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German Pogroms: Atrocities of the Waffen-SS Division ‘Wiking’ in Eastern Galicia in July 1941

During the first weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Jews in the newly occupied territories were hit by a wave of violence and mass murder. In most of those western territories, that the Soviet Union had incorporated only between September 1939 and July 1940 as a result of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact, this violence consisted not only of mass executions by units of the German police forces, primarily the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police, but also of violence and murder from among the non-Jewish local population, usually described as pogroms. Both elements of violence have been discussed extensively in the research literature. The following article will argue that, nevertheless, some misperceptions about both continue to prevail. While for the German side the role of antisemitic hatred seems to be underestimated, it tends to be overemphasized for crimes from the side of the local population.

The article will analyse a series of pogrom-like massacres where the core group of perpetrators did not come from the local population, but from the Waffen-SS Division Wiking. Parts of this unit committed atrocities in Zolochiv (Pol.: Złoczów), Zboriv (Pol.: Zborów), Ozerna (Pol.: Jezierna), Ternopil’ (Pol.: Tarnopol), Skalat (Pol.: Skafat), and Hrymailiv (Pol.: Grzymałów). Here, between 4,300 and 7,000 Jews perished in the four days between July 3 and 6, 1941. Previous research has interpreted most of these atrocities only or primarily as pogroms by the local population, mostly their Ukrainian part. In fact, in all localities Ukrainian militias and civilians did also participate in these acts of violence. But the core group of perpetrators came from the Waffen-SS. Only because of their participation were these excesses much more deadly than attacks on Jews from the local population in other localities in the same period.

In the first part of the article, I will give a short sketch of the state of research on pogroms in summer 1941 and, more specifically, in western Ukraine. In the next part, I will describe the atrocities in the above-mentioned cities and towns in more detail. Finally, in the last part of the paper I will discuss which conclusions can be drawn from these cases for notions of violence and murder originating from the local population and from the Germans.

Research on the Pogroms and the Crimes of the Waffen-SS

In the last two decades the debate on pogroms has been strongly influenced by Jan Tomasz Gross' book on the town Jedwabne in north-eastern Poland, where Polish inhabitants murdered most of their Jewish neighbours about two weeks after the German occupation of the region.¹ Gross' study emphasized an image of violence from the local side as a largely spontaneous massive outbreak of antisemitic hatred from among the population where, as he summarized his description of events in Jedwabne, "half of the population[...] murdered the other half," referring to the fact that about one half of Jedwabne's inhabitants were Christian and the other half Jewish.² More recent research has not only shown that immense acts of violence from the local side also took place in many other localities of the region, but also that intense activities of different German police units and the involvement of Polish underground forces played an important role.³ Nevertheless, the most influential, general view of the violence from the local side in the initial phase of the German-Soviet war not only in this, but also in other regions of the western Soviet Union, is that of a largely spontaneous outbreak of antisemitic hatred from among the non-Jewish population.⁴

By contrast, based on a close analysis of perpetrators, motifs, and contexts of anti-Jewish violence in more than thirty cities and towns and some villages in eastern Galicia I have argued that, in fact, anti-Jewish violence from the local side was a more diverse phenomenon and that a more complex notion of it is needed.⁵ Though antisemitism among the local population had strongly increased in the period of Soviet rule after September 1939, in the form of a stereotypical view of Jews as supporters of Soviet rule, deadly violence from the local side on a larger scale occurred only under two conditions: either groups

of organized anti-Soviet insurgents and/or German forces were involved. In Western Ukraine an anti-Soviet insurgency in support of the German attack had been organized by the Bandera wing of the “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” (OUN-B). They had an underground force of several thousand men at their disposal and in the spring of 1941 they prepared detailed plans for taking over local power as a basis for Ukrainian state-building after the beginning of the German attack of the Soviet Union.⁶

One central context of violence from the local side was reckonings of these insurgent groups with those whom they considered to have been supporters of Soviet rule and “traitors” or enemies of Ukrainian state-building. In many localities they did not kill only Jews but also Ukrainians and Poles, who in their view had committed crimes by cooperating and supporting the Soviets. However, based on the stereotypical view of Jews as supporters of Soviet rule, mostly Jews were murdered. Usually, such killings happened in smaller localities where no German or Hungarian forces – Hungarian troops had occupied the southeastern part of Galicia – were present. Testimonies of Jewish survivors often describe these acts of violence as pogroms. However, in all cases that I could analyse more closely, there are clear indications that these killings were not the result of spontaneous outbreaks of violence, but planned, targeted acts of murder of certain individuals or families.

Another important context was the attacks on Jews during the retrieval of corpses of prison inmates whom NKVD personnel had murdered before their retreat in a large number of cities and towns in Western Ukraine. In eastern Galicia as a whole probably about 10,000 prison inmates had been killed and several thousands more in Volhynia.⁷ The largest massacre had taken place in Lviv (Pol.: Lwów). Here about 2,500 inmates had been murdered in the days before the German occupation of the city on June 30, 1941.⁸

The following events in Lviv after the city had been occupied by German troops on June 30 strongly influenced the overall description of violence from the local side, not least because of a large number of photos that exist from the pogrom of July 1 in this city, among them an iconic series of photos that German war reporters produced with propagandistic purposes.⁹ In Lviv, as in some other, similar cases, there was a strong spontaneous participation of inhabitants in the

attacks on Jews. However, at the center of the pogrom-like violence on July 1 was the fact that the local Ukrainian militia had received an order by the German military authorities to take Jews to three prison buildings as forced laborers, where they had to retrieve the corpses of inmates from cells, basements, and mass graves. Soon, locals who did not belong to the militia also began to drive Jews to the prisons while mistreating and beating them when they took them from their apartments, on the street, and at the prison buildings. It is likely that Einsatzgruppe C contributed to the escalation of violence and to the fact that many more Jews were brought to the prisons than were actually needed for the work. On June 29, Reinhard Heydrich had sent a written instruction to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen that they should allow for and, if necessary, intensify “self-cleansing attempts of anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles” that he also described as “local popular pogroms” (*“örtliche Volkspogrome”*).¹⁰ Probably several hundred Jews were killed on that day in Lviv,¹¹ and very similar excesses took place in Boryslav (Pol. Borysław) and Sambir (Pol. Sambor). But also in other localities, the prison buildings and the retrieval of murdered inmates were at the center of anti-Jewish violence from the local side.¹²

The six cases that will be discussed in the next chapter have strong overlaps with these two major contexts. In Zolochiv and Ternopil’ the violence was closely related to a mass murder of prison inmates by the Soviets. In all these localities, Ukrainian militias and, to a different extent, other inhabitants also participated in the violence. However, these cases were specific, by the fact that the central role here belonged to members of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking. This was also the reason for the enormous number of victims in these localities, compared to those where acts of anti-Jewish violence took place without a larger involvement of Wiking men. This allows for distinguishing the atrocities of the SS Division Wiking as a third major context of violence against Jews.¹³

The fact that pogroms had taken place in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941 was mentioned already in early publications on the German-Soviet war and the mass murder of Jews, though the massive involvement of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking rather surprisingly has remained largely unrecognized. The pogroms in Western Ukraine were discussed in a more concrete and comprehensive way in a scholarly publication for the first time by Philip

Friedman in 1959. Among the localities that appeared in his study were Ternopil', Zolochiv, and Skalat. He refers to Ternopil', and in a footnote also to Zolochiv, as localities where the violence against Jews was related to Soviet mass killings of prison inmates. For these localities he assumes a certain control of the Germans. He mentions Skalat among those localities where pogroms – which he describes as “mainly unorganized, wild outbursts of the urban or rural populace,” without direct German involvement – took place. He did not distinguish the Waffen-SS as a specific group of perpetrators.¹⁴ Though often mentioned in research literature, further substantial research of pogroms in the summer of 1941 started only during the 1990s. A pioneering study was Andrzej Żbikowski's attempt at an overview of pogroms in eastern Poland at that time. He mentions Ternopil' and Ozerna as localities where pogroms by Ukrainians took place. However, in the text he also refers to Ternopil' as a locality where “SS men” were among the perpetrators, but without giving any details. For Zolochiv he notes that Ukrainians and Germans participated.¹⁵

The pogroms were treated in a more detailed manner in Dieter Pohl's important study on the Holocaust in Eastern Galicia. Here he assumes some role by Sonderkommando 4b in pogroms in Zolochiv and Ternopil', but lists these places together with Skalat among the Ukrainian pogroms, as well.¹⁶ He mentions atrocities committed by Division Wiking, but relates to them only for Zboriv and for the road from Lviv to Zolochiv.¹⁷

Zboriv was the only locality among those mentioned above that earlier research clearly identified as the site of a crime of the Waffen-SS against Jews, as the Einsatzgruppen reports, one of the most important and widely used sources on German crimes in the occupied Soviet territories, mentioned that a Waffen-SS unit had “liquidated” 600 Jews in Zboriv as “retaliation” for Soviet atrocities.¹⁸

The events in Zolochiv and Ternopil' received relatively large attention in the controversy about the so-called “Wehrmacht exhibition” in Germany during the second half of the 1990s. In this controversy, photos from Lviv, Zolochiv, Ternopil', and Boryslav raised close attention because it was disputed whether they actually showed victims of pogroms during the first days of German rule, or prison inmates who had been murdered by the Soviets during the last days of their rule after June 22, 1941. The question at stake here was if the exhibition

ascribed responsibility to the Wehrmacht for crimes that actually had been committed by Soviet forces.¹⁹

In this context Bernd Boll, one of the authors of the exhibition, published a study about the events in Zolochiv.²⁰ Actually, this was one of the first detailed local studies of one of the pogroms.²¹ His close description of the atrocities showed the central role of Division Wiking rather clearly. But his discussion of the events remained on the one hand influenced by the concept of “Ukrainian pogroms” and on the other hand focused critically on the Wehrmacht and their general attitude towards pogroms, but not on the role of the Waffen-SS. In addition, the article does not connect the events in Zolochiv to atrocities of Division Wiking in other localities, not even in Zboriv. A close reading of the article allows the identification of members of Wiking as a core group of perpetrators, but the author does not highlight this significant fact nor does he include it in the discussion of the results of his study.²² Even more surprisingly, the discussion about Ternopil’ in the context of the “Wehrmacht exhibition” remained totally unaware of the fact that the main group of perpetrators of the massive atrocities in this city came from Division Wiking and not from the Ukrainian population.²³ For Zolochiv, Marco Carynnyk in a short article, published in 2005, more clearly hinted at the role of Division Wiking.²⁴

Besides the strong influence of the concept of “Ukrainian pogroms,” another reason why the massive atrocities of Division Wiking were not recognized by scholars was due to the fact that also more generally the Waffen-SS and their specific character among the German armed forces did not raise much attention in research until after the turn of the century.²⁵ Since then research has shed some additional light on crimes of the Waffen-SS combat units in southern and western Europe, but not on the eastern front. A recent survey of the state of research on the Waffen-SS referred to the eastern front only regarding the murder of 600 Jews in Zboriv in July 1941 by the Division Wiking and considered it still “unconfirmed.”²⁶ However, a major exception here is Martin Cüppers’ study about the “Kommandostab Reichsführer SS” and its SS Brigades. Still, these units did not operate subordinated to the Wehrmacht, but were one of the forces that Heinrich Himmler had at his disposal for securing the German rear areas in addition to the Einsatzgruppen and the Order Police battalions of the Higher SS- and Police

Leaders in the occupied Soviet territories.²⁷ Nevertheless, in a more general and summarizing chapter on crimes of the Waffen-SS, in addition to Zboriv and Zolochiv, Martin Cüppers also mentions Ternopil' as one of the localities of mass crimes by Division Wiking, based on information of the Einsatzgruppen reports about "passing troops" having killed 600 Jews in Ternopil'.²⁸

More hints of atrocities of Division Wiking in Galicia in the beginning of July 1941 appeared in studies about the non-German volunteers from Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, but did not attract attention in international research. Division Wiking was the first unit of the Waffen-SS that included so-called "Germanic volunteers" from the Nordic countries and from the Netherlands. However, in June 1941 the "Germanic volunteers" counted for only about eight to ten percent of the division's personnel of nearly 20,000 men.²⁹

Some information on atrocities in these studies came from memoirs and other sources of the non-German volunteers who, apparently, during the post-war decades were less careful to hide them than the German members of the division. Already in 1945 the former Finnish volunteer Sakari Lappi-Seppälä reported about shootings of several dozen Jews and POWs east of Lviv at the road to Zolochiv.³⁰ But it was only after the turn of the century that this and other reports were more systematically analyzed, supplemented by interviews with former volunteers, German documents and post-war judicial investigations in a book of the Norwegian journalist Egil Ulateig. He included here a number of sources about crimes of Division Wiking that indicated that its members were not only responsible for the murder of Jews in Zolochiv and Zboriv, but also in Ternopil' and Hrymailiv, as well as of Soviet POWs in other localities, though he did not truly recognize the scale of the massacres, especially in Ternopil'.³¹ Mostly based on these and the information that had appeared in Boll's and Cüpper's studies, Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott also addressed the involvement of Wiking and its Scandinavian volunteers in atrocities in their fundamental study on "Norwegians in the Greater German project."³²

There are also diaries and other materials from Dutch volunteers that include information on crimes against Jews and POWs at the beginning of July 1941.³³ However, only recently Lars Westerlund published a comprehensive analysis of the involvement of the volunteers in crimes that, among other

sources, is based on more than 80 diaries, testimonies, and memoirs of former volunteers, mostly from Finland.³⁴

The following chapter will summarize findings on atrocities of Division Wiking that the author has presented more extensively and with a more comprehensive documentation of sources, including a close analysis of testimonies of Jewish survivors, in an earlier publication. These findings will be supplemented here with results of the studies on the “Germanic volunteers.”³⁵

Atrocities of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking

The Division Wiking of the Waffen-SS had been newly deployed only in December 1940 from the SS infantry regiment “Germania” that was augmented by two new regiments “Westland” and “Nordland.” In addition, SS artillery regiment 5 was attached to the new division. Division Wiking was trained and equipped as a combat unit.³⁶

Formally, the Waffen-SS was a separate part of the SS that developed from different armed units of the SS at the end of 1939 after several SS regiments had participated, militarily subordinated to the Wehrmacht, in the campaign against Poland. By deploying SS combat units, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler aimed to develop his own armed forces, thereby extending his influence into the military realm as well. After SS military units had participated in the campaigns in Poland, France, and in the Balkans a strong extension of the SS military activities began with the German-Soviet war. Five well equipped SS Divisions as well as the somewhat smaller “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union. As combat units, they functioned within the German armed forces like the divisions of the Wehrmacht. The Waffen SS Division Wiking and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler belonged together with seven army divisions to Tank Group 1 under the command of general colonel Ewald von Kleist. Tank Group 1 was subordinated to Army Group South and moved into the Soviet Union between the 6th Army and the 17th Army in northern Galicia.³⁷

During the war, combat units of the Waffen-SS massively increased from about 96.000 men in 1941 to about 600.000 in 1944. This growth also resulted from the fact that, in contrast to the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS recruited ethnic Germans from various parts of Europe and also, increasingly, non-Germans.³⁸ As mentioned

above, Division Wiking was the first unit of the Waffen-SS that included so-called “Germanic volunteers” from the Nordic countries and from the Netherlands.

The SS military units saw themselves as a military elite of the national socialist state. Their recruits were volunteers, at least until 1941. The German members of the division belonged to a generation that had been socialized in schools, the Hitlerjugend, and other organizations in the period of Hitler’s rule. The officers often had already served for many years in the SS. The strongly ideological motivation of its members was additionally fueled by programs of “ideological education” (*weltanschauliche Erziehung*) within the SS. The need for a brutal, ruthless fight against bolshevism as well as racist and antisemitic subjects were central parts of the educational program.³⁹ Among the “Germanic volunteers,” as well, many had sympathies for radical right-wing ideas and sympathies for Nazi ideology.⁴⁰

Only some parts of Division Wiking, among them the artillery regiment and some units of regiment “Germania,” participated in the attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 and the following days. The bulk of the division crossed the border only on June 30, when the battle in the border region had already ended. On July 1 large parts of the division came through Lviv, the day of the pogrom and of a public display of the victims of the Soviet mass murder in the prison buildings.

In Lviv some of the Wiking members visited the prisons, as many German soldiers did, in order to see the victims of the Soviet atrocities. Many of the Germans and the locals who often searched for relatives felt horrified by the view of the decomposing bodies in the prisons. The Soviet prison massacre confirmed their view that the Soviet Union was ruled by an evil, brutal regime for which many blamed the Jews. There are hints that some members of Division Wiking already participated in anti-Jewish violence on that day, but, apparently, not on a large scale.⁴¹

After most of the division had passed through Lviv some parts of regiment “Westland” became involved in an exchange of fire east of Lviv with retreating Soviet forces. It spent the night near the village Slovita (Pol.: Słowita) on the main road eastwards towards Zolochiv and Ternopil’. In the morning of July 2 the commander of “Westland,” SS-Standartenführer Hilmar Wäckerle, was shot by a sniper while inspecting the territory. As an act of retaliation “Westland”

shelled the village Novosilky (Pol.: Nowosiołki) where they believed the sniper had hidden and killed many inhabitants.⁴²

But the death of Wäckerle was also an additional trigger for unleashing excessive violence both against Soviet POWs and against Jews. Rumors spread that Jews were responsible for Wäckerle's death. On July 2 several Wehrmacht units did not only complain that parts of Division Wiking caused traffic jams by not observing traffic rules on this major road eastwards, but that they lacked discipline in other respects as well. The 295th Infantry Division reported "that the SS is shooting Russian soldiers and civilians whom they consider suspicious indiscriminately en masse." The "Russian soldiers" the report referred to were POWs and the "suspicious civilians" Jews. A report of the Fourth Army Corps to the command of the 17th Army put it more bluntly: While blocking the road with vehicles in order to reserve it for their own unit, "individual members of the division go hunting for Jews."⁴³

Zolochiv

However, the first larger massacre took place in the first city along the road that Division Wiking reached, i.e. Zolochiv. Zolochiv had been occupied after heavy fighting by the 9th Tank Division on July 1. Soon afterwards two mass graves were found in the yard of a large Soviet prison in an old castle on the outskirts of the city. Later 649 corpses were exhumed here. On July 2 a new Ukrainian city administration was established and recognized by the Wehrmacht's city commandant (*Stadtkommandant*), and a local Ukrainian militia was also created. As in most other localities the militia had been organized by OUN-B and, as it seems, OUN-B also had a strong influence in the local administration.⁴⁴

Initial units of Division Wiking arrived in Zolochiv in the late afternoon of July 2. They camped in army barracks at the outskirts of the city. Immediately after their arrival they forced several dozen Jews whom they captured in the surrounding quarter to do repair and cleaning work at the barracks. They mistreated and later shot most of them.⁴⁵ During July 3 other parts of Division Wiking also arrived in the city.

Already on July 2 some acts of violence against Jews from the local side took place. On July 3, the violence escalated into mass murder. This was clearly the

result of the involvement of Division Wiking. In Zolochiv, as in Lviv and other localities, the central context was that Jews were brought in large numbers to the prison building where they were forced to retrieve the corpses of the prison inmates from the mass graves.

On July 2, announcements were posted in the city that the Jews should assemble on the morning of July 3 in the marketplace. But apparently, only a small number of them showed up, and later the Waffen-SS men, together with members of the Ukrainian militia, started searching apartments and driving Jews to the prison building.⁴⁶ Soon civilians also participated in taking Jews out of their apartments and bringing them to the castle. All this was accompanied by an increasing level of violence. Jews were attacked and beaten and a number of them were also killed in the streets and in their apartments. However, the actual mass murder took place in the yard of the prison building. Here Jews had to take out the corpses of the murdered inmates from the mass graves. They were beaten and many killed both by soldiers of Division Wiking, members of the militia and by civilians.

Apparently, Division Wiking soldiers also encouraged the militia and the local population to engage in violence. Nevertheless, most were killed when Division Wiking members started to shoot the Jews with machine guns in one of the mass graves in the prison yard from which they had taken out the corpses of the murdered inmates. Only men were shot. Women who also had been brought to the prison yard were released at about the same time, maybe on an order from a Wehrmacht officer who appeared at that time at the castle. The shooting ended when heavy rain set in at about 6:00 pm.⁴⁷

This was not the end of violence and murder. More Jews were driven to the prison building on the morning of July 4. As on the day before, they were beaten and many killed. Meanwhile, the command of the 295th Infantry division passing the city, maybe on the initiative of the division's Chief of Staff, Helmuth Groscurth, had sent one of its regiment commanders, Otto Korfes, into the city with the task of stopping the violence. In a testimony in 1960 Korfes reported that, when he arrived at the prison building, he found two members of the SS there who together with 12 to 14 civilians threw German hand grenades into a pit into which they had driven 60 to 80 Jews. Korfes stopped this. At that time, a large number of German soldiers were in the castle.⁴⁸

In contrast to the command of the 295th Infantry Division, apparently, the Wehrmacht's city commandant did not intervene in order to stop the violence. There are indications that the excessive violence on July 3 and 4 may have not only resulted from the forced recruitment of Jews for the work in the prison, but that it also took place in the context of a more general search for "Russians and Jews" by parts of Division Wiking. It is unlikely that this occurred without the order or consent of the Wehrmacht's city commandant.⁴⁹

It is difficult to determine the number of victims of the massacre because no comprehensive enumeration has been carried out. All numbers are only estimates. Reports of surviving Jews mention 2,500 to 3,500 victims. However, these numbers seem to be too high in view of the fact that before June 1941 Zolochiv had about 7,000 Jewish inhabitants (of 16,000) though at the beginning of July the number of Jews in the city probably was higher because many refugees from Lviv had come to Zolochiv. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that mostly men were killed on July 3 and 4 and that the reports do not indicate that nearly the whole male Jewish population was exterminated, the number was probably lower. A report of the Einsatzgruppen mentioned "three to 500 liquidated Jews" as "retaliation" for the Soviet atrocities.⁵⁰ Otto Korfes estimated the number of Jews killed at the castle at 500 to 600. But many had also been killed in other places. Therefore, a number of about 1,000 victims seems to be more likely.⁵¹

Zboriv

Zboriv is located about 25 km southeast of Zolochiv, halfway to Ternopil'. Here, on July 4, another massacre was carried out by Division Wiking. In the summer of 1941 Zboriv had about 2,000 Jewish inhabitants. As mentioned above, the massacre in Zboriv is the only one that in the earlier literature had been clearly identified as a crime of the Waffen-SS and not as a Ukrainian pogrom, based on information in the Einsatzgruppen reports: "In Zboriv 600 Jews liquidated by the Waffen-SS as a retaliation measure for Soviet atrocities."⁵² In fact, there had been no Soviet atrocities in Zboriv. Only the corpse of one Ukrainian who probably had belonged to the anti-Soviet underground and had been shot and buried in the garden of the court building was found here. In contrast to

Zolochiv, where the local Ukrainian militia and civilians were actively involved in violence and mass murder, their role in Zboriv seems to have been much smaller. Nevertheless, they also supported the Waffen-SS and helped to identify Jews and their houses, but the sources do not report killings by locals.

On the morning of July 4, SS men began to take out male Jews from their houses and bring them to a certain place in the town. Ukrainians showed them the houses of Jews. When brought to the place, the Jews were beaten, brutally mocked and mistreated. Later they were driven into a bomb crater and shot there with machine guns. The arrests and shooting ended in the evening. Jewish women were forced to cover the mass grave.

Another mass murder of about 100-150 Jews took place the next day after the body of the murdered Ukrainian had been discovered in the yard of the court building. The Jews were brought to that place and shot. Memoirs of Jews mention 850 victims while the Einsatzgruppen reports have, as cited above, 600. In any case, a large part of the town's male Jewish population was murdered during these two days.⁵³

Ozerna

The next town on the road to Ternopil' was Ozerna. In 1931, about 700 Jews had lived here. It is likely that in 1941 their number was higher because of refugees. German troops came to Ozerna on July 2. Arrests and mass murder of a large part of the male Jewish population took place only on July 4 and 5, when parts of Division Wiking came through the town. On the morning of July 5, the Wiking men brought 180-200 male Jews whom they had arrested the day before to a field north of the town. Here they shot them with machine guns in a pit. The sources do not mention Ukrainians as perpetrators in the killings, but, as in the other localities, Ukrainians pointed out the houses of Jews. There are also reports that the SS burned down two synagogues after they had locked Jews inside.⁵⁴

Ternopil'

The largest massacre conducted by Division Wiking took place in Ternopil', which was a bigger city than the others. According to the census of 1931 it was home to about 40,000 inhabitants, approximately 40 percent of which were

Jews. Ternopil' had a large Soviet prison. In contrast to other prisons, most of its inmates were evacuated into the Soviet interior. However, according to Soviet documents 560 inmates were shot. 197 corpses remained in the cellars of the prison building and the others were buried in a mass grave in the prison yard.⁵⁵

The 9th Tank Division occupied Ternopil' on the afternoon of July 2. The initial units of Division Wiking arrived in the afternoon and evening of July 3. Others came through the city on July 4.⁵⁶ For Ternopil', the sources allow for a better reconstruction of the local military administration and its relation with Division Wiking than for the other localities. Colonel Erwin Sander, who served at that time with the 14th Army Corps under General Gustav von Wietersheim, was the city commandant (*Stadtkommandant*) from July 4 to 7. The headquarters of the 14th Army Corps to which both the 9th Tank Division and Wiking were subordinated were located in Ternopil' from the afternoon of July 3 to July 8.⁵⁷ At least one platoon of the 3rd company of regiment "Nordland" was assigned to the city commandant.⁵⁸

The massacre of Jews began on the morning of July 4. The sources clearly show that the SS troops systematically searched the city. Jeanetta Margules remembered that at about 9:00 am machine guns were put up at street junctions and SS units appeared in the streets.⁵⁹ Other memoirs report similar observations. Often the SS men were attended by the Ukrainian militia or civilians who showed them apartments and houses of Jews. They took male Jews from their dwellings and brought them to a number of assembly points. Here they were shot. Sara Frydman remembered that "a drunken German" forced himself with a pistol in his hand into her apartment cursing the Jews as being responsible for the war. His intent to shoot her husband failed because his pistol had no more bullets. Then he drove him to the market square. She followed with her child and saw that several hundred Jews had already been assembled there. Some Jews had to scrub SS men's cars while they were brutally beaten. Groups of Jews were driven to the interior of a large store at the marketplace and were shot there.⁶⁰

The Finnish Wiking Division member Olavi Liesinen remembered that an order had been given to assemble Jewish men between the ages of 16-60 at a square in the town. According to his testimony he was shocked by what he then observed while waiting at their trucks to continue their march. 500-600

youngsters and men were shot by five German Wiking men with submachine guns while wives, children and other relatives of the victims watched.⁶¹

Many others were shot in their apartments or on the streets. Soon streets were strewn with corpses. The violence was most intense on July 4, but also continued on July 5. Otto Schorman remembered the scenes on the streets that he observed from the window of his apartment: “The SS men were shooting Jews as if it was a hunting expedition.”⁶² Nevertheless, it was brutal, excessive violence. Synagogues were burned down, and before this occurred Jews were forced to take out Torah scrolls and to dance on them. Jews may have also been burned inside a synagogue.⁶³ According to an Einsatzgruppen report, members of the Waffen-SS threw hand grenades into apartments of Jews and caused fires.⁶⁴

A major site of violence and murder was the prison building where Jews were brought to and forced to retrieve the corpses of murdered inmates. They also had to transport the corpses to cemeteries at the outskirts of the city. The transport and burial of the corpses was another context of violence and mass murder. Here Jews were also killed in the days after July 5.⁶⁵

In the prison the retrieval of the corpses was supervised by the Waffen-SS, apparently by order of the city commandant. Jews were beaten and mistreated during the work and many beaten to death or shot. Here and at other locations, Wehrmacht soldiers and Ukrainians also participated in violence and murder. A report of Einsatzgruppe C mentions that in Ternopil’ 70 Jews had been killed with hand grenades by Ukrainians, which probably refers to the prison yard.⁶⁶ If Ukrainians had been the perpetrators, they clearly had received and had been encouraged to use the hand grenades, like in Zolochiv, from the SS.

Ten corpses of Wehrmacht soldiers were found among the murdered prison inmates. This may have contributed to the escalation of the violence. However, the first corpses seem to have been found only when the killings of Jews had already started on the morning of July 4.⁶⁷

As indicated above, Sonderkommando 4b under SS-Standartenführer Günther Herrmann have also sometimes been assumed to be perpetrators or involved in the massacres east of Zolochiv. In fact, it was the first part of Einsatzkommando C that moved from Lviv further to the east on the same road as Division Wiking. However, it seems to have moved through Zolochiv only on July 4 when the pogrom had already been largely concluded.⁶⁸ By contrast,

in Ternopil', Sk 4b, or at least parts of it, were in the city during the pogrom of July 4. A report of the Einsatzgruppe C claimed that, as a result of a "persecution of Jews (*Judenverfolgungen*) inspired by the Einsatzkommando, liquidations of 600 Jews" had taken place.⁶⁹ In fact, as the events in the other localities prove, Division Wiking did not need additional "inspiration" for massive violence. Sk 4b also reported 127 executions by the commando in Ternopil'. However, these executions took place only in the days after July 5.⁷⁰

With regard to Ternopil' as well, it is impossible to establish an exact number of victims. Many memoirs of surviving Jews mention about 5,000. A demographic study that appeared in a Ukrainian publication in the US in 1983 mentioned 2,300 victims without giving a source or a more detailed explanation. Małgorzata Bolchower, who came to Ternopil' on July 8, heard people speaking about 3,000 Jews who had been killed during the days before. Salomon Hirschberg remembered that the Ukrainian local health authority registered during the weeks after the pogrom, based on reports of the families, more than 4,000 deaths.⁷¹

The enormous massacre in Ternopil' still did not end Division Wiking's bloody raid through Galicia. Moving towards the front line at the former Polish-Soviet border, parts of Wiking's Westland Regiment devastated at least two more small-town Jewish communities on the road from Ternopil' to Husiatyn, where they became involved in their first major battle.

Skalat

Skalat suffered from two raids of Waffen-SS units. According to the memoirs of Abraham Weissbrod, several hours after the first German troops had arrived early in the morning on July 5, an "SS brigade" stopped in the town at about 10:00 am. The commander told his men: "Ten minutes to butcher the Jews." What happened then Weissbrod describes as follows: "Sweaty, begrimed from the long ride, in shirt sleeves with the cuffs rolled up, they ran about like wild wolves, firing their guns. First they assaulted Jews they encountered on the streets. The first victim was Efraim Diener, whose beard they cut along with part of his face." They drove a Jewish couple into a river and shot them there. "Other soldiers raided homes, ostensibly searching for weapons and hidden Bolsheviks, while robbing, defacing and destroying the contents of the homes. The allotted

ten minutes sufficed to turn the town upside down, to leave some twenty Jews killed and an equal number wounded.”⁷²

However, a much more devastating raid took place during the following day when another part of “Westland” came into the city. On the morning of July 6, SS men and members of the local Ukrainian militia searched the houses of Jews and drove male Jews to the marketplace where they finally assembled several hundred people. They forced Jews to wash their cars. The Jews were mocked and beaten, and many were also killed. Not only did the SS men wound and kill Jews; so too did members of the militia and inhabitants of the town. In the afternoon and evening groups of Jews were brought from the market place to the ruins of a castle in the town that had four large towers. They were led up to the towers and forced to jump down while they were shot at with machine guns. Abraham Weissbrod ascribed these killings to Ukrainians.⁷³ However, the central role that the Waffen-SS had during the massacre in the city clearly proves that this massacre was organized by them and that they at least provided the weapons and probably also took part in the shooting themselves. Another report describes the shooting of Jews at the same location by SS men.⁷⁴

Estimates about the number of deaths on July 5 and 6 in different testimonies range from 350 to 500. At that time about 4,600 Jews lived in Skalat, and constituted about half of the town’s population.⁷⁵

Hrymailiv

In Hrymailiv, that is located about 15 km south of Skalat, a mass murder of Jews had already taken place on July 5. This town was also occupied by German troops in the early morning hours of that day. For Hrymailiv, the sources show clearly that on the morning of July 5 OUN-B-led insurgents came to the town from nearby villages in order to establish a new local Ukrainian administration.⁷⁶ Here too, after the first German troops parts of Division Wiking arrived, and some of them stayed until the next day. The SS men searched the town together with the OUN-B insurgents. Already during that search many Jews were killed in their houses and on the streets. Those whom the SS men and the Ukrainians had assembled were driven into a pond and shot. A Dutch volunteer of the 2nd Company of “Westland” described what happened in his diary:

Left Tarnopol and stopped in a village. [...] We grabbed a few Jews and had them clean our car until it was shining. Before we shaved them, leaving one side of the beard untouched and the other cut with scissors. With others we burned them off with petrol. So it went. With a sabre and a wooden stick, we gave them hell and made them sweat. Later we delivered them to the commander. There they were swept up through a gate alongside a pond, and then prrt prrt with an MP and a bunch of Jews fell into the pond. I saw the pond the next morning. It was chock-full; dead, half dead etc. Roar and stench. I put a handkerchief in front of my mouth because I had to vomit.⁷⁷

Here too, the SS men offered weapons to Ukrainians to shoot Jews.⁷⁸ On July 6, other Jews were forced to take the corpses out of the pond and bury them in the Jewish cemetery. These Jews and maybe others were shot there. During these two days, according to different sources, between 350 and 500 of about 2,200 Jews who lived at that time in Hrymailiv were killed.⁷⁹

Conclusion: German and Local Violence

A summation of the above mentioned likely numbers of victims in the different localities results in between about 4,280 and 6,950 Jews who were killed during the violent excesses of Waffen-SS Division Wiking between July 3 and 6, 1941.

Victims of massacres of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking, July 3-6, 1941

Hrymailiv	350-500
Ozerna	180-200
Skalat	250-400
Ternopil'	2,300-4,000
Zboriv	600-850
Zolochiv	600-1,000
TOTAL	4,280-6,950

Jews who had been shot alongside the roads and whose numbers are difficult to establish have not been included here. There are indications that Jews were killed by the combat units of the Waffen-SS in other localities of the region as well, though on a smaller scale.⁸⁰

In these six cities and towns more Jews were killed than in the several dozen other localities in the entire region of Galicia that I could identify as places where Jews were murdered by local perpetrators during the first half of July. Their number was between 3,000 and 4,300. Furthermore, the localities where the SS Division Wiking was involved had a much higher rate of victims among the Jewish population than nearly all other cities and towns. Here between eight and thirty percent of the Jewish population were killed. In Lviv, for example, the number of victims of the pogrom on July 1 was clearly below .5 percent. In Boryslav, where one of the bloodiest pogroms except for those in these six cities and towns took place, the share of victims among the Jewish inhabitants was 1.5-2.8 percent.⁸¹

In contrast to the Einsatzgruppen and the other German police units, Division Wiking had no police function, but was a part of the combat troops and their operations were subordinated to the Wehrmacht's Tank Group 1. Orders and instructions for mass killings of alleged supporters of Soviet rule that the police units had did not apply to them. Their mass murder of Jews during their move through Galicia was an outbreak of antisemitic hatred in exceptional emotional circumstances created by the invasion of the Soviet Union. Before they had their first serious encounter with the Soviet army they began their war against the Soviet Union by shooting Jews whom they identified with Soviet rule. The excessive nature of the killings by SS Division Wiking is also established by several reports of the rape of Jewish women by members of the Waffen-SS during the pogroms in Ternopil', and probably also in Zolochiv.⁸²

The rather surprising fact is that the atrocities of the Waffen-SS had been either missing from or had been described as Ukrainian pogroms in earlier research. This is especially striking for the huge massacre in Ternopil'. The identification as Ukrainian pogroms had been facilitated by the fact that, in all these localities, Ukrainian militias and civilians also participated in the violence and that some memoirs of surviving Jews focus more on crimes of their Christian neighbors than on the SS men, probably because they were especially shocked

by their deeds and because they could more clearly identify them as opposed to the German perpetrators. Nevertheless, many reports identify Germans or SS men as the main perpetrators. A close analysis of these reports supplemented with the German sources and the information from diaries and memoirs of the Scandinavian and Dutch members of the division leave no doubt about the central role of the SS men in these localities.

Apparently, the reason the massacres of the *Waffen-SS* largely escaped the attention of researchers for so long is also related to somewhat stereotypical, pre-existing notions about the nature of the violence of the Germans and the local Ukrainians. In many reports of surviving Jews the atrocities appear as wild outbursts of violence shortly after the German occupation. Such forms of mass violence correspond, as explained above, to the concept of “pogrom” that, however, in Holocaust research usually is not associated with the Germans, but with the local population, whereas the view of the Germans is that they conducted mostly rather well organized mass executions.

This view of violence from the German side is based on two dominant and, in a way, complementary models of explanation for the German mass murder of Jews by mass executions after the invasion of the Soviet Union. More strikingly than others, the case of the atrocities of the *Wiking Division* suggests that these explanations may need some addition.

One model argues that the extension of mass executions of Jews during the first months of the German-Soviet war was the result of a dynamic process between the centre and the SS and police officers on the ground. According to this model, Himmler and Heydrich made clear that more executions of “Bolsheviks and Jews” were better than less, as Heydrich described the targets of “cleansing activities” in a letter to the *Einsatzgruppen* on July 1, 1941.⁸³ When specific units took more radical measures, Himmler usually approved of them and reprimanded those who lagged behind. However, when necessary either Himmler or his direct emissaries also conveyed instructions to extend the mass murder, as was clearly the case when women and children were included in mass executions after August 1941.⁸⁴

The second influential model refers to the internal workings of the German killing units. Here the dominant interpretation is that primarily institutional

and situational conditions transformed “ordinary men” into mass murderers, as Christopher Browning’s most influential study on Police Battalion 101 has argued.⁸⁵ According to this model most members of the German killing units rather reluctantly approached their bloody trade, but, nevertheless, engaged in it because they acted in an institutional setting that for most of them made it psychologically more difficult to refuse than to participate in mass killings.⁸⁶

The conclusion that can be drawn from the case of the SS Division Wiking is not that these models are wrong. Nevertheless, they divert attention from a factor that the atrocities of Division Wiking also clearly reveal as important: that of antisemitic hatred among the German perpetrators on the ground. The two basic models described above produce an overall image where antisemitism creates a framework of action, but direct mass murder is mostly the result of careerism among the officers, who wanted to meet the expectations of their superiors, and of the institutional setting of the killing units. However, the massacres of Waffen-SS Division Wiking clearly reveal the scale of antisemitic hatred among one of the highly ideologized units of the German armed forces.

Though Wehrmacht soldiers also participated in several localities in eastern Galicia in violence against Jews during the first days of the war, these were mostly acts of individual soldiers. There were no outbreaks of violence on a comparable scale from Wehrmacht units that were on average much less indoctrinated with the racist ideas of the national socialist regime.

Yet, the crimes of Division Wiking bore a strong similarity to a massacre that took place further to the north, in the territory of Army Group Centre, i.e. a pogrom of Police Battalion 309 in Białystok on June 27. In Białystok members of Police Battalion 309, many of them drunk, searched the Jewish quarter, allegedly for dispersed Soviet soldiers, and killed probably between 2,000 and 2,200 Jews, among them about 700 who were burned alive in a synagogue. Others were killed in their apartments or on the streets. Police Battalion 309 was subordinated to the Wehrmacht’s 221st Security Division. In contrast to the Order Police battalions of the Higher SS- and Police Leaders in the occupied Soviet territories, the Police battalions within the Security Divisions of the Wehrmacht rarely participated in the mass murder of Jews. On June 27, this was also not an organized mass execution as those of the Einsatzgruppen and

the Order Police battalions of the Higher SS- and Police leaders, but with excessive violence during a search of the mostly Jewish quarters of Białystok. Apparently, the background was that about 25 soldiers of the 221st Security Division had been murdered and their bodies mutilated after they had been caught by Soviet troops. Parts of the Police Battalion saw the corpses shortly before they arrived in Białystok.⁸⁷ Most members of Order Police Battalion 309 were, similar to the members of the Division Wiking, volunteers who had joined the Order Police in 1940. However, most were born between 1909 and 1912 and therefore belonged to an older generation than most members of Division Wiking. Nevertheless, voluntary service for the police of the Third Reich, as well as ideological education that the members of the newly formed police battalions also received, allows us to assume high identification with the National Socialist regime.⁸⁸ Apparently, the thesis that it was mostly the institutional setting of the killing units that transformed “ordinary men” into mass murderers cannot explain such excesses.⁸⁹

Antisemitic hatred related to stereotypical images of Jews as the core group of supporters of Soviet rule also drove the mass executions of the Einsatzgruppen even though they did not assume the form of wild outbursts of violence. This is already clearly visible in mockery and mistreatments during the early executions of “Einsatzkommando Tilsit” in the Lithuanian border regions in the days after June 24.⁹⁰ Similar elements are discernible in early mass executions in Western Ukraine, especially in executions by Sonderkommando 4a in Sokal’, Luts’k and other localities after June 27.⁹¹ The role of antisemitic hatred would also deserve more attention in the close analysis of later German mass executions of Jews and the treatment of Jews in general.

In contrast to violence from the German side, the acts of deadly violence against Jews from the local side during the early weeks of the German-Soviet war are usually seen as mostly spontaneous outbreaks of antisemitic hatred. In fact, as I have argued above, the anti-Jewish violence from the local side in the summer of 1941 in the western Soviet Union was a more complex and diverse phenomenon. Usually, it became deadly only in those localities where groups of organized anti-Soviet insurgents and/or Germans were involved. In smaller localities, deadly violence from local elements without German

involvement consisted mostly of the targeted killings of certain persons and, in the case of Jews, also often of entire families, by anti-Soviet insurgents and not spontaneous outbreaks of violence.

Overall, this article argues for more complex notions of the violence against Jews both from locals and Germans during the initial weeks of the German-Soviet war in the western regions of the Soviet Union. Its findings suggest that on the one hand antisemitic hatred among the forces of SS and Police should be considered a more important factor for the extension of the mass murder of Jews and that on the other hand many acts of deadly violence from the local side were not spontaneous outbursts of antisemitic hatred, but planned killings of certain individuals and families. However, both segments of violence were to a large extent based on a stereotypical, antisemitic identification of Jews as supporters of Soviet rule.

Endnotes

- 1 Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, 2001) (first published in Polish in 2000).
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 3 Edmund Dmitrów, “Oddziały operacyjne niemieckiej Policji Bezpieczeństwa i Służby Bezpieczeństwa a początek zagłady Żydów w Łomżyńskim i na Białostocczyźnie latem 1941 roku,” in Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak (eds.), *Wokół Jedwabnego*, (Warsaw, 2002), Vol. 1, pp. 273-351; Andrzej Żbikowski, *U genezy Jedwabnego. Żydzi na kresach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej, wrzesień 1939-lipiec 1941* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 191-211; Alexander B. Rossino, ‘Polish Neighbors’ and German Invaders: Anti-Jewish Violence in the Białystok District during the Opening Weeks of Operation Barbarossa,” *Polin* 16 (2003), pp. 431-451; Mirosław Tryczyk, *Miasta śmierci. Sąsiedzkie pogromy Żydów* (Warsaw, 2015), pp. 47-102.
- 4 See, for example, Jeffrey Kopstein’s and Jason Wittenberg’s recent study, which conceptualizes violence against Jews in the summer of 1941 as rather uniform outbreaks of “ethnic riots.” Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust* (Ithaca, 2018). See also Wendy Lower’s “Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations and Comparisons,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 13(3) (2011), pp. 217-246, which describes the locals’ attacks on Jews as “mob violence.”
- 5 Kai Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine* (Berlin, 2015).
- 6 Ivan K. Patryljak, *Vijs’kova dijāl’nist’ OUN(B) u 1940-1942 rokach* (Kiev, 2004). On the antisemitic bias of these plans, see Marco Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929-1947,” *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011), pp. 315-352; pp. 329-332.
- 7 The total of 10,000 victims in eastern Galicia is my estimate based on a close analysis of events in most localities where murdered inmates had been found, Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 214-216. Other estimates are higher. According to Oleh Romaniv and Inna Fedushchak, in Galicia and Volhynia about 22,000 prison inmates were murdered, including approximately 17,000 in Galicia. Romaniv and Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraińs’ka trahediia 1941* (Lviv, 2002), p. 63. On the Soviet atrocities see also Ksenya Kiebuszinski and Alexander Motyl (eds.), *The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941: A Sourcebook* (Amsterdam, 2017).
- 8 On the number of victims in Lviv, see Kai Struve, “Masovi vbyvstva v’iazniv l’vivs’kykh tiurem: shcho vidomo pro mists ta kil’kist’ zhertv?” *Ukraina Moderna*, September 9, 2018 (<http://uamoderna.com/md/struve-lonckoho>).
- 9 Gerhard Paul, *BilderMACHT: Studien zur Visual History des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 2013), pp. 182-189.

- 10 For Heydrich's letter of June 29, see Peter Klein (ed.), *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42: Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte der Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD* (Berlin, 1997), p. 319.
- 11 On the events of June 30 and July 1 in Lviv, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 253-379; John-Paul Himka, "The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* 53 (2011), pp. 209-243.
- 12 On Sambir and Boryslav, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 433-442 and pp. 464-484.
- 13 The analysis of this context is based on a larger chapter in Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 561-631, where more extensive documentation of sources can be found. A major new contribution to the research on these atrocities is Lars Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers and Atrocities against Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region, 1941-1943: An Archival Survey* (Helsinki, 2019). Westerlund largely confirms the findings of my study and provides additional evidence from diaries and other sources from Scandinavian and Dutch volunteers. It more clearly shows that, during this period, Division Wiking also murdered large numbers of Soviet POWs, but it sometimes lacks a critical analysis of sources. For example, it seems somewhat doubtful that the villages specified as Urych and Podhorolyce (or other towns and villages with similar spelling) are correctly identified as locations of crimes of Division Wiking. Some rather dubious and sensationalist quotes that are unconfirmed by other sources also appear in the chapter on Lviv, on p. 100 (Halik Kohanski) and p. 108 (Unto Boman). The photo on p. 105 is not of corpses of murdered Jews but rather victims of the Soviet mass murder of prison inmates, most likely in Zolochiv. See Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, p. 581, fn. 85.
- 14 Philip Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," *Journal of Jewish Social Science* 12 (1958/59), pp. 259-294; here pp. 273-275.
- 15 Andrzej Żbikowski, "Lokalne pogromy Żydów w czerwcu i lipcu 1941 roku na wschodnich rubieżach II Rzeczypospolitej," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 1992(2-3), pp. 3-18; pp. 12-14. His list does not include Hrymailiv, Skalat, or Zboriv.
- 16 Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich, 1997), pp. 54-67. See pp. 62-64 for references to the above mentioned localities.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 18 In 1956, Gerald Reitlinger already suggested that the perpetrators had belonged to SS-Division Wiking. Reitlinger, *The SS. Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945* (Melbourne, 1957), p. 157. However, Yaakov Lozowick believed that the perpetrators came from the 1st SS Brigade of the "Kommandostab Reichsführer SS." Yaakov Lozowick, "Rollbahn Mord: The Early Activities of Einsatzgruppe C," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2 (1987), pp. 221-241; p. 228. See also Thomas Sandkühler, "Endlösung," in

Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz 1941-1944 (Bonn, 1996), pp. 120-121. For the report see Mallmann et al. (eds.), *Die "Ereignismeldung UdSSR" 1941: Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion* (Darmstadt, 2011), p. 104 (Report no. 19, July 11, 1941). Thomas Sandkühler also mentions Hrymailiv, based on a post-war West German judicial investigation, and concludes that 150-300 Jews were murdered there on July 5 by an OUN-led Ukrainian militia. He (mistakenly) assumes some involvement of Sonderkommando 4b but not of a Waffen-SS unit. Sandkühler, "Endlösung," p. 120.

- 19 For a critique of the photos from western Ukraine in the exhibition, see Bogdan Musiał, "Bilder einer Ausstellung. Kritische Anmerkungen zur Wanderausstellung 'Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944'," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 47 (1999), pp. 563–591. Only one photo from Zolochiv in the exhibition clearly showed victims of the Soviet mass murder of prison inmates. The others likely showed victims of anti-Jewish violence during the initial days of German rule or victims of both incidents of mass murder. For documentation of the controversy in the catalogue of a revised version of the exhibition, see Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944. Ausstellungskatalog* (Hamburg, 2002), pp. 687-729.
- 20 Bernd Boll, "Złoczów, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia. From a Criticism of Photographs to a Revision of the Past," in Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (eds.), *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2002), pp. 61-99.
- 21 Another was a study of the Lviv pogrom by Hannes Heer, the main author of the exhibition. This study is rich in sources but presents an exaggerated and misleading interpretation of the Wehrmacht's role in it. Hannes Heer, "Einübung in den Holocaust: Lemberg Juni/Juli 1941," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49 (2001), pp. 409-427. For a critique of Heer's thesis, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 13-14, 376.
- 22 On the involvement of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking, see Boll, "Złoczów, July 1941," pp. 74-75.
- 23 See Klaus Hesse, "NKWD-Massaker, Wehrmachtsverbrechen oder Pogrommorde? Noch einmal: die Fotos der 'Tarnopol-Stellwand' aus der 'Wehrmachtsausstellung,'" *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 51 (2000), 712-726. Bogdan Musiał, who had been one of the most important critics of the Wehrmacht exhibition, also did not pay attention to the role of the Waffen-SS in Zolochiv and Ternopil, although he deals with these cases extensively in a larger study on the Soviet prison massacres and the subsequent anti-Jewish violence. See Bogdan Musiał, *"Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen." Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 179-185, 239-241. Delphine Bechtel lists Zolochiv and Ternopil among the Ukrainian pogroms and, as the title suggests, holds that the massacre in Zolochiv belongs to the same category of crimes as that committed in Jedwabne. Delphine Bechtel, "De Jedwabne a Zolochiv: Pogromes

- locaux en Galicie, juin-juillet 1941,” in Delphine Bechtel and Xavier Galmiche (eds.), *La Destruction des Confins* (Paris, 2005), pp. 69-92. A study by Witold Mędykowski falls even back behind the state of knowledge that had been reached by Boll’s article on Zolochiv. Indeed, his chapter on Zolochiv fails even to mention the Waffen-SS. For Ternopil, although several of the sources that he cites mention the SS, this does not influence his interpretation of the events as a Ukrainian pogrom like many others. Witold Mędykowski, *W cieniu gigantów. Pogromy 1941 r. w byłej sowieckiej strefie okupacyjnej* (Warsaw, 2012), pp. 250-259, 262-268.
- 24 Marko Tsarynnyk (Marco Carynnyk), “Zolochiv movchyt,” *Krytyka* 10 (2005), pp. 14-17.
- 25 The few earlier studies either offered a general overview of the history of the Waffen-SS or focused on structure, ideology, and recruitment, but not on the question of crimes and atrocities during the war. See Bernd Wegner, *Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933-1945*, 8th Edition (Paderborn, 2008) (first published in 1982). See also George H. Stein, *The Waffen SS. Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945* (Ithaca, 1966).
- 26 Jan Erik Schulte, Peter Lieb, and Bernd Wegner, “Die Geschichte der Waffen-SS – Forschungsschwerpunkte und Ausblicke,” in *Die Waffen-SS. Neue Forschungen* (Paderborn, 2014), pp. 11-22: p. 19. This volume includes summaries of several larger recent studies about the Waffen-SS, which also address crimes committed in southern and western Europe. See also Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, *Die Waffen-SS. Hitlers überschätzte Prätorianer* (Darmstadt, 2018), p. 128, which contains comparable and extremely limited information on crimes on the eastern front.
- 27 Martin Cüppers, *Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939-1945* (Darmstadt, 2005).
- 28 Ibid., pp. 339-342. Mallmann et al., *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* p. 151 (no. 28, July 20, 1941). Another earlier report stated that “dwellings of Jews had been set on fire by members of the Waffen-SS with hand grenades,” Mallmann et al., *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* (no. 24, July 16, 1941), p. 133.
- 29 Westerlund, *The Finnish-SS Volunteers*, p. 22. In contrast to the extensive research on the Scandinavian and Dutch volunteers in the SS, no scholarly study has been undertaken of the Waffen-SS Division Wiking as such. The existing literature was written by veterans of the division and, not surprisingly, does not report crimes. See, for example, Peter Strassner, *Europäische Freiwillige. Die 5. SS-Panzerdivision Wiking* (Coburg, 2000) (the first edition was published in 1968).
- 30 Sakari Lappi Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella. SS-miehen päiväkirjan lehtiä* (Helsinki, 1945), pp. 86-91. These crimes, and suggestions of some other sources about the brutal behavior of Division Wiking, are noted in an early extensive and rather apologetic study of the Finnish volunteers. Mauno Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona. Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan historia* (Helsinki, 1968), pp. 192, 759-760. See also Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, p. 116.

- 31 Egil Ulateig, *Jakten på massenmorderne. En dokumentarbok* (Oslo, 2006), pp. 69-86, 164-176.
- 32 Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott, *Himmlers Norge. Nordmenn i det storgermanske prosjekt* (Oslo, 2012), pp. 239-242. However, in contrast to Egil Ulateig they seem to also believe in the veracity of testimony given by former Division Wiking member Hans-Wilhelm Isenmann in Soviet custody in 1944 and 1945. Isenmann recounts participation in mass executions of Jews in Lviv and in several places east of the former Polish-Soviet border. No other sources confirm the participation of Division Wiking in mass executions in Lviv. Apparently, Isenmann also confessed here to German crimes that had not been committed by Division Wiking, but rather by Einsatzgruppe C. See Emberland and Kott, *Himmlers Norge*, pp. 242-243; Ulateig, *Jakten*, pp. 80-81, 267-268. Interrogation protocols can be found at the State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine (HDA SBU) 55663, vol. 12. I am grateful to Ray Brandon for the information on this source. On the crimes of Division Wiking based on previous studies, see also Sigurd Sørli, *Sonnenrad und Hakenkreuz. Norweger in der Waffen-SS 1941-1945* (Paderborn, 2019) (translated from the Norwegian version, which was first published in Oslo in 2015), pp. 276-277, 294-300. On volunteers from Denmark, see Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen and Peter Scharff Smith, "Dänen in der Waffen-SS 1940-1945. Ideologie, Integration und Kriegsverbrechen im Vergleich mit anderen 'germanischen' Soldaten," in Schulte, Lieb, and Wegner, *Die Waffen-SS*, pp. 196-215.
- 33 Some of these diaries are analyzed in Evertjan van Roekel, *Jongens von Nederland. Nederlandse vrijwilligers in de Waffen-SS* (Antwerp, 2011), pp. 93-99. However, this study does not relate the accounts of the Dutch volunteers to other sources on crimes in the region located east of Lviv and, therefore, is unable to estimate its real scale. On the diaries of Dutch volunteers with translations of relevant excerpts into English, see also C. Kleijn and S.J.P. Reurs, *Report on Dutch Sources concerning the Involvement of SS-Division Wiking in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Ukraine in Summer of 1941* (Amsterdam, 2018) (available on <https://arkisto.fi/news/2312/328/The-Finnish-SS-volunteers-and-atrocities-against-Jews-Civilians-and-Prisoners-of-War-in-Ukraine-and-the-Caucasus-Region-1941-1943>).
- 34 Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*. On the diaries, see pp. 55-57. This state-sponsored investigation originated in a debate sparked by a critical study of the attitudes and motives of the Finnish volunteers that levelled sharp criticism at Mauna Jokipii's earlier account. See André Swanström, *Hakaristin ritarit. Suomalaiset SS-miehet, politiikka, uskonto ja sotarikokset* (Helsinki, 2018).
- 35 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 561-630.
- 36 On the deployment of the division see Westerlund, *The Finnish-SS Volunteers*, pp. 61-75. See also Strassner, *Europäische Freiwillige*, pp. 27-28.
- 37 On the deployment and operations of German troops in the initial phase of the war, see Ernst Klink, "Heer und Kriegsmarine," in Horst Boog et al. (eds.), *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 451-652: pp. 470-480.

- 38 On personnel and the development of the Waffen-SS, see Wegner, *Hitlers Politische Soldaten*, p. 210; Bremm, *Die Waffen-SS*, p. 96.
- 39 Jean-Luc Leleu, *La Waffen-SS. Soldates politiques en guerre* (Paris, 2007), pp. 413-440; Jürgen Förster, “Die weltanschauliche Erziehung in der Waffen-SS,” in Jürgen Matthäus et al., *Ausbildungsziel Judenmord? “Weltanschauliche Erziehung” von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der ‘Endlösung’* (Frankfurt, 2003), pp. 87-113.
- 40 As already noted, the motives and attitudes of the volunteers are central to the controversies in the respective countries. For a summary of these debates and a differentiated discussion of findings on the Norwegian example, see Sørlie, *Sonnenrad*, pp. 12-24, and for a critical evaluation of earlier views in the Finnish case, see Swanström, *Hakaristin*.
- 41 See the discussion in Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 104-111. The sources that Richard Rhodes cites as proof of the intensive involvement of Wiking men in atrocities in Lviv likely relate to Zolochiv or Zboriv. Richard Rhodes, *Masters of Death: The Die SS Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust* (New York 2003), p. 63. See also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, p. 364.
- 42 Lars Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 112-117. Another source identifies neighboring Velyka Vilshanytsia (in Polish: Olszanica) as the village that had been destroyed in retaliation. Yaroslav Dovhopolyi, “To ne ti nimtsi,” Zaxid.net, September 25, 2012, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?to_ne_ti_nimtsi&objectId=1266107 (accessed June 2021).
- 43 For this and the quotes, also see Boll, “Złoczów, July 1941,” p. 75. On the killings of Jews and POWs in this region, see Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 118-124. As mentioned above, the report of Finnish volunteer Sakari Lappi Seppälä, which was published in 1945, describes the murder of several dozen Jews in this region.
- 44 See the July 16, 1941 report of Einsatzgruppe C, in Mallmann et al. (eds.), *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* p. 133. For a more extensive account regarding Zolochiv, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 566-585; Westerlund, *The Finnish-SS Volunteers*, pp. 125-134.
- 45 S. Altman, “Haunting Memories,” in Eliezer Boneh, Baruch Karu, and I.M. Laski (eds.), *The City of Zloczow* (Tel Aviv, 1967), pp. 29-146: pp. 33-36.
- 46 The clearest and most detailed account can be found in the memoirs of Shlomo Wolkowicz. See Wolkowicz, *Das Grab bei Zloczow. Geschichte meines Überlebens. Galizien 1939-1945* (Berlin, 1996), pp. 43-49. Samuel Tennenbaum’s memoirs add important details about his personal experiences but are not always reliable with regard to the general developments in Zolochiv. Tennenbaum, *Zloczow Memoir* (New York, 1986), pp. 164-170. See also Szlojme Mayer, *Der Untergang fun Zloczów* (Munich, 1947, pp. 5-15 (in English translation, see <https://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/Zolochiv/Zolochiv.html#TOC>, accessed June 2021), which focusses intensely on Ukrainian perpetrators and overemphasizes their initiative.

- 47 Shlomo Wolkowicz had fallen into the pit immediately after the shooting began but survived beneath the corpses. During the night, he was able to free himself from the corpses and escape. Wolkowicz, "Das Grab," pp. 49-52. Chaim Wittelsohn and Abram Rozen (Abraham Rosen) also escaped from among the corpses during the night. Chaim Wittelsohn, report of July 14, 1945, Jewish Historical Institute Archive (AŽIH) 301/531, p. 1; Abram Vol'fovich Rozen, testimony of September 16, 1944, State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) 7021/67/80.
- 48 For Korfes' testimony, see Ausschuss für deutsche Einheit (ed.), *Der Oberländer Prozess. Gekürztes Protokoll der Verhandlung vor dem Obersten Gericht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 20.-27. und 29.4.1960* (Berlin, 1960), p. 107. Korfes reported that he met with Groscurth late in the morning of July 4 at the castle, after the violence had already stopped. See Ausschuss für deutsche Einheit (ed.), *Der Oberländer Prozess*, p. 108. No documentary basis exists for Lars Westerlund's presentation of Groscurth as having personally appeared at the castle and stopped the violence. Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 129-130. Groscurth was an important member of the military opposition in the Third Reich. See also Helmut Groscurth, *Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940. Mit weiteren Dokumenten zur Militäropposition gegen Hitler*, edited by Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch (Stuttgart, 1970). Groscurth does not mention the atrocities in Zolochiv in his diaries. Also available is a short film from the Zolochiv prison yard in the morning of July 4 with brutal scenes of beatings recorded by a German and released for the first time in 2000 the documentary *Der Skandal um die Wehrmachtsfotos* by Tina Mendelsohn and Jochen Traupmann. A copy of this footage is located in Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv, Berlin.
- 49 For the quote, see Altman, "Haunting memories," pp. 33-34. German documents also mention "Russians and Jews" as victims of the pogrom in Zolochiv. Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, p. 571.
- 50 Mallmann et al., *Die "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR"* p. 133 (Report no. 24, July 16, 1941).
- 51 For a more extensive discussion of the numbers, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 584-585. For Korfes' estimate, see Ausschuss für deutsche Einheit, *Der Oberländer Prozess*, pp. 107-108.
- 52 Mallmann et al., *Die "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR"*, p. 104 (Report no. 19, July 11, 1941).
- 53 For a more detailed description and sources, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 586-588. See also Solomon Berger, *The Jewish Commonwealth of Zborow* (New York, 1967), pp. 84-85, and reports by Josef Gershon Leviner, Leib Kronish, Chula Broida, and Sima Zeiger in Eliahu Zilberman (ed.), *The Memory Book of the Community of Zborov* (Haifa, 1975) (Hebrew).
- 54 On Ozerna, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 589-570. See also the reports of Helena Heliczker, September 30, 1947, AŽIH 301/2798, p. 1; Dora Mantel-Lempert, "A kapitel yezierner umkum," in Yitzhak Sigelman (ed.), *The Jezerna Memory Book* (Haifa, 1971), pp. 213-225 (Hebrew), pp. 214-216. See also Westerlund, *The Finnish-SS Volunteers*, pp. 135-136, which cites diaries and recollections of Finnish Wiking men that probably refer to Ozerna.

- 55 See the documents in Romaniv and Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraińska trahediia*, pp. 370, 395.
- 56 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, p. 592.
- 57 Kriegstagebuch der Führungsstaffel (Ia) Gen. Kdo XIV. A.K., 22.4.-15.12.41, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BArch-MA) RH 24-14/33, Bl. 27, 35.
- 58 See interrogation of SS-Untersturmführer Lösken, SS- und Polizeigericht VI Krakau, 22. January 1942, BArch-MA RW 2/150, p. 38. See also Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, p. 141; Ulateig, *Jakten*, pp. 172-173.
- 59 Jeanetta Margules, *Moje przeżycia na tle getta żydowskiego w Tarnopolu*, AŻIH 302/158, p. 2. An edited version of these 1946 memoirs that avoids mentioning the Soviet crimes in Ternopil was published as Żaneta Margules, “Moje przeżycia podczas wojny,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 36 (1960), 62-94. An English translation appeared in B.F. Sabrin (ed.), *Alliance for Murder. The Nazi-Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide* (New York, 1991), pp. 61-76.
- 60 Sara Frydman, Report of May 12, 1948, AŻIH 301/3551, p. 3.
- 61 Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, p. 146. For more reports in the diaries and testimonies of Dutch and Finnish Wiking soldiers about Ternopil in Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 143-146; Ulateig, *Jakten*, pp. 173-174.
- 62 Otto Schorman, *The Brown Terror*, AŻIH 302/295, p. 7.
- 63 Aaron Ohrenstein, testimony, Munich, February 21, 1961, State Archives of Baden-Württemberg, Ludwigsburg, EL 317 III, Vol. 1392; Markus Horowitz, “Tarnopol unter Herrschaft der Gestapo”, *ibid.*, Vol. 1390.
- 64 Mallmann et al. (eds.), *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* p. 133 (Report no. 24, July 16, 1941).
- 65 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 611-615. For the days following July 5, see also the memoirs of Jeanetta Margules, *Moje przeżycia*, pp. 3-10.
- 66 Mallmann et al., *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* p. 86 (Report no. 14, July 6, 1941). For a more detailed analysis of the events in the prison yard, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 603-611. Several photos from the prison building are reproduced and analyzed in Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht*, pp. 109-120. Parts of a short film that usually is described as showing scenes from the Brygidki prison in Lviv probably are, in fact, from Ternopil, “Opfer russischer Massaker im Baltikum und in Südrussland”, (<https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn1004505>, 10:53:40 to 10:55:18 min.). I thank Taras Nazaruk and Andrii Usach for a discussion of the likely locations of this film; see also Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht*, p. 116.
- 67 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 603-604.
- 68 Only Einsatzkommando 6, which followed later, reported to have shot 16 Communists, “including three female Jews,” on July 8. Mallmann et al., *Die “Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,”* p. 104 (Report no. 19, July 11, 1941), see also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 568-569.

- 69 Mallmann et al., *Die "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR,"* p. 104 (Report 19, July 11, 1941).
- 70 See also Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 597-598, 614-615.
- 71 For a more detailed discussion of numbers and sources, see *ibid.*, pp. 616-618.
- 72 Abraham Weissbrod, *Death of a Shtetl* (New York, 1995) (first published in Yiddish in 1948), p. 4.
- 73 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
- 74 Isidor Butel (Isaac Birnbaum), "The Day I Survived the Pogrom in the Bashtis," in Weissbrod, *Death of a Shtetl*, pp. 89-90.
- 75 For a more detailed analysis of the events in Skalat, see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 621-625.
- 76 The events in Hrymailiv were investigated by the Soviet NKGB in 1944. For several interrogation protocols referring to the beginning of July 1941, see HDA SBU 31025, pp. 27-63. I would like to thank John-Paul Himka for providing me with a copy of these materials.
- 77 Westerlund, *The Finnish-SS Volunteers*, p. 153; Kleijn and Reurs, *Report on Dutch Sources*, p. 19; also quoted in van Roekel, *Jongens van Nederland. Nederlandse vrijwilligers*, p. 99. For two photos of the pond from a series of nine photos from the album of a Finnish SS volunteer, see Westerlund, *The Finnish SS Volunteers*, pp. 116-117. Unfortunately, this source mistakenly identifies them as being from Husiatyn. They were first published, without information on their location, in Ulateig, *Jakten*, after p. 161. I am indebted to Lars Westerlund for providing me with additional information regarding these photos.
- 78 See the 2009 testimony of Stanislav M. (born in 1913) who refused to participate in the shooting: <http://www.yahadmap.org/#village/hrymayliv-grymailiv-grimailov-grymailov-grzymalov-ternopil-ukraine.85>.
- 79 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 626-628.
- 80 Near the town of Mykulintsi (in Polish: Mikulińce) south of Ternopil, on July 5 following a larger battle, the SS Division Wiking shot what appears to be 200 or more Soviet POWs. In the same town, between one and several dozen Jews were killed at the beginning of July. However, a more detailed analysis would be required to determine how many were killed by the Waffen-SS and how many by local Ukrainian forces, Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 148-152; Ulateig, *Jakten*, pp. 159-161. At the beginning of the 1960s, West German prosecutors investigated possible crimes committed against Jews in Mykulyntsi in July 1941, Bundesarchiv B 162/3912. In Zbarazh (in Polish: Zbaraż) northeast of Ternopil, at the beginning of July 1941, German troops shot at least twenty Jews and burned down a synagogue. This pattern of violence resembles those in the other described localities, but further research is necessary to clearly identify Waffen-SS troops as perpetrators. See Marek Szmajuk, testimony of June 4, 1946, AŻIH 301/2571,

p. 2; Icchok Liljen, testimony of May 11, 1948, AŽIH 301/3554. With regard to Pidvolochys'k (in Polish: Podwołoczyska) on the former Polish-Soviet border east of Ternopil, there are indications that a Waffen-SS unit shot about 70 local Jews as well as Soviet POW Jakub Gilsohn, AZIH 301/1745; Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, p. 40. We also have information regarding crimes of Regiment Westland against Soviet POWs and Jews in the former Polish-Soviet border town of Husiatyn. Here, the regiment found itself in a fierce battle with Soviet forces and suffered heavy casualties. Some civilians, mostly female victims of a Soviet atrocity, were found here. On the killings of Soviet POWs, see Westerlund, *The Finnish SS-Volunteers*, pp. 154-156. The Waffen-SS may have also conducted a search in the town and shot a larger number of Jews. I am grateful to Jan Ulvenlöv for information about his ongoing research on Husiatyn. A Swedish police interrogation of volunteer Kurt Lundin conducted at the end of 1943 mentions Husiatyn both as a location of a large massacre of Soviet prison inmates and a massacre of Jews by the Waffen-SS, but very likely Lundin mixes this town with other localities. Bert Hoppe and Hildrun Glass (eds.), *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland, 1933-1945, Vol. 7: Sowjetunion mit annektierten Gebieten I: Besetzte sowjetische Gebiete unter deutscher Militärverwaltung* (Munich, 2011), pp. 502-505. Violent excesses against Jews by German troops with strong indications that Jewish women were raped, but without murders took place in Busk. There are also hints that a major massacre of Soviet POWs occurred here. It is possible, but no clear proofs could be established, that the Division Wiking was also responsible for these crimes, see Kai Struve, "La violence contre les Juifs au cours de l'été 1941 en Ukraine occidentale: les cas de Jovkva, Kamianka Strumyl'ova et Busk", *Revue d'Histoire de la Shoah* 213 (2021), pp. 15-44.

- 81 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 668-671.
- 82 Regarding Ternopil, see Anna Terkel, AŽIH 301/367, p. 1; Sara Frydman, Report of May 12, 1948, AŽIH 301/3551, p. 3. For more sources see Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, p. 602. Regarding Zolochiv, some clues appear in Mayer, *Der Untergang*, pp. 6, 11, although he also refers to Ukrainians as perpetrators.
- 83 Klein, *Die Einsatzgruppen*, p. 320.
- 84 Such a model has been put forward most clearly by Jürgen Matthäus in "Controlled Escalation: Himmler's Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21 (2007), pp. 218-242; and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, "Die Türöffner der "Endlösung." Zur Genesis des Genozids," in Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Heimatfront und besetztes Europa* (Darmstadt, 2000), pp. 437-463.
- 85 Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1992). For a newer study using material about Police Battalion 45, which was active in Ukraine, see Harald Welzer, *Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden* (Frankfurt, 2005).

- 86 On the sociological development of such a model, see Stefan Kühl, *Ganz normale Organisationen. Zur Soziologie des Holocaust* (Berlin, 2014).
- 87 Wolfgang Curilla, *Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrussland 1941-1944* (Paderborn, 2006), pp. 508-518; Stefan Klemp, "Nicht ermittelt." *Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz – Ein Handbuch* (Essen, 2005), pp. 261-267; Christian Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg. Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42* (Munich, 2009), pp. 271-275.
- 88 Browning, *Ordinary Men*, pp. 4-6.
- 89 Browning's "ordinary men" thesis is often juxtaposed with Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's thesis on the perpetrators as "ordinary Germans," which he developed based partly on the same sources used by Browning regarding Police Battalion 101. Goldhagen emphasizes the radical antisemitism of German society as the central explanation for the Holocaust. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, 1996). Here, I argue that differences existed between various German units on the ground that need to be taken into account.
- 90 Christoph Dieckmann, *Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941-1944* (Göttingen, 2011), pp. 379-391.
- 91 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, pp. 234-245, also pp. 230-231 (on Dobromyl), pp. 362-366, 397-400 (on Lviv).