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Holocaust Amnesia

The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of the Jews

Introduction

Over one and a half million Ukrainian Jews fell victim to the Holocaust between the summer of 1941 and the spring of 1944. The majority of them were shot near their homes or ghettos by German *Kommandos* and local collaborators. Many Ukrainians were witnesses to this genocide or participated in the persecution and murder of their Jewish neighbors. Nonetheless, in the collective memory of the Ukrainian diaspora, which has produced an extensive body of literature, the Holocaust remained almost completely in the dark, unmentioned. Because of the inaccessibility of Soviet archives as well as a tendency among historians to concentrate on official records, this lapse in memory has not become a subject of historical research until recently. At the same time, Holocaust research focused mainly on German perpetrators and frequently refused to take notice of reports and memoirs left by survivors because of their allegedly disputed use within the historical discipline. The published works of historians such as Philip Friedman, Shmuel Spector, and Eliyahu Yones, who were themselves Holocaust survivors and who did not neglect non-German perpetrators, received little attention from German and North American specialists of Ukrainian history and scholars of National Socialism. Only in recent years has a scholarly debate turned its attention to this blind spot in the memory of the Ukrainian diaspora and to the narrative that was constructed by it.¹

1 For essays that cover the subject of memory and the Ukrainian diaspora and its handling of the Holocaust, see John-Paul Himka, *The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine*, in: John-Paul Himka/Joanna Beata Michlic (eds.), *Bringing the Dark Past to Light. The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe*, Lincoln 2013, pp. 626–53; John-Paul Himka, *A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America*, in: *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006), pp. 17–31; Per Anders Rudling, *Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization: Ukrainian Nationalist Monuments in Edmonton, Alberta*, in: *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011) no. 5, pp. 733–68; idem, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths*, *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies* no. 2107 (Pittsburg: The Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2011); Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton. The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada*, in: *Kakanien Revisited* 12 (2010), pp. 1–16; idem,

Because of personal experiences and firsthand knowledge, the genocide of the Jews was present in the personal memories of Ukrainian exiles from the beginning. In the spring and summer of 1944, 120,000 Ukrainians who had been either witnesses to, collaborators in, or perpetrators of the extermination of their Jewish neighbors, retreated with German soldiers and administrative functionaries. However, during the Cold War, the Holocaust was only openly discussed in émigré communities when specific people were prosecuted on account of real or suspected war crimes, or when Soviet propaganda branded Ukrainians living in exile as collaborators. In the more typical and numerous accounts of the Second World War that were compiled by different groups in the Ukrainian diaspora, the extermination of Jews was hardly mentioned. When it was in fact mentioned, it was usually introduced as a side episode of German history that had not involved the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people were instead depicted as victims of the German and Soviet regimes, while Ukrainian nationalists were portrayed as heroes who fought against the German and Soviet occupying forces for the sake of national independence. This narrative was partially or completely adopted by professional historians, who taught mainly at leading North American universities.²

This essay will provide a brief outline of the Holocaust in Ukraine while also discussing the participation of Ukrainians in the genocide of the Jewish people. In doing so, it will concentrate on western Ukraine (eastern Galicia and Volhynia), where, in contrast to central, southern, and eastern Ukraine, more Jews lived and more were murdered. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*, OUN) was also based in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, as was its military arm, established in early 1943, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiiia*, UPA). Their participation in the Holocaust is particularly interesting given that their relationship with Nazi Germany was at times openly hostile. It will be discussed below why and under what circumstances Ukrainians were forcibly or voluntarily moved during the course of the Second World War to Germany, where after the war some of them lived in Displaced

Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN-UPA and other Nationalist Movements, in: *East European Jewish Affairs* 42 (2012) no. 3, pp. 199–241. For historical scholarship on survivors, see Philip Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation*, in: Philip Friedman/Ada June Friedman/Salo Baron (eds.), *Roads to Extinction*, New York 1980, pp. 176–208; Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews 1941–1944*, Jerusalem 1990; Eliyahu Yones, *Smoke in the Sand: The Jews of Lvov in the War Years 1939–1944*, Jerusalem 2004. – I would like to thank the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for supporting the research that went into this study.

² See Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust*, pp. 19–20; Rossoliński-Liebe, *Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust*, p. 205.

Persons (DP) camps. Some of them were later relocated to various countries in the West, where they established political-cultural associations for children, youths, and adults, political organizations, holiday camps that specialized in advancing the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, as well as publishing houses and newspapers. Together, these activities were used to shape the self-image of the Ukrainian diaspora with lasting effect. The principle part of this article will examine the two most important phases during which the Ukrainian diaspora's memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust were constructed. The early construction of memory that developed during the latter stages of the Second World War and the early stages of the Cold War will be covered first. In this period, a narrative was established that would be adapted and readapted to suit political circumstances during the course of the Cold War. However, at no point did this narrative lose its semantic core or its ideological orientation. Thereafter, different forms of memory will be presented that developed in the later stages of the Cold War, primarily during the 1980s. The essay will examine the memory of the 1960s and 1970s only in passing, instead switching back and forth between the early and late phases of the Cold War so as to show, first, how durable and enduring the memory that was developed at the end of the Second World War truly was, and second, how, after two decades of stagnation, this narrative returned to a central place in the life of the diaspora, blossoming into powerful forms of memory and ritual.

The Holocaust in Western Ukraine

In contrast to Western Europe, in Ukraine the extermination of Jews was usually carried out in the open. The majority of Ukrainian Jews were killed in the immediate vicinity of their homes, not transported into the unknown in trains. It was above all in western Ukraine where non-Jewish locals perceived the Holocaust, given that their Jewish neighbors were, before their very eyes, murdered during pogroms, relocated to Ghettos (in which case local Ukrainians frequently faced pleas from Jews to watch over their property), killed in one of the many mass shootings near their homes, or massacred shortly before the arrival of the Red Army during the final stages of the Holocaust by the Germans, the Ukrainian police, or local peasants in forests or other places where the Jews had been hiding.

At the time of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, 2.7 million Jews lived in the territory that today constitutes the Ukrainian state.³ Of these, approximately 1.6 million were murdered, either by Germans and their collaborators, or by Ukrainians working independently of the German occupying forces. Roughly 100,000 Jews survived the Holocaust in hiding, while approximately 900,000 Jews, predominantly those living in eastern Ukraine, fled with the Red Army into the interior of the Soviet Union during the opening stages of the war, thereby managing to save themselves. The majority of Jews in Ukraine who were killed stemmed from the western parts of the country, especially eastern Galicia and Volhynia, which were the regions with the highest Jewish population density. They constituted about ten percent of the total population there, and had little chance to flee from the Germans. In 1939, approximately 157,490 Poles, 99,595 Jews, and 49,747 Ukrainians lived in Lviv (Lemberg). After the beginning of the Second World War, the number of Jews living in Lviv rose to 160,000.⁴

To gain a better understanding of the memory of the Holocaust in the Ukrainian diaspora, it is necessary to examine how the genocide of the Jews unfolded in eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Thousands of political refugees, including collaborators (journalists, civil administrators, police) and members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fled into these territories in the face of the advancing Red Army in the spring and summer of 1944. After the war, these people remained in DP camps in Germany and Austria, and then in the late 1940s and early 1950s they were resettled in Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, where they decisively shaped Ukrainian political discourse on the Holocaust and the Second World War. In order to explain the Holocaust in Volhynia and eastern Galicia, and also to explain Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust in those areas, a brief overview of the social and political circumstances that prevailed in these regions before and during the Second World War is in order.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Poland-Lithuania was divided by Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and with that, Volhynia was incorporated into the Russian Empire, which existed until 1917, and where eighty percent of all Ukrainians lived. The remaining twenty percent of all Ukrainians lived in eastern Galicia and in Bukovina, which were part of the Habsburg Empire. In November 1917,

³ 2.47 million lived in the regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. See Alexander Kruglov, *Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941–1944*, in: Ray Brandon/Wendy Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization*, Bloomington/IN 2008, p. 273.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 273 and pp. 285–86; Christoph Mick, *Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914–1947*, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 499; Grzegorz Mazur, *Życie polityczne polskiego Lwowa 1918–1939*, Cracow 2007, p. 23.

Ukrainians declared an independent Ukrainian state in Kiev, and a second in Lviv. Neither of these states were able to defend themselves from stronger neighbors, namely Poland and Russia. Since the Ukrainians had sided with the Germans during the First World War, and because almost nobody officially recognized a Ukrainian state, Ukrainian politicians found little support at the Paris peace talks in January 1919.⁵ Volhynia and eastern Galicia were handed over to the Second Polish Republic, while most of the remaining Ukrainian regions became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.⁶

The Ukrainian nationalist independence movement was concentrated in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, and clung to the idea of national self-determination during the interwar period. The principal leaders of this movement – many of whom were veterans of the First World War – began by founding the Ukrainian Military Organization (*Ukrain's'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatsiia*, UVO) in Prague in 1920, and then the OUN in Vienna in 1929.⁷ The OUN in particular bore similarities to radical nationalist and fascist movements such as the Croatian Ustaša, the Slovakian Hlinka Party, or the Romanian Iron Guard. They focused their efforts above all on youths and mobilized Ukrainians for a ruthless struggle for national freedom. They radicalized a Ukrainian nationalism that had, until the First World War, been otherwise strongly influenced by socialist ideas, pushing it more into a fascist, racist, and antisemitic direction. The ethnically nationalist politics of Poland, which treated Ukrainians and other minorities as second-class citizens, only strengthened the conflict between Poland and Ukrainians and ensured that the OUN would use various means of terrorism and mass violence in order to “liberate” Ukraine and establish a Ukrainian state to the exclusion of other ethnic minorities.⁸

5 For the proclamation of the state in Kiev and Lviv, see Rudolf A. Mark, *Die gescheiterten Staatsversuche*, in: Frank Golczewski (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen 1993, pp. 177–79; Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939*, Paderborn 2010, pp. 240, 264, 270–71, 362–63, 383–84. For the Paris peace talks, see the same, pp. 344, 347, 366–69.

6 In the period between both world wars, approximately 26 million Ukrainians lived in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, ca. 5 million lived in the Second Polish Republic, ca. 0.8 million in Greater Romania, and ca. 0.5 million in Czechoslovakia. See Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999: Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin 2000, p. 173, 188.

7 See Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer*, pp. 547–57.

8 Also see Alexander Prusin, *Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Ukraine: The OUN-UPA Assault against Polish Settlements in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, 1943–1944*, in: Steven Béla Várdy/T. Hunt Tooley (eds.), *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, New York 2003, pp. 518–20; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *The “Ukrainian National Revolution” of Summer 1941*, in: *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12 (2011) no. 1, pp. 85–89; Franziska Bruder, *“Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!” Die Organisation Ukrainischer Natio-*

From the beginning, the membership of the OUN comprised two distinct generations, which, by the 1930s, had led to conflict within the organization. By 1940, this conflict had resulted in the OUN dividing into two camps, the OUN-M (led by Andrii Mel'nyk, the older generation) and the OUN-B (led by Stepan Bandera, the younger generation). Both factions worked together with organs of the National Socialist state, especially the *Abwehr*. They were involved in preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and planned, upon its demise, to create a Ukrainian state. The leadership of the OUN-B hoped that the Germans would accept their state, just as they had accepted the creation of the Slovakian state in March 1939, and the Croatian state in April 1941. On 30 June 1941, eight days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, one of the leading members of the OUN-B, Iaroslav Stets'ko, proclaimed the Ukrainian state in the capital of western Ukraine, the city of Lviv. As had been the case with Lithuania, where activists had proclaimed the creation of a Lithuanian state, this declaration of statehood was not recognized by Hitler. To the contrary, leaders of the OUN-B were arrested and brought to Berlin, where they were held under house arrest by the German secret police and were later incarcerated as special prisoners (*Sonderhäftlinge*) in Berlin and Sachsenhausen. In addition to these arrests, the Germans rounded up several hundred less prominent OUN-B members and placed them in various German concentration camps as political prisoners. In September 1944, the leadership of the OUN was released to mobilize Ukrainians for a renewed collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union.⁹

The Holocaust in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, as in other Ukrainian territories, unfolded in four phases, which were, however, not identical in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, as these territories were located in different administrative districts, and the Jews who lived in these territories were exposed to different policies of extermination. Eastern Galicia was placed under the General Government and organized as the district of Galicia, while Volhynia came under the control of *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*. On 22 June 1941, the first phase of the Holocaust in these territories began when at least 140 pogroms broke out, resulting in the murder of thirteen to thirty-five thousand Jews. In the largest pogrom, in Lviv,

nalisten (OUN) 1929–1948, Berlin 2007, pp. 32–51; Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer*, pp. 571–91; Marco Carynnyk, *Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947*, in: *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011) no. 3, pp. 315–52.

⁹ See Rossoliński-Liebe, *Ukrainian National Revolution*, pp. 92–106; Prusin, *Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Ukraine*, in: Várdu/Tooley (eds.), *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, pp. 522–23; Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, pp. 118–50; Adam Cyra, *Banderowcy w KL Auschwitz*, in: *Studia nad faszyzmem i zbrodniami hitlerowskimi* 30 (2008), pp. 388–402.

which began around ten o'clock at night, just a few hours before the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, four thousand Jews were killed. The perpetrators of this pogrom consisted of the militia of the OUN-B, which worked together with the Germans, groups of local civilians, as well as various German units, including some from the *Wehrmacht*.¹⁰ The second phase overlapped with the first as the *Einsatzkommandos* of the *Einsatzgruppe C* began to conduct mass shootings. Up until the end of 1941, approximately 50,000 Jews in eastern Galicia and 20,000 Jews in Volhynia were executed in mass shootings. The *Einsatzkommandos* were supported by local OUN militias, which had been transformed into the Ukrainian police in August of that year.¹¹

The Ukrainian police played a very important role in the third phase of the Holocaust, during which most of the Jews in eastern Galicia and Volhynia were killed. This phase played out differently in the General Government and the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, although both territories saw Jews first being pushed into ghettos. For Volhynia, the “Final Solution” had already been com-

10 For the total number of pogroms, see Kai Struve, Rites of Violence? The Pogroms of Summer 1941, in: *Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry* 24 (2012), p. 268. For the number of victims, see Dieter Pohl, Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine, in: Elazar Barkan/Elizabeth A. Cole/Kai Struve (eds.), *Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941*, Leipzig 2007, p. 306. For an overview of those who perpetrated the pogrom in Lviv, see John-Paul Himka, The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd, in: *Canadian Slavonic Papers* LIII (2011) nos. 2–4, p. 243. On the Lviv pogrom, also see Christoph Mick, Incompatible Experiences: Poles, Ukrainians and Jews in Lviv under Soviet and German Occupation, 1939–44, in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 46 (2011), pp. 336–63; Hannes Heer, Einübung in den Holocaust: Lemberg Juni/Juli 1941, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49 (2001), pp. 409–27. On the pogroms in general in Ukraine, see Omer Bartov, *War-time Lies and Other Testimonies: Jewish-Christian Relations in Buczac, 1939–1944*, in: *East European Politics and Societies* 25 (2011) no. 3, pp. 486–511; Wendy Lower, Pogroms, mob violence and genocide in western Ukraine, summer 1941: varied histories, explanations and comparisons, in: *Journal of Genocide Research* 13 (2011) no. 3, pp. 217–46; Struve, *Rites of Violence*, pp. 257–74; Frank Golczewski, *Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 114–55; Timothy Snyder, *The Life and Death of Western Volhynian Jewry, 1921–1945*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 77–113; Pohl, *Anti-Jewish Pogroms*, in: Barkan/Cole/Struve (eds.), *Shared History – Divided Memory*, pp. 305–13; Bernd Boll, *Zloczow, Juli 1941: Die Wehrmacht und der Beginn des Holocaust in Galizien*, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 50 (2002), pp. 899–917.

11 See Kruglov, *Jewish Losses in Ukraine*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, p. 278; Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, Munich 1997, pp. 67–71; Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, p. 79; Snyder, *The Life and Death of Western Volhynian Jewry*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, p. 92.

pleted by the end of 1942, for eastern Galicia by the summer of 1943. Of approximately 570,000 Jews who had lived in the District of Galicia shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union, over 200,000 were transported to the Bełżec extermination camp during this phase, around 150,000 were shot in the vicinity of the ghettos or in nearby forests, and roughly 80,000 died in the ghettos or in work camps.¹² By contrast, in Volhynia, almost none of the Jews were deported to extermination camps. Rather, almost all of them (ca. 200,000 of the 250,000 that lived there until June 1941) were shot before mass graves in the vicinity of the ghettos or in local forests.¹³ The chief perpetrators in this phase consisted of various German units, but also included the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police. The members of the latter did not assume a leading role, but participated in considerably larger numbers than the Germans, and indeed, their collaboration made the Jewish genocide in Ukraine technically and logistically possible.¹⁴

During the fourth and final phase of the Holocaust, the remaining ten percent of west Ukrainian Jews, that is, about 57,000 in eastern Galicia and 25,000 in Volhynia, fought for their survival. These were people who had fled from the ghettos, work camps, and transports, and had hidden in forests, with peasants in the countryside, or in the cities, or those who attempted to survive by joining up with Soviet partisans.¹⁵ Only about 15,000 Jews actually succeeded in surviving in the western Ukraine.¹⁶ During this phase, Jews were hunted down and killed by the Germans, Ukrainian police, locals, and starting in early 1943, by the OUN-B's Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In April 1943, five thousand men deserted the Ukrainian police in Volhynia and joined the UPA. Most of these men had been

12 See Kruglov, *Jewish Losses in Ukraine*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 280–83; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*, pp. 139–262.

13 See Kruglov, *Jewish Losses in Ukraine*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 280–81; Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, pp. 116–87; Snyder, *The Life and Death of Western Volhynian Jewry*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 96–97.

14 For more on the mass shootings and the role of the Ukrainian police, see Frank Golczewski, *Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine*, in: Christoph Dieckmann/Babette Quinkert/Tatjana Tönsmeier (eds.), *Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der "Kollaboration" im östlichen Europa 1939–1945*, Göttingen 2003, pp. 171–76; Gabriel Finder/Alexander Prusin, *Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust*, in: *East European Jewish Affairs* 34 (2004) no. 2, pp. 95–111; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*; Snyder, *The Life and Death of Western Volhynian Jewry*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp. 89–104.

15 See Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*, p. 385; Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, pp. 357–58.

16 See Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, pp. 217–23; Bartov, *War-time Lies and Other Testimonies*, pp. 491–98; Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, in: Friedman/Friedman/Baron (eds.), *Roads to Extinction*, pp. 187–89.

involved in the Holocaust and they were familiar with the process of exterminating an entire ethnic group in a region during a short period of time.¹⁷ The UPA was fighting for an independent Ukraine that was to take the form of an ethnically homogenous and authoritarian nation state of a fascist type. Its members hunted Jews who had survived in hiding while also massacring Polish residents of western Ukraine. In a wave of “ethnic cleansing” that took place in Volhynia and eastern Galicia in 1943, between 70,000 and 100,000 Polish civilians were murdered by the UPA.¹⁸

There were other groups besides the OUN, the UPA, and their numerous sympathizers that took part in the Jewish genocide. Ukrainian intellectuals were at least indirectly involved in the Holocaust, given that they wrote articles for collaborationist newspapers such as the *L'vivs 'ki visti* (*Lviv News*), *Krakivs'ki visti* (*Cracow News*), or the *Ukraïns'ki shchodenni visti* (*Ukrainian Daily News*), which drummed up public support for the war against the Soviet Union and propagated antisemitic stereotypes.¹⁹ The Ukrainian Central Committee, which was established in Cracow in November 1939, and mainly worked together under the leadership of Volodymyr Kubiiovych with the OUN-M, helped the Germans not only to “Aryanize” Jewish properties, but also to establish the *Waffen-SS* division “Galicia” together with the Germans. Formed in order to fight against the Red Army, this division of Ukrainians initially numbered eight thousand men. Later, it would be merged with *Schutzmannschaften* (Auxiliary Police) and other units, bringing its numbers to 14,000.²⁰ In sum, it should be noted that various cultural, social, and political groups were involved in the Holocaust in western Ukraine, including peasants, fanatical “freedom fighters,” and also intellectuals. Some groups worked together with the Germans, while others, such as the OUN and UPA, persecuted and murdered Jews on their own initiative. The spectrum

17 See Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii*, Warsaw 2006, p. 194; Timothy Snyder, *The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943*, in: *Past and Present* 179 (2003), pp. 211–12; Finder/Prusin, *Collaboration in Eastern Galicia*, p. 108.

18 See Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, pp. 410–12, 298–400; Prusin, *Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Ukraine*, in: Várdy/Tooley (eds.), *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, pp. 523–35.

19 See John-Paul Himka, *Krakivski visti and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War*, in: *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21 (1996) nos. 1–2, pp. 81–95; Golczewski, *Shades of Grey*, in: Brandon/Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, p. 134.

20 See *ibid.*, pp. 133–38.

of factors that motivated Ukrainians was broad and included ideological as well material motives.

The Emigration of Witnesses and Perpetrators

As the Red Army pushed the Germans out of Ukraine in 1944, roughly 120,000 Ukrainians fled the country as well. Most of those who fled were people who feared the Soviets for political reasons. Among them were members of the police forces, civil servants, members of the Ukrainian Central Committee, intellectuals who had written for the newspapers of the occupying forces, and also members of the OUN and UPA partisan groups. After the war, these political exiles remained in Germany and Austria in DP camps. Together, they numbered approximately 250,000 Ukrainians, including forced laborers who had been shipped to Germany during the war and who wished to avoid being sent back to the Soviet Union. Leading OUN-B members, who had been shipped to concentration camps as political prisoners, and who found one another again in the DP camps, reorganized the structures of the OUN in exile. Roughly 11,000 soldiers of the *Waffen-SS* Division “Galicia” who had surrendered to British forces also avoided being repatriated to the Soviet Union. In a number of Ukrainian DP camps, people who were accused of working together with the Soviet Union were murdered by the OUN. Given their mutual interest in combating communism and Soviet intelligence, American intelligence agencies often cooperated in these acts. Torture cellars were also set up where OUN activists interrogated suspected individuals. There were rumors that “traitors” were disposed of by cremation. A reliable figure for people who were murdered during this period does not exist; estimates place the number at under one hundred.²¹

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Refugee Organization resettled Ukrainian

²¹ See Katrin Boeckh, *Stalinismus in der Ukraine: Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Wiesbaden 2007, p. 293; Howard Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry. The Truth about Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946–1956*, Toronto 2000, pp. 131–32, 135, 146; Julia Lalonde, “Building a Home Abroad” – A Comparative Study of Ukrainian Migration, Immigration Policy and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany after the World War II, Diss., Hamburg 2006, pp. 149–53. For the acts of violence committed in the DP camps, see Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, p. 249; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 362/10137, 272, *Voruntersuchung gegen Bogdan Staschynskij*, May 22, 1962; Stephen Dorril, MI6. *Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service*, New York 2002, pp. 234–45.

DPs, including veterans of the *Waffen-SS* Division “Galicia” and members of the OUN, in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. Several thousand Ukrainians remained in Germany and Austria, among them the leadership and numerous members of the OUN, who, with the help of the CIA, established their new headquarters in Munich. At first, it was located at Lindwurmstraße 205, and then, after 1954, at Zeppelinstraße 67, where today, a plaque donated by Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko honors the “freedom fighter” Iaroslav Stets’ko and his wife.²² In their new countries, the resettled Ukrainian DPs stumbled upon already existing groups of the Ukrainian diaspora, which, in Canada for example, had already been there since the late nineteenth century. Since the resettled DPs were more strongly shaped by the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, were more politically active, and were better educated than those Ukrainians who had already lived abroad for decades, the new émigrés often assumed leading roles in associations and organizations in their new countries. Subsequently they brought these institutions into line with their nationalist ideology, and set up structures for numerous nationalist youth organizations.²³

An important medium through which the resettled DPs were able to publish their own memories, and with which they were able to influence the groups that had settled abroad before them, was newspapers. Three very important newspapers that were controlled by veterans of the OUN-B were the *Homin Ukraïny* (*The Sound of Ukraine*) in Toronto, the *Ukrains’ka dumka* (*The Ukrainian Idea*) in London, and the *Shliakh peremohy* (*The Road to Victory*) in Munich. To these were later added in London the newspapers *ABN Correspondence* and *Liberation Path*. The political émigrés also founded publishing companies in Germany, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and in other countries, in which countless memoirs and histories of the OUN, the UPA, and the Second World War were published, mostly in Ukrainian. As a way of preparing their children for the future struggle for Ukrainian independence, the activists of the Ukrainian diaspora created various cultural and political organizations for Ukrainian youth, and organized vacation camps in which the younger generations could be schooled in Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Despite their geographical dispersion, the radical seg-

²² See Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, London/New York 2002, pp. 89, 101; Dorril, MI6, pp. 240–41; Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, pp. 131–32, 135, 146; Lalande, Building, pp. 149–53; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*, Stuttgart 2014.

²³ See Himka, *A Central European Diaspora*, p. 18; Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, p. 105.

ments of the Ukrainian diaspora in particular built a well connected transnational community of memory that developed and cultivated a narrative shaped by a number of commemorative strategies.²⁴

Early Constructions of Memory

The non-remembering of the Holocaust in Ukraine, and an active remembering of Ukrainian resistance against National Socialist Germany, were established by OUN-B propaganda already during the Second World War. Decisive in this regard was the insight that Germany would lose the war, as well as the conviction that Ukrainian nationalists would have to unite with Great Britain and the United States in order to fight against the Soviet Union. In late October 1943, local UPA leaders gave the order to produce documents confirming that the Germans had carried out the pogroms of 1941 without the assistance of the Ukrainian militia, and that the pogroms had instead been organized by the Poles, who then participated in them.²⁵ In a similar fashion, the OUN-B presented itself in numerous brochures and newspapers as a liberation movement that was both equally anti-German and anti-Soviet, even after the spring of 1944, when it again began to work together with Nazi Germany. After the Red Army had occupied western Ukraine for the second time in the summer of 1944, the underground of the OUN-UPA continued to print and distribute such material up to the end of its existence in the early 1950s.²⁶ Some of these publications dealt with the Second World War and the struggle of the Ukrainian nationalists. Jews were not mentioned in these publications. They only appeared in indirect references and claims, such as the asser-

²⁴ See Himka, *A Central European Diaspora*, p. 18; Rossoliński-Liebe, *Celebrating Fascism*, pp. 3–4; Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, p. 105.

²⁵ Nakaz Ch. 2/43, Oblasnym, okruzhnym i povitovym providnykam do vykonannia, in: *Tsentrāl'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy/Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine* (henceforward: TsDAVOV), f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 43, 9. Also see Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, p. 222; Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, p. 290; Anatolii Rusnachenko, *Narod zburenyi: Natsional'no-vyzvol'nyi rukh v Ukraïni i natsional'ni rukhy oporu v Bilorusii, Lytvi, Estnii u 1940–50-xh rokakh*, Kiev 2002, p. 136.

²⁶ Also see Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, pp. 231–34; for the flyers, see, for example, the collection in: *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii* (RGASPI), f. 17 (Tsentrāl'nyi Komitet KPSS), op. 125, spr. 338. For a general overview of OUN and UPA propaganda, see Oleksandra Stasiuk, *Vydavnycho-propahandyvna diial'nist' OUN*, Lviv 2006.

tion that the OUN had never distributed antisemitic propaganda,²⁷ or in the form of requests to, and threats against, Holocaust survivors not to fraternize with the “Muscovite-Bolshevik imperialists.”²⁸

Early memory of the Holocaust was similarly fashioned by OUN members who had fled Ukraine with the Germans, or even earlier, in order to take up contact with the Allies. The Second World War became an important element of the memory of this group for two reasons. First, the Ukrainian DPs were charged with having collaborated with the Germans during the war and with supporting Hitler’s policies in Ukraine. Second, Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Union, and a heroic narrative was needed to mobilize émigrés and their children to continue the struggle. Already in 1946, Mykola Lebed, the head of OUN-B intelligence (Sluzhba Bezpeky, SB), who had assumed overall command of the OUN-B after Bandera’s arrest, published a book in Rome about Ukrainian nationalists and the Second World War.²⁹ Lebed presented the OUN and the UPA as an anti-German and anti-Soviet movement of freedom fighters, saying nothing about ethnic or political violence that the OUN and UPA had carried out during the war. According to him, a number of Jews had survived within the ranks of the UPA, and other ethnic minorities had been treated kindly and civilly. Furthermore, he stressed that many Jews, when presented with the chance to join the Red Army, chose to remain with the UPA, and indeed, that many Jews had died “a heroic death” in the struggle for Ukrainian independence.³⁰

Lebed mentioned no documents or evidence that could point to antisemitism within the OUN-B and UPA. One such document indicates otherwise, however, an order that Lebed possibly issued personally as chief of OUN-B intelligence: “All Jewish non-professionals [no doctors, nurses, tailors, cobblers] should be secretly eliminated so that neither [other] Jews nor our people will know. The rumor should be spread that they went to the Bolsheviks.”³¹ At only one point does this leading member of the OUN-B hint at the UPA-orchestrated “ethnic cleansing” of

²⁷ See Carynnyk, *Foes of Our Rebirth*, p. 345.

²⁸ Volodymyr V’iatrovych, *Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv: Formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy*, Lviv 2006, p. 139.

²⁹ See Mykola Lebed, *UPA, Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia: ïi heneza, rist i diï u vyzvol’nii borotbi Ukraïns’koho narodu za Ukraïns’ku samostiïnu sobornu derzhavu*, Presove biuro UHVR, Rome 1946.

³⁰ Mykola Lebed, *UPA, Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia*, Munich 1987, p. 69.

³¹ P. Sokhan (ed.), *Dovidka YShPR pro posylennia vyshkolu kadriv UPA, aktyvizatsiu diial’nosti zahoniv Ukraïns’kykh povstantsiv proty partyzaniv i poliakiv*, in *Litopys UPA*, vol. 4, Kiev 2002, Document 44, p. 126; also see Alexander Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in Western Borderlands*, Cambridge 2010, p. 85.

Poles that took place between 1943 and 1944, writing that “we issued the order to the Poles to leave the territories that were important for UPA actions. When that had no effect, their resistance was liquidated by force.”³²

We find a similar, though more victimization-oriented, picture of Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War in the sixty-seven page publication, *Why is the World Silent?*, written by two [former] Ukrainian concentration camp prisoners, and published in 1945 or 1946. The authors do not see the Jews as prisoners in German camps. The only Jews who appear in their book are capos. Both of the anonymous authors present the Ukrainian prisoners as either “patriots” or “traitors,” asserting that the Ukrainian patriots were the primary victims of Germany’s policies of annihilation, and that, in addition to this, they were also persecuted by other Polish, Russian, and Soviet prisoners.³³

Silence about the Jews and the genocide committed against them was a central element in the Ukrainian diaspora’s early memory discourses on the Second World War. Neither the press of the Ukrainian nationalist underground inside Ukraine nor the émigrés themselves alluded to Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust, and this despite the fact that they published, both during the conflict and afterwards, a great deal about the Second World War and about the struggle of the Ukrainian nationalists in particular. In addition, descriptions of the events and transformations in which Ukrainians suffered after 1914 were integrated and presented in detail alongside the “heroic” struggle of the UPA against the German and Soviet occupying forces. Moreover, it was often speculated whether Ukraine could be freed with nuclear weapons. One source that provides a good glimpse into this discourse is the newspaper of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (*Ukraïns’ka Holovna Vyzvol’na Rada*, UHVR), *Do zbroï*, which was founded by the OUN-B and the UPA in July 1944 in order to establish contact with Great Britain and the United States, and to represent the voice of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.³⁴

Thus, for example, in the second issue of *Do zbroï*, I. Stepaniv discussed using the atomic bomb for the purpose of the national liberation struggle. He described the advantages and disadvantages of this weapon, regretting that its destructive power was too weak to set off a revolution in the Soviet Union.³⁵ In the same issue, crimes committed by Polish units against Ukrainians living in Poland

³² Lebed, *Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia*, p. 89.

³³ See V-K., A.-T., *Chomu svit movchyt’*, Kiev/Paris 1946, pp. 4, 27, 35–36, 39, 41, 46, 48, 51.

³⁴ On the UHVR, see Motyka, *Ukraïnska partyzantka*, pp. 130–35.

³⁵ See I. Stepaniv, *Atomova Bomba i Maibutnia taktyka*, in: *Do zbroï* 2 (1946), p. 7.

were described in detail,³⁶ as were the various struggles between the UPA and units of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyi komisariat vnutrennikh del*, NKVD), the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK), and the Polish Citizens' Militia (*Milicja Obywatelska*, MO).³⁷ Another issue of *Do zbroi* went into great detail about the economic circumstances that led to the creation of the UPA.³⁸ In all of the issues published between 1946 and 1954, neither the ethnic and political violence committed by the OUN and the UPA, nor their participation in the Holocaust were mentioned.³⁹

In 1946, Volodymyr Makar published an additional book under the pseudonym, Marko Vira, titled *Seven Years of the Liberation Struggle* (*Sim lit vyzvol'nykh zmahan'*). As in Lebed's book, and typical of the nationalist perspective and early memory, all forms of mass violence perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists during the war are left out. Just as typically, those crimes committed by Ukrainian opponents are exaggerated. Makar claims, for example, that roughly twenty million Ukrainians were starved or murdered during the interwar years as a direct result of Soviet policies. However, when describing events that took place after 22 June 1941, he is silent about any cooperation that took place between the Germans and the OUN-B. Instead, he asserts that the Germans needed no assistance from the Ukrainians, and that the Ukrainians would not have worked together with the Germans because their movement was founded on the principle of national self-reliance. Instead, the Ukrainian state was proclaimed on 30 June by the OUN-B because it reflected the "will of the nation." When describing the events of 30 June and other acts of the OUN-B during this period, he not only remains silent about Ukrainian participation in pogroms, he actually does not even mention the pogroms at all, and this despite elaborate descriptions of how and why young Ukrainians joined the Ukrainian militia that had been organized by the OUN-B, and how the OUN-B, with the help of the local supporters, had attempted to build up the structures of a state.⁴⁰

Furthermore, Makar describes German wartime atrocities in Ukraine in detail. Indeed, the only group that he presents as victims of the German terror are

³⁶ See "Masovyi mord pol's'ko-bol'shevyts'kykh bandytiv, dokonany v dni 25. 1. 1946 r. na ukrains'komu naseleniu v seli v seli Zavadka Morokhivs'ka ta v inshykh selakh Sianichchyny," in: *Do zbroi* 2 (1946), pp. 22–23.

³⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 23–26.

³⁸ "Ekonomichni prychny postannia UPA," in: *Do zbroi* 3 (1947), pp. 10–17.

³⁹ The collected volumes of *Do zbroi* are located in the archives of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich.

⁴⁰ See Marko Vira, *Sim lit vyzvol'nykh zmahan'* (1939–1945), Buenos Aires 1946, pp. 5, 14–17.

Ukrainians. The fate of Soviet prisoners of war is described in detail because they were, according to Makar, primarily Ukrainians. He is similarly selective about the deterioration of living conditions and the issue of forced labor. In his telling, only the Ukrainians are affected by these problems. Jews are mentioned neither in the context of violence carried out by Ukrainian nationalists nor as victims of German policies. Leaving the subject of Jews out of his publication follows the logic that the Jewish issue in Ukraine had been “resolved” and that it no longer needed to be addressed after the war. Interestingly, when Makar describes the German massacre of Ukrainians, it resembles descriptions of the mass shootings carried out by the German *Einsatzkommandos*, leaving the impression that the author was well-acquainted with what had happened to the Jews during the Second World War. Also the term “pogrom” appears in the book only in the context of German violence directed toward Ukrainians.⁴¹

The nationalist factions among Ukrainian émigrés were not the only ones who remained silent about the pogroms of July 1941. Even self-described “democrats” who criticized the “nationalists” were silent on the issue. In 1947, the “Ukrainian-democratic weekly” *Na chuzhyni (In a Foreign Land)* criticized the proclamation of a Ukrainian state that had taken place on 30 June 1941, and also criticized its leader (*Providnyk*), Stepan Bandera, but said not a word about the pogrom that had taken place in Lviv on 30 June, just hours before the proclamation was declared.⁴² Neither were the crimes of the UPA mentioned or criticized, even though the UPA was discussed.⁴³

In 1948, the publishing house of the department for foreign affairs of the Zakordonni Chastyny OUN published excerpts of the diary kept by P. Novyna, a partisan in the UPA battalion “Vovky” (“Wolves”), who was killed in an operation on October 19, 1945. A ten-page introduction is included with the sixty-four-page publication in which the UPA is described as “an expression of the active will of the masses of the Ukrainian nation,” and as an army that fought against two enemies and that continues to fight behind the Iron Curtain against the enemies of the Western alliance. The author draws a parallel between the efforts of the OUN-UPA and the struggles that took place in Ukraine between 1917 and 1920, suggesting that political events are repeating themselves. It is also his opinion that “Ukraine, which fought against Russian-Bolshevik imperialism from the

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 22–27. Ukrainian nationalists contended as early as the 1920s that the Jewish question in Ukraine “needed to be solved.” See, for example Iurii Mylianych, *Zhydy, sionizm i Ukraïna*, in: *Rozbudova Natsii 20–21 (1929)* nos. 8–9, pp. 271, 276.

⁴² See *Chas opam’iatatys’*, in: *Na chuzhyni*, June 12, 1947, p. 1.

⁴³ See *Bandera i UPA*, in: *Na chuzhyni*, November 12, 1947, p. 6.

beginning, was bound to lose because it was abandoned to fight alone.” To avoid a repetition of events and to keep their common enemies from growing too strong, the West should help Ukraine fight them. Toward the end of the foreword, the editors point out that only those parts of the diary are being published that deal with the UPA’s struggle with the Soviet Union and its defense of the Ukrainian people against Polish-communist forces in the western regions. Despite this attempt at self-censorship, the killing of Polish civilians is mentioned in the diary, even though it is only referred to euphemistically and as justified by Novyna.⁴⁴

A similar narrative also appeared early on in the newspapers of the Ukrainian diaspora. The newspaper *Homin Ukraïny*, which was founded in 1948 and became the official newspaper of the OUN-B in Toronto, published an article in December 1949 under the title “For an Objective Assessment of Historical Experiences.” Its author, Ostap Mlynarchuk, “corrected” the “false” presentation of the OUN’s actions after 22 June 1941 and the proclamation of a Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, invoking the “objective” perspectives of eyewitnesses who, at the time, did not feel themselves attached to any political movement. According to Mlynarchuk, he wrote the article because the OUN was being defamed by the émigré Ukrainian press, this despite the fact that the OUN “had led the entire liberation movement fighting for the independence of all Ukrainians during the years of the war and the German occupation of Ukraine,” and despite the fact that the OUN had founded the UPA, and was continuing to struggle in resistance against the Soviet occupation until the present day. Furthermore, he states that those who frame the act of 30 June 1941 as an act of collaboration are mistaken. He reminds his readers that “proclamations suddenly appeared on the walls around Lviv calling for the independence of Ukraine,” claiming that “the Ukrainian state is working together with Germany, and with it they would together fight against the Bolsheviks,” but only because “this course of events was obvious to us all,” since “we planned to free Ukrainian lands from the Bolsheviks and set up our own state.”⁴⁵

The memories that Mlynarchuk presents in his article are very significant because they are based on his personal observations. They contain information about which aspects of events were perceived and remembered, and which ones not. However, they cannot tell us whether certain events occurred but were not perceived during the pogrom, or if they were perceived but not remembered, or

⁴⁴ P. Novyna, Vovky. *Frahmenty z khroniky odnoho viddilu UPA ‘Vovky’*, Paris 1948, pp. 6–7, 9, 19, excerpt, 6.

⁴⁵ Ostap Mlynarchuk, *Za obiektyvnu otsinku istorychnykh podii*, in: *Homin Ukraïny*, December 10, 1949, p. 6.

if they were indeed remembered but not narrated due to later social and political circumstances. Hence, the author says nothing about what happened to the Jews in Lviv as Stets'ko proclaimed the founding of a Ukrainian state, even though he had to have been an eyewitness to the anti-Jewish excesses. Mlynarchuk only mentions the Jews in one sentence, when he writes that all of the population groups were friendly toward the Germans, with the exception of the Jews.⁴⁶

Like Mlynarchuk, many other Ukrainian eyewitnesses could not remember the mass violence against the Jews, and this despite the fact that they could remember the proclamation of the Ukrainian state in Lviv, which meant that they must have witnessed the pogrom or were involved in carrying it out. Ivan Hryn'okh, a member of the OUN-B and the chaplain for the German *Abwehr* battalion "Nachtigall" ("Nightingale"), a unit that consisted of Ukrainian soldiers, and which was one of the first units that moved into Lviv during the early morning of 30 June after the Soviet army had pulled out, was in the city during the time when the pogrom occurred. Hryn'okh actively participated in the events leading up to proclamation of the state on 30 June. Together with Stets'ko, he visited the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, whom they convinced to support the state with a pastoral letter. Hryn'okh was also present for the proclamation that was issued that same evening. On the next day, he made a radio broadcast of the proclamation from Lviv and sang German and Ukrainian military songs for those who were listening.⁴⁷

Hryn'okh's activities meant that he was in the city repeatedly while the pogrom was being carried out. He must have therefore also seen the pogrom in more than one part of the city. Like other Ukrainian nationalists, Hryn'okh remained in West Germany after the war and worked as a professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. In 1959, he was heard as a witness in the legal proceedings taken against Theodor Oberländer, who had served in the "Nachtigall" battalion as an expert for Ukrainian matters. Hryn'okh confirmed that he had been in Lviv, but not only disputed the involvement of the battalion and Ukrainian civilians in anti-Jewish mass violence, he also flatly denied that the pogrom had even taken place. In response to the question, whether or not "pogroms and excesses were carried out against the Jews," he responded, "I did not see anything of the sort,

⁴⁶ See *ibid.*

⁴⁷ See Rossoliński-Liebe, *The Ukrainian National Revolution*, pp. 97, 105; Interrogation of Ivan Hryn'okh, in: *Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen* (henceforth: *Landesarchiv NRW*), *Gerichte Rep.* 350, vol. 2, p. 23.

even though I walked and drove through many different streets in Lviv during my time there. I can firmly say that I was not informed of anything like that.”⁴⁸

Even after someone read him the testimony of another witness who described the pogrom, Hryn'okh asserted: “I cannot rule out that something like that did indeed occur. I did not however, as I have already stated, see or hear anything like that.”⁴⁹

Another important account of the events in Lviv that was based upon personal memories and experiences was that of Iaroslav Stets'ko, the person who proclaimed the founding of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941. Published in 1967 under the title *30 chervnia 1941 (30 June 1941)*, this three-hundred-page book included a foreword by the chief ideologue of Ukrainian fascism, Dmytro Dontsov, whose publications had been essential to shaping Stets'ko and many other Ukrainian nationalists in their youth. Stets'ko was, from a political perspective, probably the most important figure to participate in the events that played out in Lviv from the end of June to the beginning of July 1941. He represented the *Providnyk* Stepan Bandera, who could not personally come to Lviv for the proclamation. Shortly after the proclamation, Stets'ko wrote letters to Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Pavelić declaring his loyalty to them and requesting that they recognize the Ukrainian state as a part of the “New Europe.”⁵⁰

Stets'ko's *30 chervnia 1941* is a prototypical example of selective and politicized memory. For the purposes of this article, we will only focus on those events that are connected to the mass violence committed by Stets'ko's OUN-B. Unlike Hryn'okh or Mlynarchuk, Stets'ko could remember that pogroms broke out in Lviv and in other places shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, he regarded them as irrelevant and only mentioned them in the context of German misdeeds and in order to firmly establish Ukrainian non-participation, which he presented as stemming from Ukrainian patriotism. Furthermore, he claimed that the leaders of the OUN-B warned their members and the OUN-B militia against participating with the Germans in the “anti-Jewish” and “anti-Polish” pogroms, indeed, forbidding all types of anti-Jewish violence. Therefore, according to Stets'ko, not a single Ukrainian militiaman or member of the OUN-B participated in the pogrom in Lviv or in any other pogroms. Only some criminal elements, which were not representative of the Ukrainian nation, allowed themselves to

48 Testimony of Ivan Hryn'okh, in: *ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*

50 See Rossoliński-Liebe, *The Ukrainian National Revolution*, pp. 96–100.

become involved by the Germans in anti-Jewish violence, and then later joined the militias which were taken over by the OUN-B.⁵¹

The memory of Ukrainian patriots as a group that did not allow itself to be induced by the Germans into antisemitic crimes repeatedly appears in Stets'ko's publication, and in such a way that the uninformed reader inevitably begins to believe it. Trust in the narrator is further strengthened by the fact that Stets'ko remembers these events as an actor who participated in them. Conspicuously, in Stets'ko's telling, it is precisely those individuals and groups who were most often involved in mass violence to whom the victims should have been the most grateful. According to him, it was these people who risked their lives to save victims from the Germans. He reports, for example, that Ivan Ravlyk, a leading member of the OUN-B, who established the militia in Lviv together with other senior OUN-B members, is owed a great deal of thanks by Jews and Poles because he had not betrayed the names of well-known Jews and Poles after being arrested and interrogated for days by the Gestapo.⁵²

By the same token, Stets'ko admits that he was in Lviv, and that he discussed the events of the days that followed with Roman Shukhevych, another important senior member of the OUN-B and an officer of the "Nightingale" battalion, even though Stets'ko limits himself only to the massacres of prisoners that had been committed by the NKVD before the German invasion had begun.⁵³ This bit of selective memory – shaped as it is by the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism – is particularly interesting because both events (the terror committed by the NKVD against political prisoners on the one hand, and the violence carried out by the Germans and the OUN-B against Jews, on the other) were so closely interwoven that one could not discuss the one without being aware of the other. Relatively few of those who were incarcerated as political prisoners were evacuated from the Soviet prisons following the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Many of them were instead murdered by the NKVD during the days that followed. According to Soviet and other documents, 2,800 prisoners were shot in Lviv by the NKVD,⁵⁴ while a total of 8,789 prisoners were shot in all of Ukraine.⁵⁵ The corpses of those

51 See Iaroslav Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941, Lemberg 1967*, pp. 77, 177.

52 See *ibid.*, p. 183.

53 See *ibid.*, p. 190.

54 An NKVD collaborator and professor in Kiev, Johann Druschbach, overheard these numbers being mentioned by Soviet officials with whom he departed from Lviv by airplane to Kiev on June 28, 1941. *Landesarchiv NRW, Gerichte Rep. 350, vol. 2, p. 72*. German estimates place the number of victims between 3,000 and 3,500. See Heer, *Einübung in den Holocaust*, p. 410.

55 Vgl. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*, Cambridge 2004, p. 14.

who had been shot were left in the prisons, and within a few days they were discovered by the Germans as well as members of the local population. In Lviv, the Germans organized a public viewing of the bodies, staging it as an act of stereotypical Jewish-Bolshevism (“Judeo-Communes”), and placing the responsibility for the murders that had been carried out by the NKVD on the Jews. Jews were forced to drag the decomposing corpses out of the prison cellars, and Jewish women had to wash the bodies and kiss the corpses’ hands. While this was occurring, the Jews were beaten, abused, and killed by the Germans, members of the OUN-B militia, and locals. In the end, the corpses of NKVD victims as well as Jews were littered across the prison grounds.⁵⁶

Heroization and Victimization

The Ukrainian diaspora’s memory of the Second World War was shaped by two related components – heroization and victimization – that subsequently cast all Ukrainians as either heroes (of the struggle for national independence) or victims (of other regimes or ideologies). This particular formula for remembering took shape immediately after the war and not only survived to the end of the Soviet Union, but is present among many groups to this day. Since this narrative was widely accepted by nearly all groups of the Ukrainian diaspora, and because historians working in Ukraine used it and accepted it as true, all references to Ukrainian complicity in the Holocaust were dismissed as provocation or propaganda. This political frame of memory was generally retained throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but beginning in the 1980s, it began to come under growing scrutiny because of various Holocaust-related events, including the broadcast of the mini-series “Holocaust,” the Demjanjuk trial, and the work of the Canadian Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals (also known as the Deschênes Commission), in addition to Soviet propaganda. What follows are a few representative examples, primarily from the 1980s, that demonstrate how the Ukrainian diaspora characterized its history in terms of heroization and victimhood in order to avoid confrontation with an uncomfortable topic, or to protect fellow members of the community.

⁵⁶ See also Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Der Verlauf und die Täter des Lemberger Pogroms vom Sommer 1941. Zum aktuellen Stand der Forschung*, in: *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 22 (2013), pp. 222–32; Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom of 1941*, p. 215; Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944. Życie codzienne*, Warsaw 2000, p. 204.

Stets'ko and the Declaration of 30 June 1941: The thirtieth of June grew into the most important symbol of resistance against Germany. This day was commemorated in memorial and ritual by various groups of the diaspora long before Stets'ko published his 1967 book *30 chervnia 1941*. The memory of this event was constantly adjusted to match current political debates and trends. For example, in the 1950s, it was the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union that provided this event with meaning. Writing in 1958 in the newspaper, *Shliakh peremohy*, V. Shcherbii stated that “we are not being allowed to clearly see this date (the thirtieth of June) as it was and as it must have been. This date was a historical necessity without which Ukraine in our age of technology and atoms would have nothing to offer to the so-called free world.” With this statement, the author meant that, had Stets'ko not proclaimed the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, the Ukrainian émigré community would not be in a position to support the West in preparing for a nuclear war. In addition, he wrote that “the stateless Ukrainians lost more struggles before and after 30 June 1941, but on this most memorable of days, they probably won the most important of all victories. They won the struggle for the soul of the Ukrainian nation and for greater understanding of other oppressed nations.”⁵⁷

Following the war, Stets'ko continued his political career in exile. He stepped into the role as the “last premier of a free and independent Ukrainian state,” and also rallied representatives of other nations in the fight against the “red devil.” In 1946 he founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which he guided until his death in 1986. The ABN united veterans from various East European ultranationalist, fascist, and antisemitic movements, such as the Iron Guard, the Ustaša, or the Hlinka Party, and remained an influential and serious international organization throughout the Cold War. The German Federal Minister for Expellees, Refugees, and Victims of War, Theodor Oberländer, moved in ABN circles and was a leading member of the European Freedom Council, which worked closely with the ABN and other anti-Communist organizations.⁵⁸ In 1966, the Canadian city of Winnipeg declared Stets'ko an honorary citizen.⁵⁹ On 18 July 1983, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the anti-Communist organization Captive Nations, and the fictitious fortieth anniversary of the ABN, he was invited to the U.S. Congress, where he was received by Vice President George H. W. Bush. One day later, he was invited to the White House to meet with Ronald

⁵⁷ V. Shcherbii, 30. Chervnia v Ukraïni, in: *Shliakh peremohy*, June 29, 1958, p. 2.

⁵⁸ See ABN Correspondence XVIII (1967) 4, on the back of the envelope.

⁵⁹ See Former Prime Minister of Ukraine – Honorary Citizen of Ukraine, in: ABN Correspondence XVIII (1967) 3, p. 31.

Reagan, who had, on various occasions, supported the activities of the anti-Communist “freedom fighters.”⁶⁰

The Antisemitism of Others: A very common element of the Ukrainian diaspora’s memory of the Holocaust, the Second World War, and Jewish-Ukrainian relations was the antisemitism of others. In publications about the Second World War, Ukrainian exiles primarily focused on the antisemitism of the Germans, Poles, and Russians. In articles that focused on the period following the Second World War, Soviet antisemitism was often discussed in detail. In contrast to this, there were no discussions about Ukrainian antisemitism. To broach this issue was understood as a provocation, likely stirred up by Soviet propaganda or Jewish “chauvinists.”

In November 1958, the newspaper *Shliakh peremohy* initiated a series about the Polish-organized pogroms of November and December 1918. The catalyst for this was criticism from Jewish newspapers directed toward Ukrainian author Ivan Franko and his antisemitism, as well as the conduct of certain Polish academics who supported this line of criticism.⁶¹ When various newspapers in Australia and Canada began to publish articles on the Ukrainian pogroms of 1918 and 1919, naming Ukrainians among the perpetrators, Rostyslav Iednyk, writing in the *Shliakh peremohy*, claimed that these pogroms had been started by Russian provocateurs. Furthermore, he declared that the only reason that the Jewish newspapers would write about Ukrainian participation in the pogroms of 1919 was because this was a version of the story invented and spread by Soviet propaganda in order to weaken and defame Ukrainian nationalism and the anti-Soviet liberation struggle. The articles about the pogroms were “not just anti-Ukrainian, but were also anti-statist. They were directed equally against the Ukrainian nation and its state-establishing concepts of freedom and independence.”⁶² A different (anonymous) author claimed that the Ukrainian pogroms of 1919 were initiated solely by Bolsheviks, the “white” Denikin Army, and Poles. To declare

60 For more on Stets’ko as “Premier of a free Ukrainian state,” see Captive Nations Week Observed, in: Ukrainian Echo, August 31, 1983, p. 1; Ukraïna staie predmetom svitovoi polityky: u 25-littia tyzhnia ponevolenykh narodiv i 40-richchia ABN, in: Homin Ukraïny, August 17, 1983, p. 1. For Stets’ko and his visit to the White House, see the same, pp. 1, 3; Politychnyi aspekt vidznachennia richnyts’: TPN i ABN, in: Homin Ukraïny, August 24, 1983, pp. 1, 4.

61 See Iaroslav Hrynevych, Lystopad 1918 r. and L’vovi i zhydy, in: Shliakh peremohy, November 9, 1958, p. 3. For the pogrom in Lviv, see William W. Hagen, The Moral Economy of Ethnic Violence: The Pogrom in Lwow, November 1918, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 31 (2005), pp. 203–26. Also see Antony Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 1914–2008, vol. 3, Oxford 2012, p. 25.

62 Rostyslav Iednyk, Moskva rozpaluie antysemyzm, in: Shliakh peremohy, May 24, 1958, p. 2.

that Ukrainians had participated in the pogroms was, for him, an anti-Ukrainian provocation.⁶³

The discourse about the antisemitism of others was maintained throughout the Cold War and was complemented by additional factors related to the politics of history. One of these was the desire of the Ukrainian diaspora's more radical factions to build a healthy relationship with the Jewish community. However, this required one to accept the belief that Jews resented the Ukrainians only because Jews continued to subscribe to Jewish and Soviet stereotypes of Ukrainians, as one anonymous author explained in the article "Do pytan' ukrains'koho-zhydivs'kykh vzaiemyn" ("Questions Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations"), published in 1978. The stereotypes that had been spread by Soviet propaganda were, in his opinion, evidence enough that Ukrainians had not participated in the 1919 pogroms, and this, ergo, was why attempts were being made to blame Ukrainians.⁶⁴ The author came to similar conclusions about the 1941 pogroms. These were remembered, above all, by "older Jews" who were "hostile toward Ukraine and its liberation struggle." Their hostile attitude was made evident because they "constantly referred back to the [1941] pogroms," which harmed the image of the liberation struggle and was, therefore, a stereotype. According to the anonymous author, these same Jews had forgotten how Jews had economically oppressed the Ukrainians and how Ukrainians had fallen victim to Jewish "Pogromists" such as Leon Trotsky and Lazar Kaganovich. Also forgotten was how tolerant Petliura, and other politicians who had tried to establish a Ukrainian state following the First World War, had been toward the Jews. In a memorandum on Ukrainian-Jewish relations that was signed by thirteen people and published adjacent to the article, it was claimed that the "KGB inspired and financed Jewish publications in the United States that were anti-Ukrainian," and that the "contemporary Russian

⁶³ See "Zhydy pro svoje zhyttia v Ukraïni," in: Shliakh peremohy, May 31, 1958, p. 4. It is difficult to determine the number of victims of the pogroms that occurred in the Ukrainian state between 1919 and 1921. Nakhum Gergel, the Deputy Minister for Jewish Affairs in Zentralna Rada (Kiev Central Assembly), placed the number of pogroms that took place at 1,182, and the number of victims between 50,000 and 60,000. The three most important groups of perpetrators were the Ukrainian soldiers of the Zentralna Rada, the soldiers of the White Army, and gangs of local Ukrainian civilians. See also Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia*, vol. 3, pp. 32–43; as well as Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920*, Cambridge 1999.

⁶⁴ See "Do pytan' ukrains'koho-zhydivs'kykh vzaiemyn," in: Shliakh peremohy, March 5, 1978, p. 2.

Empire was the source of antisemitism, given that it was [the Soviet Union] that had raised the example set by Hitler's Germany to a political principle."⁶⁵

The Movie "Holocaust": Directed by Marvin J. Chomsky, the four-part mini-series "Holocaust," which first appeared on American television in April 1978, and which was shown in other western countries in the following months, attracted much attention to the Holocaust and, at the same time, unleashed significant reactions within the Ukrainian diaspora. By evoking sympathy through the story of a Jewish family from Berlin and showing how National Socialist policies destroyed the lives of Jews in Europe, the movie raised awareness among millions of viewers. The Ukrainian diaspora reacted above all to a scene in the third part of the series, which was set in Ukraine. It shows Jewish partisans ambushing and shooting a group of Ukrainian policemen. Shortly before opening fire, one of the Jewish partisans declares to Rudi Weiss, one of the main characters in the film, "they have killed more of us than the Germans." As one of the Ukrainian policemen attempts to flee, he is pursued by Rudi, who ultimately overpowers him and shoots him, even though the young policeman begs his pursuer not to do so.

The Ukrainian diaspora perceived this as a direct attack and tried to debunk the film as an international campaign orchestrated by Hollywood, Jews, and the Soviet Union against the Ukrainian "liberation struggle." On 5 July 1978, Leonid Poltava published the article, "The Movie 'Holocaust' and Ukraine" in *Homin Ukraïny*. Poltava – who had immortalized Stepan Bandera and other "freedom fighters" and heroized the "struggle for freedom" in his poems – wrote that the creators of the film had deliberately wanted "to show Ukrainians in a bad light," and this was why the "young man Rudi Weiss from Berlin was thrown into Czechoslovakia and later into Ukraine." In his description of the relevant scene, Poltava pointed out that the "police are not an entire people," and that "a police force existed under every regime (in the same way that there were Jewish capos, who murdered their Jewish brothers in fascist concentration camps)." To this he added that, "when a young man was among the police, whose father was murdered by a bullet from the GSU, the Cheka, or the NKVD, and the head of a local department was a Communist and ethnically Jewish, then one can understand this policeman: he avenged his father." In Poltava's opinion, the police had only carried out the orders of the German regime, and indeed, the only reason that Ukrainians had joined the police was for the purpose of "wiping out red, Soviet partisans who would by night shoot civilians and Ukrainian patriots, especially the nationalists." Similarly, he commented on another line that supposedly

65 Ibid.

appeared in the film that referred to the UPA, namely: “If you run into a Ukrainian partisan, you’re dead.” Poltava described this line as “anti-Ukrainian.”⁶⁶

The “Ukrainian Holocaust”: In contrast to its silence about and failure to remember the Holocaust and, in particular, Ukrainian involvement in it, the Ukrainian diaspora has, since the late 1970s, very intensely and actively commemorated the mass starvation that took place in central and eastern Ukraine in 1932–1933, which, four decades later, became known as the “Holodomor” or the “Ukrainian Holocaust.” The famine had arisen in the 1950s in public political discourses among Ukrainian émigrés, but it only began to play an important role after (though in some cases shortly before) the film “Holocaust” was shown on North American television. The former head of propaganda for the OUN, Petro Mirchuk, who had been incarcerated in Auschwitz as a political prisoner from July 1942 to January 1945, and until May 1945 had been imprisoned in Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and afterwards had resettled as a DP in the United States, stated in an address to the Anti-Defamation League that the Germans wanted to annihilate the Jews first and foremost, but that Ukrainians and other Slavic people were subsequently targeted for eradication as well. He pointed out that before Germany, the “mass annihilation of nations” had already been initiated by “Bolshevik Moscow,” which “by means of methodical and deliberate mass starvation [...] massacred six to ten million Ukrainian peasants in 1932 and 1933 alone.” According to *Shliakh peremohy*, Mirchuk described the famine as “a premeditated ‘Holocaust.’”⁶⁷

After the movie “Holocaust” was broadcast on American television in 1978, more and more articles that focused on the famine began to appear in the newspapers of the Ukrainian diaspora. In commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the famine, *Shliakh peremohy* published a series of articles dealing with the issue. In one of these articles, Ivan Bodnaruk stated that the “Muscovite Bolsheviks, following the orders of that bloodsucker (*krovopyvtzia*) Stalin, had organized a terrible man-made famine which brought about the deaths of millions of Ukrainians.” Bodnaruk believed that Soviet officials, in addition to the famine of 1932–33, had also coordinated the famines of 1922–23 and 1946–47 as a means of “exterminating” the Ukrainian nation. In 1932–33 alone, eight million Ukrainians were murdered, and already during the first famine of 1922–23, seven million Ukrainians had perished. So as not to forget this catastrophe, Bodnaruk insisted that “we should use the press to call up and mobilize all of our countrymen, to

⁶⁶ Leonid Poltava, Film “Holokost” i Ukraïna, in: *Homin Ukraïny*, July 5, 1978, p. 6.

⁶⁷ R.K., Ukraïns’kyi “holokast”. Dopovid d-ra Mirchuka u “B’nai B’rit” u filadel’fii, in: *Shliakh peremohy*, April 16, 1978, p. 2.

honor the memory of those who died as a result of this starvation. We ask God to hasten the demise of the Muscovite-Soviet regime and to free the Ukrainians and all other oppressed peoples!”⁶⁸

Due to a lack of reliable research, and especially because of limited access to Soviet archives, the actual number of victims in the Soviet Ukraine, which lies somewhere between 2.6 and 3.9 million, was not known during the 1970s and 1980s.⁶⁹ With this in mind, there was a tendency within the Ukrainian diaspora to inflate the number of victims, and it was especially important to place the number at more than five or six million as a way of showing that more Ukrainians were “exterminated” during the “Holodomor” than were Jews during the Holocaust.⁷⁰ What was not discussed was the question of whether, and to what degree, the famine had been caused by Soviet policies that targeted the Ukrainians, or whether the famine had been caused not entirely intentionally by agricultural collectivization.⁷¹

Most of the activists who were involved in this movement of remembrance did not stem from the famine-stricken Soviet Ukraine, but rather came from those regions that had earlier belonged to the Second Polish Republic, that is, eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Nonetheless, it was precisely these Ukrainian exiles who were the most involved in raising memorials for the victims of the famine. In the Canadian city of Edmonton, an initiative for constructing a memorial in honor of the victims of the “Holodomor” was taken up by, among others, Petro Savaryn, a former soldier of the *Waffen-SS* and lecturer at the University of Alberta from 1982 to 1986. At the memorial’s unveiling, speeches were held in which the Holodomor was repeatedly described as a horrible mass crime and compared to the Holocaust.⁷²

“Heroes” and the Genocide of the Jews: Heroization and a ritual worship of the leaders and fighters of the national “liberation struggle” were integral parts of the movement of remembrance created by the Ukrainian diaspora. The actual biographies of the “heroes” were not important and most admirers were not familiar with them. Through this symbolic transformation into “heroes,” issues such as their participation in the Holocaust and other mass crimes, as well as

⁶⁸ Ivan Bodnaruk, *U 45-rychchia holodu v Ukraïni*, in: *Shliakh peremohy*, November 5, 1978, p. 1.

⁶⁹ See John-Paul Himka, *How Many Perished in the Famine and Why Does It Matter?*, BRAMA, February 2, 2008; http://www.brama.com/news/press/2008/02/080202himka_famine.html.

⁷⁰ In this context, see Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering. Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, Lund 2006.

⁷¹ See Himka, *How Many Perished in the Famine and Why Does It Matter?*; Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering*.

⁷² See Rudling, *Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization*, pp. 751–53; Rossoliński-Liebe, *Celebrating Fascism*, pp. 7–8.

collaboration with the Germans, became taboo. The questioning of this narrative was considered to be anti-Ukrainian and anti-statist. In order to demonstrate how selective their memory was, a brief overview of the biographies of Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera will be presented here, followed by an analysis of their subsequent heroization.

Roman Shukhevych: Roman Shukhevych was born on 20 June 1907 in Krakovets, a small town located 80 kilometers west of Lviv. In 1925, he completed his secondary schooling in Lviv, joined the UVO, and then later studied in Danzig and then in Lviv. He committed his first act of murder on 19 October 1926, when he and an associate, Bohdan Pidhainyi, shot the school superintendent Stanisław Sobiński in Lviv, for which two other Ukrainians were later held responsible.⁷³ Shukhevych was arrested in Warsaw on charges related to the assassination of Polish Interior Minister Bronisław Pieracki, carried out on 15 June 1934, but was released in 1937 on the grounds of false testimony delivered during the trial by other OUN-B members. After the beginning of the Second World War, Shukhevych remained in Cracow, where he took part in assembling the Ukrainian “Nachtigall” battalion of the *Wehrmacht*, and together with Bandera and other OUN-B members he prepared for the establishment of a Ukrainian state. It is unclear whether Shukhevych participated in any of the excesses directed toward the Jews following the occupation of Lviv. According to one soldier from the “Nachtigall” battalion, while on their way to Vinnytsia, the members of the battalion “shot all of the Jews that they encountered in two villages.”⁷⁴ Because of their dispute with the Germans regarding the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, the battalion was disarmed on 13 August 1941, reorganized into the *Schutzmannschaft* Battalion 201, and then sent to Belorussia for a year, where it fought against partisans and participated in the Jewish genocide.⁷⁵ *Schutzmannschaft* Battalion 201 was disbanded in Lviv at the beginning of January 1943. Some of its members were transferred to the *Waffen-SS* division “Galicia,” while others such as Shukhevych joined the UPA, where they proceeded to commit the same kinds of violence against civilians as did the German *Schutzmannschaften*. Shukhevych was promoted to senior commander of the UPA in August 1943, holding this position until his death on 5 March 1950, when he died near Lviv during a fight with Soviet sol-

73 See Mazur, *Życie polityczne polskiego Lwowa*, pp. 119–20, 148.

74 Autobiography of a well-known member of the OUN, in TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, p. 17; see Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, p. 150. The soldier was Viktor Khar’kiv “Khmara.” See I.K. Patryliak, *Viiis’kova diial’nist’ OUN (B) u 1940–1942 rokakh*, Kiev 2004, pp. 361–62.

75 Golczewski, *Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine*, in: Dieckmann/Quinkert/Tönsmeier (eds.), *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, p. 176.

diers from the Interior Ministry. He was fully involved in the mass violence carried out against the Polish populations in Volhynia, and ordered that the “ethnic cleansing” of Polish civilians be extended into in eastern Galicia.⁷⁶ Under the leadership of Shukhevych, the UPA also began to murder numerous Ukrainian civilians during the brutal conflict with the NKVD/MVD, which lasted until the early 1950s.⁷⁷ Parallel to the mass violence carried out against Polish civilians, the UPA also murdered Jews who attempted to survive in the forests. The number of Jewish victims killed by the UPA is estimated between several hundred and several thousand.⁷⁸

Despite involvement in these crimes, Shukhevych’s cult of personality developed within the Ukrainian diaspora immediately following his death. Volodymyr Ianiv, a leading member of the OUN-B – who had been arrested along with Shukhevych in 1934 for the assassination of Pieracki, who had spent much of the Second World War in German concentrations camps as a political prisoner, and who served as the Rector of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich from 1968 to 1986 – characterized the UPA senior commander at a memorial service in Munich as “one of the greatest legends of mankind.” Ianiv stated that Shukhevych’s career started when he shot Sobiński in 1926.⁷⁹ In the following decades of the Cold War, Shukhevych became the most important symbol of the UPA. His memory was openly celebrated, and his image, usually showing him in uniform, regularly appeared in the newspapers of the diaspora. In 1970, Petro Mirchuk published the first hagiography with the title *Roman Shukhevych (Gen. Taras Chuprynka) Commander of the Army of Immortals*.⁸⁰ Some groups in the diaspora, such as the one in Edmonton, commissioned busts of Shukhevych, displaying them on the grounds of their culture centers, where they regularly celebrated nationalist-religious memorial services.⁸¹ Two important days that were annually celebrated

76 Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, p. 367.

77 According to Soviet sources, the UPA had killed ca. 20,000 civilians by 1953. See also Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, p. 650. On the conflict between the OUN-UPA and the NKVD, see *ibid.*, pp. 414–573, and Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*.

78 See John-Paul Himka, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust*. Paper prepared for the forty-first national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, November 12–15, 2009; Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, pp. 217–23; Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, in: Friedman/Friedman/Baron (eds.), *Roads to Extinction*, pp. 187–89.

79 Volodymyr Ianiv, *Shukhevych – Chuprynka. Liudyna i symvol. Dopovid na zhalibni akademii 19 lystopada 1950 v Miunkheni, Munich 1950*, pp. 4 (quotation), 8.

80 See Petro Mirchuk, *Roman Shukhevych (Gen. Taras Chuprynka), Commander of the Army of the Immortals*, Toronto 1970.

81 See Rudling, *Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization*, pp. 743–46.

were the anniversary of Shukhevych's death on 5 March, and the UPA festival on 14 October, often celebrated in conjunction with the so-called Holiday of Arms (*Sviato Zbroï*).

In a typical Shukhevych-cult issue of the London newspaper, *Ukraïns'ka Dumka*, dating from 1967, a front-page portrait of Shukhevych was printed with an article from Dr. Sviatomyr M. Fostun. The author began the description of the celebration marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the UPA with the following quote, supposedly from Shukhevych:

The heroic struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the liberating revolutionary activity constitute the most heroic epoch in the history of Ukraine. You should know that the history of mankind has never known such a heroic epoch. Even the heroics of the heroes from Thermopylae are overshadowed by our struggle. Later generations will be raised on the heroism of the UPA and the liberating revolutionary underground. The fighters of the UPA, the Ukrainian revolutionaries will take the place of the courageous Spartans.⁸²

On 22 June 1980, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Shukhevych's death, an event took place in Toronto involving about six thousand members of the Ukrainian diaspora. It began with a religious service. Behind the altar on the stage, a large portrait of the General in uniform was hung. Following the service, Ukrainians in native dress and military uniforms sang religious and nationalist songs. At the end, a series of short speeches were held praising the General and calling upon Ukrainians not to give up in the struggle against the Soviet Union.⁸³

On 7 March 1985, Dr. Fostun published yet another front-page article in the *Ukraïns'ka Dumka* in honor of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the UPA General's death. He described Shukhevych as a commander who did not give up the fight against the "red empire" even after all the Western states had abandoned him. The heroic struggle of the UPA made him into a "living symbol" that continued to rally Ukrainians to fight against the enemy and to sacrifice their lives for Ukraine. As with his article from 1967 and all of the other essays published in this issue, the author said nothing about the "darker" side of the movement and characterized the UPA as an army that had heroically fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. With that, he also referenced John Armstrong, the first to publish a historical monograph about the OUN. Armstrong's study, which was largely based on the memories and testimonies of OUN members as well as German archival

⁸² Sviatomyr M. Fostun, U 25-ti rokovyny bezprykladnoï epopeï, in: *Ukraïns'ka Dumka*, October 12, 1967, p. 1.

⁸³ See "Khai slava pro velykoho komandyra prokhodyt' u viky," in: *Homin Ukraïny*, July 2, 1980, p. 3.

documents, made no mention of the OUN's participation in pogroms, and was equally silent about its participation in ethnic cleansings during 1943–1944 in Volhynia and eastern Galicia. Likewise, the murders of Jews carried out by UPA went unmentioned in this study.⁸⁴

Stepan Bandera: Stepan Bandera was born in the eastern Galician village of Staryi Uhryniv on 1 January 1909. He attended a Ukrainian high school in Stryi, and then took up the study of agricultural science in Lviv, which, however, he never finished because of his political and terrorist activities. He joined the UVO in 1927. After 1931, he was the head of propaganda and after June 1933, he served as the head of the homeland executive of the OUN. In this capacity, he decisively radicalized the activities of the OUN. He became well known as a result of the assassination of Polish Interior Minister Pieracki on 15 June 1934, which he helped to plan, and for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He escaped from prison in September 1939 and was named the *Providnyk* of the OUN faction that would carry his name. Remaining in the General Government, he prepared, together with other leaders of the OUN, including Shukhevych, the proclamation of the Ukrainian state of which he was to be the *Providnyk*. After the state proclamation of 30 June 1941, he was arrested, along with Stets'ko and other leading members of the OUN-B, and was held as a special prisoner in Berlin and Sachsenhausen until September 1944. Following his release, he continued to support the German war effort until February 1945. After the war, he stayed primarily in Bavaria. Together with other OUN exiles, and with the support of American, British, and West German intelligence services, he built an OUN-B center. On October 15, 1959, he was murdered in Munich by Bohdan Stashyns'kyi, a KGB agent.⁸⁵

The heroization of Bandera began as early as the 1930s and 1940s among young Ukrainians in West Ukraine. After the Second World War, it cooled a bit, but then really began to blossom after he had been murdered. Following his death, Bandera was transformed into one of the most important symbols of the Ukrainian “liberation struggle,” and his grave in the Munich Waldfriedhof became a central pilgrimage site for Ukrainian “freedom fighters.” Those OUN members living in exile, as well as veterans of the *Waffen-SS* Division “Galicia” and of the UPA, met there regularly on October 15 to honor the *Providnyk*. Paral-

84 Sviatomyr M. Fostun, *Vin zhytyme u vikakh...*, in: *Ukrains'ka Dumka*, October 12, 1967, p. 1. See John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945*, New York 1955.

85 See David Marples, *Stepan Bandera. In Search of a Ukraine for Ukrainians*, in: Rebecca Haynes/Martyn Rady (eds.), *In the Shadow of Hitler. Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York 2011, pp. 227–44.

lel to this, the Ukrainian diaspora would also honor Bandera on the date of his death, celebrating religious-nationalist memorial services every year in over fifty different cities in various countries of the West. He was remembered as a martyr who – like Shukhevych – had died for Ukraine. Admirers established a museum for him in Nottingham in 1962, which was then in 1978 moved to London, where his personal belongings as well as his death mask and a bust were placed on display. In 1962, a set of monuments with busts of Bandera, Shukhevych, Ievhen Konovalets, and Simon Petliura was unveiled at a youth vacation camp for the Ukrainian diaspora in Ellenville in upstate New York. During summer vacation, Ukrainian boy scouts – often the descendants of the political émigrés who left in 1944 – sang patriotic songs in front of this heroic ensemble, recited heroic and nationalist poetry, performed folk dances, and fortified themselves with traditional Ukrainian dishes. In all of these rituals and in all of the diaspora's publications, the subject of the Jewish genocide in which Bandera and his faction of the OUN were involved was left out. Connecting Bandera to the Holocaust was understood as an anti-Ukrainian provocation.⁸⁶

Nationalists in the German Concentration Camps: The fact that OUN-B members were kept as prisoners in German camps was a central element to the memory and identity of the Ukrainian diaspora, especially in the 1980s. Serving as a backdrop to their imprisonment was the conflict sparked by the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941. In July and August 1942, forty-eight members of the OUN-B were sent to Auschwitz I as political prisoners, followed by an additional 130 who were imprisoned in October 1943. Over thirty of these prisoners died in the camp. Altogether, several hundred members of the OUN were sent to concentration camps as political prisoners.⁸⁷

Auschwitz began to play an extraordinarily important role in the life of the Ukrainian diaspora during the Cold War. Those OUN-B members who were imprisoned in Auschwitz became the most recognized representatives and speakers of the diaspora. One example is Petro Mirchuk, an important member of the OUN propaganda machine, who was in Auschwitz from July 1942 to January 1945, and who later wrote hagiographies of leading OUN-B members and published numerous books on the Ukrainian “liberation movement.”⁸⁸ Mirchuk was also

⁸⁶ See Rossoliński-Liebe, *Celebrating Fascism*, pp. 7–12; idem, *Stepan Bandera*.

⁸⁷ See Adam Cyra, *Banderowcy w KL Auschwitz*, in: *Studia nad faszysmem i zbrodniami hitlerowskimi 30* (2008), pp. 388–402; Franziska Bruder, “Der Gerechtigkeit dienen.” Die ukrainischen Nationalisten als Zeugen im Auschwitz-Prozess, in: *Irmtrud Wojak/Susanne Meinel* (eds.), *Im Labyrinth der Schuld. Täter – Opfer – Ankläger*, Frankfurt a.M./New York 2003, p. 138.

⁸⁸ See Petro Mirchuk, *Akt vidnovlennia Ukraïns'koï Derzhavnosti 30 chervnia 1941 roku. Iioho geneza ta politychne i istorychne znachennia*, New York 1952; idem., *In the German Mills of*

active in Jewish-Ukrainian organizations that regarded Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust as Soviet propaganda and argued for reconciliation through forgetting. In his book detailing his trip to Israel, he tells of showing the tattooed number he had received in Auschwitz to historians from Yad Vashem in order to convince them that Ukrainians, and especially Ukrainian nationalists, had been persecuted and killed by the Germans just as the Jews had been.⁸⁹

The subject of OUN-B members in Auschwitz was also presented in the London Bandera museum. To this end, the curators used the drawings of Petro Balei, another OUN-B member who had been imprisoned in Auschwitz. The drawings and their accompanying text suggest that Ukrainian nationalists were the primary group of victims in Auschwitz. Because of their constitutive significance for Ukrainian identity, they were featured in many nationalist publications.⁹⁰

Activists of the Ukrainian diaspora would wear the striped concentration camp prisoner uniforms at anti-Soviet events, especially in the second half of the 1980s. This form of protest was reinforced in response to the Canadian Deschênes Commission, which searched for war criminals, and also by the first Demjanjuk trial, which took place in Israel in 1987. A few days after the Deschênes Commission publicly declared its goals in May 1985, over six hundred activists of the diaspora appeared in Ottawa to demonstrate for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners who were being held in the Soviet Union. Eight students wearing replica concentration camp uniforms stood in a row in front of the Canadian Parliament and read from various texts that referred to the condition of Ukrainian prisoners in the Soviet Union. One important demand was the release of Yuriy Shukhevych, the son of Roman Shukhevych, who had been, with only brief interruptions, held in prison since 1948. The eight students were chained together, and introduced themselves using the names of notable Ukrainian Gulag prisoners and dissidents: Levko Lukyanenko, Danylo Shumuk, Ivan Kandyba, Yuriy Shukhevych, Viacheslav Chornovil, Yaroslav Lesiw, Oles Budnyk, and Oksana Popovych.⁹¹ Their actions symbolically equated the experience of concentration

Death, 1941–1945, New York 1976; *Koly horiat' lis*, 1947; *My Meetings and Discussions in Israel (Are Ukrainians “Traditionally Anti-Semites”)*, New York 1982; *Narys istorii OUN*, Munich 1968; *Revoliutsiyni zmah za USSD: Khto taki “banderivtsi,” “mel’nykivtsi,” “dviikari,”* New York 1985; *Stepan Bandera. Symvol revoliutsiinoi bezkompromisovosty*, New York 1961; *Ukraiins’ka derzhavnist’, 1917–1920*, Philadelphia 1967; *Ukraiins’ka Povstans’ka Armiia 1942–1952*, Munich 1953; *Za chystotu pozytsii ukraiins’koho vyzvolnoho rukhu*, Munich 1955.

⁸⁹ See Mirchuk, *My Meetings and Discussions in Israel*, pp. 25–26.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Stefan Petelycky, *Into Auschwitz, for Ukraine*, Kingston 1999.

⁹¹ Danylo Shumuk was in fact a victim of the National Socialist regime. He was captured as a member of the Red Army but saved himself from starvation by escaping from the Khorol camp.

camp prisoners with those of Gulag prisoners, placing the victims of National Socialism and the Soviet Union on equal footing, while also publically calling attention to the Soviet Union's totalitarian character. After singing the Ukrainian anthem, the students marched to the Soviet Consulate, where they "prayed for the release of political prisoners" and once more sang the Ukrainian anthem.⁹²

The Rescue of Jews: The rescue of Jews by the UPA was another central motif of the Ukrainian diaspora's memory. Notwithstanding the political instrumentalization of this subject, it is important to note that an unknown number of Ukrainians did in fact help and save Jews despite the imminent danger of punishment meted out by the German occupying forces, the Ukrainian police, and the OUN-UPA.⁹³ A small, unknown number of Jews even managed to survive the Second World War with the UPA. These individuals, mostly doctors and nurses, usually remained with the UPA against their will, and were forced to treat UPA partisans. A number of documents, including the memoirs of survivors, the orders of OUN-B's intelligence services, and the testimonies of OUN activists found in NKVD interrogation records, indicate that the majority of the Jews in the UPA were murdered by functionaries of the OUN-B and UPA partisan groups shortly before or after the Red Army entered western Ukraine. Many of those who had survived with the UPA fled and joined the Soviet partisans and the Red Army. Their reports were in agreement that the UPA partisans, in addition to their vehement hatred of the Soviet Union, widely subscribed to genocidal nationalism and antisemitism, and that the UPA carried out ethnic cleansing against Polish populations and hunted down and murdered Jews who had hid themselves in the forests.⁹⁴

To demonstrate otherwise, Petro Mirchuk published the fake autobiographical report "Alive Thanks to the UPA" in 1957 under the name of Stella Krentsbakh in the volume edited by himself and V. Davydenko, *A Collection of Reports from Former Soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*. The account begins with the statement, "the reason that I am alive today and can devote all of my energy to the state of Israel is thanks only to God and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army." The "doc-

⁹² "In support of Ukrainian political prisoners, Deschenes Commission continues probe," in: *Ukrainian Echo*, May 22, 1985, p. 1. For a similar event, see "Za zvil'nennia Iurii Shukhevycha," in: *Homin Ukraïny*, April 9, 1986, pp. 1–2.

⁹³ As of January 1, 2014, Yad Vashem has recognized 2,472 Ukrainians who saved Jews as "Righteous Among the Nations." See <http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp>. This number is the lowest estimate for the number of rescue cases.

⁹⁴ See also Himka, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust*; Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, pp. 217–23; Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, in: Friedman/Friedman/Baron (eds.), *Roads to Extinction*, pp. 187–89; also see Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka*, p. 296; Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, p. 256.

ument” tells the story of a Jewish woman born in a small town seventy-five kilometers from Lviv, who, while attending high school, began to “hate the enemies of Ukraine and love its friends.” During the Second World War, she became a “member of the heroic UPA,” surviving among people who “do not divide people into races, but rather, into honest and dishonest people.” After the war, Krentsbakh went to live in Israel “in order to serve this state.”⁹⁵ The Ukrainian diaspora relied heavily on this “autobiography,” forged by Mirchuk, during the Cold War to prove that the UPA saved Jews and was not hostile toward them.⁹⁶

Conclusion

To this day, the Ukrainian diaspora’s memory of the Holocaust has not been thoroughly researched, even though the subject is essential for gaining an understanding of the problems that Ukraine has faced since 1990 in its attempts to come to terms with its history and erect a pluralistic state identity. The political émigrés who left the country in 1944 with the German occupying forces, lived in DP camps, and were later resettled in other countries, developed a memory narrative during the Cold War that strongly resembled the politics of remembrance that is practiced today by various nationalist and right-wing extremist organizations and parties in western Ukraine, and which was popularized by President Viktor Yushchenko during his time in office from 2005 until 2010. An analysis of the Ukrainian diaspora’s memory culture shows that its discourse of memory has been strongly anchored in the propaganda and self-understanding of the OUN and UPA, given that many of the actors had been leading members of the OUN – men such as Lebed, Ianiv, Stets’ko, and Bandera. It was their interpretation of history that prevailed in the diaspora, and then later in Ukraine. Aside from the fact that a considerable number of these figures were involved in the mass violence perpetrated by the OUN and UPA, and that all of them knew about the Jewish genocide and other crimes, such as the ethnic cleansing of Poles, the narrative that they propagated seems to have served as a protective shield in the ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union and for political status in their new places of residence.

Research on the Ukrainian diaspora’s memory of the Holocaust was first made possible by new empirical research into the Second World War and the

⁹⁵ Krentsbakh, *Zhyvu shche zavdiaky UPA*, pp. 342–43, 345–46, 349.

⁹⁶ See Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust*, p. 25.

Holocaust in Ukraine. This research included in its analysis reports and memoirs of survivors, and did not rely as heavily on the documents left by German and Ukrainian perpetrators, as was the case, until recently, with most of the Holocaust scholarship in Germany and, to some degree, in North America. The expansion and improvement of research methods permitted historians to trace which aspects of the war and the “heroic liberation struggle” were not remembered. They also allowed us to better understand why references to the pogroms or other atrocities that were committed by Ukrainian nationalists or police provoked such strong reactions within the Ukrainian diaspora and also among some historians.

One reason that research into the memory of the Holocaust in the Ukrainian diaspora was delayed is that Ukrainian émigrés, from the beginning, did not understand the Holocaust to be part of their history and identity. On the one hand, the Holocaust was marginalized, while on the other, Ukrainians presented themselves as victims of Jewish capos in the concentration camps. The process of remembrance revealed continuities as well as discontinuities. Among the most important of the continuities was the tendency toward heroization and victimization, as well as a portrayal of the OUN and UPA as an unparalleled, heroic liberation movement that had formed the core of Ukrainian resistance against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. But the act of remembrance also adapted itself to contemporary political discourses of the Cold War, referring to questions such as the use of nuclear weapons, which the Ukrainian exiles integrated into their own discussions about resistance, believing that their political activities would prove useful in a future nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

An important transformation in the memory of the Ukrainian diaspora was brought about by the movie “Holocaust,” which confronted émigrés with Ukraine’s participation in the Holocaust. This reinforced a paradigm of victimization within the commemorative discourse, mainly through the instrumentalization of the famine of 1932–1933 in the Soviet Ukraine, which provided Ukrainian émigrés with the opportunity to present themselves as a group that had already suffered more before the Second World War than the Jews suffered during the war itself. Similarly, the Demjanjuk trial and the activities of the Deschênes Commission affected the self-understanding and the self-portrayal of members of the Ukrainian diaspora, who portrayed themselves at political demonstrations as victims through the use of Holocaust symbols.

The memory narrative in which Ukrainians appeared as heroes and victims, but not as perpetrators, was, from a political perspective, advantageous to the nationalist factions of the Ukrainian diaspora during the Cold War. At the same time, however, it was also disastrous for the process of coming to terms with Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust and collaboration with the Germans. This narrative protected the identity and self-understanding of the Ukrainian émigrés

and their children, who knew their fathers as tragic but courageous heroes. The ritualization of this deeply rooted political memory was very important. Through regularly held religious-nationalist celebrations, the Ukrainian exiles reassured themselves that their portrayal of history was both generally accepted and indispensable for attaching oneself to the tradition of the “liberation struggle” and for carrying forward the war against the “occupiers of Ukraine.” Even though the actors lived in different parts of the world, they formed a coherent community of memory that cultivated a common view of the history of the Second World War, and that suppressed any mention of Ukrainian participation in the genocide of the Jews.

