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# THE WAFFEN-SS

A EUROPEAN HISTORY

EDITED BY JOCHEN BÖHLER & ROBERT GERWARTH

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Edited by  
JOCHEN BÖHLER  
and  
ROBERT GERWARTH

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military counter-intelligence, in Dallwitz, eastern Prussia. Students of this school were slated to be parachuted behind the Soviet lines and engage in intelligence gathering and acts of sabotage. Practically all of those who were parachuted into Soviet territory were eventually captured by Soviet troops and sentenced to various terms in prison or, in some cases, to death.<sup>109</sup>

### THE BELARUSIAN HOME GUARD (*OLEG ROMANKO*)

From the German point of view, the security situation in German-occupied Belarus in early 1944 was precarious to say the least. The Soviet counter-offensive that began after the battle of Kursk in summer 1943 was in full swing and brought the Red Army to the gates of the General Commissariat for White Ruthenia. Entire areas of Belarus were proclaimed to be ‘partisan zones’ out of reach of the Germans. In September 1943, Curt von Gottberg, the SS and Police Commander in White Ruthenia and acting Supreme Police and SS Commander for Central Russia, succeeded Wilhelm Kube as General Commissar for White Ruthenia, when Kube was assassinated by partisans. While von Gottberg was an unlikely candidate to promote any Belarusian national projects,<sup>110</sup> in his capacity as commander of the SS and police forces he was nevertheless eager to seek any available means to cope with the worsening security situation at the front and in the rear. It is against this background that the creation of the Belarusian Home Guard (*Belaruskaya Karyova Abarona*, BKA) should be regarded.

The creation of the Belarusian Home Guard was preceded by the proclamation of the Belarusian Central Council (BCC; *Belaruskaya Tsentralnaya Rada*) in December 1943. This body was perceived by its members as the Belarusian government, while, from the German point of view, it was no more than an advisory auxiliary administration.<sup>111</sup> On 22 January 1944, Radaslaŭ Astroŭski, the president of the BCC, proclaimed as his primary aim the organization of Belarusian forces for the armed struggle against partisans and against Bolshevism in general.<sup>112</sup> It was intended to create a modern armed defence force, which, although subordinated to the German authorities, would have a ‘clearly articulated Belarusian national character’. This force was named the Belarusian Home Guard.<sup>113</sup>

Mobilization into the Home Guard was supposed to proceed through a draft of men of military age and of Belarusian origin. From the start, limitations were

<sup>109</sup> On the Dallwitz school see a recent apologetic study by Belarusian scholar Syargei Yorsh: *Desant ŭ Nyapeŭnasc’: Belaruskii Parashutny Batalion ‘Dallwitz’ 1944–1945* (Minsk: n.p., 2012).

<sup>110</sup> Gottberg described Belarusian national ideas as ‘fabrications’ of ‘émigrés and of Berlin armchair politicians’. See ‘Aus der Brief des SS- und Polizeiführers in Weißruthenien SS-Brigadeführer v. Gottberg an der Chef der SS-Hauptamt’, undated, BArch, R.6/106.

<sup>111</sup> ‘Entwurf des Gottbergs Schreibens an Rosenberg betreffend Errichtung und Organisation des weißruthenischen Zentralrates’, 19 March 1944, *ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> ‘Belarusian Home Defence’, Russian State Archive for Social-Political History (RGASPI), 625-1-44, list 376.

<sup>113</sup> Francišak Kushal, *Sproby Stvarennya Belaruskaha Vojska* (Minsk: Belaruskii Histarychny Aglyad, 1989), 72.

imposed upon recruitment to the BKA. The obsessive German fear of large-scale indigenous armed formations expressed itself in von Gottberg's order of 23 February 1944 regarding the formation of the Home Guard. According to this order, only 500 men were to be mobilized into the BKA in each district of the General Commissariat for White Ruthenia.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, mobilization was to be carried out in only eight of the eleven districts of the General Commissariat for White Ruthenia. Lida district, which was the centre of activities of the Polish Home Army in Belarus, was excluded from the mobilization drive,<sup>115</sup> as were the Pripyat area in the south and the areas controlled by the partisans, where it was impossible to carry out recruitment to the BKA. Also excluded from mobilization were the heads of the local administration, auxiliary policemen, peasants in the 'defensive villages',<sup>116</sup> some physicians and agronomists, railway engineers, employees of the military factories, pupils and teachers of secondary schools, as well as physically and mentally disabled people, and fathers with many children.<sup>117</sup>

Up to May 1944, thirty-nine infantry and six engineer battalions with a total strength of about 30,000 people were recruited.<sup>118</sup> The infantry battalions of the BKA were formally subordinated to the staff of the Belarusian Home Guard headed by the former Polish officer Major Franz (Francišak) Kushal. According to the agreement reached in early 1944 between the Belarusians and the Germans, the officers' staff of the Belarusian Home Guard was to cooperate with the special staff of the Supreme SS and Police Commander for Central Russia in all matters pertaining to the propaganda, equipment, medical services, and military training of the BKA units, while all the operational activities were to be regulated by German staff. Germans took upon themselves the responsibility of arming the BKA units, while supplying these units with uniforms became the responsibility of the Belarusian Central Council.<sup>119</sup>

Already at the stage of mobilization into the Home Guard, contradictions arose between German economic demands and local interests. Thus, throughout the districts, many of the BKA recruits were snatched up by German authorities and transferred to the Todt Organization (OT) for road construction. After Astroŭski protested to the General Commissariat, a compromise was reached. The recruits transferred to OT were to form engineer battalions, which for a month and a half were to be at the Wehrmacht's disposal and were then to be transferred to the authority of the Home Guard.<sup>120</sup>

In contrast to the Belarusian auxiliary police, recruitment to which proceeded on a voluntary basis (at least in the initial stages), recruits into the Belarusian

<sup>114</sup> Alexei Litvin, *Akupacyja Belarusi (1941–1944): Pytanni Supracivnu i Kalabaracyi* (Minsk: Belaruski Knigazbor, 2000), 158.

<sup>115</sup> 'Mobilization of Polish Citizens on the Two Sides of the Front', AAN, fond 202, 202/II/73, 86, n.d.

<sup>116</sup> The defensive villages were situated in strategically important places, primarily along roads, in areas that were inaccessible to Germans. See Rein, *The Kings and the Pawns*, 297–300.

<sup>117</sup> 'General Directorate of Military Affairs of the Belarusian Central Council. 1942–1945', NARB, 383-1-11, lists 8, 9.

<sup>118</sup> Litvin, *Akupacyja Belarusi*, 186–7.

<sup>119</sup> Kushal, *Sproby*, 75.

<sup>120</sup> Litvin, *Akupacyja Belarusi*, 184.



Home Guard were drafted. Thus, in this case it is difficult to discern the multitude of factors that influenced people to join the BKA. Given the fact that mobilization was compulsory and death sentences were threatened to those trying to evade it,<sup>121</sup> it appears that recruits did not have much choice. Still, it is undeniable that the population in many districts responded enthusiastically to the call to arms.<sup>122</sup> The fact that mobilization was carried out by Belarusians themselves, that use of the Belarusian white–red–white colours, of the national *Pahonya* coat of arms, and of the double *Yaryla* cross was allowed, combined with the opening of a BKA officer school in Minsk in June 1944, provided the people with the impression that the Belarusian Home Guard was indeed going to be a national Belarusian army and that this time something serious was happening. German officials themselves acknowledged the fact that people in their districts were attending the mobilization commissions eagerly. Thus, in Slutsk district about 8,000 people showed up to the mobilization commission, almost twice as many as were needed.<sup>123</sup> Fear of the return of Soviet rule was also present among the population in the western parts of Belarus, which, in the two years following the annexation of the area by the Soviet Union, had been subjected to an accelerated Sovietization process<sup>124</sup> with everything this involved, including forced collectivization and deportations to remote Soviet areas.

The age of rank and file soldiers of the Home Guard ranged between 20 and 36 years. The maximum age of NCOs was established at 55 years and at 57 years for officers. The officer corps and the NCOs of the BKA were recruited from among former officers and NCOs from the Polish and Red armies.<sup>125</sup>

In formal terms, the Belarusian Home Guard was supposed to be a mono-ethnic force. None of Russians, Ukrainians or Poles could join its ranks. The reality looked somewhat different. On 15 March 1944, the chief of staff of the Home Guard, Kushal, issued an order explicitly demanding the exclusion of officers and NCOs of Polish origin from the BKA battalions and transferring them to the German labour authorities. He also called for the retirement of Polish rank and file soldiers ‘if, in the opinion of company commanders, their presence in BKA ranks is undesirable’.<sup>126</sup> Even so, this anti-Polish policy was not pursued consistently in the Home Guard. Thus, in some BKA units the order was carried out literally and all the mobilized Poles were dismissed, while in other units Poles continued to serve both as rank and file soldiers, and as NCOs and officers. Still, Kushal, himself a former officer in the Polish army, pursued a rigid anti-Polish policy and imbued

<sup>121</sup> On 15 April 1944 Radaslaŭ Astroŭski issued his Order No. 3 which said that ‘Anyone who does not appear at the mobilization commission should be regarded as enemies of the fatherland and deserters who should be court-martialled’, RGASPI, 625-1-44, list 379.

<sup>122</sup> Tina Klykovskaya, *Obrechyonnyi Eskadron* (Minsk: Imya, 1998), 3.

<sup>123</sup> ‘General Directorate of Military Affairs of the Belarusian Central Council. 1942–1945’, NARB, 383-1-11, list 9.

<sup>124</sup> As Israeli scholar Ben-Cion Pinchuk noted, people in the newly annexed territories ‘had to travel in 21 months a road traversed by the Soviets in over 20 years’. See B.-C. Pinchuk, *Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 11.

<sup>125</sup> ‘Belarusian Home Defence. 1944’, NARB, 382-1-8, list 3.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 382-1-14, list 27.

the BKA with an anti-Polish spirit. According to his orders, Poles were excluded from the four-week BKA officer-training course, and even the singing of Polish songs by Home Guard soldiers was forbidden.<sup>127</sup>

Among those who joined the Belarusian Home Guard were also people who had defected from the partisans. On 14 March 1944, Kushal issued a special order according to which any partisans who decided to come out of the forest and wanted to join the Home Guard were to serve in special units consisting solely of such deserters. They were also to be under the constant control of the SD.<sup>128</sup> Kushal had a reason to mistrust these deserters. Both the Soviet partisan movement and the Polish *Armia Krajowa* pursued a policy of ‘decomposing’ the Belarusian Home Guard from within. Thus, among those who joined the BKA were Soviet partisan agents who, once inside the Home Guard ranks, spread Soviet propaganda threatening, on the one hand, punishment of all traitors once Soviet rule returned and, on the other, promising, ‘in the name of the people’s rule, forgiveness to all those who would repent’.<sup>129</sup> The Polish Home Army also sent its agents into the BKA ranks to try to encourage its members to defect to the Polish resistance. Thus, eighty AK members joined the Home Guard battalion in Baranaviči. One member of this group, known as *Porucznik* (Lieutenant) Viktor, even became a company commander in the battalion. In April 1944, these agents tried unsuccessfully to lead the battalion’s members into the forest to join the resistance.<sup>130</sup>

As was the case with the Belarusian auxiliary police, the Germans were eager to transfer as much as possible of the burden for equipment and supplies for the BKA units to the shoulders of Belarusian institutions. Thus, the president of the Belarusian Central Council, Astroŭski, personally assumed an obligation to supply the Home Guard with uniforms. In reality, the BCC was hardly able to honour this commitment. Only in May–June 1944 did some of the Home Guard battalions, primarily those stationed in the Minsk area, begin to obtain uniforms. The soldiers in infantry battalions received the green uniforms of the German police, while those serving in engineer battalions received the uniforms of Wehrmacht engineers.<sup>131</sup> What distinguished members of the BKA from the military and police formations recruited from among other ethnicities of the Soviet Union were the Belarusian national white–red–white colours and the Belarusian coat-of-arms. Home Guard soldiers were allowed to wear uniforms.<sup>132</sup>

The German authorities were responsible for supplying Home Guard units with weapons and equipment. Initially, each battalion was supposed to receive

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 382-1-14, list 39.

<sup>128</sup> ‘Guidelines of Major Kushal Regarding the Treatment of the Partisan Deserters’, 14 March 1944, Belarusian Museum of the Great Patriotic War, 8001-20-10a-4, copy YVA M.41/107.

<sup>129</sup> John Armstrong, *Sovetskie Partisany. Legendy i Deystvitel'nost', 1941–1944* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007), 289–316.

<sup>130</sup> Kazimierz Krajewski (ed.), *Nowogródzki Okręg AK w dokumentach* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYT, 2009), 42.

<sup>131</sup> ‘Further Topics of the Conference with HSSPF for Central and White and *Fliegerführer 1*’, 11 April 1944, BA-MA, RW 41/59a, bl. 172.

<sup>132</sup> Litvin, *Akupatsyya Belarusi*, 190–1, Ūladzimer Shnek, *Belaruskaya Krayova Abarona: Uniforma i Adznaki* (Melbourne: Vydavetstva Belaruskaha Vyzvalenchaga Frontu, 1984), 22.



100 Italian rifles, i.e. one rifle for every five to six persons. Only when, in late April 1944, they grasped that, armed in such a way, the force could not be effective in combat against partisans did the Germans supply them with additional weapons. These weapons were of various origins—German, French, Dutch, Soviet, Polish, and others. Also, some Polish heavy machine guns were supplied. In fact, the Home Guard units were not fully armed until the very start of the summer 1944 Soviet offensive.<sup>133</sup> The equipment situation was even worse. Most of the BKA soldiers did not have even the simplest engineering tools, such as sapper shovels, axes etc. The officers had neither field maps nor compasses. Instead of military rucksacks, soldiers carried their belongings around in makeshift bags.

From the start, the main problem the Home Guard experienced was the lack of any military experience in most of its recruits. Many of the experienced NCOs and officers had been drafted into the Red Army, while those of Polish origin were dismissed, as described above. The officer corps available to the BKA consisted mostly of officers of the Belarusian auxiliary police and the Self-Defence Corps, along with former officers of the Russian Imperial, Polish, and Red Armies. Many of these were of advanced age and of little use in modern warfare. Much more serious from the point of view of people like Kushal was these people's lack of interest in the Belarusian national cause.<sup>134</sup>

The situation was addressed in several ways. First, monthly re-training courses for officers and NCOs were started in Minsk. Each district of the General Commissariat for White Ruthenia was to send selected officers and NCOs to these courses. Between March and June 1944, a total of 150 officers and 600 NCOs underwent these courses. The courses were headed jointly by a German officer with the rank of *SS-Hauptsturmführer* responsible solely to von Gottberg, and by Belarusian Captain Viktor Chebotarevich. In the second half of June 1944, an officer school was also opened for the training of new Home Guard officers. Although courses in this school were supposed to last for six months, it was evacuated to Vilnius on 29 June 1944 as a result of the Soviet advances. Later, all its students were transferred to the 'Siegling' Auxiliary Police Brigade (which became the 30th *Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS*).<sup>135</sup>

There were still not enough trained commanders, however, for the Belarusian Home Guard. In some districts, for example Slutsk, the rank and file soldiers and NCOs of the BKA who distinguished themselves in combat against partisans were promoted to NCOs and officers respectively and, by April 1944, there were already forty-five such promotions. However, the Slutsk district BKA chief Stepan Shnek maintained that those promoted were brave fighters and loyal to the national course, but weak commanders of the regular forces.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>133</sup> *Belaruskaya Tsentral'naya Rada, Za Dzyarzhajnyu Nezalezhnast Belarusi. Dokumenty i Materyialy* (London, 1960), 107.

<sup>134</sup> Kushal, *Sproby*, 81–2.

<sup>135</sup> A. Vinitcki, *Materyialy da Historyi Belaruskaj Emihratsii ŭ Nyamechchynе* (Minsk: Tekhnalogiya, 1994), 56.

<sup>136</sup> 'General Directorate of Military Affairs of the Belarusian Central Council. 1942–1945', NARB, 383-1-11, list 9.

The BKA experienced a particularly acute lack of NCOs and officers for combat support troops, such as engineers, communication and reconnaissance personnel, along with military lawyers and propagandists.<sup>137</sup>

The training of the Home Guard soldiers suffered from a lack of uniformity and left much to be desired. The textbooks used for this training were mostly abridged versions of German and Soviet service regulations.<sup>138</sup> Many, if not most, of the Home Guard commanders had little or no experience in modern warfare. Many of them paid more attention to square-bashing and weapons study than to combat and tactical field training. Their soldiers did not leave their barracks and did not engage in combat training of any kind.<sup>139</sup> Of all the Home Guard battalions, only the station in Vileyka ever took part in military manoeuvres in early June 1944, during which the men were trained in the capture of enemy positions. These manoeuvres, which were carried out without air or tank support, have been evaluated as rather poor for the prosecution of modern warfare.<sup>140</sup>

Even though Belarusian nationalists regarded the Home Guard as a Belarusian armed force, von Gottberg had other plans and other views. Initially, he planned to create a 20,000-strong combat group bearing his name (*Kampfgruppe von Gottberg*) in Belarus, which was to include various auxiliary units operating at that time in Belarusian territory, and also BKA units. Since more people were mobilized into the Home Guard than Gottberg had envisaged, it was ultimately decided that Home Guard battalions would participate in anti-partisan combat either individually or as part of larger German units.<sup>141</sup> In this way, only better trained and better armed battalions were to be used in anti-partisan operations, while less prepared units were to serve as self-defence units, patrolling their assigned areas and protecting local peasants from assaults by small partisan detachments. Those Home Guard units whose training level and arming were below average were used for sentry duties at various institutions, warehouses, and production facilities.<sup>142</sup>

The assignment of BKA units for anti-partisan operations by the Germans was not always coordinated with the Belarusian staff of the Home Guard. For example, the BKA staff were not informed about the planned participation of the Stoŭbtsy Battalion of the Home Guard in the anti-guerrilla operation in early June 1944 and many of the battalion soldiers who were to be transported to their place of assignment by train started to disperse just before boarding. Kushal himself was compelled to dispatch his deputy, Captain Vitaly Mikula, to Stoŭbtsy to restore order and to prevent the battalion from falling apart.<sup>143</sup>

Similar to the Belarusian auxiliary police, the effectiveness of Home Guard units as a fighting force depended, to a large degree, on the level of their armament and training. There were some units that performed admirably from the German point of view. Thus, in April–May 1944, the Haradzišča Battalion of the Home Guard commanded by Lieutenant Ŭbattali Rodzka participated as part of *Kampfgruppe*

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., lists 10–11.      <sup>138</sup> Ibid., list 13.      <sup>139</sup> Ibid., lists 13–15.

<sup>140</sup> Ya. Malezki, *Pad Znakam Pahoni* (Toronto: Pahonya, 1976), 131–2.

<sup>141</sup> J. Turonek, *Białoruś pod okupacją niemiecką* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1993), 215–16.

<sup>142</sup> 'Belarusian Home Defence. 1944', NARB, 382-1-3, lists 165, 374, 626.

<sup>143</sup> Kushal, *Sproby*, 84.

*von Gottberg* in the anti-partisan operation ‘Spring Festival’ (*Frühlingsfest*) in the Polotsk-Ushachi area of eastern Belarus. German commanders of this operation commended the Belarusian Home Guard soldiers who participated in this operation. Battalion Commander Rodzka was awarded the Iron Cross, while company commanders and many of the battalion’s NCOs and rank and file soldiers were awarded the ‘Medal for Gallantry and Merit of the Eastern Peoples’.<sup>144</sup>

Overall, however, just as in the case of the Belarusian auxiliary police, the fact that the BKA soldiers were outgunned by the partisans did not enhance the combat effectiveness of the Home Guard as a body. The German perception of the Belarusian Home Guard was not that of a Belarusian army, but that of a mere auxiliary force, which strongly contributed to damping the initial enthusiasm of BKA recruits.

In this situation, it is little wonder that desertions to the Soviet and Polish partisans on the part of individual Home Guard soldiers, and even by entire units, started early on. Thus, Pavel Bedritskiy, the chief of the propaganda department in Baranaviči district, informed Regional Police Commander Moche that there were mass desertions of BKA soldiers in the area, while the rates of absence without leave had reached 35–40 per cent in the battalions stationed in Kletsk, Nesviž, Stoŭbtsy, and Mir alone.<sup>145</sup> Already in March–April 1944, the staff of the Home Guard reported numerous cases of desertions of whole units of BKA to the partisans.

The participation of various BKA units in anti-partisan operations also made them into a tool of Nazi terror. As has been noted above (in the section dealing with the Belarusian auxiliary police), the large-scale anti-guerrilla operation claimed the lives of numerous victims who had little or nothing to do with the partisans. Thus, Operation ‘Spring Festival’, in which the Haradzišča BKA battalion took part, claimed the lives of about 7,000 people. Around 11,000 able-bodied persons were shipped to forced labour in Germany in the course of the same operation.<sup>146</sup>

On 23 June 1944, the Red Army launched a large-scale operation named after Pyotr Bagration, a hero of the anti-Napoleonic war. This operation ended in the destruction of the German Army Group Centre and the liquidation of the General Commissariat of White Ruthenia. The Germans did not have any coherent plans for evacuating the Home Guard units; the fate of the BKA battalions was decided by the commanders themselves. They often confronted their soldiers with a choice: to leave westwards, or to stay at home. Many voted for the latter option. Thus, out of 700 soldiers from the Baranaviči Battalion of the Home Guard, only about two dozen, mostly NCOs, left for the west, while the rest dispersed to their homes.<sup>147</sup> At least one BKA battalion participated in combat against the Red Army and was crushed. Most of the Home Guard battalions were disbanded by their

<sup>144</sup> S. Yorsh, *Źvevalad Rodzka. Pravadyr Belaruskikh Natsyyanalistaŭ* (Minsk: Holas Krayu, 2005), 10.

<sup>145</sup> ‘Bedritzkis Schreiben an den Polizeikommandanten d. Gb. Baranowitsche Major Moche’, undated, BArch, R.90/159.

<sup>146</sup> See the data in Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 903.

<sup>147</sup> Turonek, *Białoruś pod okupacją niemiecką*, 225.

commanders. The most battle-worthy infantry battalions retreated to still-occupied Poland. Here their fate was not much different from the fate of Belarusian auxiliary policemen who left Belarus. Members of the Home Guard battalions were also incorporated into the auxiliary police brigade commanded by *SS-Sturmabführer* Hans Siegling, which, as noted above, later became the 30th *Waffen-Grenadier* Division of the SS and ended up on the western front. The six combat engineer battalions of the BKA that were under the Wehrmacht's jurisdiction were also evacuated to Poland, where they were reorganized into two 'construction battalions' (*Baubataillone*), and, without the knowledge of the Belarusian Central Council, incorporated into the German land forces. Later on, both these battalions were also transferred to the western front, where they stayed until the very end of the war.<sup>148</sup>

### THE 14TH SS 'GALICIA' VOLUNTEER DIVISION (*ANDRII BOLIANOVSKYI*)

In April 1941, the idea of recruiting Ukrainians into the *Waffen-SS* was supported by Gottlob Berger, Chief of the Head Office of the SS. Berger sent Himmler a memo outlining that he had roughly eighty 'racially suitable' Ukrainians and 600 'non racially suitable' Ukrainians available for service in the *Waffen-SS*. However, the *Reichsführer-SS* opposed the idea of involving Ukrainians at this time, even in separate units, on racial grounds.<sup>149</sup> The majority of Slavic volunteers had to wait until 1943, with the creation of the 13th and 14th *Waffen-SS* Divisions, before they were granted this right.

Otto Gustaw Wächter, the second German Governor of Galicia, was the main author of the idea to create the *Waffen-SS* 'Galicia' Division using Ukrainians. His political line in Galicia contrasted greatly with the policy of Erich Koch, head of the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine, who strongly prohibited the creation of any military formations made up of Ukrainians in the territories under his authority. According to eyewitness memoirs, Wächter tried to transform Galicia into a kind of laboratory for the revision of Nazi policy towards Ukraine.<sup>150</sup>

Ukrainian supporters of the 'Galicia' Division were hoping to utilize this unit as a base for the establishment of a Ukrainian army. One of them was Volodymyr

<sup>148</sup> O. Romanko, 'Belaruskaya Krayovaya Oborona (Fevral–Iun 1944). K voprosu o nekotorykh aspektakh nemetskoï okkupatsionnoy politiki na territorii SSSR', *Kultura Narodov Prichernomor'ya*, 39 (2003), 90.

<sup>149</sup> Himmler to Berger, 31 April 1941, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), T-175, roll 110, frames 2634861, 2634860; George H. Stein, *The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 185–6.

<sup>150</sup> Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia', 1943–45: A Memoir* (Toronto, Paris, Munich: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1988), 3–4; V. Kubiiovych, *Meni 85* (Munich: Vydavnytstvo 'Molode zhyttia', 1985), 109–11; R. Krokhamliuk, *Zabrava na Skhodi. Spohady i dokumenty z pratsi u Viiskovii Upravli 'Halychyna' v 1943–1945 rokakh* (Toronto and New York: Nakladom Bratstva kol. voiakiv 1-oï Ukraïns'koï dyvizii UNA, 1978), 20–1; K. Pan'kiv's'kyi, *Rokynimets'koï okupatsii 1941–1944* (New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto: vyd-vo NTSh, 1983), 221–3. See also M. J. Melnyk, *To Battle. The Formation and History of the 14th Galician Waffen-SS Division* (Solihull: Helion, 2002), 11.

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