): 396–410. doi:10.1086/240210 (<https://doi.org/10.1086%2F240210>). JSTOR 1878147 (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878147>). S2CID 144135929 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:144135929>).
5. Snyder, Timothy (1999). "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All'" (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925017>). *Journal of Cold War Studies*. **1** (2): 86–120. doi:10.1162/15203979952559531 (<https://doi.org/10.1162%2F15203979952559531>). JSTOR 26925017 (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925017>). S2CID 57564179 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:57564179>).

6. Carynnyk, Marco (2011). "Foes of our rebirth: Ukrainian nationalist discussions about Jews, 1929–1947" (<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/foes-of-our-rebirth-ukrainian-nationalist-discussions-about-jews-19291947/110829E5A0E4E7D3727ACCD4476F082D>). *Nationalities Papers*. **39** (3): 315–352. doi:10.1080/00905992.2011.570327 (<https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00905992.2011.570327>). S2CID 159894460 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:159894460>).
7. "Ethnocratic Concepts. Ukrainian Statehood in the 20th Century" (<http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e02.htm>).
8. "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other' " (<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249724458>).
9. Rudling, Per Anders (2016). "The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications" (<https://www.academia.edu/25782059>). *Fascism*. **5** (1): 31. doi:10.1163/22116257-00501003 (<https://doi.org/10.1163%2F22116257-00501003>). ISSN 2211-6249 (<https://search.worldcat.org/issn/2211-6249>). "Founded in 1929, the OUN was the largest and most important Ukrainian far-right organization. Explicitly totalitarian, the movement embraced the Führerprinzip, a cult of political violence, racism, and an aggressive anti-Semitism. It sought the establishment of Ukrainian statehood at any price.."
10. Marples 2007, p. 196.
11. Grzegorz, Rossolinski (2014). *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (https://books.google.com/books?id=SFH_BgAAQBAJ&dq=The+investigation+of+Bandera%27s+life,+his+cult,+and+the+history+of+the+OUN+and+UPA+are+highly+contingent+upon+the+study+of+archival+documents+and+original+publications.&pg=PA40). Columbia University Press. ISBN 9783838266848. "The investigation of Bandera's life, his cult, and the history of the OUN and UPA are highly contingent upon the study of archival documents and original publications. Because of the extremist nature of the OUN and its involvement in the Holocaust and other kinds of ethnic and political mass violence during and after the Second World War, OUN émigrés and UPA veterans began producing forged or manipulated documents during the Cold War, by means of which they whitewashed their own history. They removed undesirable and inconvenient phrases from republished documents, especially those relating to fascism, the Holocaust, and other atrocities. In 1955, for example, in a new edition of documents entitled *The OUN in the Light of the Resolutions of Great Congresses*, the OUN reprinted the resolutions of the Second Great Congress of the OUN in Cracow in April 1941. According to the original resolutions, the OUN adopted a fascist salute, consisting of raising the right arm "slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head," while saying "Glory to Ukraine" (Slava Ukraïni!), and answering "Glory to the Heroes" (Heroiam Slava!)"
12. Yurkevich, Myroslav (1993). "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (<http://www.encyclopediiaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CO%5CR%5COrganizationofUkrainianNationalists.htm>). *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Retrieved 9 December 2022.
13. Potocki, Robert (2003). *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=HtwsAQAAIAAJ>) (in Polish). Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. p. 105. ISBN 978-83-917615-4-0.

14. Piotrowski, Tadeusz (1998). *Poland's Holocaust* (<http://archive.org/details/polandsholocaust00piot>). McFarland. pp. 224, 233, 234. ISBN 978-0-7864-0371-4 – via Internet Archive. "... after the massive exodus of the Polish people created a hiatus in the flow of requisitions, the Germans decided to stop the UPA terrorist attacks against civilians ... These anti-Jewish actions were carried out by the members of the Ukrainian police who eventually joined the UPA ... By October (1944), all of Eastern Poland lay in Soviet hands. As the German army began its withdrawal, the UPA began to attack its rearguard and seize its equipment. The Germans reacted with raids on UPA positions. On July 15, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, or UHVR, an OUN-B outfit) was formed and, at the end of that month, signed an agreement with the Germans for a unified front against the Soviet threat. This ended the UPA attacks as well as the German countermeasures. In exchange for diversionary activities in the rear of the Soviet front, Germans began providing the Ukrainian underground with supplies, arms, and training materials."
15. Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz (2014). *Stepan Bandera: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 165–245. ISBN 978-3-8382-0684-4.
16. Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz (2014). *Stepan Bandera: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 224–250. ISBN 978-3-8382-0684-4.
17. Bellant, Russ (1991). *Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=ZWAHmLuZeloC>). South End Press. p. 69. ISBN 978-0-89608-418-6. "During the rise of European fascism after World War I, some Ukrainian nationalist groups tied their hopes to fascism as an ideology and then collaborated with Hitler and nazism in World War II. One Ukrainian nationalist group was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which split into two organizations: a less militant wing, led by Andrew Melnyk and known as OUN-M, and the extremist group of Stepan Bandera, known as OUN-B."
18. Rudling 2011, p. 2 "The ideology of the organization was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Dmytro Dontsov, Italian Fascism, Nietzsche, and German National Socialism, combining extreme nationalism with terrorism, corporatism, and the Führerprinzip."
19. Albanese, David C. S. (2015). *In Search of a Lesser Evil Anti Soviet Nationalism and the Cold War* (<https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/neu:rx915s212/fulltext.pdf>) (PDF). Boston: Northeastern University. p. 188. "OUN leaders emulated the Nazi's organizational structure and portions of its political ideology. Both wings of the OUN had an affinity for Nazi-style organization, based on the dictatorial fiihrerprinzip that placed a single leader above the law itself."
20. Marples, David (2013). "The OUN, 1929–43" (<https://books.openedition.org/ceup/545>). *Heroes and Villains*. Central European University Press. pp. 79–123. ISBN 9789637326981. "Most writers concur that the UVO was one of the principal foundation stones for the creation of OUN, which—Kost' Bondarenko maintains—"was a classical, radical rightist terrorist organization," ideologically close to Fascism of the Italian type, which was believed to be the "avant-garde European ideology" of that time"
21. Himka, John-Paul (2021). *Ukrainian Nationalists and the Holocaust* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=7OtDEAAQBAJ&dq=OUN+fascist+salute&pg=PA145>). BoD – Books on Demand. ISBN 978-3-8382-1548-8. "The question of whether OUN was fascist has exercised a number of scholars, particularly since the rehabilitation of the nationalists in independent Ukraine. OUN certainly looked fascist. At the trials of the OUN leaders in 1935-36, OUN defendants and witnesses shocked the courtroom by giving what a Polish newspaper called "the Hitlerite greeting. ... "The organizational greeting has the form of raising the extended right arm to the right, higher than the crown of the head. The mandatory words of the full greeting: 'Glory to Ukraine!' with the answer 'Glory to the heroes.'" The same document stipulated that the (Banderite) OUN was to have its own flag, in red and black which alluded to the German nationalist and national socialist concept of blood and soil."

22. Wodak, Ruth; Richardson, John E. (2013). *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=XMIG9aJxuxAC>). Routledge. p. 229. ISBN 978-0-415-89919-2. "OUN relied on terrorism, violence and assassinations, not least against other Ukrainians, to achieve its goal of a totalitarian and ethnically homogenous Ukrainian nation-state... The former Marxist Dmytro Dontsov created an indigenous Ukrainian fascism based upon Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Sorel and Charles Maurras and translated the works of Hitler and Mussolini into Ukrainian"
23. Bresciani, Marco (2021). *Conservatives and Right Radicals in Interwar Europe* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=luPHzQEACAAJ>). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-367-22516-2. "The ideology, organisational foundations and political style of the OUN were markedly influenced by fascism, especially Italian, and from 1929 to 1939 this influence steadily increased... The German version of fascism – National Socialism – attracted the attention of the Ukrainian Nationalists in the autumn of 1930, when the NSDAP achieved its first major success in the Reichstag elections."
24. Rudling, Per Anders (2013). "The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right: The Case of VO Svoboda" (<http://defendinghistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PA-Rudling-on-Return-of-Ukrainian-Far-Right-2013.pdf>) (PDF). In Wodak and Richardson (ed.). *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text*. New York: Routledge. pp. 229–235.
25. "Державний архів Львівської області" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20170105084537/http://www.archivelviv.gov.ua/materials/exhibitions/do-21-richchja-vidnovlennja-nezalezhnosti-ukrajini/1146/>). Archived from the original (<http://www.archivelviv.gov.ua/materials/exhibitions/do-21-richchja-vidnovlennja-nezalezhnosti-ukrajini/1146/>) on 5 January 2017. Retrieved 19 December 2016.
26. Snyder, Timothy (2004). *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=xSpEynLxJ1MC>). Yale University Press. p. 143 (<https://books.google.com/books?id=xSpEynLxJ1MC&dq=%22Organization+of+Ukrainian+Nationalists%22+terrorist&pg=PA143>). ISBN 978-0-300-10586-5. "The OUN was an illegal, conspirational, and terrorist organization bound to destroy the status quo. The OUN counted on German help ... Germany was the only possible ally."
27. Katchanovski, Ivan (2013). "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the Nazi Genocide in Ukraine" (<https://www.academia.edu/6414323>). *Paper Presented at the "Collaboration in Eastern Europe During World War II and the Holocaust" Conference, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies*. "The OUN and the UPA can both be classified as terrorist organizations because their actions correspond to academic definitions of terrorism as the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors in order to intimidate and to achieve political goals."
28. Delphine, Bechtel (2013). *The Holocaust in Ukraine – New Sources and Perspectives – The 1941 pogroms as represented in Western Ukrainian historiography and memorial culture* (<https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20130500-holocaust-in-ukraine.pdf>) (PDF). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. pp. 3, 6. "Some Ukrainian immigrant circles in Canada, the United States, and Germany had been active for decades in trying to suppress the topic and reacted to any testimony about Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence with virulent diatribes against what they dismissed as 'Jewish propaganda' ... the Ukrainian Insurrectional Army (UPA), which was responsible for ethnic "cleansing" actions against Poles and Jews in Volhynia and Galicia."

29. Plokhyy, Serhii (2015). *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (<https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/gates-europe-history-ukraine>). New York: Basic Books. p. 320. "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which had close to 100,000 soldiers at its height in the summer of 1944, was fighting behind the Soviet lines, disrupting Red Army communications and attacking units farther from the front ... Among the UPA's major successes was the killing of a leading Soviet commander, General Nikolai Vatutin. On 29 February 1944, UPA fighters ambushed and wounded Vatutin as he was returning from a meeting with subordinates in Rivne, the former capital of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. He died in Kyiv in mid-April. Khrushchev, who attended Vatutin's funeral, buried his friend in the government center of Kyiv ... not all the UPA fighters shared the nationalist ideology or belonged to the OUN."
30. Friedman, Philip; Friedman, Ada June (1980). *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust* (<http://archive.org/details/roadstoextinctio00frie>). New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies: Jewish Publication Society of America. p. 179. ISBN 978-0-8276-0170-3 – via Internet Archive. "After the outbreak of World War II, the Germans constantly favored the OUN, at the expense of more moderate Ukrainian groups. The extremist Ukrainian nationalist groups then launched a campaign of vilification against moderate leaders, accusing them of various misdeeds ... As early as the spring of 1940, a central Ukrainian committee was organized in Cracow under the chairmanship of Volodimir Kubiovitch ... Shortly before the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities, the Germans, through Colonel Erwin Stolze, of the Abwehr, conducted negotiations with both OUN leaders, Melnyk and Bandera, requesting that they engage in underground activities in the rear of the Soviet armies in the Ukraine."
31. Katchanovski, Ivan (2015). "Terrorists or national heroes? Politics and perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine" (<https://www.academia.edu/16854200>). *Communist and Post-Communist Studies – Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, June 1–3, 2010*. 48 (2–3): 15. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.006 (<https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.postcomstud.2015.06.006>). ISSN 0967-067X (<https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0967-067X>). "However, historical studies and archival documents show that the OUN relied on terrorism and collaborated with Nazi Germany in the beginning of World War II. The OUN-B (Stepan Bandera faction) by means of its control over the UPA masterminded a campaign of ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia during the war and mounted an anti-Soviet terror campaign in Western Ukraine after the war. These nationalist organizations, based mostly in Western Ukraine, primarily, in Galicia, were also involved in mass murder of Jews during World War II. The 2009 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey shows that only minorities of the residents of Ukraine have favorable views of the OUN-B and the UPA and deny involvement of these organizations in mass murders of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews in the 1940s."
32. Timothy Snyder. (2004) *The Reconstruction of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 168
33. Motyka 2006, p. 124.
34. "Poland's president expresses regret over 1947 Akcja Wisla (<http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2002/170202.shtml>) Archived (<https://web.archive.org/web/20200806010238/http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2002/170202.shtml>) 6 August 2020 at the Wayback Machine", *The Ukrainian Weekly*
35. Rudling, Per Anders (2013). "The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right: The Case of VO Svoboda". In Wodak and Richardson (ed.). *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text*. New York: Routledge. pp. 229–235. "During the Cold War, US, West German, and British intelligence utilized various OUN wings in ideological warfare and covert actions against the Soviet Union (Breitman and Goda, 2010: 73–98; Breitman, Goda, Naftali and Wolfe, 2005). Funded by the CIA, which sponsored Lebed's immigration to the United States and protected him from prosecution for war crimes, OUN(z) activists formed the core of the Proloh Research and Publishing Association, a pro-nationalist semi academic publisher."
36. Motyka 2006, p. 36.

37. Christopher Gilley (2006). *A Simple Question of 'Pragmatism'? Sovietophilism in the West Ukrainian Emigration in the 1920s* (http://www.kices.org/downloads/KICES_WP_04.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20070930140122/http://www.kices.org/downloads/KICES_WP_04.pdf) 30 September 2007 at the *Wayback Machine* Working Paper: Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies pp. 6–13
38. Motyka 2006, pp. 37–38.
39. "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages/O/R/OrganizationofUkrainianNationalists.htm>). *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
40. Orest Subtelny. (1988). *Ukraine: A History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 441–446.
41. Snyder, Timothy (1999). "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947" (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925017>). *Journal of Cold War Studies*. **1** (2): 117. doi:10.1162/15203979952559531 (<https://doi.org/10.1162%2F15203979952559531>). ISSN 1520-3972 (<https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1520-3972>). JSTOR 26925017 (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925017>). S2CID 57564179 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:57564179>). "In interwar Poland, the Ukrainian nationalist OUN was a far smaller party than the moderate UNDO."
42. Compilation of various authors (2019). "Ukrainian Fascism" (<http://archive.org/details/ukrainian-fascism>). *A compilation of articles by various US, Canadian and European authors describing the role of various fascist organizations in Ukraine, from WW-II collaborationists (OUN-UPA, Waffen-SS Galizien, etc.) to present day neo-Nazis*. p. 257. "Before the war, the moderate UNDO party was more important among Ukrainians in Poland than the radical nationalists of the OUN. See Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, 'The 'Ukrainian National Revolution' of 1941'."
43. Shekhovtsov, Anton (March 2011). "The Creeping Resurgence of the Ukrainian Radical Right? The Case of the Freedom Party". *Europe-Asia Studies*. **63** (2): 207–210. doi:10.1080/09668136.2011.547696 (<https://doi.org/10.1080%2F09668136.2011.547696>). S2CID 155079439 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:155079439>).
44. Rossoliński-Liebe 2014, pp. 71, 77–89. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014 (help)
45. Motyka 2006, pp. 44–45.
46. Brown, Kate (2009). *A Biography of No Place* ([https://books.google.com/books?id=rUD2HppXjOIC&dq=Nationalists+\(OUN\),+a+nationalist,+terrorist+organization+which+had+plotted+to+create+an+independent+Ukrainian+state+in+eastern+...+led+by+Stepan+Bandera,+was+determined+to+use+the+German+attack+to+set+up+an+independent+Ukrainian+state&pg=PA214](https://books.google.com/books?id=rUD2HppXjOIC&dq=Nationalists+(OUN),+a+nationalist,+terrorist+organization+which+had+plotted+to+create+an+independent+Ukrainian+state+in+eastern+...+led+by+Stepan+Bandera,+was+determined+to+use+the+German+attack+to+set+up+an+independent+Ukrainian+state&pg=PA214)). Harvard University Press. p. 214. ISBN 978-0-674-02893-7. "... OUN), a nationalist, terrorist organization which had plotted to create an independent Ukrainian state in eastern Poland and carried out the assassination of several Polish leaders in interwar Poland. The OUN had many factions and was rife with ideological disputes, but on the whole it harmonized with the fascist, integral-nationalist, anticommunist, and antisemitic profile of German National Socialists."
47. Bauerkämper, Arnd; Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz (2019). *Fascism without Borders: Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945* (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvw04hnr>) (1st ed.). Berghahn Books. pp. 176, 177. ISBN 978-1-78533-468-9. JSTOR j.ctvw04hnr (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvw04hnr>). "It saw itself as a fascist movement, but it called itself the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and not the Organization of Ukrainian Fascists. The members of the movement called themselves the Ukrainian nationalists, too, but they claimed to be related to movements such as the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, the Ustasa, and the Iron Guard. Mussolini trained Ukrainian nationalists together with Ustasa revolutionaries in Sicily, and the OUN had offices in Berlin and Vienna."

48. [Rossoliński-Liebe 2014](#), p. 68. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): [CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014](#) (help)
49. [Rossoliński-Liebe 2014](#), pp. 73–74. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): [CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014](#) (help)
50. [Grzegorz Motyka](#), *Ukraińska Partyzantka 1942–1960*, Warsaw 2006
51. Alexander Motyl (1985). "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921–1939" (<https://www.proquest.com/openview/5c2d9eba815c6bfeb56224a242ad8ab5/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1820860>). *East European Quarterly*. **19** (1).
52. Chornovol, Ihor. "*Lvivska Hazeta* (Lviv Gazette), October 7, 2005. The Art of Compromises: Kyryl Studynsky and Soviet Rule" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20090615050644/http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2005/10/07/9554/>). Archived from the original (<http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2005/10/07/9554/>) on 15 June 2009.
53. Bohdan Budurowycz. (1989). Sheptytsky and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914 (chapter). In Paul Robert Magocsi (ed.). *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytsky*. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. p. 57. A more detailed sample of Sheptytsky's impassioned words condemning the OUN, printed in the newspaper of the mainstream western Ukrainian newspaper *Dilo*: "If you are planning to kill treacherously those who are opposed to your misdeeds, you will have to kill all the teachers and professors who are working for the Ukrainian youth, all the fathers and mothers of Ukrainian children...all politicians and civic activists. But first of all you will have to remove through assassination the clergy and the bishops who resist your criminal and foolish actions...We will not cease to declare that whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of our people."
54. [Motyka 2006](#), pp. 54–55.
55. [Rossoliński-Liebe 2014](#), pp. 70–71. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): [CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014](#) (help)
56. [Rossoliński-Liebe 2014](#), p. 71. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): [CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014](#) (help)
57. Armstrong, John A. (1968). "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe". *The Journal of Modern History*. **40** (3): 403. doi:10.1086/240210 (<https://doi.org/10.1086%2F240210>). ISSN 0022-2801 (<https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0022-2801>). JSTOR 1878147 (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878147>). S2CID 144135929 (<https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:144135929>).
58. [Motyka 2006](#), p. 75.
59. [Motyka 2006](#), p. 77.
60. Breintman and J.W. Goda. "*Hitler's Shadow*" (<https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf>) (PDF). *National Archives*. p. 74. "...the OUN turned its hopes toward the Germans. In late 1939 the Germans housed OUN leaders in Krakow, then the capital of the German-occupied General Government."
61. Motyl, Alexander J (2000). *Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Two-Volume Set* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=pvHRNNk9hHEC&pg=PA40>). Elsevier. p. 40. ISBN 978-0-08-054524-0. "One of the main sources of financial support in this period for the OUN was Germany."
62. Hnatiuk, Ola (2020). *Courage and Fear* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=8zm6DwAAQB> AJ). Academic Studies PRes. ISBN 978-1-64469-253-0. "...the Ukrainian Central Committee set up in Cracow under the leadership of Volodymyr Kubiyovych.."

63. Friedman, Philip; Friedman, Ada June (1980). *Roads to extinction : essays on the Holocaust* (<http://archive.org/details/roadstoextinctio00frie>). Internet Archive. New York : Conference on Jewish Social Studies : Jewish Publication Society of America. p. 179. ISBN 978-0-8276-0170-3. "After the outbreak of World War II, the Germans constantly favored the OUN, at the expense of more moderate Ukrainian groups. The extremist Ukrainian nationalist groups then launched a campaign of vilification against moderate leaders, accusing them of various misdeeds...As early as the spring of 1940, a central Ukrainian committee was organized in Cracow under the chairmanship of Volodimir Kubiovitch...Shortly before the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities, the Germans, through Colonel Erwin Stolze, of the Abwehr, conducted negotiations with both OUN leaders, Melnyk and Bandera, requesting that they engage in underground activities in the rear of the Soviet armies in the Ukraine."
64. Armstrong 1963, pp. 36–39.
65. Motyka 2006, p. 79.
66. Armstrong 1963, p. 159.
67. Armstrong 1963, p. 87.
68. І.К. Патриляк. Військова діяльність ОУН(Б) у 1940–1942 роках. (https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Patryliak_Ivan/Viiskova_diialnist_OUN_B_u_1940_1942_rokakh.pdf?) Archived (<http://web.archive.org/web/20161104141147/http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Patr/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8F%D0%BA.pdf>) 4 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine – Університет імені Шевченка Ін-т історії України НАН України Київ, 2004 (No ISBN) pp. 271–278
69. Motyka 2006, p. 81.
70. Motyka 2006, p. 85.
71. Motyka 2006, p. 86.
72. Motyka 2006, p. 84.
73. Motyka 2006, p. 88.
74. Kopstein 2020, pp. 219–220: Kopstein writes: "On June 30, 1941, on the eighth day of operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, a pogrom broke out in Lviv, the capital city of Eastern Galicia. Ukrainians, and to a lesser extent Poles, massacred their Jewish neighbors and fellow citizens. ... For the next two days Lviv witnessed terrible anti-Jewish violence at the hands of the local Ukrainian population and the Ukrainian militia, and under the Nazis' approving eyes."
75. Glöckner Olaf (2021). "The Collaboration of Ukrainian Nationalists with Nazi Germany". In Bitunjac, Martina; Schoeps, Julius H. (eds.). *Complicated Complicity European Collaboration with Nazi Germany During World War II*. De Gruyter. pp. 90–91. ISBN 9783110671261. "Ukrainian militiamen and civilians chased down Jews, took them to the prisons, forced them to exhume bodies of killed prisoners, mistreated and finally killed them."
76. Rudling 2011, p. 8 "OUN activists participated in the July 1941 pogroms, in which many of them displayed an above-average brutality. Upon their arrival in L'viv the commandos of the Ukrainian Nachtigall Battalion could rely on a fanatically anti-Semitic auxiliary contingent with good knowledge of local conditions. ... Similar pogroms took place across Western Ukraine. At least 58 pogroms are documented in Western Ukrainian cities, the estimated number of victims of which range between 13,000 and 35,000."

77. "Lvov" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20120307103305/http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005171>). *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*. 2011. Archived from the original (<http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005171>) on 7 March 2012. "Encouraged by German forces to begin violent actions against the Jewish population in Lvov, Ukrainian nationalists massacred about 4,000 Jews in early July 1941. Another pogrom, known as the Petliura Days, was organized in late July. This pogrom was named for Simon Petliura, who had organized anti-Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine after World War I. For three days, Ukrainian militants went on a rampage through the Jewish districts of Lvov. They took groups of Jews to the Jewish cemetery and to Lunecki prison and shot them. More than 2,000 Jews were murdered and thousands more were injured."
78. Yad Vashem, The Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority (11 March 2005). "July 25: Pogrom in Lvov" (https://web.archive.org/web/20050311225417/http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/chronology/1939-1941/1941/chronology_1941_18.html). *archive.ph*. Archived from the original (http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/chronology/1939-1941/1941/chronology_1941_18.html) on 11 March 2005. Retrieved 31 May 2022. "The pogroms were organized by Ukrainian nationalist circles with German encouragement. Among the Jews of Lvov, rumors had spread that the Ukrainians were planning a pogrom. As July 25 approached, an unusual bustle was noticed among the Ukrainian police in the city. Jews tried not to step outside. Early in the morning of July 25, groups of peasants from nearby villages began to flow into Lvov. They assembled on the premises of police stations, set out from there to the street accompanied by Ukrainian policemen, and assaulted any Jew whom they encountered with clubs, knives, and axes. Groups of Jews were taken to the Jewish cemetery and murdered brutally."
79. *Lower* 2012, p. 204.
80. *Breitman* 1991.
81. *Longerich, Peter* (2010). *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews* (<https://books.google.com/books?id=cxYqYIn73SgC&q=Petljura+Days>). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 194. ISBN 978-0-19-280436-5.
82. *Motyka* 2006, pp. 98–99.
83. *Rossoliński-Liebe* 2014, p. 234–236: "The OUN-B organized a militia, which both collaborated with the Germans and killed Jews independently." sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRossoliński-Liebe2014 (help)
84. "Book chapter (1941–1942)" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20110717125647/http://www.history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/4.pdf>) (PDF). *history.org.ua* (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original (<http://www.history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/4.pdf>) (PDF) on 17 July 2011.
85. A.B. Shirokorad, *Uteryannie zemli Rossii: otkolovshiesya respubliki, Moscow:"Veche"*, 2007, p. 84.
86. *Armstrong* 1963, pp. 91–98.
87. International Military Tribunal (1947). *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal ("Blue Series")* (https://www.loc.gov/item/2011525338_NT_Vol-XXXIX). Vol. 39. pp. 269–270.
88. *Armstrong* 1963, pp. 114–117.
89. *Paul Robert Magocsi*. (1996). *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press: p. 629.
90. "[Documents declassified and released by Central Intelligence Agency under Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act]: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (https://web.archive.org/web/20240602121113/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/QRPLUMB%20%20%20VOL.%201_0009.pdf) (PDF). 2007. Archived from the original (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/QRPLUMB%20%20%20VOL.%201_0009.pdf) (PDF) on 2 June 2024.
91. *Armstrong* 1963, pp. 142–165.

92. Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: *Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors* (<http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11.htm>) Archived (<https://web.archive.org/web/20170224172959/http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11.htm>) 24 February 2017 at the Wayback Machine by John-Paul Himka, University of Alberta. Taken from *The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency*, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 13 (1997): 170–189.
93. (in Ukrainian) Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія p. 165 (http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/11.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20080411144040/http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/11.pdf) 11 April 2008 at the Wayback Machine
94. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 3, pp. 152–153 http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/9.pdf Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20090303232902/http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/9.pdf) 3 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine
95. Timothy Snyder. (2004) *The Reconstruction of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 164
96. Motyka 2022, p. 143.
97. Rudling 2011, p. 14.
98. Marples 2007, p. 195.
99. Armstrong 1963, pp. 172–173.
100. Marples 2007, p. 293.
101. International Court of Justice. "IMT Nuremberg Archives. H - 3453" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20240522112500/https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/bz166rx2778/bz166rx2778.pdf>) (PDF). *Stanford University Library – Digital Stacks*. p. 136. Archived from the original (<https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/bz166rx2778/bz166rx2778.pdf>) (PDF) on 22 May 2024.
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103. Burds, Jeffrey. "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20070127004924/http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf>) (PDF). *history.neu.edu*. Archived from the original (<http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf>) (PDF) on 27 January 2007.
104. Martovych O. *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)*. Munchen, 1950 p. 20
105. Piotrowski, Tadeusz (1998). *Poland's Holocaust* (<http://archive.org/details/polandsholocaust00piot>). McFarland. pp. 224, 233, 234. ISBN 978-0-7864-0371-4 – via Internet Archive. "... after the massive exodus of the Polish people created a hiatus in the flow of requisitions, the Germans decided to stop the UPA terrorist attacks against civilians ... These anti-Jewish actions were carried out by the members of the Ukrainian police who eventually joined the UPA ... By October (1944), all of Eastern Poland lay in Soviet hands. As the German army began its withdrawal, the UPA began to attack its rearguard and seize its equipment. The Germans reacted with raids on UPA positions. On July 15, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, or UHVR, an OUN-B outfit) was formed and, at the end of that month, signed an agreement with the Germans for a unified front against the Soviet threat. This ended the UPA attacks as well as the German countermeasures. In exchange for diversionary activities in the rear of the Soviet front, Germans began providing the Ukrainian underground with supplies, arms, and training materials."
106. Розділ 6 – 2. Самостійницький рух у 1944 р. (<https://web.archive.org/web/20230531052241/http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/18.pdf>) [Chapter 6 – 2. Independence Movement in 1944] (PDF) (in Ukrainian). *history.org.ua*. p. 338. Archived from the original (<http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/18.pdf>) (PDF) on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2016.
107. *Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (<https://web.archive.org/web/20230531055004/http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/13.pdf>), pp. 174–180

108. Розділ 4. – 4. Протинімецький фронт ОУН і УПА (https://web.archive.org/web/20080411143921/http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/14.pdf) [Chapter 4. – 4. Anti-German front of the OUN and UPA] (PDF). *Institute of History of Ukraine* (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original (http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/14.pdf) (PDF) on 11 April 2008.
109. Marchuk 2012, pp. 37–38.
110. "Ukrainian News Agency" (<https://web.archive.org/web/20080317132156/http://www.ukranews.com/eng/article/109073.html>). Archived from the original (<http://www.ukranews.com/eng/article/109073.html>) on 17 March 2008. Retrieved 13 March 2008.
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112. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 8 pp. 462–463 <http://www.history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/30.pdf>
113. (in Ukrainian) Конгресс Українських Націоналістів (http://www.da-ta.com.ua/mon_mainnews/815.htm), Database DATA
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116. (in Ukrainian) The nationalists have been identified with a presidential candidate (<https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/11/19/7198643/>), *Ukrayinska Pravda* (19 November 2018)
117. Zelenskiy wins first round but that's not the surprise (<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/zelenskiy-wins-first-round-but-that-s-not-the-surprise/>), *Atlantic Council* (4 April 2019)
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139. Rudling 2011, pp. 14, 15, 16, 20 "The outcome of the battle of Stalingrad had changed the geopolitical situation and necessitated a reorientation. The OUN(b) now started to do away with its overtly fascist attributes. In February 1943 the Third Congress of the OUN(b) decided that raising the right arm was no longer to be considered an obligatory party salute and began to remove any references to it in their own documents...The OUN(b) leaders issued explicit instructions on how to blame pogroms and anti-Jewish violence on the Germans and Poles... One of these collections, "The Book of Facts" (Do pochatku knyha faktiv), was aimed at deflecting attention from OUN(b) and UPA participation in the Holocaust...It claimed that the Germans asked the OUN(b) to take part in a three-day pogrom in early July 1941, but that the OUN(b) regarded it as a German provocation, and refused...The Banderite narrative represented their own legacy as a "heroic Ukrainian resistance against the Nazis and the Communists" which had been "misrepresented and maligned" by 'Moscow propaganda' the OUN(b) and the UPA were fighting 'not only for Ukraine, but also for all of Europe ... The OUN(b) regularly censored any documents that contradicted the image they wanted to produce ... In 1947 and 1948, the OUN-UPA annual commemoration was presented as an oppositional, anti-German step. At this time, the OUN's denial of its own anti-Semitism was already categorical. In 1947, the OUN issued an English-language propaganda leaflet in post-war Poland..Given the particular stigma anti-Semitism carried following the Holocaust, pronationalist historians have gone to great lengths to deny its very existence. Denial of the fascist and anti-Semitic nature of the OUN, its war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and participation in the Holocaust have become central components of the intellectual history of the Ukrainian diaspora."
140. Rudling, Per Anders (2013). "The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right: The Case of VO Svoboda" (<http://defendinghistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PA-Rudling-on-Return-of-Ukrainian-Far-Right-2013.pdf>) (PDF). In Wodak and Richardson (ed.). *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text*. New York: Routledge. pp. 229, 230. "In 1943–1944, OUN(b) and its armed wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), carried out large-scale ethnic cleansing, resulting in the deaths of more than 90,000 Poles and thousands of Jews. After the war, the UPA continued a hopeless struggle against the Soviet authorities until 1953, in which they killed 20,000 Ukrainians. The Soviet authorities killed 153,000 people, arrested 134,000 and deported 203,000 UPA members, sympathizers and their families (Siemaszko, 2010: 93; Motyka, 2006: 649). The OUN was dominant among the Ukrainian Displaced Persons who settled in the West after the war....The OUN wings disagreed on strategy and ideology but shared a commitment to the manufacture of a historical past based on victimization and heroism. The émigrés developed an entire literature that denied the OUN's fascism, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, and its participation in atrocities, instead presenting the organization as composed of democrats and pluralists who had rescued Jews during the Holocaust. The diaspora narrative was contradictory, combining celebrations of the supposedly anti-Nazi resistance struggle of the OUN-UPA with celebrations of the Waffen-SS Galizien, a Ukrainian collaborationist formation established by Heinrich Himmler in 1943."

141. Rossolinski, Grzegorz (2014). *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (https://books.google.com/books?id=SFH_BgAAQBAJ&dq=The+investigation+of+Bandera's+life,+his+cult,+and+the+history+of+the+OUN+and+UPA+are+highly+contingent+upon+the+study+of+archival+documents+and+original+publications.&pg=PA40). Columbia University Press. p. 40. ISBN 978-3-8382-6684-8. "The investigation of Bandera's life, his cult, and the history of the OUN and UPA are highly contingent upon the study of archival documents and original publications. Because of the extremist nature of the OUN and its involvement in the Holocaust and other kinds of ethnic and political mass violence during and after the Second World War, OUN émigrés and UPA veterans began producing forged or manipulated documents during the Cold War, by means of which they whitewashed their own history. They removed undesirable and inconvenient phrases from republished documents, especially those relating to fascism, the Holocaust, and other atrocities. In 1955, for example, in a new edition of documents entitled *The OUN in the Light of the Resolutions of Great Congresses*, the OUN reprinted the resolutions of the Second Great Congress of the OUN in Cracow in April 1941. According to the original resolutions, the OUN adopted a fascist salute, consisting of raising the right arm "slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head," while saying "Glory to Ukraine" (Slava Ukraini!), and answering "Glory to the Heroes" (Heroiam Slava!)"
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145. *Armstrong 1963*, pp. 159–165.
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151. Myroslav Shkandrij. (2009). 'Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity.' New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 152–153
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153. Kost Bondarenko, Director of the Center for Political Research, *The History We Don't Know or Don't Care to Know*, *Mirror Weekly*, #12, 2002 (<http://www.mw.ua/1000/1030/34310/>) Archived (<https://web.archive.org/web/20080216044918/http://www.mw.ua/1000/1030/34310/>) 16 February 2008 at the *Wayback Machine*
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