

JOURNAL
OF
SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Vol. 6, No. 1 (2020)

Contributor's copy
For personal use only

Special Sections

Multilingualism in Ukraine

Issues in the History and Memory of the OUN III

JSPPS 6:1 (2020)

GENERAL EDITOR AND ISSUE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Julie Fedor, University of Melbourne

GUEST EDITORS:

Rory Finnin, University of Cambridge

Ivan Kozachenko, University of Cambridge

Andreas Umland, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation

Yuliya Yurchuk, Södertörn University, Sweden

CONTENTS

SPECIAL SECTION: MULTILINGUALISM IN UKRAINE

Introduction: Ukraine's Multilingualism RORY FINNIN and IVAN KOZACHENKO.....	3
The Languages and Tongues of Mykola Markevych TARAS KOZNARSKY.....	15
Channel Switching: Language Change and the Conversion Trope in Modern Ukrainian Literature MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ.....	39
Linguistic Conversion in Ukraine: Nation-Building on the Self LAADA BILANIUK.....	59
Ukrainian Cinema and the Challenges of Multilingualism: From the 1930s to the Present VITALY CHERNETSKY.....	83
“I Will Understand You, Brother, Just Like You Will Understand Me”: Multilingualism in the Songs of the War in Donbas IRYNA SHUVALOVA.....	103
REPORTS:	
Multilingualism in the Academy: Language Dynamics in Ukraine's Higher Education Institutions OLENKA BILASH.....	135
Language Use among Crimean Tatars in Ukraine: Context and Practice ALINA ZUBKOYCH.....	159

**SPECIAL SECTION: ISSUES IN THE HISTORY AND MEMORY
OF THE OUN III**

Introduction: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
and European Fascism During World War II
ANDREAS UMLAND AND YULIYA YURCHUK 181

The OUN(b), the Germans, and Anti-Jewish Violence in
Eastern Galicia during Summer 1941
KAI STRUVE..... 205

The Biography of the OUN(m) Activist Oleksa Babii in the
Light of his “Memoirs on Escaping Execution” (1942)
YURI RADCHENKO..... 237

The Ustašas and Fascism: “Abolitionism,” Revolution,
and Ideology (1929–42)
TOMISLAV DULIĆ AND GORAN MILJAN 277

REVIEWS

Ksenia Maksimovtsova, *Language Conflicts in Contemporary
Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine: A Comparative Exploration of
Discourses in Post-Soviet Russian-Language Digital Media*
OLGA KHABIBULINA..... 307

Mariëlle Wijermars and Katja Lehtisaari (eds.), *Freedom of
Expression in Russia’s New Mediasphere*
OLENA NEDOZHOGINA 310

Nadja Douglas, *Public Control of Armed Forces in the Russian
Federation*
OLEKSII POLTORAKOV 313

ABOUT THE GUEST EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS 317

The OUN(b), the Germans, and Anti-Jewish Violence in Eastern Galicia during Summer 1941*

Kai Struve

Abstract: *The article analyzes the contexts and motives of anti-Jewish violence carried out by the local population in the initial phase of the German–Soviet war in Eastern Galicia during the summer of 1941. It begins by discussing the extent to there were plans and preparations for their instigation from the German side or from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Next, it analyzes the well-documented events in L'viv and compares them with acts of anti-Jewish violence in more than thirty other cities and towns and a number of villages.*

The article argues that three major contexts of anti-Jewish violence and pogroms can be distinguished. The first context was related to the recovery of the bodies of prison inmates that the Soviets had murdered in large numbers in L'viv and a number of other localities in Western Ukraine before their retreat. The second context consisted of planned executions by combat groups and militias of the OUN(b). These usually took place without German presence or the knowledge of the German military authorities and had no larger spontaneous elements. The third context were violent excesses by the Waffen-SS division “Wiking.” In several localities, most notably in Ternopil’ and Zolochiv, the core group of perpetrators came from this division. Local militias and inhabitants also participated in the violence against Jews. But the large number of victims in these localities was clearly the result of the excesses of that military unit.

During the first weeks after the German attack of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 in Western Ukraine, as in most other territories that the Soviet Union had occupied in September 1939 and summer 1940,

acts of violence against Jews and pogroms were carried out by the local population.

Over the past two decades the question of the scale and causes of this local violence against Jews has attracted increased attention among international researchers and the public mostly as a result of Jan Tomasz Gross's book, published in 2000, on the pogrom in Jedwabne and other localities in the Polish regions of Western Belarus.¹ The intense debate that Gross's small book provoked centered on the one hand on the question of the role of Germans compared to Polish perpetrators, and on the other hand on the question to which extent the acts of violence could be explained by anti-Semitic stereotypes and hatred or rather by an allegedly pro-Soviet attitude of Jews during the previous twenty-one months of Soviet occupation.²

For these mostly Polish territories, it was revealed only as a result of Gross's book and further research that pogroms had taken place here in a rather large number of localities. By contrast, for the mostly Ukrainian territories of the western Soviet Union it had already long been known that riots against Jews had taken place. For these regions, it is most controversial which role the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv*), led by Stepan Bandera and usually referred to as OUN(b), played in the anti-Jewish violence and whether and if so how it cooperated with the Germans. While on the one hand the leading OUN(b) activists and historians sympathizing with them denied any participation,³ on the other hand there are also

* The article is a slightly edited and updated translation of "OUN(b), nimtsi ta antyievrejs'ke nasyt'stvo v Halychyni vlitku 1941 roku," *Ukraina Moderna* 24 (2017): 234-55.

¹ Jan Tomasz Gross, *Sąsiedzi. Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka* (Sejny: Pogranicze 2000).

² On the debate Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic (eds.), *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

³ See primarily Yaroslav Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941. Proholoshennia vidnovlennia derzhavnosti Ukrainy* (Toronto: Liga Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1967), 267-68; a more recent example from the historiography is Volodymyr V'iatrovych,

exaggerated notions about the scale of violence and misleading assertions on the OUN(b)'s relations with the Germans.⁴

The question of OUN(b) and local violence against Jews became so controversial also because the accusation of having committed bloody crimes in German service was a central theme of Soviet propaganda against the Ukrainian nationalists. Thereby, Soviet propaganda also legitimized the brutal suppression of anti-Soviet resistance in Western Ukraine during the second half of the 1940s. However, Soviet propaganda either did not refer to crimes against Jews, or did so only indirectly.⁵

The following article summarizes results of a larger study of anti-Jewish violence during the first days and weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union in eastern Galicia.⁶ The article's focus is on the relations between the different actors on the German side and the OUN. In its first part, the article presents results of the study on the cooperation between the Germans and Ukrainians before the invasion of the Soviet Union. In the second part, it discusses relations between Ukrainian and German actors during the pogrom on 1 July and during the following events in L'viv. The third part summarizes the analysis of acts of violence in more than thirty other cities and towns and in many villages in Galicia during the first days of July.

Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv. Formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy (L'viv: Vydavnytstvo "Ms", 2006), 59–60.

- 4 Exaggerated notions about the scale of violence exist especially for L'viv. In several other, extremely deadly pogroms the core group of perpetrators were not, as some earlier publications assumed, from the local Ukrainian population, but from the Waffen-SS division "Wiking" (on which see below).
- 5 On Soviet propaganda's depiction of the Ukrainian nationalists in the early post-war years, see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera. The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (Stuttgart: *ibidem*, 2014), 363–405.
- 6 Kai Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine* (Berlin: deGruyter, 2015). Only the most important sources and titles from the research literature are referred to in the following article. A comprehensive documentation of sources and literature can be found in the book.

The OUN and the Germans Before the Invasion of the Soviet Union

Already the OUN's predecessor, the Ukrainian Military Organization (*Ukrains'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiia*, UVO), had cooperated with Abwehr, the German military intelligence. After its foundation in 1929, the OUN continued this cooperation. Both organizations got financial support from Abwehr and in certain periods some of their members also received military training and training in intelligence activities. In exchange, they provided Abwehr with information from Poland. However, as a result of the German–Polish rapprochement after Hitler came to power, the Germans terminated cooperation towards the end of 1933. It was renewed only in 1938 when Germany increased pressure on Czechoslovakia and also wanted to mobilize the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia for this aim. Even though the OUN's attempt at establishing a Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia after October 1938 failed because Germany left that region to Hungary in March 1939, the OUN supported Germany's preparation of the attack of Poland during the following months by preparing for a Ukrainian insurgency in Galicia and Volhynia. But another failure soon followed when Germany and the Soviet Union agreed on a partition of Poland in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that left most of the Ukrainian territories in Poland to the Soviet Union.⁷

After the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland following 17 September 1939, many thousands of Ukrainians, among them a large number of OUN activists, fled into the German-occupied territories. The Germans did not grant legal status to the OUN, but tolerated its activities. During 1940 the OUN split into two competing organizations. This split had two main causes. One was an older conflict between the exile leadership that had been taken over by Andrii Mel'nyk in 1938 and the homeland leadership in Poland dating back to the mid-1930s. It flared up again after former

⁷ See the comprehensive treatment of relations between the different Ukrainian political actors and Germany until September 1939 by Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), on UVO and OUN especially 431–55, 623–35, 992–1016.

members of the homeland leadership, among them Stepan Bandera, escaped from Polish prisons in September 1939. The second cause was a conflict about strategies towards the Soviet occupation of the Western Ukrainian territories. The OUN leadership under Mel'nyk opposed an active struggle against Soviet rule because they viewed this too risky and unlikely to succeed. In addition, at that time the Germans did not want any activities against the Soviet Union from their territories in order not to compromise their agreement with the Soviet Union. By contrast, Mel'nyk's critics advocated an active struggle against Soviet rule in the Ukrainian territories. One of the consequences of the split was that the OUN leadership under Mel'nyk lost the support of the large majority of the organization's members in the General Government and all contacts with the underground in the Soviet territories to the "revolutionary OUN" under Bandera's leadership.⁸

The activist strategy pursued by Bandera and his followers in the Soviet territories proved to be successful. They developed a strong underground organization in Galicia and Volhynia despite a large number of arrests of OUN activists by the NKVD. During the first half of 1941 in particular, they intensified the struggle by attacks on and killings of Soviet officials and by developing detailed plans and preparations for a larger uprising. Before the German attack in June 1941, there existed a network of underground OUN-groups with several thousand members who had stocked weapons and had made detailed plans for assuming power in their localities and regions.⁹

⁸ On the split from the perspective of Bandera's followers, see Volodymyr Kosyk, *Rozkol OUN v svitli dokumentiv* (Kyiv: Ukrain's'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2002); from the perspective of the Mel'nyk followers: Zynovii Knysh, *Rozbrat (spohady i materialy do rozkolu v OUN v 1940-1941 rokakh)* (Toronto: Sribna Surma, 1960).

⁹ On the Ukrainian underground in the Soviet territories, see Ivan K. Patryliak, *Viis'kova diial'nist' OUN(B) u 1940-1942 rokach* (Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy NAN, 2004), 135–66; on the strength of the organization: *ibid.*, 171; on the organizational network, see also Ivan Klymiv's report to Stepan Bandera, "Kraevyi Providnyk OUN na ZUZ do v.p. pana holovy OUN Stepana Bandery," in Orest Dziuban (ed.), *Ukrains'ke derzhavotvorennia. Akt 30 chervnia 1941. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv: Piramida, 2001), 213.

Even though the Germans mistrusted the activist Bandera-OUN and preferred cooperation with the Mel'nyk-OUN and other Ukrainians, Abwehr established cooperation with the Bandera-group in spring 1941 as part of their preparations for the war against the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Mel'nyk group, the Bandera-OUN was able to provide information from the Soviet territories and, even more important, they were able to prepare an insurgency behind the front that should begin at the time of the German attack. A part of this cooperation was also that Abwehr deployed two battalions of Ukrainians with the codenames "Nachtigall" and "Roland" that should support the Wehrmacht's invasion of the Soviet Union.¹⁰

In May 1941 the OUN(b) leadership composed extensive, detailed instructions under the title "The struggle and activities during the war" for the course of action and the establishment of a Ukrainian state after the German attack on the Soviet Union. Combat groups of the OUN were to attack Soviet troops and, most importantly, assume power in towns and villages, if possible, before or with the arrival of German troops. They were to establish a Ukrainian local administration and local militias as a basis for a Ukrainian state and a Ukrainian army.¹¹ The Ukrainian nationalists had failed to get a pledge from the German side to establish a Ukrainian state in return for supporting the German attack. By demonstrating their strength in the newly occupied territories, presenting themselves as a force of military importance, and showing the Ukrainians' ability to create state institutions, they

¹⁰ On "Nachtigall" and "Roland," see Patryliak, *Viis'kova diial'nist'*, 253–91; and Andrii Bolianovs'kyi, *Ukrains'ki viiskovi formuvannia v zbroinykh sylakh Nimechchyni (1939-1945)* (L'viv: L'vivs'kyi Natsional'nyi Universytet im. Ivana Franka, 2003), 41–74.

¹¹ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 186–91; on the plans and expectations of OUN(b) for the beginning of the German-Soviet war, see also Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, "The 'Ukrainian National Revolution' of 1941. Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement," *Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12 (2011): 83–114, here 90–95.

hoped to persuade the Germans to allow the foundation of a Ukrainian state.¹²

One of the tasks that Bandera's OUN had assigned to their combat groups and the newly established local militias was the "cleansing of the territory from hostile elements." In this context the instructions for the procedure at the beginning of the war explained: "At the time of chaos and confusion it is permissible to liquidate undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists, especially supporters of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism."¹³ Other passages in this and further documents prove that at this time also in the OUN primarily Jews were seen as supporters of Soviet rule. But Jews were also regarded as an unwanted group with regard to the desired Ukrainian nation-state.¹⁴

Ivan Klymiv, the leader of the OUN underground in the Soviet territories, added to those plans an even more radical twist in two appeals he issued immediately after the German attack. In a leaflet circulated in many places in Western Ukraine in the first days of July, he stated: "People! Know! Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians, the Jews are your enemies! Destroy them!"¹⁵ Apparently, in concrete terms, this call was understood in July 1941 primarily as a call for violence against Jews. For various places where acts of violence against Jews occurred in July 1941, sources quote these lines from the altogether much longer leaflet and put them into context with the violence in the respective places.¹⁶

¹² O. Veselova *et al.* (eds.), *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy NAN, 2006), 80. On relations during the weeks before 22 June 1941, see also Volodymyr Kosyk, *Ukraina i Nimechchyna u Druhii svitovii viini* (Paryzh-Niu Jork-L'viv: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1993), 100–105.

¹³ Veselova *et al.* (eds.), *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, vol. 1, 93.

¹⁴ See, for example, *ibid.*, 129. More extensively on this and the following, see Marco Carynnyk, "Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947," *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011): 315–52, here 329–32.

¹⁵ Kraievyi provid Ukrain's'kykh natsionalistiv na MUZ (Matirni ukrains'ki zemli), "Ukrains'ke narode!" in Dziuban (ed.), *Ukrains'ke derzhavotvorennia*, 129.

¹⁶ On Nezvys'ko: T. Lipiński, report, 20 March 1961, Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego (henceforth: AŻIH) 301/5775, p. 3; on this village see also below; on Tlumach: Juda Feuer, report, 14 April 1945, AŻIH 301/4977, p. 1; on Dobropole and other villages north of Buchach, see the diary of the Roman-Catholic priest Józef Anczarski: Józef Anczarski, *Kronikarskie zapisy z lat*

In another document that Ivan Klymiv signed in his capacity as “High Commander of the Ukrainian national revolutionary army” he issued the order to introduce “military revolutionary tribunals” and declared: “[...] I introduce collective responsibility (of kin and nationality) for all offenses against the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian state.”¹⁷

These documents governed the local and regional OUN(b) structures in eastern Galicia in June and July. In all likelihood there was no direct order by the OUN(b) leadership for acts of violence against Jews that went beyond these instructions. The violence against Jews arose from the widespread belief among the population and also among members of OUN(b) that Jews had been essential supporters and beneficiaries of Soviet rule.

On the German side as well, Jews were seen as supporters and beneficiaries of Soviet rule. This was the basis for the fact that during the first weeks of the war the Einsatzgruppen shot mostly male Jews as part of their operations to secure the occupied territories and as “retaliation” for Soviet crimes.¹⁸ The widespread expectation on the German side that a violent “reckoning with the Bolshevik-Jewish oppressors” would take place in the newly occupied territories, likewise originated from this perception. On the German side, the violent “reckonings” were seen as a positive contribution to securing the new territories.¹⁹ The expectation that there would be violent

cierpień i grozy w Małopolsce Wschodniej 1939-1946 (Lwów: Wydawnictwo Bł. Jakuba Strzemie Archidiecezji Lwowskiej Obrządku Łacińskiego, 1998), 180f.

¹⁷ Nachal’nyi kom[andant] Ukr[ains’koi] nats[ional’noi] revoliutsiinoi armii, leutenant Liegenda, “Hromadiane Ukrains’koi derzhavy!” in Dziuban (ed.), *Ukrains’ke derzhavotvorennia*, 131. See on these orders already Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944* (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), 62.

¹⁸ On the extension of mass shootings in summer 1941, see Christopher Browning (with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus), *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 253–68.

¹⁹ These words were used by Georg Leibbrandt, the designated Secretary of State in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, at a meeting on 29 May 1941; see Babette Quinkert, *Propaganda und Terror in Weißrussland 1941-1944. Die deutsche „geistige” Kriegführung gegen die Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), 56f.

reckonings was also due to the fact that numerous reports that the Germans received from their agents in the Soviet-occupied territories presented a stereotypical picture of Jews as a privileged group and supporters of Soviet rule who had incited the hatred of the non-Jewish population.²⁰

As shown by an often quoted letter from Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich's Main Security Office, to the Einsatzgruppen from 29 June 1941, this expectation was also an issue at a meeting held by Heydrich in Berlin on 17 June 1941 with the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen. In the letter, he summed up the discussion on this point and urged the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen not to "prevent the self-cleansing efforts of anti-Communist and anti-Jewish circles. On the contrary, they should be triggered, but without trace, intensified if necessary and steered into the right direction." Heydrich further specified that "local popular pogroms [...] are to be triggered."²¹ From the German point of view, the expected acts of violence were a part of the change of rule. They were to be supported because they would help to remove pro-Soviet forces—"Bolsheviks and Jews," as Heydrich identified them in another letter of 1 July 1941.²²

When Heydrich mentioned the "anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles"—elsewhere he called them "self-protection circles"—he had in mind the anti-Soviet underground and insurgents in the western areas of the Soviet Union. Like the OUN in the Ukrainian case, there were also organizations in the Baltic countries preparing insurgencies and sabotage behind the Soviet lines in cooperation with Abwehr for the time when the German attack would start.²³

²⁰ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 132-135.

²¹ Amtschef IV, Berlin, 29.6.1941, an die Chefs der Einsatzgruppen, gez. Chef der SiPo u. d. SD, Heydrich, in: Peter Klein (ed.), *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42. Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD*, (Berlin: Hentrich, 1997), 319.

²² *Ibid.*, 320.

²³ See on this Karlis Kangeris, „Kollaboration vor der Kollaboration? Die baltischen Emigranten und ihre „Befreiungskomitees“ in Deutschland 1940/1941,“ in Werner Röhr (ed.), *Okkupation und Kollaboration. Beiträge zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik* (Berlin: Hühig, 1994), 165-90.

Apparently, Abwehr expected that the insurgents would play a role in the transition from Soviet to German rule and in the replacement of previous Soviet authorities. However, there were no more detailed plans or preparations by the Wehrmacht for local administration before 22 June 1941, nor is there any evidence that there had been planning or preparation of pogroms. Among the reasons why there were no more precise plans was that there was still no decision on the German side about the future status and administration of the Soviet territories. Some provisional orders regarding local administrations and local militias were issued in the area of Army Group South, to which the Ukrainian territories belonged, only during the first half of July.²⁴

The basic decisions on the structures of the administration of the newly occupied Soviet territories fell only at a meeting that Hitler held on 16 July 1941. Until then, it was also unclear whether there would be a Ukrainian state. At that meeting Hitler decided that Alfred Rosenberg should be appointed Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. At the same time, however, Hitler rejected the concept of a Ukrainian state as a bulwark against Russia supported by Rosenberg and assigned the Ukrainian territories the position of a German colonial territory to be ruled and exploited by a Reichskommissar. In connection with this meeting, it was also decided that eastern Galicia, as “Distrikt Galizien,” should be attached to the General Government and thus, in terms of administration, be separated from the other Ukrainian territories.²⁵

While Stepan Bandera’s OUN cooperated with Abwehr, there were no close contacts between the OUN(b) and the German

²⁴ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 387–91; see also Frank Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung unter deutscher Besatzungsherrschaft 1918 und 1941/42* (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2005), 267f.

²⁵ On the 16 July meeting, see Andreas Zellhuber, „*Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu...*“. *Das Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete und die deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941–1945* (München: Vögel, 2006), 70–100. As Reichskommissar Hitler appointed the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, who then realized the brutal regime of suppression and exploitation that Hitler imagined. On Koch’s appointment, see also Ralf Meindl, *Ostpreußens Gauleiter. Erich Koch – eine politische Biographie* (Osnabrück: Fibré, 2007), 326–28.

Security Police. The reason was mutual mistrust. The Security Police mistrusted the uncompromising attitude of OUN(b), which wanted to establish a Ukrainian state in any case, and therefore seemed not to be controllable. The OUN(b), on the other hand, feared that the German police forces could prevent their plans for state-building, and, therefore, avoided closer contacts. By contrast, the remaining Mel'nyk followers in the General Government maintained contacts with the German Security Police, who apparently preferred them because of their more docile attitude. Several Ukrainians with relations to OUN(m) came with the Einsatzgruppe C and the Einsatzkommando Lemberg from the General Government to the newly occupied Soviet territories.²⁶ Therefore, it seems unlikely that there were any concrete preparations or collusion on anti-Jewish violence, because the security police, which wanted to instigate pogroms on the German side, worked together with an organization on the Ukrainian side that had virtually no organizational structures in Galicia and Volhynia at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941.

L'viv in July 1941

When German troops, including the battalion "Nachtigall," entered L'viv in the early morning of 30 June 1941 after Soviet troops had retreated, they were enthusiastically welcomed as liberators from Soviet rule. On their arrival, they found a large number of corpses in cells, basements, and mass graves in the yards of the local prisons. These were inmates who had been murdered by the Soviets before their retreat, mostly by shots in the neck. According to Soviet documents, which may not be comprehensive, around 2,100 prison inmates were killed. According to later German estimates, there were up to 3,500 victims.²⁷

²⁶ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 201f., 227f.; on the relationship between OUN(b) and the Security Police see also Yuri Radchenko, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Mel'nyk Faction) and the Holocaust: The Case of Ivan Iuriiiv," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 31, no. 2 (2017): 215–39.

²⁷ On the numbers see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 252f.; see also Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939-1944. Życie codzienne* (Warszawa: Książka i

On the morning of 30 June OUN(b) formed a local militia from its underground structures in L'viv and the surrounding area. The formation of the militia was initiated by the leading OUN(b) activist Roman Shukhevych, who had come to the city with the battalion "Nachtigall," and other leading members of the OUN who arrived in the city together with Bandera's deputy, Yaroslav Stets'ko, a few hours later. In the afternoon, also initiated by the OUN(b), a new city administration was established under the mayor Yuriy Polans'kyi. The local German military commander ("Stadtkommandant") recognized the militia and the city administration the same day.²⁸ This procedure corresponded to the planning of the OUN(b) from the weeks before the German attack. OUN(b)-led militias and local administrations formed in numerous other cities in eastern Galicia in a similar way. In L'viv, however, later in the day Stets'ko also prepared for the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, which took place at a gathering of local Ukrainians on the evening of 30 June. Unlike the militias and local administrations in L'viv and many other places, the Germans did not recognize Stets'ko's government and the Ukrainian state proclaimed by him. Nevertheless, they initially proceeded with caution against the OUN(b), as there was no decision from the German political leadership on the future political and administrative order in the newly occupied territories yet. Even more important was that the Wehrmacht expected further

Wiedza, 2000), 190; with higher numbers: Oleh Romaniv and Inna Fedushchak (eds.), *Zakhidnoukrains'ka trahediia 1941* (L'viv: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 2002), 55–58, 63. More recent archival findings indicate a likely number of between 2,358 and 2,752 victims; Kai Struve, "Masovi vbystva v'iazniv l'viv'skykh tiurem: shcho vidomo pro mistsia ta kil'kist' zhertv?" *Ukraina moderna*, 9 September 2018 (<http://uamoderna.com/md/struve-lonckoho>).

²⁸ On the formation of the militia see the memoirs of Bohdan Kazaniv's'kyi, *Shliakhom Legendy. Spomyny* (London: Ukrains'ka vydavnycha spilka, 1975), 209–17; Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941*, 179–82; on the city administration, *ibid.*, 192. See also "Nezabutnyi den," *Surma. Orhan Provodu Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*, no. 1, 2 July 1941, 2f., Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchychkh Orhaniv Vlady Ukraïny (henceforth: TsDAVO) 3833/2/104. On the events in L'viv see also the excellent study by John-Paul Himka, "The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* 53 (2011): 209–43; on the formation of the militia, *ibid.*, 227–29.

support from the OUN(b) in the fight with the Red Army, which they did not want to endanger. However, on 5 July the Security Police arrested Bandera in Kraków and on 9 July Stets'ko in L'viv and brought them to Berlin. Since both refused to repudiate the founding of the state, Abwehr also stopped the cooperation with the OUN(b) during the following weeks.²⁹

Already before German troops had entered the city rumors about the murders in the prisons had spread among the population. In the hours after the German entry on 30 June numerous people gathered at the prisons looking for arrested relatives. On the afternoon of the same day, the German military authorities ordered the bodies to be recovered and to allow the city's inhabitants to look for their relatives. Apparently, the German military authorities commissioned the militia created by the OUN(b) to bring in workers for the retrieval of the bodies. Here, as in other localities, it was the usual practice of the Wehrmacht to use primarily Jews as forced laborers for clean-up work.³⁰ The work in the prisons started on the afternoon of 30 June. No major violence is reported for that time.

Major riots against Jews began on the morning of 1 July and lasted until the evening hours. The central context was that Jews were arrested on the streets or taken out of their homes and driven to the prisons and other places for forced labor. In that process, many more Jews were brought to the prisons than were actually able to work there.

²⁹ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 288–95; see also Yevhen Stakhiv, *Kriz' tiurny, pidpillia i kordony. Povist' moho zhyttia* (Kyiv: Rada, 1995), 91f.; and Stets'ko (1967), 218–81.

³⁰ See also Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht. Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944* (München: Oldenbourg, 2008), 249.



Image 1. Jews in the Yard of the prison at vul. Lonts'koho, 1 July 1941, Landesarchiv NRW—Abteilung Rheinland—RWB 28440/5.

Not only the militiamen but also many inhabitants spontaneously took part in arresting Jews on the streets or taking them out of their homes and chasing them to the prisons. The Jews were mocked, beaten, and otherwise mistreated as they were led through the streets. This intensified around the prisons and in the prison yards. Jews were also attacked that day in other places where they were brought for work.

From the point of view of the perpetrators, the violence punished members of a group that had supported and benefitted from Soviet rule and, therefore, shared responsibility for Soviet crimes.³¹ The violence became a public spectacle, which showed that Jews, unlike allegedly in the Soviet era, should only have a subordinate place in society in the future.

³¹ On perceptions of Jews in L'viv during Soviet rule, see Christoph Mick, "Only the Jews do not waver...". L'viv under Soviet Occupation," in Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, and Kai Struve (eds.), *Shared History - Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 245-62.



Image 2. In front of the prison at vul. Lontskoho, 1 July 1941, Yad Vashem, Photo Archive, Jerusalem, sign. 73Co3.

The violence also originated from hatred of Soviet rule, which was reinforced by the confrontation with the sometimes horrible-looking corpses in the prisons. Rumors of extensive Soviet atrocities and mutilations of the corpses spread quickly. Several of these rumors displayed motifs of Christian origin with strong similarities to ritual murder allegations. In fact, almost all the prisoners in L'viv, as well as in other localities, were killed by shots in the neck. Reports of crucified priests or hanged children in prisons were products of excited phantasies.³² These rumors, however, prove that there was

³² There are only a few reports of persons who actually claimed to have seen such mutilated corpses themselves. But they can be refuted by reports from other people who were in the same places at the same period and who saw nothing of

also an older, religious element in the anti-Semitic uproar of these days.

The prisons themselves had been under German control since the early morning of 30 June. Units of the Feldgendarmerie and a battalion of the Abwehr regiment “Brandenburg 800”—the Ukrainian battalion “Nachtigall” was subordinated to it—had been charged with guarding the prisons. The recovery of the bodies was supervised by NCOs of the Wehrmacht’s city commander. Thus, the German troops could have prevented a considerable part of the violence. They did not do this, but let it happen or even committed acts of violence themselves.³³ In addition, on 1 July members of Einsatzgruppe C and numerous soldiers were present at the prisons. In Brygidki Prison, up to one hundred Jews were shot by Germans, most likely members of Einsatzgruppe C.³⁴ The violence ended in the late afternoon or evening of 1 July, when, according to various witnesses, German officers appeared in the prisons ordering the release of the Jews.

Although there is no unequivocal evidence, it is very likely that Einsatzgruppe C encouraged the militia and civilians to bring a much larger number of Jews to the prisons than actually needed for the work and had the Feldgendarmerie let them in. Thus, they intervened in the events in accordance with Heydrich’s order of 29 June to encourage and extend riots against Jews. The Sonderkommando 4b of Einsatzgruppe C had already arrived in Lemberg around noon on 30 June. The group staff with the chief of

the sort; for a more extensive discussion of sources, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 278–88. However, there is strong evidence that also some children aged 10–14 were among the victims of the Soviet prison massacre; see interrogation of Dr Georg Sältzer by Army Judge Möller, High Command of 17th Army, L’viv, 6 July 1941, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RW 2/148, p. 339.

³³ There are hints that here also members of “Nachtigall” participated in acts of violence; more extensively on that controversial issue, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 354–60.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 363–66.

Einsatzgruppe C, Otto Rasch, and other parts arrived in the early morning of 1 July.³⁵

The number of victims on 1 July cannot be determined exactly. However, the numbers of 4,000 or even 7,000 mentioned in the research literature are significantly too high. The reports and documents on concrete acts of violence do not indicate that there were such a high number of victims. A realistic estimate would be several hundred instead of several thousand.³⁶

However, the number of 4,000 victims is mentioned in several accounts of Jewish survivors. Apparently, this number spread as a rumor among Jews in L'viv. In fact, it reflects rather the number of Jews killed during the whole month of July 1941 than the number of victims on 1 July. In addition to the victims of the pogrom on 1 July probably around 2,000 Jews were shot by Einsatzgruppe C on 5 July, ostensibly as "retaliation" for the Soviet massacre of prison inmates.³⁷ Furthermore, during the so-called "Petliura Days" on 25–26 July 1941 the German Security Police shot about 1,500 Jews.

In the research literature the "Petliura Days" sometimes feature as a second pogrom. In fact, they did not resemble the events of 1 July, but those of 4 and 5 July, i.e. the mass execution by Einsatzgruppe C.³⁸ From the point of view of observers not directly involved, including most of the surviving Jews, all three events presented a rather similar picture. Therefore, it is not surprising that testimonies and memoirs from after the war did not always distinguish them clearly. In all three cases, large numbers of Jews were taken from their homes or arrested on the streets, driven in columns with beatings and other forms of ill-treatment to the prisons or, before the mass shooting on 5 July, to the sports stadium

³⁵ Klaus-Michael Mallmann *et al.* (eds.), *Die „Ereignismeldungen UdSSR“. Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), 65 (Ereignismeldung no. 10, 2 July 1941); and Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 360–61.

³⁶ For a more detailed discussion of numbers and sources, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 376–79.

³⁷ On this execution see also Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 68–69.

³⁸ More extensively on the "Petliura days," see also Kai Struve, "Komanda osobogo naznacheniiia 'L'vov', ukrainskaia militsiia i 'Dni Petliury' 25 i 26 iuliuia 1941 g.," *Problemy istorii holokostu* 6 (2013): 102–24.

on ul. Pelczyńska near the prison on ul. Łąckiego. On 5 July and during the “Petliura days” most of them were then taken out of the city for execution by the Einsatzgruppe.³⁹

On 25–26 July against the background of the arrests again a mood for a pogrom spread in the city, but resulted only in some isolated attacks on Jews by civilians. There are also hints that the German police tried to provoke riots. But apparently, they had no success. In fact, the “Petliura Days” essentially consisted of a round-up of Jews by the Ukrainian militia, at least in part according to earlier prepared lists, in the yard of the prison on ul. Łąckiego. They were held there for a day and beaten severely by German police, soldiers, and Ukrainian militiamen. The following day they were taken away and executed by the German security police outside the city. The “Petliura Days” were probably a consequence of Heinrich Himmler’s visit to L’viv on 21 July 1941.⁴⁰

It was not only on 1 July that the OUN-led militia played a central role in arresting and driving Jews to the prisons; they also took on the task of arresting Jews before the mass shooting on July 5 and during the “Petliura Days” on 25–26 July. In the latter case, they supported the German mass execution even after Bandera and Stets’ko had been arrested and brought to Berlin and when it had become clear that the Germans would not allow the establishment of a Ukrainian state. However, the OUN(b) continued to try to persuade the Germans to recognize the state proclaimed by Yaroslav Stets’ko in L’viv on 30 June 1941. At the same time, they continued to build the Ukrainian local and regional administrative and police structures and aimed at securing their influence, especially in the local police forces. These were the main reasons why the militias,

³⁹ On the arrests before the mass execution on 5 July and on the events in the stadium, see Leon Weliczker Wells, *The Janowska Road* (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1999, first published 1963), 45–54.

⁴⁰ Only scant details are known about Himmler’s visit. For a first mention of this visit, see Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 65. Meanwhile, it is well documented that Himmler’s various travels in the newly occupied territories in the summer of 1941 were usually followed by an expansion of the mass murders of Jews in the respective regions; Jürgen Matthäus, “Controlled Escalation: Himmler’s Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 2 (2007): 218–42.

established and led by the OUN(b), continued their cooperation with the Germans. From August 1941, however, the Germans dissolved the militias that had emerged in July and replaced them in “Distrikt Galizien” with the newly created Ukrainian auxiliary police. Many of the former militia members were taken over by the new police, but usually not the leading OUN(b) members who had been at the head of the militias.⁴¹

However, another reason why OUN(b) cooperated with the Germans in the persecution of the Jews in July 1941, also consisted of the fact, as various documents from the second half of July 1941 show, that they approved of it also with respect to their aspired nation-state.⁴² The aspired state should be ethnically as homogeneous as possible and the “hostile nationalities” should not enjoy equal rights.⁴³

Contexts of Anti-Jewish Violence

In addition to L’viv, in numerous other localities in eastern Galicia local perpetrators committed acts of violence against Jews in July 1941. A closer analysis of these violent events shows, however, that they did not run in all places according to a single scenario, but that there were considerable differences in the nature, scope, and context. The common elements were mainly that they were based on the view of Jews as supporters and beneficiaries of previous Soviet

⁴¹ On L’viv, but not without some factual errors regarding the militia, see David Allen Rich, “Armed Ukrainians in L’viv: Ukrainian Militia, Ukrainian Police, 1941 to 1942,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 48 (2014): 271–87.

⁴² On Yaroslav Stets’ko’s statements in German custody in July 1941, see Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Yaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 Zhyttiepyss,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 3/4 (1999 [2001]), 149–84; and the minutes of a meeting chaired by Stepan Lenkavs’kyi in mid-July in L’viv that was devoted to conditions in Soviet Ukraine, including the issue of relations between the different national groups. Stepan Lenkavs’kyi summarized the debate over whether Germany could be a model for measures against Jews in an Ukrainian state with the statement: “Regarding Jews we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction”; “Zi stenohramy konferentsii OUN u L’vovi,” in Dziuban (ed.), *Ukrains’ke derzhavotvorennya*, 181–91, here 190.

⁴³ Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth”, 338–44.

rule and that a central group of perpetrators were members of the OUN(b) underground and OUN(b) militias. In the following, three major contexts of anti-Jewish violence are distinguished. The findings go back to the analysis of events in more than thirty cities and towns and a number of villages in eastern Galicia in July 1941.⁴⁴ Only a few of these localities that are exemplary for the respective contexts will be mentioned here.

1) *Violent acts during the recovery of murdered prison inmates.* In addition to L'viv, the Soviets had murdered inmates of local prisons also in many other places in eastern Galicia and Volhynia during the days after the German attack.⁴⁵ In several of these places riots against Jews with a similar course as in L'viv took place. However, the murder of prison inmates did not necessarily lead to deadly attacks on Jews. A comparison of the events in Sambir and Boryslav on the one hand and Stryi and Stanislaviv (today: Ivano-Frankiv'sk) on the other hand shows this very clearly. In all four places murdered prisoners were found in local prisons, with especially large numbers in Stanislaviv, Sambir, and Stryi.⁴⁶

In Sambir and Boryslav, Jews were taken to the prisons by local Ukrainian militias or OUN(b) combat groups to recover the bodies. Here numerous acts of violence and murders by the militia and inhabitants took place, especially in Boryslav. In both localities the Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln or units of the German Order Police subordinated to him were present during the riots and controlled the prisons. At least for Boryslav, the sources indicate that they were the catalyst for the violence and contributed significantly to its escalation. Here the German police shot many of the Jews who had been taken to the prison by the local Ukrainian militia and by inhabitants.⁴⁷ Although the German police forces operating in Sambir and Boryslav were not subordinated to

⁴⁴ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 437–67.

⁴⁵ See the survey in Romaniv, Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraïns'ka trahediia*, 51–63.

⁴⁶ On these localities, see *ibid.*, 59f.

⁴⁷ In Boryslav between 160 and 350 and in Sambir between 50 and 150 Jews were killed; Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 433–42, 464–84.

Heydrich, they apparently acted in accordance with his instructions of 29 June.

For Stryi it is not known whether Jews had to work in the prison building to recover the bodies. At least there were no acts of violence in the prison that left traces in the sources. However, Jews had to dig a mass grave for the murdered inmates and here they were also abused and threatened. In addition, there were some attacks and ridicule of Jews on the streets, but probably no deaths.⁴⁸ Further research would be necessary to clarify which factors influenced the varying course of events in these localities. Among the factors there may have been different attitudes among the German local military commanders, the German police forces, and the local Ukrainian forces, and possibly also the longer history of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews.

Stanislaviv, like all of south-eastern Galicia, had been occupied by Hungarian troops, who, unlike the Germans, in the places where they were present, usually prevented murders of Jews. This was also the case in Stanislaviv. Jews had to recover the bodies of the murdered prison inmates. But apparently, only as many Jewish forced laborers were actually brought to the prison building as were able to work there. There are no reports of violence against Jews here. Individual attacks on Jews on the streets were stopped by the Hungarian military. However, the Hungarians exercised closer control only in the cities. In the countryside, where they had little presence, a significant number of murders of Jews took place also in this region.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ On Stryi, see *ibid.*, 492–96. However, in Stryi shortly after the occupation of the city members of Einsatzgruppe C shot twelve “communists,” eleven Jews, and one Ukrainian, who had been named by Ukrainians, probably the militia or the city administration. In some publications, including the entry on Stryi in the *Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945*, vol. 2: *Ghettos in German-occupied Eastern Europe*, ed. by Martin Dean (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 834, a pogrom in early July 1941 with many deaths is mentioned. Apparently, this goes back to a misreading of sources.

⁴⁹ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 630–67. See also the cases of Otyniia and Nezvys’ko sketched below. They were located in the area occupied by Hungarian troops.

2) *Executions by combat groups and militias of OUN(b)*. As stated above, the instructions of the OUN(b) of May 1941 allowed for the liquidation of “hostile elements” and of supporters of “Muscovite Bolshevik imperialism.” Ivan Klymiv’s leaflets and orders had made these instructions even more stringent, notably through the introduction of “revolutionary military tribunals” that could impose punishments not only on individuals, but also on families and national groups. This is the context of much of the violence in villages or small towns that took place without German participation or presence.

The “cleansing of the territory from hostile elements” hit not only Jews, but also Ukrainians and Poles. In the case of the Ukrainians, the violence, which could range from mocking rituals to executions, seems to have been mostly directed against people who actually had supported Soviet rule, for example, by carrying out functions in the village Soviet or by setting up a collective farm. In the case of Poles, persons, usually men, who, from the point of view of the Ukrainian nationalists, had shown themselves particularly anti-Ukrainian in the period of the Polish state were also killed. However, the central victims of violence in this context in July 1941 were Jews who, in particular, were identified with Soviet rule. In their case, often not only individuals, but families were murdered.

The following examples show that in different places there were large differences in the forms of violence and the profile of victims also within this context. However, all the acts of violence have in common that they were related to the local change of rule and originated from the OUN(b) insurgents.

For example, in the village of Dychkiv near Ternopil’, an OUN execution squad shot between 9 and 12 previously arrested Jewish men on 6 July. The executions took place outside the village at daytime. There were no murders of Ukrainians or Poles.⁵⁰ In the

⁵⁰ The events in Dychkiv are documented in two Soviet investigations, records of which can be found in Haluzevnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy (henceforth HDA SBU), oblast’ Ternopil’ no. 4954 and no. 18132, vol. 1 (cited according to the copy in United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archive (henceforth USHMM RG-31.018M)); on this village also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 534f. One Ukrainian who had compromised himself during Soviet

village of Perevoloka near Buchach, the local OUN group executed at least eight men as part of their takeover of local rule, even before German troops arrived. Here the victims were at least six Ukrainians and two Jews. In addition, a Jewish family of three was killed at night in their home.⁵¹

In the village of Skorodyntsi, north of Chortkiv, at least 23 Jews belonging to six families were killed between 6 and 8 July. These were all Jews living in the village. They were murdered in their homes at night. At the same time, the local OUN group arrested eight or nine Polish men. They were executed after interrogation and a provisional trial.⁵² In the village of Laskivtsi, a little further north-west, the local Ukrainian militia arrested between 16 and 18 people on 8 July, interrogated and then killed them the next day. In documents of the Soviet “Extraordinary State Commission” from 1944 they are referred to as “komsomoltsy and Soviet activists.” There were one Jew, eight or nine Ukrainians, and seven or eight Poles among them.⁵³

In the aforementioned village of Perevoloka, a few days after the execution a public mocking and punishment ritual against Ukrainian villagers who had supported the establishment of a collective farm took place. They were led through the village with pictures of Lenin and Stalin and forced to burn these and other

rule in the eyes of the local OUN activists was forced to participate in the execution. Polish villagers were threatened and forced to bury the victims.

- ⁵¹ On the investigation see HDA SBU, oblast’ Ternopil’ 1417 and 26874 (also in USHMMA RG-31.018M); “Protokol dopytu Romana Stepanovycha Otamanchuka,” in Petro J. Potichnyi (ed.), *Borot’ba z ahenturoiu: Protokoly dopytyv Sluzhby Bezpeky OUN v Ternopil’shchyni 1946-1948*, vol. 1 (Toronto: Vydavnytvo Litopys UPA, 2006), 247–52; see also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 515–18.
- ⁵² Several reports by former Polish inhabitants of Skorodyntsi are published in Henryk Komański and Szczepan Siekierka, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na Polakach w województwie tarnopolskim 1939-1946* (Wrocław: Nortom, 2006), 692–710.
- ⁵³ Documents of the Soviet “Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices” on this village from 1944 are in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth GARF), 7021/75/88, pp. 13–15 (cited according to a copy in USHMMA RG-22.002M); on this village also Komański and Siekierka, *Ludobójstwo*, 403f.

Soviet symbols in the central square. They were mocked, beaten, and humiliated also in other ways.⁵⁴ While there were no deaths in this ritual punishing Ukrainians, a similar ritual in Staryi Sambir shortly after the German occupation of the town targeting only Jews resulted in more than thirty Jewish men murdered at the Jewish cemetery.⁵⁵

However, public spectacles with numerous killings were not the usual way of the elimination of “hostile elements” implemented by the Ukrainian insurgents and their newly established organs of power. The killings in this context, as most of the examples show, took place mostly as executions outside of the villages or as killings at night in or near the victims’ homes. These nocturnal murders often included families. In reports from surviving Jews, these acts frequently appear as a pogrom-like, largely spontaneous outburst of anti-Semitic hatred with material greed as an additional motive. However, a more detailed analysis of what happened in these localities shows that, in fact, these were deliberate, planned killings of certain individuals or families that took place, with certain local variations, in the framework of instructions and orders of OUN(b) for the change of power, as described above. Greed for material goods, even if villagers appropriated the property of the killed families, does not appear to have been an important motive.

The events in the small towns of Ulashkivtsi and Otyniia are further cases from this context. Here, according to the available testimonies 74 and 89 Jews from a total Jewish population of a few hundred or about 1,000 were killed. The choice of houses whose inhabitants were murdered was not accidental and the violence was not a spontaneous riot.⁵⁶ The killings in Ulashkivtsi took place

⁵⁴ Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 526f.

⁵⁵ Alexander Manor (ed.), *Sefer Sambor – Stari Sambor. Pirquei edut ve-zikaron li-kehillat Sambor – Stari Sambor me-r’ashitan ve-’ad khurbanan*, (Tel Aviv: Publisher: Irgun yots’e Sambor-Ştari-Sambor veha-sevivah be-Yiśra’el, 1980), XXXVII (English section). This account mentions 32 victims, including eleven by name. See also Masza Dattelkremer, testimony Haifa 4 December 1962, Landesarchiv Berlin B Rep. 058 Nr. 6615; and Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 442–44.

⁵⁶ The Soviet “Extraordinary Commission” collected several testimonies on the events in Ulashkivtsi in July 1944: GARF, 7021/75/107, pp. 46, 58–61 (also in

before German troops appeared in the village. Otyniia was in the region occupied by Hungarian troops. At the time of the killings, however, no Hungarian soldiers were present in the village.

In villages where only a few Jewish families lived, as in the case of Skorodyntsi, killing families frequently meant killing all the Jews in the given locality. The sources for the smaller places often do not allow establishing whether in these cases the goal was to eliminate all Jews or whether murders were about retaliation for actual or suspected “misconduct” of concrete persons or families in the period of Soviet rule. However, for the town of Kosiv, located between Buchach and Chortkiv, and for the village of Nezvys’ko near Obertyn the sources clearly prove that the goal was the extermination of the entire Jewish population. Here too, however, this was not a spontaneous excess, but a mass murder planned by the new local Ukrainian authorities in these localities. At least 80 Jews were murdered in Kosiv and 60 in Nezvys’ko.⁵⁷

3) *Violent excesses of the Waffen-SS.* In eastern Galicia, the core group of perpetrators in those pogroms with the largest numbers of victims were not from the local population, but from the Waffen-SS Division “Wiking.” In all localities in question OUN-led militias and inhabitants also participated in various degrees in the riots and

USHMMA RG-22.002M); see also Hilary Kenigsberg, report of 28 March 1948, AŻIH 301/3337, p. 1; on Otyniia Zvi Schnitzer: “Hedim migej zalmavet. Hoshana Raba – ‘Ha-aqtsya Harishona’”, in Dov Noy and Mark Schutzman (eds.), *Sefer zikaron le-kehilat Kolomej ve ha-sevivah* (Tel Aviv: Irgun yots’e Ķolomiyah ve ha-sevivah ba-arets uva-tefutsot, 1972), 325–31, here 328f.; several testimonies collected by the “Extraordinary Commission” are in GARF, 7021/73/8, pp. 241–53; Bodiner (Bodniew), AŻIH 301/4897; see also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 551–54, 638–43.

⁵⁷ On Kosiv, the anonymously published report of a former Polish inhabitant, “Fraza,” “‘Krzyształowa Noc’ w Kosowie w wigilię św. Iwana,” *Głosy Podolan* 39 (2000): 17–21; see also Marian Woźniak, “A co działo się w Chomiakówce (pow. czortkowski),” *ibid.*: 22–26; Fischel Winter, AŻIH 301/835, p. 1; with more sources, Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 545–48; on Nezvys’ko and surrounding villages, T. Lipiński (Teofil Jetel), report of 20 March 1961, AŻIH 301/5775; and Markus Willbach, “Skupisko żydowskie w Obertynie podczas II wojny światowej. Wspomnienia,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 36 (1960), 106–28; more extensively Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 654–61.

killings. The high death toll, however, was the result of the involvement of the SS troops. The “Wiking” Division did not have police duties, but was a part of the combat troops and subordinated to the High Command of the Wehrmacht’s Tank Group 1, which advanced to the east in northern Galicia between the 6th and 17th Armies. This SS Division, which had been newly deployed only shortly before the attack on the Soviet Union, had little experience of fighting as it passed through eastern Galicia. It had not belonged to the first line of German troops during the attack on 22 June, but had crossed the border only at the end of June and only after 5 July became involved in heavy fighting east of Ternopil’ and at the former Polish–Soviet border at Husiatyn.

The Waffen-SS troops understood themselves as part of a military elite of the National Socialist state and were ideologically highly motivated. Apparently, parts of the “Wiking” division began their war against the Soviet Union by shooting Jews while they were passing through eastern Galicia. Unlike much of the violence from the local side, outlined in the previous section, their massacres were indeed excessive acts of violence. In the files of the Wehrmacht they left only a few traces. Obviously, there were attempts to cover them up. The “Wiking” division was responsible for excesses in Zolochiv (600–1,000 deaths), Zboriv (600–850 deaths), Ozerna (180–200 deaths), Hrymailiv (350–500 deaths), Skalat (250–400 deaths), and especially Ternopil’ (2,300–4,000 deaths) between 3 and 7 July.⁵⁸ The

⁵⁸ On the massacres by Waffen-SS division “Wiking,” see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 561–630; and now with a number of additional sources from memoirs of the “Germanic volunteers” from northern and western Europe, Lars Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers and Atrocities 1941-1943* (Helsinki: The National Archives of Finland, 2019), 98–157. Earlier research paid little attention to the violent excesses of this unit. The “Wiking” division had been identified only as responsible for the mass murder in Zboriv; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 70. The events in Zolochiv and Ternopil’ at the beginning of July 1941 attracted some attention in a controversy over photos in a critical exhibition on the Wehrmacht, the so-called “Wehrmachtsausstellung,” shown in Germany in the second half of the 1990s. From this context, see Bernd Boll, “Złoczów, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia. From a Criticism of Photographs to a Revision of the Past,” in Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (eds.), *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New Press, 2002),

Waffen-SS units, assisted by local militias, combed these places for Jewish men and shot them either where they found them or at certain assembly points, among them in the cases of Zolochiv and Ternopil' at the prisons.

Here too the Soviet massacres of prison inmates were part of the background to the violence. The division had learned about them when parts of it came through L'viv. In Zolochiv and Ternopil' the division was involved in overseeing the recovery of the bodies of murdered prisoners, also carried out by Jewish forced laborers. As elsewhere, this was the central context of the violence. Another contributing factor was that the commander of the division's "Westland" regiment had been shot by a sniper near the village of Velyka Vil'shanytsia between L'viv and Zolochiv on the morning of 2 July.⁵⁹

The share of victims in the Jewish population was considerably higher in these places than in the other larger localities where violence against Jews occurred. In Zolochiv between 8 and 15 percent of the Jewish inhabitants were killed, in Zboriv about 30 percent, in Ozerna 20–25 percent, in Ternopil' between 12–22

61–99. Boll recognizes the involvement of the Waffen-SS in Zolochiv. However, since his research arose from a controversy over the role of the Wehrmacht, he is not particularly interested in it. In the discussion about the events in Ternopil' in the same context, the role of the Waffen-SS has not been considered or recognized at all; see Klaus Hesse, "NKWD-Massaker, Wehrmachtverbrechen oder Pogrommorde? Noch einmal: die Fotos der „Tarnopol-Stellwand“ aus der Wehrmachtsausstellung," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 51 (2000): 712–26; and Bogdan Musial, „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen“. *Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2001), 235–41. The role of the Waffen-SS in Zolochiv has been identified more clearly by Marco Carynnyk, "Zolochiv movchyt'," *Krytyka* 10 (2005): 14–17.

⁵⁹ See also Jonathan Trigg, *Hitler's Vikings: The History of the Scandinavian Waffen-SS: The Legions, the SS Wiking and the SS Nordland* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2010), 66. One of the retaliatory measures was the destruction of the village Velyka Vil'shanytsia; Yaroslav Dovhopolyi, "To ne ti nimtsi," *Zaxid.net*, 25 September 2012, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?t_o_ne_ti_nimtsi&objectId=1266107. There were also so-called "Germanic volunteers" from western and northern Europe among the division's personnel. In summer 1941 their share was below ten percent, but it was higher in the regiments "Westland" and "Nordland." Most of the perpetrators seem to have belonged to these regiments.

percent, in Skalat between 6–10 percent, and in Hrymailiv 16–23 percent.⁶⁰ In L'viv, however, it was less than 0.5 percent and also in Boryslav, where the level of violence was quite high, it is likely not to have exceeded two percent of the Jewish population.

Conclusion

All in all, the close analysis of anti-Jewish violence in several dozen places in eastern Galicia makes it possible to correct existing, sometimes highly contested views, in three respects:

1) The analysis of the acts of violence shows that in places of deadly violence, the central group of local perpetrators came from combat groups and militias created by the OUN(b). Thus, this finding clearly contradicts the thesis that was asserted by leading members of the OUN(b) after World War II and historians sympathizing with them, namely that the OUN(b) was not or only marginally involved in anti-Jewish violence. However, the closer examination of the relationship between the Germans and the OUN(b) also proves that it was different from the image that Soviet propaganda had drawn and that sometimes found its way also into publications in Western countries. To be sure, the OUN(b)'s approach to eliminating supposedly pro-Soviet "hostile elements" largely met the expectations of the German Security Police. But the OUN(b) acted here independently and not according to German orders. For them, it was a step towards the establishment of a Ukrainian state, which they imagined as ethnically homogeneous as possible (or with only limited rights for Jews, Poles, and Russians). At the same time, in their view violence—and also in its mass application—was a legitimate means to achieve their goals. Although the OUN(b) had a certain ideological proximity to the National Socialist regime, at the same time it was undoubtedly the Ukrainian political organization whose resistance to the Germans was strongest. The ideological positioning of the OUN(b) in the field of radical nationalist or fascist movements in Europe at that time

⁶⁰ See for a more detailed discussion of the numbers of victims, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 584f., 588, 590, 616–18, 625, 628.

did not preclude a sharp antagonism to National Socialist Germany since the center of the OUN(b)'s ideology was the independent nation-state that National Socialist Germany did not wish to allow.⁶¹ The cooperation in the spring and summer of 1941 was possible merely because the German attitude to this question only became clear in the course of July.

2) The finding that in cases of deadly violence against Jews in the summer of 1941 almost always combat groups or militias of OUN(b) were a central group of perpetrators, and that apart from the public spectacles during the recovery of the corpses of murdered prison inmates, the violence was mostly targeted and planned also disproves the thesis that anti-Jewish violence in this period can be explained as a massive, spontaneous outburst of hatred against Jews from among the mass of the population. This thesis, especially since Jan Tomasz Gross's *Neighbors*, has strongly influenced the discussion about anti-Jewish violence in summer 1941. In the English-language version of his book, Gross sums up this thesis succinctly in the phrase "half of the population [...] murdered the other half," referring to the fact that about half of Jedwabne's population were Jewish and the other half Christian.⁶² In fact, such a generalization detracts from asking about the real perpetrators and their political and organizational background. In the summer of 1941, there was a strong sentiment against Jews in the non-Jewish population, based on stereotypical, anti-Semitic images of Jews focusing on their alleged cooperation with the Soviets. However, this anti-Semitic sentiment alone rarely led to deadly violence. Usually, two other factors were needed, namely the participation of combat groups or militias of the OUN(b), who deliberately killed those whom they considered supporters of Soviet rule or enemies of

⁶¹ On the controversy over whether OUN(b) can be considered to have been fascist, with differing opinions, see Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*, and Oleksandr Zaitsev, *Ukrains'kyi integral'nyi natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti roky). Narysy intelektual'noi istorii* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013), 261–69; see also *idem*, "De-Mythologizing Bandera: Towards a Scholarly History of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement," *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies* 1, no. 2 (2015): 411–20.

⁶² Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2001), 7.

Ukrainian state-building, or the instigation to violence from German side.

A comparison with other regions in the western border areas of the Soviet Union, where anti-Jewish violence occurred, confirms the conclusion that such acts were primarily related to the local takeover of power by anti-Soviet insurgents and their aims of state-building.⁶³ A region in the western border areas of the Soviet Union, in which only a few, mostly non-fatal attacks on Jews took place, were the predominantly Belarusian areas. The reason for this was not that local hostility to Jews was smaller. The reason was that no militarily organized, nationalist Belarusian underground existed and no anti-Soviet insurgency took place here after 22 June.

At first glance, the predominantly Polish areas of Western Belarus seem to be another exception. In contrast to the other parts of Western Belarus, in this region violence against Jews with a high death toll happened not just in Jedwabne, but also in numerous other localities. But unlike in Western Ukraine and the Baltic countries, here the beginning of the German–Soviet war was not associated with nation-state-building expectations (in this case, for the re-building of the Polish state). However, there was also a strong anti-Soviet underground in these Polish territories. A recent study has shown much more clearly than Gross’s *Neighbors* and other subsequent studies that in this region too anti-Jewish violence was primarily related to the local takeover of power by members of the Polish anti-Soviet underground. Here, too, the German invasion led to a change of local authorities. Afterwards, a “punishment” of supposed or actual supporters of Soviet rule among the population by members of the nationalist, anti-Soviet underground began.⁶⁴

⁶³ For a more extensive comparative discussion of events in Lithuania, Latvia, and the Romanian-occupied regions of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, see Kai Struve, “Anti-Jewish Violence in the Summer of 1941 in Eastern Galicia and Beyond,” in Simon Geissbühler (ed.), *Romania and the Holocaust. Events – Contexts – Aftermath* (Stuttgart: *ibidem*, 2016), 89–113, here 103–12.

⁶⁴ The sources that Mirosław Tryczyk presents in his study show this very clearly; Mirosław Tryczyk, *Miasta śmierci. Sąsiedzkie pogromy Żydów* (Warszawa: RM, 2015). This study has attracted strong and, at least partially, well-grounded critique, in most detail by Krzysztof Persak, “Wdmuszka. Lektura krytyczna Miast śmierci Mirosława Tryczyka,” *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały* 12 (2016),

3) However, a detailed analysis of local events in eastern Galicia also shows that the image of local perpetrators being guided by a deeply rooted, primitive Jew-hatred specific to the region, while the German perpetrators proceeded in a well-planned, in a sense “rational” way needs correction. This is shown above all by the extremely deadly riots of the Waffen-SS Division “Wiking.”

As indicated above on the example of L'viv, data on the number of victims of these three contexts of violence, usually summarized under the term pogrom, are subject to great uncertainty also for the entire region. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that in 1941, in most cases, the dead were not counted in a very close way and data in the sources are therefore often strongly different and not too reliable. In addition, it can be assumed that there were other acts of violence in villages that have left no traces in the sources. Based on the documented events, my study comes to an estimate of between 7,300 and 11,300 victims of anti-Jewish violence in the summer of 1941 in Western Ukraine. These are slightly lower figures than indicated by previous research. Of these, however, about sixty percent were killed during the large pogroms carried out by the Waffen-SS Division “Wiking.”⁶⁵

357–74. But Persak does not question Mirosław Tryczyk's important finding that the perpetrators came to a high degree from the anti-Soviet underground and the new local authorities and militias established by them; *ibid.*, 368.

⁶⁵ Earlier estimates of the overall number of victims of pogroms ranged from 16,000 to as high as 24,000. For a more extensive discussion of the numbers, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 668–71. The earlier estimates can be found in Aleksandr Kruglov, “Pogromy v Vostochnoi Galitsii letom 1941 g.: organizatory, uchastniki, masshtaby i posledstviia,” in A. R. Diukov and O. E. Orlenko (eds.), *Voina na unichtozhenie. Natsistskaia politika genotsida na territorii Vostochnoi Evropy* (Moskva: Fond Istoricheskaiia Pamiat', 2010), 324–41, here 341. Aleksandr Kruglov assumes that about three percent of the pre-war Jewish population in eastern Galicia were killed in pogroms during July 1941. Based on a number of about 540,000 Jews living in that region at the beginning of the German invasion, this would be about 16,000 victims. Aharon Weiss mentions 24,000 victims for the whole of Western Ukraine; Aharon Weiss, “The Holocaust and the Ukrainian Victims,” in Michael Berenbaum (ed.), *A Mosaic of Victims. Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis* (New York: New York University Press 1990), 109–15, here 110. However, for Volhynia, Shmuel Spector suggests the rather low number of about 500 victims of pogroms; Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), 66f.