"For the Eradication of Polish and Jewish-Muscovite Rule in Ukraine": An Examination of the Crimes of the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense

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This study examines the German-sponsored Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense (Ukrains'kyi Legion Samooborony, ULS), both its rank and file and its Ukrainian and German officers. Drawing upon sources in German, Ukrainian, American, and Israeli archives, the authors analyze the Legion's command structure, its relationship to the Third Reich, and its relationship to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists branch led by Andriy Atansovich Mel'nyk. The presentation of the political and military careers of lower-, mid-, and upper-level Legionnaires reveals their participation in killings of Jews, Poles, and other Ukrainians. The authors also identify the motivations of many of the actors. A close analysis of one case of German and Ukrainian "cooperation" in the Holocaust and other mass murders, this article relates to the debate over whether Holocaust perpetrators were "Ordinary Men."

On December 1, 1995 a short notice in *Svoboda* (Freedom), the oldest Ukrainian-American newspaper, stated that the memoirs of Mykhaylo Karakots' had been published in Minneapolis under the title *From Voronezh to the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense*. A veteran of the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense (ULS) and collaborator in the founding of the OUN (M)—the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (the "M" is for the charismatic leader Andriy Atanasovich Mel'nyk) during the Second World War, Mr. Karakots' had lived in the United States since 1949. The paper stated that the ULS was "a military unit of Mel'nyk's followers created in [the Western Ukrainian province of] Volhynia-Podolia (here, Volhynia) after a truce with the Germans in September 1943," and it described Karakots' as one of the founders and leaders of the ULS who "answers the question of why patriotic Ukrainian partisans who had previously fought against the invaders had unexpectedly changed their tactics."[1]

In June 2013 the Associated Press published a series of news items documenting that Karakots' was a former "SS officer" guilty of "burning down villages with women and children during the Second World War."[2] In March 2017 the Polish government announced that it would seek the extradition of Karakots' from the United States to try him for war crimes. Media outlets reported that the Main Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation had undertaken an investigation into his wartime activities,[3] but Karakots' cheated them by dying on December 14, 2019, to be buried five days later next to his wife in Minneapolis.[4]

Although scholars have devoted considerable attention to the ULS, many questions concerning its history remain unanswered. It is well known that its highest-ranking officers were Reich

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Germans, yet their biographies and activities remain largely unknown. Especially important are collective biographies and research on the "careers" of people who served in Nazi structures that carried out the Holocaust.[5] What were the Germans who served in the ULS like? What role did they play in the Nazi structure before they joined the Legion? What was the nature of their involvement in the crimes of the unit? What kind of relationships did they have with the Ukrainian officers and soldiers? How were the German officers of the ULS portrayed in official Nazi commentaries as well as in the postwar commentaries of former Legionnaires? What did official Soviet propaganda write about them?

The focus often falls on ideology,[6] relations with Germany,[7] and participation in the Holocaust and other war crimes by the OUN (B), B standing for Stepan Bandera, that organization's charismatic leader.[8] Such studies have analyzed the Bandera organization from 1941 to its merger with the UPA (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Researchers have paid attention to OUN (B) activists facing the "cooperation-resistance" dichotomy under German occupation, several analyzing how earlier service in police formations and participation in the killings of Jews influenced the behavior of former police officers in the UPA.[9]

The OUN (M) and its significant military formation, the ULS, have not received the attention they deserve. In his large-scale study Kai Struve writes about the OUN (M) only during 1940–1941.[10] Grzegorz Rossolinsky-Liebe's biographical study of Stepan Bandera and his movement touches on the OUN (M) mainly in the same years.[11] Much the same applies to studies of the German occupation and collaboration on Ukrainian soil.[12] So what were the incentives for Ukrainians to serve in the Legion, especially counter-intuitive given the background of German atrocities against Ukrainians? Were soldiers of the Legion involved in crimes against humanity prior to joining it? In exactly which killings did members of the Legion take part? What was their involvement in the Holocaust? What categories of Ukrainians served in the ULS? How effective was indoctrination of the ULS rank-and-file in the ideology of the OUN (M)? To what extent did the actions of the Legionnaires reflect the OUN (M)'s official line? We shall try to answer these and other questions in this study.

Sources

The records of postwar Soviet trials of former Legionnaires provide an exceptionally useful window onto events. Interrogation reports and witness statements not only depict Legion activities, but also shed light on specific individuals' biographies, *Weltanschauung*, and motivations.[13] (Of course it is necessary when using such sources to bear in mind the physical and psychological pressure Soviet interrogators employed, as well as the determination of the accused to reveal as little as possible.) Another important source was the SS files of Germans who served in the Legion, available in the German Federal Archive in Berlin. These reveal much about the career development of German officers in addition to their own Nazi indoctrination and involvement in the crimes of the Hitler regime.[14] Of great significance to the study were the attitudes of Ukrainian officers of the ULS toward German command in 1944 as reflected in appeals to the German command in 1944 that may be found in the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, MD, the Archive of the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich, and the Peter Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine at the University of Toronto Library.[15] The authors drew upon information prepared by the Mel'nykite diaspora, primarily in North America and appearing in such places as the newspaper *Novyi Shlyakh*, Legionnaire memoirs, and the writings of one of Mel'nyk's "official historiographers," Vasyl' Veruha. The authors found the contemporary press of the OUN (M)'s legal successors in independent Ukraine helpful.[16] The creators of the latter kinds of sources frequently "scrubbed" the history of the OUN (M) as a whole and of the ULS in particular, but the documentary heritage of the movement preserved in the Ukrainian diaspora and in Ukraine today aided the authors' analysis and deconstruction of the Mel'nyk narrative.

A Short History of the Legion

The late summer and early fall of 1943 were a critical period for the Mel'nykite underground and the partisan movement in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (RKU). The partisan units of the OUN (M) in Volhynia, created during the previous spring, had been effectively destroyed, disarmed, or absorbed by the Banderists. Many Mel'nykites had begun to reconsider the Germans as potential allies. The Mel'nykites and the Germans founded the Legion in November from the OUN (M) insurgent detachment under the command of Ilarion Polishchuk (underground name "Nechai"), who had operated in the Lutsk area, following negotiations between the German Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, SiPo) and Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) of the Volhyn-Podol'e General District (Generalbezirk) and representatives of the Volhynia regional council of the OUN (M) led by Mykhaylo Soltys (underground "Cherkas"). Subsequently, Soltys held the post of "political leader" of the ULS.[17]

The underground OUN (M) found itself in difficult circumstances at this time. The desire of many in the rank-and-file to continue the fight against the Germans collided with the intransigence of the OUN (M) Council, which clung to its new Germanophile position to the bitter end. At the same time, the new stance antagonized the local population. Nor did it help the Mel'nykites compete with the underground Bandera organization and its fighting force, the UPA, which had succeeded in disarming and subjugating almost all alternative insurgent units in Volhynia that summer and fall. The SiPo and the SD, responsible for the suppression of resistance, exploited the new alliance to improve contacts with all locals hostile to the Banderists; for their part, the latter exploited the isolation of the Mel'nykites for their own ends. The Germans' attempts to attract Ukrainian allies did not always yield results: persistent attempts to entice Taras Bulba-Borovets, commander of yet another insurgent movement operating in Volhynia, had proved futile—a de facto prerequisite for inaugurating talks with the Mel'nykites. One of the Germans involved in talks with Bulba-Borovets, Volhyn'-Podil'e SiPo-SD commander Obersturmbannführer Karl Pütz, had been in communication with him since fall 1942.[18]

The initial core of the ULS consisted of some 150 Mel'nykite partisans. After successful early cooperation with the Germans, the consequent liberation of Mel'nykites from German imprisonment, and the publication of recruitment propaganda, their number grew. By summer 1944 their ranks reached 1,000 soldiers.[19] The ULS's initial deployment in late fall of 1943 and the winter of 1943–1944 was to the village of Pidhaitsi, near Lutsk, which it left on January 18, 1944. A communication from OUN (B) partisan "Ivas'" reported immediately thereafter that the Legionnaires had captured and cruelly beaten several Bandera followers and others suspected of being in touch with the Banderists.[20] They also took part in an anti-Jewish "action." As Ivas' wrote, "Before leaving [the ULS fighters] shot some thirty Jews and several other people. We also shot a guy who [had] served in our unit but who had deserted and deserted to the Mel'nykite gang. No one trusted him, so we [caught him and] finished him off."[21]

ULS formation, date and location uncertain. Courtesy of Andrii Usach.

More likely than not, Ivas' was talking about the murder of Jews who had managed to hide after the final wave of killings in Volhynia from May to December, 1942. We should note that Soviet publications reported on the Pidhaitsi killings, asserting that about 100 persons were killed in that instance—Jewish skilled workers detained in the Lutsk prison, and people suspected of links to the pro-Soviet partisans.[22] Soviet writers alluded to other instances of ULS anti-Jewish atrocities, but we could not find confirmation of those in other sources.[23] It is uncertain exactly who gave the order to commit this particular crime. We cannot rule out the possibility that the Legionnaires on the spot may have carried out the massacre (as did local Banderists) on their own initiative.

The ULS spent more than a month after this event in conflict with Soviet and Polish partisans in Volhynia, for example, an "anti-partisan operation" against the Polish villages of Korchunok and Edwardpole near Volodymyr-Volyns'k during the course of which scores of inhabitants were murdered.[24] At the end of February 1944 it deployed to the German-controlled General Government of Poland, to be billeted in the villages of Moroczyn and Dziekanów in Hrubieszów district. Here ULS personnel carried out further "anti-partisan" operations in the townships of Moroczyn, Prehoryłe, Masłomęcz, Modryn, and Małkow that included the slaughter of Polish civilians.[25] We read in one March 13, 1944 underground report of the OUN (B) that "local riflemen and the Legion were shooting Poles on the Hrubieszów-Sokal' and Hrubieszów-Zamost'e roads."[26] In June the ULS redeployed for a time to Volhynia, where, according to available information, it engaged in the capture and murder of Banderist underground fighters.[27] In addition, Legionnaires helped to mobilize local inhabitants for forced labor in Germany.[28] Renewed deployment to the General Government in mid-July involved the ULS in new "anti-partisan" activities. As one of the Legionnaires later testified: "On Polish soil in summer 1944 operations took place every day or two and it's hard to remember them."[29]

Legionnaires frequently slaughtered Polish civilians. During a reprisal for the murder of German ULS officer Siegfried Assmuss near the village of Chlaniow on July 22, 1944, ULS soldiers burned to the ground not only Chlaniow but the neighboring village of Wladyslawin, massacring forty-four inhabitants, five of them children.[30] A participant later acknowledged, "I also shot at people with my rifle and set houses on fire. But I no longer remember if I killed anyone. I don't know the exact number of townspeople eliminated in [the] village, but we left no one alive."[31]

The best-known episode was participation of a UPS combat group in August 1944 in suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of August 1–October 2, 1944, including street fighting against soldiers of the Polish Home Army. It is impossible to rule out participation of ULS soldiers in the massacre of civilians in the Polish capital. One of the Legionnaires provided a description of his participation in events: "Throughout the three-weeks of street battles in Warsaw, the soldiers of our Legion fended off assaults of attacking Polish patriots no fewer than ten times as they strove to occupy the highway leading from Warsaw to its suburb of Praga, while soldiers of the Legion themselves went on the attack against the rebels six to eight times. In these clashes … no fewer than thirty soldiers of our Legion were killed or wounded."[32] Although rumors of the Ukrainians' cruelty circulated widely among the Poles, our sources provide no information about specific crimes of the ULS against civilians during the Uprising.[33] In the remaining months of the war the ULS continued to be involved in anti-partisan operations in occupied Poland and in Yugoslavia.[34]

In spring 1945, as the impending collapse of the Third Reich grew obvious, the Germans created a Ukrainian National Committee (UNK), which Andrii Mel'nyk joined, to consolidate all collaborationist Ukrainian military entities into one unit. In March they decided to absorb the ULS into the 14th, "Galicia," Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS, a move some of the Legionnaires openly disliked. Then in occupied Yugoslavia, these undertook to desert to the Serbian nationalist Chetniks, but the latter betrayed them to the Galicia Division command, which enlisted them all the same.[35]

The Germans of the ULS

The German high command tried to maintain a good number of German officers in any non-German units fighting in the German armies. As of early 1944, two German officers were serving in the ULS: SS-Sturmbannführer Siegfried Assmuss and his aide-de-camp SS-Oberscharführer Rauling, who was fluent in Russian. By fall the number of Germans had grown. Aside from the new commander, SS Sturmbannführer Ewald Heinrich Biegelmayer, and his aide-de-camp SS-Hauptsturmführer Herbert Weichelt, several more Germans had arrived. Among them we can identify the following: SS-Obersturmführer Hellwig (possibly Kellwig or Mellwig), SS-Untersturmführer Windhoevel (possibly Windhoefel), SS-Untersturmführer Schmidt, SS-Untersturmführer Otto Hoch, Staffel-Oberscharführer Leo Pressl, SS-Oberscharführer Schmelich, SS-Untersturmführer Walter Wäth, and a "Doctor Strum," who had all served before this in the Chelm SD.[36] Thus, as of fall 1944, some ten Germans were serving in the ULS. We have succeeded in compiling more or less full biographical information for three of them: two officers (Siegfried Assmuss and Ewald Biegelmayer), and one non-commissioned officer (Walter Wäth). We were able to find partial information about Herbert Weichelt.

Each of the three men experienced World War I and the break-up of the old German and Austro-Hungarian Empires as children. Two were German, the other Austrian. All came from families of minor officials or lesser intelligentsia. Assmuss was born on August 20, 1912 in the city of

Gross Plochotschin, Schwetz district, West Prussia (now Płochocin, Mazovetski province, Poland), to the teachers Willi Assmuss and Olga Assmuss (*née* Dobbrik). When he reached the age of six, Assmuss went to a parochial Protestant school in Sprindt.[37] Biegelmayer was born on July 21, 1911 in Parsberg, Oberpfalz, Bavaria. His father, Alois Biegelmayer, worked in the court system. His mother's surname was Hoferer; whether she worked is unknown. Ewald completed public school and his secondary education at a higher non-classical school in that same town.[38] Wäth was born on August 19, 1909 in Vienna, and from 1913 to 1923 attended a public municipal school.[39]

Assmuss's father was wounded in World War I and held a leadership position in the right-wing militias known as the Freikorps afterwards. Many Nazi leaders began their careers in the Freikorps, Rudolf Hess, Reinhard Heydrich, Ernst Röhm, and Hans Frank among them. Assmuss referred to his father's activity when he wrote his official personnel autobiography. His father had fought against Poles as a commander in the Freikorps, and in 1920 the family was compelled to leave their home in territory ceded to the newly reconstituted Polish state and move west. From 1920 to 1922 they lived in Berghausen, where Willi taught in the same school that Siegfried attended. Difficult financial circumstances then forced the family to relocate to Leutzbach. Siegfried attended public school there and subsequently in Altenkirchen, and then a Realgymnasium in Betzdorf.[40]

All three were attracted to the Nazi movement in the late 1920s as the economic crisis grew worse. Assmuss first encountered activists of the NSDAP (Nazis) late in 1929. Enthralled by the ideology, he joined not only the Party (card no. 721 802), but as well the SA (Sturmabteilung, a paramilitary organization associated with the Nazi Party) in 1930 ("without telling his father," a conservative who disapproved of the Nazis' radicalism), and the SS (no. 49 786) in 1931. His political views not only caused Assmuss problems with his father, but got him expelled from school in early 1932. From this moment until May 1, 1933 (the significance of that date is not clear from his Party autobiography) he "devoted all his energies to the movement." His loyalty paid off when Assmuss was inducted on May 9 into the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (Hitler's personal bodyguard), where he remained until his promotion to SS-Scharführer.[41]

Biegelmayer joined the Hitler-Youth in 1929, and both the Party (card no. 482 311) and the SA in 1931 (reaching SA-Obertruppführer in 1937). In 1932 he joined the Labor Service of the German Student Union, directing one of the Union's camps in 1933. He earned a diploma in economics in 1935, moving on in 1936 to work at the SD in Königsberg, where he gained a reputation as an enthusiastic colleague. Biegelmayer joined the SS in late 1937 (card no. 272 273). In 1938, now as SS-Obersturmführer, he began work as director of Department II 23 of the Königsberg SD. He served in the military before the war, notably in the anti-aircraft artillery from January 30 to April 29, 1939.[42]

Wäth's career path differed somewhat, largely because he was an Austrian. Training and then working as a baker in Vienna from 1923 to 1929, he grew interested in the Nazi movement. Between 1929 and 1931 he was an enlisted man in in the Austrian armed forces, serving in a motorized military-police battalion. After this, however, he moved to Germany in 1932, joining the Nazi labor union, the National Socialist Factory Organization. When the Nazis came to power in 1933 Wäth was taking stenography classes, later moving on to a private evening school (1935–1936) for a diploma in economics. Of the three, he was the last to join the Party and the SS; as Biegelm, Wäth was accepted into the SS (1937, card no. 298 239) before the Party (1938, card no. 6 222211).[43] We could not determine the date that Weichelt joined the SS, but his membership number was apparently 196049.[44]

As World War II began in 1939, all three were working for the SD, either in Germany or in the newly occupied regions. All became to one extent or another complicit in atrocities: the Gestapo and Security Police (SiPo) and SD all played key roles in the persecution and annihilation of the Jews and in other crimes in Germany and occupied Europe.[45]

Following promotion to SS-Hauptsturmführer, Assmuss started work at the end of March 1940 as SiPo and SD inspector in Stuttgart. At the middle of the same year he was transferred to the Dortmund SD, where he remained until mid-1942. In June of that year he was appointed executive assistant of the SD at Radom, in occupied Poland, only to be sent shortly thereafter to Rovno (occupied Poland, later Reichskommissariat Ukraine). There, in Klepani district, he helped organize an SD battalion of Ukrainians. He next transferred to SD work in Lutsk.[46]

Biegelmayer followed a similar trajectory. As of fall 1939 he was SS-Obersturmführer, and from April 20, 1940, now as SS-Hauptsturmführer, headed the SD (SD-Leitabschnitt) in Koenigsberg. From June 1940 to October 1941, Biegelmayer directed the SiPo and SD in Metz, France, after which he moved to Brussels, to direct the SiPo and SD there until July 14, 1942. Like Assmuss, he was next sent "east." Early 1944 found Biegelmayer, now SS-Sturmbannführer, directing Section III of the SiPo and SD in Lublin. Here he had participated in the notorious "Harvest Festival" (Aktion Erntefest, the near final elimination of the Polish Jews), and specifically the November 3–4, 1943 destruction of the 42000 to 43000 Jews then in Lublin.[47]

For both Assmuss and Biegelmayer, posting to occupied Poland and Ukraine was a de facto demotion (we don't know why; it was more so for Assmuss). As of February 25, 1940, Wäth was working in the Krakow SD as head of Section II, and then in the section (formal designation unclear) dealing with questions of "Ukrainian and other ethnic minorities in the General Government," where he demonstrated "great political understanding of the Ukrainian Question." In the Krakow SD he rose from SS-Oberscharführer to SS-Untersturmführer, working there until summer 1944.[48]

In 1941 Weichelt worked in one of the German police structures, most likely the SD, at Sanok in occupied Poland.[49] Probably in the first half of 1942 he was transferred to Przemyśl, where from approximately January to June 1944 he headed the Border Police Commissariat with the rank of SS-Untersturmführer (and subsequently SS-Hauptsturmführer), subordinate to Commander of SiPo and SD Krakow SS-Oberführer Karl Eberhard Schöngarth. (The latter was infamous for his participation in the January 1942 Wannsee Conference that mapped out the total destruction of European Jewry.) In various SD positions Weichelt played a role in the extermination of the Jews of Przemyśl and surroundings, and notably the three well-known summer 1942 "mass actions" (July 27 and 31, and August 3) in which approximately 16,000 Przemyśl Jews were deported to the Belzec extermination camp.[50]

At this time the head of the military administration of the city, Major Max Lidtke (d. 1955), and his aide-de-camp Lt. Doctor Alfred Battel (d. 1952), saved from deportation a group of Jews then working for the Wehrmacht; after the war Yad Vashem recognized Lidtke (1993) and Battel (1981) as Righteous Among the Nations.[51] On August 24, 1942 Weichelt apparently sent to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler a detailed denunciation, though seemingly not in time to effect any result.[52] After the Red Army drove the Germans out of Przemyśl, Weichelt worked until early November 1944 in the SiPo and SD station in Warsaw.[53]

The Reichsführer-SS prized the reserve of "Nordic blood" in his order and urged its members to have as many children as possible—unsuccessfully. Despite this, for the 115,650 families of married SS members the average (in 1939) was 1.1 per family, and even for families of officers only

1.41.[54] All three Germans in the ULS for whom we have relatively complete information were married; all three spouses had strong links to the Nazi movement going back as far as the late 1920s. The wife of Siegfried Assmuss, Brunhilde (*née* Sainisch) was born on October 14, 1914 in Düren. Her father August died before his daughter was born. While Brunhilde was attending public school, her mother died in 1921. Later she attended Düren's principal vocational college. At this time Brunhilde's favorite entertainments were sports and music. Later she moved to Königsfeld, where she started to learn tailoring. In 1931 Brunhilde took an interest in National Socialism. Girls in her college were prohibited from joining political organizations, but she and her female classmates rounded up support for the storm troopers in Hamburg. In 1933 she joined the League of German Girls. Siegfried and Brunhilde were married in late 1934 or early in 1935.[55]

Biegelmayer's wife, Barbara Pitroff, three years younger than her husband, also had a history with the Nazis. Ewald and Barbara were married on June 2, 1937.[56] Wäth's wife, Erna Brendl, was eleven years younger than him, and was a sister in the National Socialist People's Welfare Organization before the war. They married in Krakow on December 28, 1943.[57]

Before a couple could obtain a marriage permit, the intended wives had to be tested by the SS Race and Settlement Main Office. But while Assmuss had two children (Wolf-Dieter and Folker-Guenter),[58] it was a big problem for Biegelmayer that his wife could not conceive. Aside from the pressure exerted on him by the SS high command, the Third Reich levied a special tax for remaining childless five years after marriage. A checkup in 1942 revealed that no treatment could help Barbara Biegelmayer.[59] Wäth and his wife apparently had at least one child in the last six months of 1944 or after the war.[60]

Himmler considered Christianity hostile to the ideology of National Socialism, and the SS leadership discouraged members from participating in church ceremonies.[61] Nevertheless, the ULS had its own chaplain, and all three Germans we know most about called themselves "believers." But Biegelmayer was such a fanatical Nazi that he officially withdrew from the Catholic Church. His wife followed in his footsteps in July 1943, her exit probably intended to signal compensation for the "flaw" of her infertility. Assmuss, Biegelmayer, and Wäth participated in SS rituals and received gifts from Himmler. Biegelmayer and Wäth got Yuletide lamps (*Julleuchter*), and both wore "Old Fighter chevrons" (*Ehrenwinkel der Alten Kämpfer*—members of the Party before it came to power). Biegelmayer had a Hitler Youth gold badge and bronze and silver decorations for ten and fifteen years of Party membership.[62] How Wäth earned the status of Old Fighter remains unclear, for he did not join the NSDAP until 1938; perhaps it was for his support of Nazism from the late 1920s in Austria, perhaps in part for his resettlement to Germany in 1933.

Assmuss met the future soldiers of the Legion for the first time in September 1943, when he twice took part in negotiations with representatives of the Mel'nykite partisans: Mikhail Soltys (Cherkass), Yuri Makukh, Mykhaylo Karakots' (Vovk). The first meeting took place in the cemetery of Mydushi village near Lutsk, the second in Lutsk itself. Along with Assmuss, Germans attending included the commander of the Volhynian SiPo and SD SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Karl Gustav Pütz, "two colonels," "three majors," and a representative of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in civilian attire.[63] These meetings concluded in the decision to collaborate.

Assmuss was one of those German commanders of foreign units who both remained adherents of Nazism and stood up for "partnership" relations with soldiers of "Eastern" collaborationist commands. In letters, Himmler expressed dissatisfaction with this "pro-Eastern" orientation. Thus, when the commander of the Waffen-SS "Viking" Division, Felix Steiner, declared that the war could be won only if the aspiration of Ukrainians to create their own state were taken into account and they joined Germany in a common fight with Communism, the Reichsführer-SS responded, "Do not forget that these 'good' … Ukrainians killed Field Marshal von Eichhorn in 1918 [i.e., in Ukrainian territory Germany occupied after the Bolshevik Revolution]."[64] Himmler reacted similarly to statements by a series of SS military chieftains urging abandonment of the dogma of the "sub-human" Slav, and substitution of a "New Europe" concept: "Discussions of a United Europe are nothing more than empty blather. There can be no talk of including Ukrainians and Russians in this Europe. I forbid once and for all any form of support for this approach, which the Führer unequivocally rejects."[65]

Andrii Mel'nyk lived in Berlin until the end of 1943 in an apartment in the Kurfürstendam district owned by retired General Hermann Niehoff,[66] but the Allied bombing raids drove him and his wife to Vienna, where the Viennese Gestapo arrested him on January 26, 1944, dispatching the couple back to Berlin under house arrest at a summer cottage in the Wannsee District. There the Germans interrogated the OUN's chieftain several times in January and February, the investigators including SS-Gruppenführer and Gestapo chief Heinrich Mueller and SS-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Wirsing.[67] The arrests of Mel'nyk and other OUN high command distressed the ULS. With the aim of lifting the fighting spirits of the Legionnaires, Assmuss traveled to Berlin to clarify the situation. On his return he informed the rank-and-file that Mel'nyk and the other leaders had been arrested for their "anti-German" stance, but he also predicted that "that everything would cool down and a positive outcome would take the place of it."[68] Assmuss continued to command the ULS until July 22, 1944, when he was killed by Polish partisans in the Krasnostav (Pol. Kasnystaw) district. Siegfried's brother Guenter, a captain in the Wehrmacht, was also killed on the Eastern Front.[69] After this Biegelmayer commanded the Legion until its merger with the SS Galicia Division in spring 1945. Under his command, in August 1944 the Legion participated in suppression of the Warsaw Uprising. Shortly after the war a French military commission unsuccessfully sought his extradition to be tried for crimes committed in Lorraine. The Federal Republic of Germany tried Biegelmayer early in the 1960s for participation in "Harvest Festival," but ultimately he was acquitted for "lack of evidence."[70]

The Ukrainian Soldiers of the ULS

Ethnic Ukrainians constituted an absolute majority of Legion personnel, but this diverse group included: (1) Mel'nykites (members and sympathizers); (2) "Petlyurists" (former officers of the forces of the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under Symon Petlura following the Bolshevik Revolution); (3) Banderists (members and sympathizers); and (4) "Easterners" (*skhidniaky*)–natives of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.

The most prominent members of the OUN (M) and (B) in the Legion represented for the most part a younger generation that had experienced the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the rise and fall of both the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) or the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) as children. The Petlyurists frequently had significant experience of the armed struggle for Ukrainian statehood between 1917 and 1921. Most if not all had lived abroad as emigrés after the collapse of the UNR and ZUNR. The Easterners had come of age in the Soviet system, most having previously served in collaborationist police structures and later having fled to German-occupied Poland ahead of the resurgent Red Army. During deployment in the Hrubieszów district from March through June 1944, the ULS sought to recruit from the local Ukrainian population, for example by means of an inflammatory anti-Polish leaflet of May 9, 1944,[71] but it is difficult to determine the results of such efforts.

We do know, however, that desertion was a factor. According to information from the OUN (B) underground, prior to redeployment to Volhynia in June 1944, some of the Banderist Legionnaires simply melted away.[72] A number of the latter did continue to serve nonetheless—but kept quiet about their orientation.[73]

The Mel'nykites

Volhynian Mel'nykites formed the backbone of the ULS. The Legionnaire Evdokiy Sobko testified that despite the fact that some recruits had had no previous contact with the OUN, in general, the unit consisted of OUN (M) supporters.[74] Ivan Ishchuk had become involved with the OUN in spring 1939. Mykola Gavryliuk had joined in summer 1937, and in September 1939 he and other members had disarmed a detachment of Polish police in Teslugiv and then burned an archive to prevent its capture by the Red Army. As early as 1940, Gavryliuk crossed to the German occupation zone of the recently dismembered Polish state.[75] Before Poland's dismemberment, both Gavryiuk and Ishchuk had been arrested by the Polish security services for nationalist activity.

The OUN (M) underground urged members enrolling in the ULS to sign up under pseudonyms, and thus deprive the German military authorities of fuller and more accurate information.[76] Evidently, some of the new Legionnaires were hoping to avoid trouble for deserting from various police entities in spring 1943. The practice of recruiting from the police draws particular interest. The OUN (M) leadership focused a great deal of attention on knowing as much as possible about their movement's cadres. A meeting of provincial and district leaders of the OUN (M) even established a position for an administrative assistant to work with local policemen. Mykola Nedzvetskyi ("Khrin") occupied this post in the Kremenets district while actually employed as chief of the Kremenets city police from 1941 to 1943.[77] Among other things, he conducted OUN propaganda among his official subordinates. In police courses in 1942 Nedzvetskyi and his deputy, Bonifat Barnai ("Zharyna," also a Mel'nykite and future Legionnaire), lectured their students that "the Bolsheviks are totally defeated, [and] that in cooperation with the Germans, we Ukrainians can set up our own independent state."[78] The OUN (M) never abandoned this position, either during its cooperation with the Germans or during Nazi repressive crackdowns. Their orientation may be seen in a New Year's Day 1942 leaflet in which Andrii Mel'nyk proclaimed, "We are living at the time of the birth of a new order in Europe. In a Europe that is renewed and consolidated under the leadership of National Socialist Germany, Ukraine must take its place side-by-side with other nations."[79]

Many researchers describe local police forces as an important instrument in the implementation of the Nazi program for Ukraine, including the extermination of the Jews.[80] The situation in Kremenets was no exception. Former subordinates of Nedzvetskyi testified that he induced them to guard the Jewish ghetto.[81] Testimonies of Gentile witnesses confirm popular participation in massacring Jews and looting their property.[82] Elsewhere too, men in the collaborationist police were likely recruits to the Legion. According to local rumor, in Volodymyr-Volyns'k the municipal policeman Petr Glyn had Jewish belongings transported to his house.[83] In 1941, 1942, and 1943 the above-mentioned Gavryliuk worked in various capacities for the police in Demidivka district, Dubno, and the villages of Teslugiv and Smyga. As police chief in Teslugiv, Gavryliuk was ordered in fall 1942 to arrest any Jews still living in the village and dispatch them to the ghetto in the district center of Kozyn. As he himself would later testify, "I assigned a squad of police which on my instructions arrested whole Jewish families and transported them under guard in a convoy to the ghetto in Kozyn village, where the Germans subsequently shot them."[84] Several days after that killing one of Gavryliuk's men captured a Jew near Teslugiv. They were planning to send him on to Kozyn, but the leadership there told them to kill him on the spot, which they did, simply burying the body near the police station.[85]

In the spring of 1943 the OUN (M) was creating its own partisan largely on the initiative of the lower echelons, perhaps more sensitive than the leadership to popular anti-German moods, and fearful that the Mel'nykites were ceding ground to competing tendencies in Volhynia (Banderite, Soviet partisan, and Polish). The most active Mel'nykite command was in the Kremenets area, under the command of Nedzvetskyi–the so-called Military detachment XXI (Vijs'kovyj viddil XXI), which attracted about sixty defectors from police units.[86] In May 1943 twenty men from this detachment under Oleks Babii ("Ariets") were sent to the Volodymyr-Volyns'k district as a new Military detachment IX. These two units do not seem to have been heavily involved in anti-Jewish "actions." But (contrary to the dominant view in the literature) they did take part in ethnic cleansings of the Polish minority. A 1944 propaganda text pointed to the presence of "Polish partisans" among the foes of the insurgent detachments of the OUN (M) in the Kremenets and Volodymyr-Volyns'k administrative regions.[87] A few of the anti-Polish actions were even conducted jointly with the Bandera OUN. Thus, on the night of April 30 to May 1, 1943, they launched a joint attack against the Polish village of Kuty in the Kremenets district of Volhynia. Former Mel'nykites wrote in postwar memoirs that all Polish houses there were incinerated.[88] In an internal report the OUN (B) acknowledged not only the burning of eighty-six farm buildings, but the slaughter of the local population as well for "collaboration with the Gestapo and the Soviet authorities."[89] Polish investigators believe fifty-six Poles perished in Kuty at that time.[90] On July 11, 1943 the insurgent detachment under Babii carried out attacks on the Polish settlements of Gurów and Wygranka in the Ivanychi district of Volhynia, during which more than 100 people perished.[91] After Banderists disarmed Babiya's detachment on June 30, 1943, one group of his insurgents continued to operate in the Sokal'shchina region.[92] Evidently this is what the local Banderist underground had in mind when reporting the arrival in northern Sokal'shchina of Mel'nykites who over the course of two nights on October 8–9 and 10–11 had killed fifteen Poles there.[93] For many Mel'nykites who joined the ULS, violence against ethnic minorities was not something beyond the pale; it certainly accorded with their propaganda.

In November 1943 a Mel'nykite leaflet urged, "What is in our interest today is not the struggle against the Germans, but quite the opposite—with the help of the Germans we must destroy as many Bolsheviks as possible."[94] The ULS turned itself into a German weapon, especially striking if one considers the fact that many Legionnaires and their relatives had been victims of the Nazis. One Kopylovs'kyi was arrested twice, first in August 1941 to remain in jail for more than a year; and again in September 1943, to be released upon the intervention of the ULS, but only on the condition that he join the unit.[95] Several men so joined rather than remain in prison. Thus Galyna Panasevych, who had been detained in April 1944 by the SD for evading compulsory labor in Germany and who spent three weeks in prison in Volodymyr-Volyns'k was freed on condition of recruitment to the ULS as a paramedic (assigned to monitoring the psychological state of the troops).[96] Vasyl Konash was dispatched to the ULS from Lublin (by Biegelmayer personally) in return for the release of his brother from the Maidanek concentration camp.[97]

ULS women, date and location uncertain. Courtesy of Andrii Usach.

Mel'nykites formed the most prominent group of ULS personnel in the postwar emigration. In March 1965 former Melnylite Legionnaires, in addition to other non-Banderist combatants, created the League of Veterans of the Ukrainian Resistance (Soyuz veteraniv ukrayins'koho rezystansu, SVUR), headed by the above-mentioned Taras Borovets.[98] One of the basic tasks of the SVUR was to legitimize their and other World War II collaborationist military formations. In the "memory wars" they spent inordinate energy promoting themselves over the Banderists. Despite this, in an October 1972 SVUR communication entitled "The Truth About the UPA," they acknowledged that "in the struggle against the German and Muscovite occupiers, all Ukrainian underground organizations, regardless of party affiliation, are inscribed in gold letters in the history of Ukraine and demonstrate their invincibility to the Ukrainian Nation."[99]

The Petliurists

Former officers of the UNR Army constituted a distinctive, if not numerous, group among the personnel of the ULS. The best-known were Volodymyr Gerasymenko, Petro Dyachenko, and Oleksandr Kvitko: respectively battalion commander, chief of staff, and officer in charge of military training. All of them had started in the Russian Imperial Army during the First World War. The politically crucial years of their activity coincided with the Ukrainian Revolution of 1918–1921.

In the 1920s and 1930s Dyachenko and Kvitko served as contract officers in the Polish Army.[100] During the Second World War, Dyachenko actively collaborated with the German intelligence services.[101] More likely than not, this accorded with his political views. A Banderist report from September 1943 quotes him, "I myself once led Ukrainian troops, and I loved Mother Ukraine and continue to love her now, but I see that today our only path forward is with the German people headed (pointing at Hitler's portrait) by this man here. By his order we must struggle and, when necessary, die."[102] Dyachenko's colleagues knew him as strongly anti-Polish.[103] He seems to have served in the ULS together with his son and daughter.[104]

At the start of World War II Kvitko also began to collaborate with Germany, and again specifically German intelligence.[105] In fall 1941 he briefly held the position of Commandant of the regional (*oblast'*) police in Kyiv,[106] and before he joined the ULS he directed the local "self-defense" (Ortschutz) unit in Chelm district.[107] We were unable to find reliable information about Gerasymenko's activities during the Nazi occupation. It is likely that he had contacts with the underground OUN (M), since he reported to the ULS in November 1943 on an assignment from a territorial chief named Yaroslav Haivak ("Bystri").[108] There can be no doubt that the experience of the Petliurists was respected in the ULS, but they did not enjoy any special authority for that reason. As battalion commander, Gerasymenko remained under the influence of Soltys and was considered a weak individual.[109] He may have been a homosexual, cohabiting with his orderly; word of this spread and gave rise to jokes among the men.[110]

With the possible exception of Kvitko, whose fate remains uncertain,[111] the postwar lives of the other former UNR noncommissioned officers who went on to serve in the ULS seems to have turned out well. Soviet intelligence suspected Dyachenko of working for American military counterintelligence.[112] In any case, he emigrated to the United States without difficulty. Curiously, Dyachenko's published 1950s memoirs concern the Second Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army (UNA, a short-lived German project just before the end of the war), which he commanded after leaving the ULS; his history with the ULS finds no reflection either there or in his unpublished papers.

The Banderists

A significant number of ULS clerical workers had passed through the OUN (B) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which it controlled. In most cases they had been forced to enlist in the Banderist movement and accordingly deserted at their first opportunity. For example, Nedzvetskyi found himself in the UPA after his Mel'nykite detachment was disarmed in July 1943, but the following November he defected back to the ULS.[113] The Banderists executed relatives of many Legionnaires. For example, when Glyn' deserted from the UPA, his parents, two brothers, a sister-in-law, and a nephew were killed.[114] Likewise, in May 1944 the Banderists killed the family of Viktor Romaniuk—his wife, two children, mother, and sister—and he had to go into hiding until he joined the ULS.[115] As he himself explained, he did this "without having any other way to save his own life."[116] Anton Borshchevs'kyi hid for more than a year to avoid mobilization into the UPA.[117] For at least some ULS soldiers, armed clashes with the Banderists were something like a blood feud. In early April 1944, around the village of Ludin near Volodymyr-Volyns'k a fight broke out between the ULS and a UPA detachment, during which the latter lost two killed and one wounded.[118] Still, armed clashes were the exception. More frequently, Legionnaires resorted to arresting and interrogating suspected Banderists, which often enough ended in the death of the latter. In May 1944 some of them raped and killed a woman linked to the OUN (B) underground.[119] The above-mentioned Konash, a Biegelmayer recruit, was required to "ferret out Banderists engaged in anti-German activities among ULS personnel."[120]

The OUN (B) also conducted propaganda against the ULS, characterizing it as an exclusively marginal enterprise and its organizers as adventurists trying to escape from Ukraine and, for this reason, unworthy of so much as a separate discussion with them. Thus, a UPA leaflet titled "Ukrainians of the Kholm region!" and dated May 7, 1944 commented on anti-Banderist propaganda of the Legion: "For a long time we did not reply to it, since for the authors of such leaflets we felt only the sympathy we would feel for the mentally handicapped.… We would have left them in peace and quiet if they had not tried to infect our social organism with their illness…. We have no intention of bringing up all the stupidities and inconsistencies in the above-mentioned leaflets; any child with [an elementary] education could easily debunk them."[121]

In this context, the presence of Banderists in the ULS seems quite remarkable. It is more likely that most fell into the Legion due to random circumstances, and they did not advertise their adherence to the OUN (B). On the other hand, members of the two factions had similar lifetime trajectories and ideological views. Thus could Orest Horodys'kyi defect to the ULS in August 1944 with a group from the 204th Schutzmannschaft der Ordnungspolizei (Auxiliary Police) Battalion. He had been arrested in 1939 by the Polish security services for nationalist agitation.[122] From 1941 to 1943 he had served—with OUN (B) permission—as an interpreter in the Wehrmacht. His diary makes clear his antisemitic convictions.[123] Along with the other Legionnaires, Gorodyts'kyĭ joined up with the 14th Waffen-SS Division in March 1945.[124] He actually became the author of one of the first official histories of the ULS.[125]

Evhen Popivs'kyi offers yet another example. A native of Vinnytsia, he joined the OUN (B) underground in 1941 and later held positions of oblast'-level importance.[126] The circumstances of his enrollment in the ULS are uncertain, but more likely than not, the Legion did not know about his previous activities. For this reason he was able to become commander of a machine gun regiment.[127] As Gorodyts'kyĭ, he ended the war in the 14th Waffen-SS Division, subsequently to emigrate to Great Britain, where he became a pro-Bandera publicist. In all likelihood, Popivs'kyĭ was the author of a 1952 essay critical of the ULS that appeared in the Banderist journal *Vyzvol'nyĭ Shliakh* under the pseudonym "E.P."[128]

The "Easterners"

In March 1944 the first group of Easterners joined the ULS,[129] a platoon under the command of Mykola Sobchyk along with a medical unit from the 101st Security Battalion of the Order Police. His command had commenced in May 1943 in the city of Starokonstiantyniv ostensibly protecting the railroad.[130] Soon enough it, as other similar battalions, was being assigned to mass murders of Jews and "anti-partisan" operations.[131] The nineteen-year-old (in 1943) Volodymyr Olynets' was another Easterner. His father, a veteran Communist, had fled early in the war, leaving his family to face German occupation on their own. Olynets' evaded being called up for forced labor, but was apprehended in summer 1943. Offered the chance to join a police unit, he agreed, and thus ended up in the 101st Battalion. In the ULS but schooled in Russian, he was retrained in Ukrainian as the language of command.[132] Early in his career with the ULS Olynets' took part in a clash with Polish partisans.[133]

Some Easterners ended up in the ULS after having been dropped from the 14th Waffen-SS Division. As a matter of fact this phenomenon occurred all the way up to the final merger of the Legion into that formation.[134] Among such recruits was former Red Army Lieutenant Vasiliy Lychmanenko, later accused by Soviet journalists of serving with the SD in Zhitomir and Rovno.[135]

For several Easterners the route to the ULS was more complicated. When the war started Vladimir Lushchik was only fifteen. In spring 1943 he joined a UPA regiment under the command of "Miron," and then the so-called "Sich" detachment under Sosenko ("Klishch"). For Lushchik, military life was a type of socialization, inasmuch as everyone regarded him, a non-native of the area, "altogether differently."[136] He carried out exclusively transport and liaison duties under the pseudonym of "Maly," but he also testified later about Banderist operations against not only Germans but Poles as well: "UPA detachments themselves at first engaged in armed clashes with the Germans, but then in July 1943 switched to fighting … Polish partisans, and to top it all off slaughtered Polish civilians."[137] After the Soviet partisans routed his UPA detachment in spring 1944, Lushchik joined the ULS. Other comrades from the UPA showed up as well.[138] "It didn't matter where you served," Lushchik later observed."[139] In general, the Easterners seem to have been the least ideological group in the ULS, and in the postwar emigration none of them other than the above-mentioned Lychmanenko was politically active.[140]

Other Divisions

One notes how difficult it was to sustain inclusive solidarity as political, regional, and interpersonal differences tore at the ULS. We have already mentioned the measures against Banderists who turned up in the ULS. Tensions prevailed among the Mel'nykites themselves, especially between representatives of the Lutsk and Dubno-Kremenets communities. For example, Shkurs'kyǐ (acting on the instructions of Anany Fedchuk, "Bass") reported on the latter group, who at one point "were dissatisfied with the leaders of the Legion, especially with Soltys, whom they wanted to kill."[141]

Indeed, it was Soltys, the organizer and political leader of the ULS, who appears (per several sources) to have been the most controversial. He did not get along with Khamulyak, whom the directorate of the L'vov OUN (M) had sent over. Relations with Kvytko were still worse. A surviving Banderist report of May 19, 1944 tells of some secret negotiations with "a colonel" of the ULS who goes unnamed but is clearly Kvytko;[142] the report quotes Kvytko's words to characterize Soltys as "psychologically ill."[143] These negotiations may have become known to the ULS high command, further exacerbating Kvytko's situation, who became the target of several assassination attempts in June 1944 and was forced to leave the ULS.[144] Gerasymenko did not work in harmony with Dyachenko, two more "insurgents" who constantly quarreled.[145] In effect, the ULS had three leaderships: the official German one, an official but tacit German and Ukrainian one, and an unofficial Mel'nykite one.[146]

Yet another line of division, according to Popyvs'kyi, ran between the majority "Westerners" and minority Easterners: "Ukrainians constituted an absolute majority of the Legion's personnel, but this group … was very diverse. New 'Easterners' were blamed for all negative acts, but [all] groups committed them as well. This amplified the mutual unhappiness and even hostility on all sides."[147]

Despite all the differences, the ULS remained a reliable military organization. Cases of desertion were comparatively rare, especially in the General Government (due to the hostility of the surrounding population).[148] Far less is known about Legionnaires switching from one formation to another, although such departures led to the liquidation of many Easterner detachments. When people left the ULS it was usually for another structure. Thus, several dozen former Legionnaires, including the previously mentioned Borŝevs'kyj, Glyn', Luŝik, Panasevyč, and Romaniuk, were recruited by agents of German intelligence in 1944. Even the arrest of Soltys did not lead to the break-up of the ULS, as did happen (for instance) with the 29th Division of the Waffen-SS after the execution of its commander, SS-Brigadeführer Bronislav Kaminski, at approximately the same time.[149] Nor did the attempted desertion of a portion of ULS personnel in March 1945 entail significant results. Legionnaires were inspired to desert on a threatening scale only after they were included into the Waffen-SS 14th Division; even then, only a few were punished: five persons were sent to prison, and one, Roman Kyveliuk, was executed.[150] Throughout the spring of 1945 the rest fought loyally in the final battles of the formation against the Red Army, during which the frequently-mentioned Nedzvets'kyi was killed.[151]

What in fact made the ULS such a reliable military command? First, ideological conviction bound its personnel, and Mel'nykite propaganda specifically eschewed anti-Nazi or even anti-German positions, even after arrests and executions of members of its own core. Second, the circumstances of 1943–1944 did not leave the Mel'nykites much room for maneuver. Their undermanned detachments could not compete with the Banderist, Soviet, and Polish partisans. All the more does this apply to the Petliurists and the Easterners, for most of whom the ULS was only the latest point on a longer road of collaboration. For many of the latter, primarily former police personnel, their complicity in Nazi terror meant they were threatened by Germany's impending defeat. Third, the ULS provided a more reliable material situation than any other options available to the men. This was especially important late in the war when they found themselves no longer on Ukrainian territory and even many of their families had evacuated westward.[152] Reports of the Banderist underground documented ULS plundering.[153] The ULS plundered Chłaniów and Władysławin before burning them down in June 1944; a witness claimed that she saw wagons with the wives and children of ULS soldiers carrying off the loot.[154] A Legionnaire after the war acknowledged that after suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, his fellow participants returned "with substantial quantities of stolen goods."[155] Everyone wounded was recommended for a medal, though in the event none received any.[156] The German commanders indulged their USL personnel, for instance allowing the ULS to publish its own propaganda, permitting them to have an Orthodox chaplain, and overlooking the practice of many Legionnaires who concealed their actual personal identification data.

ULS Propaganda

An important non-combat activity of the German and Ukrainian high command of the Legion was ideological education. Generally, Ukrainian soldiers and officers were unhappy with German propaganda. A July 26, 1944 letter from Soltys to his commanders reflects this, requesting that the German commanders define explicitly the future place of Ukraine should Nazi Germany be victorious. Criticizing the dryness of "written on order" German propaganda, the author stressed the Germans' and Ukrainians' common antisemitism. Propaganda should

> give a clear answer to all of the paramount ambitions, desires, and aspirations of Ukrainians as members of their own national community.... The goals and the struggle of the Ukrainian people must be clearly designated—from the destruction of Bolshevism to the restoration of their forfeited political will, independence, and state sovereignty.... [This] propaganda ... is essential for spiritual-moral rearmament and the hostility of Ukrainians to world Jewry and its ideologues in the form of Communism in the East and plutocracy in the West. [Recognition] of such a long-awaited right to our national state identity and

independence … will be the best stimulus and moral inducement for the Ukrainian people to make heavy sacrifices … for the … shared struggle with the Germans against Bolshevism.[157]

Mel'nykite Legionaires tried to correct the "shortcomings" of German propaganda. As far back as the late 1920s, future ULS soldiers had been influenced by OUN propaganda. At his postwar investigation, Gavryliuk recalled reading antisemitic articles in 1930s editions of *Surma* and *The Bulletin*.[158] The indoctrination of ULS personnel continued a long tradition but also reflected a *sui generis* synergism of Nazi and Mel'nykite ideologies. In November 1943 the provincial director of the OUN (M), Iaroslav Haǐvas ("Speedy"), assigned Teodor Khamulyak ("Tesar") to propaganda work in the ULS. The latter had experience of nationalist agitation going back to 1933. Now he delivered daily lectures, eventually appearing forty times.[159] He assured the Legionnaires that "When the German Army smashes the Soviet Union, a separate independent Ukrainian state will arise."[160] The ULS actively published its own propaganda under the supervision of Volodymyr Smykurzhevs'kyǐ ("Trojan"), former propaganda assistant of the OUN (M) of the Kremenets district.

The chief ULS propaganda vehicle was the Legion's official journal, *Nash Shlyakh* (Our Path),[161] which published anti-Polish, anti-Russian/anti-Soviet, and antisemitic articles. Poles, Russians, and Jews featured here as allies of "the foremost enemy of the Ukrainian people"—Bolshevism. Legion propaganda for both its own soldiers and the broader Ukrainian population pictured Germany as an ally of Ukraine. This propaganda helped convince Legionnaires that there was no moral problem in slaughtering civilians.

The first issue of *Nash Shliakh* appeared on April 16, 1944 with a commentary ("Forward") defining war on Germany's side as part of a struggle "for the eradication of Polish [*lyashskyi*] and Jew-Muscovite rule in Ukraine."[162] The publication called Muscovites (*moskali*) and Poles "historical enemies."[163] Those wishing a Ukraine free of "Jew-Bolshevik rule" must follow the line of *Nash Shliakh*.[164] Ukrainians must fight on the side of Nazi Germany, and take on "any partisan who wanted to undermine Ukraine on the orders of Moscow or Warsaw."[165] At this time the Legion also distributed a leaflet under the title of "Ukrainian Partisans!" urging those Mel'nykites fighting in the "cold and hunger" of the forests to cross over to the ULS, where they would receive "freedom, a legal status, good weapons, and a uniform."[166]

Stereotypes about "Jewish Bolshevism" echoed in articles about soldiers who had fallen in battle. The obituary of Volodymyr Remishevs'kiy (Hirkyi or Weightlifter) boasted that the deceased had "never missed any opportunity to engage in armed combat with Jewish-Muscovite Communism."[167] Antisemitic verses appeared in "Innocent Moshko," where a Jew languidly prepares for war against Germany and says he will return when he has killed a number of people. People ask him, "But what if someone wants to kill you?" To which Moshko replies, "But what am I guilty of? What would they kill me for?"[168] ULS leaflets also promoted antisemitic tropes, for instance stating, "Jew-Communists fattened themselves like wild night owls on the body of our Motherland."[169]

Calls to annihilate Polish civilians reverberated in ULS propaganda. A leaflet of May 9, 1944 entitled "To Ukrainians of the Chelm Region" stressed that prior to 1939 the Polish state had condemned Ukrainians "to the complete and absolute forfeiture of their national Ukrainian singularity and identity," and "in every way tried to expunge all signs of a Ukrainian presence here in Chelm." The leaflet bore two slogans: "Down with Bolshevik-Polish imperialism!" and "Down with all manifestations of Polish banditry in our land!"[170] As the Germans got ready to crush the Warsaw Uprising, a poem entitled "Arise, Brothers!" gloated, "Fire will consume Warsaw."[171] The journal recorded participation of the ULS in a series of anti-Polish "actions" in the Chelm region, even hinting at the anti-civilian side of some, for example, the utter destruction of the settlements of Amerika and Laskow. Authors boasted of Legionaires' participation in "liquidating actions." Poles appeared in such reports as "*lyakho*-communists." The Legion features in this literature as a formation that "stands on the side of law and order and tranquility, on the side of the security of the Ukrainian people in their ethnographic lands."[172]

Legion propaganda was basically identical with that appearing in earlier wartime OUN (M) newspapers, brochures, and leaflets. Of course, one can detect contradictions, partly reflecting efforts to pin the biggest sins on the Banderists. A leaflet entitled "Ukrainian Peasant!" (dated September 19, 1943) condemned the former for robbing the Polish peasants of "bread, clothing, and shoes for the sake of feeding, dressing, and shodding thousands of Uzbeks, Tatars, Chuvashes, Bolshevik lieutenants, and NKVD agents, whom they recruited to provoke the Germans, burn down national property (estates), blow up bridges needed by the peasantry, and burn down Polish barns, in the process killing thousands of young people."[173] None of this, however, prevented the authors of another 1943 OUN (M) leaflet from boasting that the "destruction of hostile [i.e., Polish] agricultural colonization is planned for the future,"[174] in other words, bragging of Mel'nykite plans to do precisely what they were accusing the Banderists of.

As early as June 1943, the official journal of the OUN (M), *Surma*, described Germany as a power with which one might eventually cooperate, foreshadowing much of what later appeared in the ULS's *Nash Shlyakh*. Still underground, *Surma* permitted itself critical undertones toward the Nazi Reich:

> having won a series of unheard-of victories, the continental [i.e., Axis] powers have not said a word about the rights of nations. Their language is all about "a new order," "a New Europe," "the solidarity of European nations in place of the sovereignty of European nations." [Unlike] their enemies, who can promise European nations all conceivable benefits since Europe is not in their hands, [Germany and the Axis] are in a very disadvantageous situation. But should they be able to hold Europe in their hands, to some degree at least they would have to fulfill their promises. Nevertheless there are signs that they are revealing their evolution in order to hold a 'national' [i.e., strictly German] position.[175]

Such nuances gave way before hopes that alliance with Germany might afford Ukraine the ability to defeat their historic enemy, Polish "colonialism." When Banderist and a few Mel'nykite detachments launched anti-Polish "actions" in the summer of 1943, an anonymous item in *Surma* called for the annihilation of the Polish population of Volhynia, collectively accused of imperialism (i.e., colonizing Ukrainian lands): "The Poles again, as in 1939, are worked up about the Polish Empire, about Poland "from sea to sea," and the restoration of the Jagiellonian monarchy. In other words, the Poles dream only about enslaving other people—also including many Ukrainians.... Polish Volhynian colonists are the avant-garde of the Polonization efforts of the former Polish state. Polish colonists not only seized land from Ukrainian peasants, but they actively and intentionally [incited] the Polish government against Ukrainian peasants." The anonymous author continued on to the theme of Polish terrorism: "the killings of Ukrainian civilians have multiplied. Ukrainian peasants, teachers, cooperative members, workers, priests, and police officers are dying at their hands. And all segments of the Polish population support and justify these actions...." The conclusion was obvious: if the Poles were the aggressors who initiated the killing, then "Ukrainians have the right and the duty to promulgate and strengthen the Ukrainian presence on this territory with all the means at their disposal."[176]

Conclusion

In displaced persons camps in the American and British Zones following the war, OUN (M) activists tried to calculate how many members of their group had died in combat at the hands of various antagonists: "Bolsheviks," Germans, Banderists, the Polish underground…. Entered as "killed by Poles in 1944" or "died in Warsaw" were a number of ULS soldiers who participated in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 (which had been accompanied by the slaughter of civilian residents and theft of property). It is noteworthy that none of these reports identified the detachment in which these Mel'nykites had served.[177]

The ULS had been, in effect, an instrument of Nazi and OUN (M) terror. The chief victims of the Legion were Poles, Ukrainians with other political convictions, and Jews who had miraculously survived the first two-and-a-half years of German occupation. "Experienced" Volhynian members of the Mel'nyk wing of the party had had no moral compunction against murdering any of these groups. Many already had extensive records as murderers in collaborationist police formations from 1941 to 1943. Yet as émigrés, former ULS soldiers denied in pro-Mel'nykite Canadian newspapers their participation in various crimes, including the murder of Jews in Pidhaitsi and the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944.[178]

The Legion's German officers were "normal" Nazis who fanatically fought for the victory of the Third Reich, devoted all possible efforts to the annihilation of the Jews, and did everything in their power to Nazify all Europe. At the same time, German and Ukrainian ULS officers freely disagreed on how Germany should use the "Ukrainian factor" in the war. For Assmuss, there was no ideological contradiction in using Ukrainians to murder Poles and Jews, so he could be "diplomatic" with the Legionnaires. Possibly his "Ukrainophilism" reflected childhood impressions from his father, a Freikorps member who took part in armed clashes with Poles. Whatever the case, former ULS soldiers depict the period of Assmuss's command as an example of successful collaboration between German officers and rank-and-file Ukrainians. Biegelmayer was more ossified in his Nazi disdain for Slavs. His command marked a weakening of solidarity and a sharp decrease in the Ukrainians' motivation to fight for the Reich.

Although the moving force of the Legion were Volhynian Mel'nykites, many types of individuals served in the unit, and any number of them had ended up there by chance: Banderists, Easterners from the pre-1939 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and others. These more often than not were simply trying to survive the war. For former officers of the UNR, service in the Legion had been an attempt to continue the struggle in the absence of any effective Ukrainian army, and it had reflected a lack of faith in any prospect for successful guerrilla warfare such as the Banderists were developing. Some of these Ukrainian veterans could share various aspects of Nazi ideology. For the OUN (M) activists themselves, the Legion was not only an attempt to create a military capability, but the very means of survival at a point when the Banderists (by late summer 1943) had replaced them as a significant partisan force.

Political indoctrination figured importantly in the tasks anticipated by the OUN (M) activists who initiated creation of the ULS. Their propaganda did not differ markedly from the OUN (M)'s, replete with anti-Jewish and anti-Polish positions. The OUN (M) did not embrace anti-German slogans even in spring and summer 1943, when many of the Volhynian Mel'nykites defected to the partisans. That is why during the September 1943 negotiations with the Germans, it was unnecessary for the remaining Volhynian Mel'nykites to clean up their image. A basic feature of Mel'nykite policy throughout the war ranged from neutrality toward Germany to friendship with it. Creation of the Legion crystalized this policy. Nevertheless, Volhynian Mel'nykites in 1943 walked a tightrope between "collaboration and resistance." Although these people had been partisans in the forest for possibly only five to six months of the three-year Nazi occupation of Volhynia, their memoirs accentuate that experience (as did, for instance, Yuri Makukh's "The Forest Accepts the Rebels").[179]

Definite contradictions marked the propaganda and the practice of the OUN (M) toward the Poles. Some favored the Banderist line of expulsion and even physical annihilation, though others were opposed. In many ways the practice of the Mel'nykite partisans and the ULS violated the "propaganda theses" that the OUN (M) worked out in October 1943. Individual Mel'nykites regarded the killings and displacement of the Poles in Volhynia (by whichever OUN tendency) as "a polit[ical] mistake and a nat[ional] crime."[180] This may have been the position only of Mel'nykites close to Oleg Ol'zhich (Kanadyba), but in principle, Legion propaganda adhered to the displacement or destruction of Poles in the territories which the OUN (M) considered "ethnographically Ukrainian." Such uncertainties in propaganda and Realpolitik demonstrate that the OUN (M) remained a political group without strongly centralized coordination. Confirmation of this appears in the basic reality that while the ULS was actively if not fanatically fighting on the side of Nazi Germany, their ideological leader Mel'nyk was arrested by the Germans in January 1944, kept under "honorary" house arrest from March to July at the Ifen Hotel in Hirschaid, from August to October of the same year confined in the Zellenbau (solitary confinement barracks) in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and only then freed to participate in various intrigues of the Third Reich until April 1945.[181]

In contemporary Ukraine the narrative of the Mel'nykites and the Legionnaires in general—as opposed to the Banderists—has not been broadly disseminated. Nevertheless, the legal successors of the OUN (M) in Ukraine have published hagiographic obituaries of ULS fighters. Thus in 2016 did a posthumous biography of Ivan Shlapak appear in the Mel'nykite newspaper *Ukrainskoe Slovo* (Ukrainian Word). A "classic" Volhynian Legionnaire, between 1941 and 1943 this "true son of Ukraine" served in the Kremenets police, the Mel'nyk partisans, the ULS, and ultimately the Waffen-SS Galicia Division.[182]

Future historians need to study the increasingly accessible archival materials, and especially the criminal cases of former ULS Legionnaires tried in the USSR and Poland, and they should also seek out and analyze the histories of the unit's German personnel. This can not only bring to light new facts, but also can contribute to understanding the motivations that spurred Ukrainians to collaborate with the German occupation, pursue the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Polish population, and contribute to the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes.

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Memorial Museum; a fellowship at the Zentrum für Holocaust-Studien, Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich); a Yahad In Unum Research Fellowship; a Yad Hanadiv/Beracha Foundation post-doctoral fellowship at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and a post-doctoral fellowship of the Israeli Inter-University Academic Partnership in Russian and East European Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He recently finished a monograph "Hilfspolizei, Self-Government, and the Holocaust in the Ukrainian-Russian-Belorussian Borderlands: Motivation, Identity, Collective Portrait, and Memory" (under peer review). His academic interests include the history of the Holocaust, Ukrainian-Jewish relations from the 1920s through the 1940s, collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe, and right radical movements in 1920s–1940s Europe.

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Notes

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1. "*Ukraïns'kyĭ Lehion Samooborony: Spohady uchasnyka*," *Svoboda*, December 1, 1995.

2. Commander in SS-Led Unit Living in US, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1WGRwz_1Gs (accessed September 21, 2020).

3. "Poland announces that it will seek the arrest and extradition of Michael Karakots', a citizen of the USA," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvCLVzkH11I (accessed September 21, 2020).

4. https://nv.ua/ukr/world/countries/pomer-ymovirniy-komandir-pidrozdilu-ss-mihaylo-karkoc-ostanni-novini-50065434.html (accessed September 29, 2020).

5. *Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsocialistische Täterbiographien*, ed. Klaus-Michael Mallmann et al. (Darmstadt, Germany: wbg Academic, 2004); Jacek Sawicki and Jochen Zygmunt Böhler, *Kariera SS-Oberscharführera Hermanna Baltruschata 1939–1943: Album fotograficzny funkcjonariusza Einsatzgruppe i Geheime Staatspolizei na ziemiach polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy=Die Karriere des SS-Oberscharführers Hermann Baltruschat in den Jahren 1939–1943=SS-Oberscharführer Hermann Baltruschat's career 1939–1943* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej 2014).

6. Oleksandr Zaĭtsev, *Ukraïn'kyĭ intehral'nyĭ natsionalizm 1920–1930-kh rokiv: Narysy intelektual'noï istoriï* (Kyiv: [n.p.], 2013).

7. Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer, 1914–1939* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010).

8. For example: Kai Struve, "Anti-Jewish Violence in the Summer of 1941 in Eastern Galicia and Beyond, The Particular and the Context," in *Romania and the Holocaust: Events—Contexts—Aftermath* (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem, 2016); Delphine Bechtel, "De Jedwabne à Zolotchiv: Pogromes locaux en Galicie, juin–juillet 1941," in *Cultures d'Europe Centrale* (Paris: CIRCE, 2005), 69–92; Marco Carynnyk, "'Jews, Poles, and Other Scum': Ruda Kozaniecka, Monday, 30 June 1941," paper presented at the Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 23, 2008.

9. For example: John-Paul Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, November 12–15, 2009, at https://www.academia.edu/1071581/The_Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army_UPA_and_the_Holocaust (accessed September 21, 2020).

10. Kai Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt: Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).

11. Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem, 2014), 242–45.

12. Martin Dean, *Collaboration during the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000); Gabriel Finder and Alexander Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 34, no. 2 (2004): 95–118; Aleksandr Prusin, “Ukrainskaia politsiia i Kholokost v general’nom okruge Kiew, 1941–1943: Deistviia i motivatsii,” *Golokost i suchasnist’*, (2007), 31–59; Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich: De Gruyter, 1996).

13. For example: Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny u L’vivs’kiĭ oblasti (AUSBULO), f. 5, spr. 57046; Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny u Ternopil’s’kiĭ oblasti (AUSBUTO), f. 5, spr. 32262; Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny v Rivnens’kiĭ oblasti (AUSBURO), f. 4, spr. 8886; Derzhavnyi Haluzevyi Arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny (GDA SBU), f. 5, spr. 39713, t. 1.

14. For example: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), Berlin Document Center, Siegfried Assmuss; ibid., Ewald Biegelmeyer; ibid., Walter Väth.

15. Institut für Zetigeschichte Archive (IFZ), MA 1528; Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, box 130; the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), T 78, 673.

16. “Pravda pro UPA: Komunikat SVUR,” *Novyĭ Shliakh* 44 (1972); “Vidbulosia ob’iednannia dvokh soiuziv ukraïns’kykh veteraniv,” *Svoboda* 152, no. 15 (1986); Anatol’ Kabaĭda, *“1941” Kalendar-al’manakh “Novoho Shliiakhu” na 1991 rik* (Toronto: Novyĭ Shliakh, 1991); Volodymyr Hots’kyĭ, “Kholms’ka Ukraïns’ka samooborona,” *Visti Kombatanta* (1985); Vasyl’ Stanyslaviv (Iuriĭ Makukh), *Lis pryĭmaie povstantsiv* (Kremenets’, Ukraine: [n.p.], 2002); Mykhaylo Karakots’, *Vid Voronizha do Ukraïns’koho Lehionu Samooborony* (Rivne, Ukraine: [n.p.], 2002; Vasyl’ Veryha, *Vtraty OUN v chasi Druhoï svitovoï viĭny abo “zdobudesh ukraïns’ku derzhavu abo zhynesh v borot’bi za neï”* (Toronto: [n.p.], 1991; Denys Volynets’, Serhiĭ Kot, “Pam’iati Ivana Shlapaka,” *Ukraïns’ke Slovo*, no. 3 (2016).

17. The history of the ULS and its complicity in Nazi violence has been examined in several academic publications, the most significant of which are Martsin Majewski, “Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów Ukraińskiego Legionu Samoobrony (1943–1945),” *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2, no. 8 (2005): 295–327; and idem., “Teodor Dak i operacja” *Służby bezpieczeństwa Polski i Czechosłowacji wobec Ukraińców (1945–1989). Z warsztatów badawczych* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2005), 248–69. See also O. Klymenko and S. Tkachov, *Ukraïntsi v politsiï v reĭkhskomisariati “Ukraïna”: Nimets’kyĭ okupatsiĭnyĭ rezhym na Kremenechchyni u 1941–1944 rr*. (Kharkiv, Ukraine: Ranok-NP, 2012), 193–202. Here we can give only a brief history, focusing on facts previously not widely familiar in the scholarship and drawn from a variety of sources, including postwar criminal cases against Legionnaires in the archives of the SBU; propaganda published by the Legion; and underground reports on them by their rivals in the OUN (B), primarily for 1943 and 1944.

18. For more details, see: I. Marchuk. “Lystuvannia mizh otamanom Tarasom Bul’boiu-Borovstem ta nimets’koiu okupatsiĭnoiu vladoiu iak dzherelo z istoriï bul’bivs’koho rukhu na Volyni u 1942–1943 rr.,” *Arkhivy Ukraïny* 1–3 (2005): 552–69.

19. Andrii Bolianovs'kyi, "Ukraintsi, rosiany i poliaky u Zbrodnykh syliakh Nimechyny u 1939–1945 rr.: Porivnial'nyi analiz," in *Ukraina-Polsha: Istirychna spadshyna i suspilna svodomist'* 5 (2012): 85.

20. Derzhavnyĭ arkhiv Volyns'koï oblasti, f. P-1021, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 92.

21. Ibid., ark. 28.

22. S. Borodulìn, "Geografiâ zločiniv mel'nikivciv-legioneriv," *Vìsti z Ukraïni* 44 (1978): 6; P. Šafeta, *"Chornyi lehion,"* in *Vìdpovid' zemlâkam*, upor. M. Dubyna (Kyiv: Radâns'kij pis'mennik, 1988), 181, 187–88.

23. Borodulin, "Heohrafiia zlochyniv," 6.

24. Klymenko and Tkachov, *Ukraïntsi v politsiï*, 197.

25. Ibid; Majewski, "Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów," 307–309.

26. Tsentral'nyĭ derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia Ukraïny (TsDAVOU), f. 3833, op. 1, spr.135, ark. 11.

27. Ibid., spr. 119, ark. 18–19.

28. Ibid., ark. 19.

29. GDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74945-FP, ark. 61–62.

30. Klymenko, *Ukraïntsi v politsiï*, 197; Majewski, "Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów," 311–12.

31. AUSBULO, f. 5, spr. 57046, t. 2, ark. 32.

32. AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 32262, ark. 38zv.

33. For similar rumors see V. Vinogradov, Z. Gaiovnichek, et al. *Varshavskoe vosstanie 1944: Iz documentakh iz arkhivov spetssluzhb* (Warsaw: Moskva, 2007), 248, 380.

34. Concerning the intensity of fights with partisans in Yugoslavia, we have testimony that in only one of them did the ULS suffer casualties (eight killed, fifteen injured): AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 32262, arkh. 20zv-21.

35. M. Melnik, *To Battle: The Formation and History of the 14. Gallician* [*sic*] *SS Volunteer Division* (Solihull, UK: Helion and Co., 2007), 238–40.

36. Majewski, "Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów," 313.

37. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Siegfried Assmuss.

38. Ibid., Ewald Biegelmeyer.

39. Ibid., Walter Väth [*sic*].

40. Ibid., Siegfried Assmuss.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., Ewald Biegelmeyer.

43. Ibid., Walter Väth [*sic*].

44. Rahmenpersonal 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr. 1), http://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php/Thread/10247-Rahmenpersonal-14-Waffen-Grenadier-Division-der-SS-galizische-Nr-/?s=bf5a79a13e50119bf26b735542b671c25eec74ed (accessed September 21, 2020).

45. Weisz, Franz, "Personell vor allem: Ein 'ständesstaatlicher' Polizeikörper. Die Gestapo im Österreich," in *Die Gestapo—Mythos und Realität*, ed. Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995), 439–62; Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "Von 'landfremden Eroberern' und autochthonen 'Hilfswilligen': Überlegungen zu einer Sozialgeschichte der 'Gestapo-Herrschaft' in Polen,"

in ibid., 482–91; Robert Bohn, "Ein solches Spiel kennt keine Regeln: Gestapo und Bevölkerung in Norwegen und Dänemark," in ibid., 463–81.

46. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Siegfried Assmuss.

47. Ibid., Ewald Biegelmeyer; [no title or author] *Canadian Jewish Review*, May 25, 1962.

48. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Walter Väth.

49. Ya. P.G., "Buvshi postantsi 'chy buvshi koliaboranty?'," *Vyzvolnyi Shliakh* 48, no. 9 (1951): 36.

50. "Przemysl," at http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/ghettos/przemysl.html (accessed September 21, 2020); Seev Goshen and Albert Battels, "Widerstand gegen die Judenvernichtung in Przemysl," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 33, no. 3 (1985): 482.

51. "Battel Albert (1891–1952)," at http://db.yadvashem.org/righteous/family.html?language=en&itemId=4042973 (accessed September 21, 2020).

52. IFZ, Fa 156, Bl. 68–75.

53. Rahmenpersonal 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr. 1).

54. Khaintz Khene (Heinz Heine), *Chernyi orden SS: Istoriia okhrannykh otriadov* Moscow: Rodina, 2003 <transl. fr. Gm>, 187.

55. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Siegfried Assmuss.

56. Ibid., Ewald Biegelmeyer.

57. Ibid., Walter Väth.

58. *Das Schwarze Korps*, November 9, 1944.

59. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Ewald Biegelmeyer.

60. Rahmenpersonal 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr. 1), http://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php/Thread/10247-Rahmenpersonal-14-Waffen-Grenadier-Division-der-SS-galizische-Nr-1/?s=bf5a79a13e50119bf25b735542b671c25eec74ed (accessed October 29, 2020).

61. Khene (Heine), *Chernyi orden SS*, 187.

62. BAB, Berlin Document Center, Ewald Biegelmeyer; ibid., Walter Väth.

63. Stanyslaviv (Makukh), *Lis pryimaie povstantsiv*, 129–31.

64. Khene (Heine), *Chernyi orden SS*, 517.

65. Ibid.

66. Archive of the OUN, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 312, ark.24. Hermann Niehoff (1897–1980)—German general during World War II. From March 2, 1945 garrison commander of "Fortress Breslau," which he surrendered to the Soviet 6th Army on May 6, 1945.

67. "Wil'gel'm Virzing," Archive of the OUN, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 302, ark. 5–6.

68. Stanyslaviv (Makukh), *Lis pryimaie povstantsiv*, 146–47.

69. *Das Schwarze Korps*, November 9, 1944.

70. *Canadian Jewish Review*, May 25, 1962.

71. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 84–85.

72. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, t. 71, ark 203–204; TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 135, ark. 16.

73. One of the recruits, Ivan Kyrychuk named another six of his countrymen who continued their service in the ULS. AUSBURO, f. 4, spr. 8886, t. 4, ark. 184–88, 193–94.

74. AUSBURO, f. 4, spr. 8886, t. 4, ark. 268.

75. AUSBULO, f. 4, spr. 8886, t. 2, ark. 86; ibid. t. 3, ark. 65–66; GDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 1660, t. 1, ark. 50.

76. AUSBURO, f. 4, spr. 8886, t. 2, ark. 95; AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 32262, ark. 19; GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 32, ark. 184.

77. Derzhavnyĭ arkhiv Ternopil's'koï oblasti, f. R-3429, op. 3, spr. 3396, ark. 36–37, 44.

78. AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 16898, ark. 107, 130.

79. Ibid.

80. For example, cf. relevant works on Volhynian topics: Yehuda Bauer, *The Death of the Shtetl* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000); Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990).

81. AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 3168, ark. 18; spr. 25128, ark. 19, 43.

82. For example, with respect to the complicity of local police, see relevant entries in the diary of the Kremenets youth Roman Kravchenko-Berezhnoi, *Mezhdu belym i krasnym: Stop-kadry moego XX veka* (St. Peterburg: GAMAS, 2008). Also cf. evidence obtained by the Security Service of the OUN (B): *Borot'ba z ahenturoyu: Protokoly dopytiv Sluzhby Bezpeky OUN v Ternopil'shchyni 1946–1948. Litopys UPA*, tom. 43, kn. 1, ed. P. Potichnyĭ (Toronto; L'viv: "Litopys UP," 2006), 772.

83. GDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 39713, t. 1, ark. 340.

84. Ibid., spr. 1660, t. 1, ark. 145–46.

85. Ibid., ark. 147–49.

86. Some 120 men deserted from the Kremenets police force together with Nedzvets'kyi, half of whom remained in the insurgent detachment under his command. AUSBUTO, f. 6, spr. 10709-П, ark. 15zv.

87. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 21zv.

88. Maksym Skorups'kyi, *U nastupax i vidstupax (Spohady)* (Chicago: Ukrayin'ko-Amerykans'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 1961), 79–80; Stanyslaviv, *Lis pryjmaye povstanciv*, 87.

89. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 164, ark. 15.

90. Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960: Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN; Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 2006), 321.

91. AUSBULO, f. 5, spr. 57046, t. 9, ark. 47. Other researchers estimate that more than 300 persons were killed, including two Jewish women, the mother and daughter Hipel', who were hiding in Gurów: Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945, I* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2000), 829–30, 836–937.

92. AUSBULO, f. 5, spr. 57046, t. 3, ark. 23–25.

93. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 3, 8.

94. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 72.

95. GDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 680, ark. 65–66.

96. AUSBUVO (Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny u Volyns'kii oblasti), f. 5, spr. 2869, ark. 25-26zv.

97. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 84–85.

98. “Povidomlennia,” *Svoboda*, no. 48 (1965): 3.

99. “Pravda pro UPA. Komunikat SVUR,” *Novyi Shlyakh*, 44 (1972): 3.

100. For more details see: Yaroslav Tynchenko, *Ofitsers’kyi korpus Armiï Ukraïns’koï Narodnoï Respubìlki (1917–1921)* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2007), Kn. 1, 1, 105, 151–53, 192.

101. GDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 582, ark. 26; spr. 607, ark. 246; spr. 868, ark. 49.

102. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 92, ark. 49.

103. Stanislavìv, *Lìs prijmaê povstancìv*, 155.

104. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 32, ark 185; Hirniak, *Ukraïns’kyi Lehion Samooborony*, 38.

105. GDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 627, ark. 57–58.

106. Kabaida, *“1941” Kalendar-al’manakh* (Toronto: Novyǐ Shliakh, 1991), 53.

107. Volodymir Hots’kyi, “Holms’ka Ukraïns’ka samooborona,” *Vìstì Kombatanta*, 2 (1985): 49.

108. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 77, ark. 110.

109. Orest Horodys’kyi, “Dva dni v partizantsi,” *Samostiǐna Ukraïna* 7 (1962): 22; TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 72, ark. 2.

110. AUSBULO, f. 5, spr. 57046, t. 2, ark. 43–44.

111. Ibid., ark. 147–49.

112. GDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 868, ark. 49–51.

113. Deržavnij arhìv Rìvnens’koï oblasti, f. P-30, op 2, spr. 33, ark. 153.

114. GDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 39713, t. 1, ark. 342–434, 345.

115. AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 21601, ark. 10–11, 23zv, 27.

116. Ibid., ark. 28.

117. AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 2650, ark. 98.

118. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, t. 34, ark. 40

119. E.P. “Ukraïns’kyi Lehion Samooboroni,” 39.

120. TsDAGOU, f. 283, op. 1, spr. 58468, t. 1, ark. 19.

121. For example, cf. the UPA leaflet, “Chelmshchina Ukrainians!” dated May 7, 1944: GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, t. 40, ark. 12–13.

122. Orest Korchak-Horodys’ski, “Avtobiohrafiia,” *Visti Kombatanta* 3 (2012): 82–83.

123. For more details, see Carynnyk, “‘Jews, Poles, and Other Scum.’”

124. TsDAVOU, f. 3971, op. 1, spr. 43, ark. 149.

125. Horodys’kyi, “Dva dni v partyzantsi”: 22–26.

126. For more details see Evhen Aletiiano-Popivs’kyǐ, *Z ideieiu v seratsi—zi zbroieiu v rukakh (Zbirka pysan’)* (London: Ukraïns’ka vydavnycha spilka u V. Brytaniï, 1980).

127. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 32, ark. 187.

128. E.P., “Ukraïns’kyǐ Lehion Samooborony (Narys)” *Vyzvol’nyǐ Shliakh*, 2 (1952): 39–40.

129. Hirniak, *Ukraïns’kyǐ Lehion Samooborony*, 30–31.

130. TsDAVOU, f. 3676, op. 4, spr. 317, ark. 32.

131. On participation of the 101st Battalion in the Holocaust, see Anatoliy Kruglov, Andrei Umanskiy, and Igor Shchupak, *Kholokost v Ukraine: Reikhskomissariat "Ukraina," Hubernatorstvo 'Transnystryia'* (Dnipro, Ukraine: Ukraynskyĭ instytut izuchenyĭ Kholokosta "Tkuma," 2016), 551–52. For participation in anti-partisan operations, see Klimenko and Tkachov, *Ukraïntsi v politsiï*, 190.

132. GDA, d. 16, spr. 627, ark. 57–58.

133. Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny u Khmelnits'koi oblasti, f. 6, spr. 404, ark. 30.

134. For example, Petro Kurlandek from the village of Garmaki in the Bar district near Vinnytsia, who announced his desire to join the 14th Division of the SS, was transferred from that unit to the ULS on January 5, 1945: TsDAVOU, f. 3971, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 152. Volodymyr Hots'ky Z *Peremyshlia do Rimini. Spomyny* (London: Nakladom avtora, 1992), t. 2, 24; Orest Korchak-Horodys'kyĭ, "Do khval'noï redaktsiï *Visti Kombatanta*," *Visti Kombatanta*, 3–4 (1971): 90; Hrihorii Denisenko, *"Tak velelo sertse,"* in *Heroi podpolia. O podpol'noi bor'be sovetslikh patriotov v tylu nemetsko-fashiskikh zakhvatchikov v gody Velikoi Otechesvennoi voiny* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1970), 278–79.

135. Horodys'kyi, "Dva dni v partyzantsi": 22; TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1., spr. 72, ark. 2.

136. GDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74945-FP, ark. 12.

137. The sources vary on Kvitko's fate. According to one, he was arrested by the Germans on Dyachenko's word: AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 2650, ark. 99. According to another, he perished at the hands of Polish partisans: AUSBURO, f. 4, spr. 9999, t. 1, apk. 133. A third source has him executed by the Soviet security services: Tynchenko, *Ofitsers'kii korpus*, 192.

138. GDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74945-FP, ark.17.

139. Ibid., ark. 53.

140. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 39713, t. 1, ark. 342–434, 345.

141. AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 21601, ark. 10–11, 23zv, 27.

142. Ibid., ark. 28.

143. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 72, ark. 2.

144. E.P., "Ukraïns'kyĭ Lehion Samooborony," 39; Stanyslaviv, *Lis pryĭmaie povstantsiv,* 153.

145. AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 2650, ark. 116.

146. Horodys'kyi, "Dva dni v partyzantsi," 22.

147. E.P., "Ukraïns'kij Lehion Samooboroni," 39.

148. AUSBUVO, f. 5, spr. 2650, ark. 82-82ob.

149. On the arrest of Soltys see GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 32, ark. 183; ibid, f. 16, spr. 680, ark. 67. On the execution of Kaminski: Vinogradov, Gaiovnichek, Majewski, et al., *Varshavskoe vosstanie*, 622–24.

150. AUSBULO, f. 4, spr. 9999, t. 1, ark. 133–34; GDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 680, ark. 66.

151. Êvgen Šipajlo (upor.) *Spisok polâglih voâkiv 1-oï Ukraïns'koï divìzìï UNA, ta ukraïnciv inših vijs'kovih formacìj v ÌÌ-ìj svìtovìj vìjnì* (New York: Bratstvo "Brodi-Lev," 1992), 98.

152. Horodys'kyi, "Dva dni v partyzantsi," 23.

153. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 119, ark. 19.

154. AUSBULO, f. 5, spr. 57046, t. 8, arch. 14, 26, 61, 96, 118, 243.

155. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 32, ark. 184.

156. AUSBULO, f. 4, spr. 9999, t. 1, ark. 141.

157. IFZ, MA 1528; Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, box 130; NARA, T 78, 673.

158. GDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 1660, t. 1, arch. 50. On the character of OUN publications in the 1930s, see for example, Taras Kurylo, "The 'Jewish Question' in the Ukrainian Nationalist Discourse of the Inter-War Period," *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry*, 26 (2014): 233–58; and Oleksandr Zaitsev, *Ukraïns'kyĭ integral'nyĭ natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti roky): Narysy intelektual'noï istoriï* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013).

159. GDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 77, ark. 110.

160. AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 32262, ark. 19zv.

161. As of writing, only two issues of the journal are known to have survived.

162. "Vpered!," *Nash shlyakh*, part 1, April 16, 1944.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. Oseredok Archive (Winnipeg, Canada), Anatoly Kotovych Diary, B7 (c), B8 (a), 2394, pp.73–74.

167. "Posmertna zhadka," *Nash Shlyakh*, pt. 1, April 16, 1944.

168. "Nevinniy Moshko," *Nash Shlyakh*, pt. 2, August 21, 1944.

169. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 82.

170. "Do Ukraintsiv Kholmshchyny," http://avr.org.ua/index.php/viewDoc/1812/ (accessed September 29, 2020).

171. "Vstavaite, brati!," *Nash Shlyakh*, pt. 2, August 21, 1944.

172. "'V ohni kuiet'sia nasha dolia'… (Epizod iz shliakhu borot'by ULS)," *Nash Shliakh*, pt. 2, August, 21, 1944.

173. "Ukraïns'kyi selianyne!" http://avr.org.ua/index.php/viewDoc/1798/ (accessed Septermber 29, 2020).

174. "Ukraïntsi!" http://avr.org.ua/index.php/viewDoc/1794/ (accessed September 29, 2020).

175. "Do sytuatsiï," *Surma*, June 1943.

176. "Do pol's'kovo terroru," ibid.

177. Arkhiv OUN v Kyievi, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 323, ark. 1.

178. Lehioner, "Khto zh naspravdi zlochynets'?" Ch. 21, *Novyĭ Shliakh*, May 25, 1985.

179. Stanyslaviv (Makukh), *Lis pryĭmaie povstantsiv*.

180. Oseredok Archive (Winnipeg, Canada), Mykhaylo Seleshko Collection, OUN, B3(b), Ea-4-9, Tezi propagandi.

181. Arkhiv OUN v Kyievi, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 302, ark. 6–11.

182. Denys Volynets' and Serhiĭ Kot, "Pam'iati Ivana Shlapaka," *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, no. 3, March 2016.