
THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE

New Sources and Perspectives

Conference Presentations

UNITED STATES
HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL
MUSEUM

CENTER FOR ADVANCED HOLOCAUST STUDIES

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UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM
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This conference highlighted the historical research on the Holocaust in Ukraine, including discussions of new sources of documentation. Topics included perpetration, collaboration, and local reaction; documentation, physical evidence, and testimony; the history, responses, and resistance of Jews and other victim groups; and aspects of historical memory and representation. The conference was jointly organized by the Mémorial de la Shoah, Paris; the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC; Yahad-In Unum: Catholics and Jews Together, Paris; and the Center for Central European History of the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne.

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Opening Remarks

Dear colleagues, survivors of the Holocaust, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to the opening of this very special conference on the Holocaust in Ukraine. The conference is the result of a unique institutional partnership between the Mémorial de la Shoah, Yahad—in Unum and the Catholic Church, the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne, and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Exceptional sponsors—the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Deanie and Jay Stein, the Morris Family Foundation—added strong financial support to the resources of the organizing partners. This broad cooperative effort is built on a number of intellectual pillars:

- 1) The belief that it is critical in both memorial and intellectual terms to study the Shoah, in particular aspects of the Shoah that have not been adequately explored up to now, and to present the results of new research to scholars and the general public;
- 2) The belief that the Shoah is much more than frightening history; it is history that continues to affect the way in which we live today; what happened 65 years ago is directly relevant to our lives today in a world rife with genocide and stained by continuing, virulent antisemitism; we continue to experience the direct consequences of the Shoah and to confront problems for which understanding the Shoah may help provide solutions; in short, we continue to live Holocaust history today;
- 3) The belief that no event illustrates so clearly the danger—to Jews, Christians, and others—of unchecked antisemitism and the racial, ethnic, and religious hatred that its acceptance can unleash;
- 4) The belief that there is among human beings a shared set of values regarding relationships that are cornerstones of what we call civilization—values that have emerged from the Judeo-Christian tradition (the Abrahamic tradition, to be even more appropriately inclusive) and that have been transformed over centuries into the fundamental values of our civilization, whether expressed in religious or secular terms and whether enunciated through popular custom or from the heights of our most distinguished intellectual centers and institutions;

5) And the belief that studying the Holocaust can help us appreciate in a uniquely powerful way the importance of defending those common values—and the immense cost of failing to do so.

Our goal over the next two days is to memorialize, to understand, and to stimulate. To come face to face with the facts of mass murder, not as theory or as macro-history, but at ground level, and to remember the victims. To explore the potentialities of all human beings, illustrated so graphically in the Ukraine during the Holocaust—the potentiality to be perpetrators; to be victimized; to look away and consider what happens in your presence to be only someone else’s business; all too rarely, to act selflessly or nobly; or, since we continue to live this history, to give and take testimony, even if decades later, so that truth might prevail. And to stimulate further scholarly research, further teaching about the Shoah in university settings, and greater emphasis on the steps necessary to ensure that we are able to educate the next generation—the first that will mature in the absence of Holocaust survivors and other eyewitnesses—about the Shoah. Thank you very much.

Paul A. Shapiro

Director

Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

THE 1941 POGROMS AS REPRESENTED IN WESTERN UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND MEMORIAL CULTURE

Delphine Bechtel

Following the publication of Jan T. Gross's book *Neighbors*,¹ a vast movement to uncover the forgotten history of the first days of Nazi occupation in northeastern Poland was launched by dozens of historians and researchers from the Polish Academy of Science (PAN), the Institute for National Memory (IPN), and Polish universities at large. The resulting analyses and interpretations,² as well as the archival sources on which they were based, were widely discussed over several years in a national debate that was given broad coverage in the media. Today most of Polish society has gone through the process of confronting the darker chapters of its past, and, except for the voice of the right wing (expressed, for example, by the highly visible Radio Maryja), no one seriously denies that pogroms took place.

Since 2003, I have been pursuing similar research regarding the former southeastern territories of the Second Polish Republic—that is, the province of Eastern Galicia, today part of western Ukraine. The *yizker-bikher* (Jewish memorial books) devoted to these places contain a wealth of information about these local forms of violence, but they were long ignored except for a few articles published in Poland.³ Numerous testimonies and memoirs are preserved in the archives of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw and at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, but these have rarely been taken into account by local historians. Even more so than in the West, the topic remained for years largely unresearched, and was passed over in silence in Ukrainian émigré academic circles and society. After the Orange Revolution and under the Yushchenko presidency, a more radical school of historians emerged in Western Ukraine. These historians, whose emphasis was on vindicating a resolutely nationalist historiography and rehabilitating the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), managed to extend their influence even to the capital. This paper addresses these areas of silence, dissimulation, and diversion in academic writing in Ukraine and in their (non)commemoration in public spaces, such as monuments and museums, in the former eastern Galicia.

BACKGROUND: THE UKRAINIAN POGROMS OF SUMMER 1941

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, pogroms took place in virtually every Galician town or village, from the capital Lemberg/Lwów/L'viv to provincial towns such as Złoczew/Zolochiv, Tarnopol/Ternopil, Żółkiew/Zhovkva, Drohobych/Drohobycz, Borysław/Boryslav, Brzeżany/Berezhany, Sambor/Sambir, Stryj, Kolomyja, Obertyn, and others, as well as in dozens of villages and hamlets in which the Jewish population was simply wiped away by its peasant neighbors.

The pogroms broke out with extreme violence. Perpetrators used household or agricultural tools such as bats, axes, sickles, and sticks with razor blades to kill at random any Jew they encountered. Although in some places only men or professionals (lawyers, doctors) were targeted, in others, women, elderly people, and even children were attacked. The violence took place during the last days of June and during July 1941, in several waves: simultaneous with or even before the arrival of the German troops; during the “prison actions” (after the discovery of prisoners massacred by the NKVD just before the Soviet withdrawal); during several actions aimed at humiliating and beating down the local Jewish population; and finally in late July during the “Petliura days,” when the Nazis offered the Ukrainian populace an opportunity to avenge the assassination of the Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura by a young Jew in Paris in 1926. The acts of violence and murder were associated with the looting of the Jews’ property, the burning of synagogues, and the widespread abuse of Jewish women. They occurred with or without the presence of the occupying forces: Germans participated only in about half of the incidents, even if in some instances—such as in Zolochiv—they played a major role.⁴

The pogroms often, though not always, took place following the discovery of earlier NKVD massacres in the local prisons: only half of the towns and none of the remote villages had an NKVD office. If massacres by the NKVD were indeed discovered, Jews were randomly pulled out of their houses and brought to dig up the mass graves, retrieve and clean the corpses—sometimes they were forced to lick them or drink the filthy water that had been contaminated by the corpses—then beaten to death with various instruments and buried on the spot, in the same mass graves they had just helped empty of the NKVD’s victims. Witnesses attest that most pogroms took place with the active participation of local Ukrainian elites (clergymen, mayors, pharmacists, lawyers, students) who sometimes played a leading role. The expeditionary groups (*pokhidni grupy*) that came in with the Wehrmacht and the

Ukrainian auxiliary police formed under German control also took part. Unlike at Jedwabne, most of the perpetrators were not Poles, but Ukrainians. For the most part, Poles kept away from the pogroms or are mentioned as occasional participants. Later testimonies identified most of the perpetrators of the pogroms as “Ukrainian nationalists” or simply as “the Ukrainians.” The German invaders’ attitude toward Ukrainians appeared strikingly different from their attitude toward Poles: German collaboration with the Ukrainian nationalist movement had begun in the 1930s and intensified in 1939 with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees who had settled in western Poland after the Soviet invasion.

THE BEGINNINGS OF WESTERN UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY: “WHITE PAGES” OR DARK CORNERS?

After years of Soviet silence, local Ukrainian historians started to address these pogroms only with difficulty. Some Ukrainian immigrant circles in Canada, the United States, and Germany had been active for decades in trying to suppress the topic and reacted to any testimony about Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence with virulent diatribes against what they dismissed as “Jewish propaganda.”⁵ Although interesting research, most of it by scholars of Jewish origin, began to appear in central and eastern Ukraine (Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv), historians from Western Ukraine continued to address the topic awkwardly. Many in the older generation, such as Yaroslav Dashkevych or Volodymyr Serhiichuk,⁶ continue to reflect a traditional point of view. The leading L’viv historian Yaroslav Hrytsak changed this situation in 1996 with the publication of his widely read textbook on the history of Ukraine.⁷ That work was the first to include chapters on the Nazi invasion of Ukraine and on collaborationism. He also penned subsequent essays, some of which were published in Poland.⁸ Some of his research had been included that same year in a special issue of the L’viv-based journal *Yi* devoted to the Jews in Ukraine—a pioneering choice made by the editor, Taras Vozniak. Two years later, in 1998, Zhanna Kovba, another L’viv historian, published *Liudianist’ u bezodni pekla* (Humanity in a Bottomless Hell), and in 2004, Yevhen Nakonechny, a L’vivian who had witnessed the events in question as an adolescent, published his memoirs of Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish relations in occupied L’viv, *Shoa u L’vovi* (The Shoah in L’viv).⁹

Before going into a deeper analysis of these three early works, it is important to note that they constitute the very best of the literature produced in western Ukraine, and

that their authors have been praised for their courage in addressing the difficult issue of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Hrytsak even claims to have been scorned as a “vile Judeophile.” Although these early works have been followed by a wave of far more dubious publications, in themselves they are not yet consistent with Western standards of scholarly research. They are marred by what has been perceived as rampant Ukrainocentrism and apologetic tendencies, and as prejudice against Poles, Russians, and Jews. They seem to reflect a belief in essentialism, with individuals seen through the prism of collective group psychology.

One is struck by the problematic and repeated use of particular rhetorical devices, such as the concept of “balance” (for instance, equating Ukrainian antisemitism with “Jewish Ukrainophobia”)¹⁰ and the exaggeration of the extent and political influence of “Ukrainophobia” among Jews around the world. This supposed Jewish Ukrainophobia is sometimes taken as a starting point for antisemitism among Ukrainians.¹¹ One example is the repeated reference to the CBS television program *The Ugly Face of Freedom*, which aired in 1994 and presented Ukrainians in general as collaborators, as an example of purportedly Jewish-led anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the United States.¹² Other rhetorical devices include relativization and asymmetry: although the three authors do admit that pogroms occurred, in the next few sentences they minimize the significance of those atrocities by stressing several examples of Ukrainians who saved Jews. By using marginal examples of positive behavior by individual Ukrainians, they counterbalance the recognition that Ukrainians did participate in pogroms or in the Holocaust. A similar form of relativization is the frequent reference to the decades-old statistics introduced by Stefan Possony on the proportion of war criminals among the total population of each country of occupied Europe,¹³ according to which Ukraine had only three collaborators per 10,000 people—allegedly the lowest rate in Europe.¹⁴ Finally, some of the authors do at times cross the line into denial of one or more elements of the pogroms, claiming, for example, that the “Petliura days” simply did not take place¹⁵; they make this claim on the grounds that they have found no Ukrainian witness who would acknowledge remembering them.

Some of the authors also use justification, explaining away collaboration in mass murder as a provocation staged by the Nazis.¹⁶ That is, participation was a way for the collaborators to save themselves¹⁷ in a wartime context, or was a “response” to Jewish collaboration with the Soviets and particularly the NKVD.¹⁸ Another tactic is to devalue the opinions of researchers who hold different views, introducing them with the expressions “according to some sources,” “according to Israeli sources,” or

“according to Jewish researchers.” The suggestion is of course that opposing views are necessarily biased when their authors are Jewish.¹⁹

The question of Ukrainian responsibility in the pogroms is never clearly addressed. The pogroms are attributed either to the “Gestapo” or to the so-called “scum” (*shumovynnia*), described as consisting mostly of Poles.²⁰ Taking a wider view, the ultimate responsibility for the pogroms is ascribed to the Germans, the Soviets, or even the Jews themselves: according to this last view, the Ukrainians only “responded” to Soviet atrocities, pogroms did not occur but were simply a part of Nazi propaganda, Jews had joined in the NKVD, and therefore revenge was justified.²¹

In this respect Kovba’s *Liudianist’ u bezodni pekla* is of particular interest. Her announced goal is to illuminate the “white pages” (unwritten pages) of history, by which she means not Ukrainian collaboration, but the rescue of Jews by thousands of Ukrainians who were for the most part not recognized as Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem. She explains away all evidence of the willing collaboration of OUN leaders with the Nazis regarding the extermination of the Jews.²² The book is infused with a dichotomized vision of the moral struggle between Good and Evil that took place, according to Kovba, in Galicia during the war: the “Good” being the joint community of all three ethnic groups of the Galician population (Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles, but characterized in very caricatured ways) against the “Evil” of the Soviets and the Nazis lumped together. Kovba’s study, consisting of a few dozen interviews with unrecognized Ukrainian “rescuers” of Jews, leads her to the following grandiloquent statistical conclusion: “out of 10 Ukrainians, 7 did help the Jews.”²³ She concludes that the inhabitants of Galicia, “Poles and Ukrainians,” united by their “Christian ethics, love for their neighbors and responsibility before God,” fought together “against the extermination of Humans—the Jews.”²⁴ This self-congratulatory work, which seemingly aims solely to defend Ukrainian honor, overlooks the scholarly confrontation with Ukrainian participation in the pogroms and in the Shoah more broadly.

THE POLITICS OF SELECTIVE COMMEMORATION

Following these early publications, which at least raised the question, local authorities and historians in Western Ukraine have taken a more radical stance and have begun even to rehabilitate local nationalists and Nazi collaborators, transforming them into national heroes.²⁵ This process was followed by many municipal museums, starting with the well-known L’viv History Museum located in the “Black House” on the Old Market square. The rooms that once celebrated Soviet partisans have gradually been

turned into a display of extremist nationalists and sometime war criminals. Among those individuals and groups featured are the theoretician Dmytro Dontsov, the OUN leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, and collaborationist units including Bataillon Nachtigall and the expeditionary groups (*pokhidni grupy*) that entered Galicia in June 1941 with the Wehrmacht; the Ukrainian Insurrectional Army (UPA), which was responsible for ethnic “cleansing” actions against Poles and Jews in Volhynia and Galicia; and the Division SS-Galizien, formed of Ukrainian volunteers under Nazi command. After several years of reconstruction, the new exhibit prepared by Volodymyr Boyko reopened in 2006 under the name “Struggle of the Ukrainians for Liberation and Independence.” During the remaking of these rooms, a number of gradual shifts took place: the Bataillon Nachtigall was renamed under its Ukrainian appellation, “Division of Ukrainian Nationalists” (DUN), and the Division SS-Galizien appears now as “Ukrainian Division Halychyna (Halychyna being the Ukrainian equivalent of Galicia) or simply “First Ukrainian Division.” Strangely, the initials *SS* have disappeared, and on the uniforms exhibited, the particular insignia and stripes of the *SS* have been removed, making the costume appear “neutral” instead of recognizable as belonging to German units (the catalog describes the display as a “reconstruction”).²⁶ Ukrainian heroism and the struggle for independence are placed in the foreground, whereas collaboration is never addressed. The recent changes, however, clearly indicate the direction of revisionism: collaboration is being obfuscated. This is all the more blatant as the history of the Jews and Poles, who formed the majority of the citizens of the prewar city, is not even mentioned. Similar exhibits are now to be found in most Galician towns, including Brody, Drohobych, Stryj, and Zhovkva.

This shift is the protracted result of a long-running policy of the local authorities and city councils all over Galicia since Ukrainian independence in 1991. Beginning in the 1990s, the municipalities started renaming streets, building monuments, and placing memorial plaques for “heroes” linked with the OUN. In L’viv a whole area of the city has seen streets named after OUN and UPA leaders such as Stepan Bandera, Evhen Konovalets, Taras Shchuprynka (Roman Shukhevych), and Andrei Melnyk. Plaques and statues have been erected in symbolic places of the area: for example, the bas-relief and text to the memory of OUN leader Roman Shukhevych was placed on the wall of the last Polish-language high school, on the street that bears his *nom de guerre* (Shchuprynka): an obvious provocation for the Polish minority of the city.

In the same area of L’viv, near the St. Elisabeth church, a gigantic Bandera memorial, reminiscent of fascist or Stalinist architecture, has recently been completed.

Stepan Bandera has long been the object of a particular cult in Galicia, constituting a provocation for Ukraine's central and eastern provinces, where the anniversary of the Great Patriotic War and the engagement of the Soviet partisans against Nazi Germany still symbolizes local heroism, and where the *Banderivtsi*, Bandera's partisans, are considered war criminals.²⁷ In 2007 the festivities centered on Shukhevych, who led Bataillon Nachtigall into the city in German uniform in 1941: the hundredth anniversary of the birth of the OUN leader was marked by a series of official commemorative events. The Historical Museum hosted a memorial exhibit about his life; called "Freedom and Ukraine: The Motto of Roman Shukhevych," it presented mostly private family pictures showing a good family man and a loyal Ukrainian. Hagiographical works on Bandera and Shukhevych are being sold in the streets along with the usual antisemitic literature and paraphernalia: OUN and UPA badges, insignia, and swastikas.

The invention of new heroes and martyrs finds its pinnacle in the memorial complex inaugurated in 2007 at the Lychakiv cemetery in Lviv. To dominate the cemetery for the Polish defenders of Lwów in 1918–1919, local authorities conceived a huge mausoleum, comprising several massive columns recalling the "freedom fighters" from 1918–1919 and 1941–45, among them the battalion Nachtigall and the SS-Galizien (under their Ukrainianized, neutral names). The latter is commemorated by the grave of an unknown soldier—the only one in the world dedicated to the memory of a soldier of the SS.²⁸

While extremist nationalists, war criminals, and collaborationists are being heralded as heroes and martyrs, the places where pogroms against Jews took place seem to be simply forgotten. In L'viv, the site of the former prison on Zamarstinivska Street where the NKVD committed the massacres in June 1941 has been marked by a huge memorial showing a Christ-like figure in the shape of a tortured and crucified martyr. Behind, two enormous memorial plaques are inscribed with the names of hundreds of victims; the plaques also bear this caption: "Between September 1939 and June 1941, in western Ukrainian prisons, 48,867 people were killed. 1,738,256 were deported to Siberia. In the prisons of the L'viv oblast, during 6 days of 1941, 7,348 prisoners, Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, were shot." Aside from these inflated numbers, the plaques are adorned with three symbols (Ukrainian trident, Polish eagle, and the Star of David, the last showing signs that someone attempted to erase it), suggesting a community of fate for the three ethnic groups of the city. No word, however, is said about the dreadful pogroms that took place in the very same prison when the Germans

opened the mass graves of NKVD victims and allowed the Ukrainian police and local population to target local Jews for revenge, and to torture and kill hundreds of innocents.

On the site of the “Tiuurma na Lontskoho,” the Łacki Street (now Bandera Street) prison where Soviets committed massacres that were followed by a pogrom in 1941, the “Memorial Museum Dedicated to Victims of Occupational Regimes” was opened in 2009 under the direct supervision of Ukrainian National Memorial Institute (NMI). The exhibition, in which Ukrainians are presented as victims of both totalitarian regimes and never as perpetrators, was prepared by employees of the Research Centre for the Liberation Movement and directly supported by the State Security Services of Ukraine.

Similar memorials can be found in provincial towns in Galicia. In Brody, a recently constructed memorial links all NKVD prison massacres in Galicia in a chain of Ukrainian martyrdom, but remains silent about the pogroms that took place a few days later in the same places. In the castle and former prison of the city of Zolochiv, where similar massacres and pogroms occurred, the L’viv city museum, of which the castle is a component, decided in the early 2000s to renovate the existing Chinese pavilion, and open an exhibition of oriental arts in the hope of attracting foreign visitors. In the cellars of the former prison, an exhibit on the local NKVD crimes opened as early as 2001, with elegiac texts about Ukrainian martyrdom, but no mention of the tragic fate of the local Jews. The director, Boris Voznitsky, acknowledged in a 2001 interview that he knew about the pogroms. But he attributed those atrocities solely to the Germans, who, according to him, rounded up Jews, forced them to dig up the corpses of recent victims, and then shot the Jews on the spot. About Ukrainian participation in locating the Jews in the town, chasing them through the streets and beating them to death, he did not say a word. When I suggested the necessity of commemorating the Jewish victims of the city as well, he ascribed the absence of such a monument to “internal disagreements within the Jewish community,”²⁹ refusing to deal with the unwillingness of most Ukrainian authorities to represent a history that they do not consider “theirs.” This tendency continues even now in Western Ukraine, widening the gap with other regions of the country, the more so now that the right-wing nationalist party Svoboda, which makes a point in drawing a continuity with OUN-UPA, has gained in political influence in elections in regional councils in Lviv and Ternopil as well as nationwide.³⁰

THE RADICALIZATION OF UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 2005–2010

Under President Yushchenko, there has been a gradual shift in Ukrainian historiography, politics, and commemoration of the past. That shift has coincided with the rise of a new, radical school of historians in Ukraine. In 2005, Yushchenko called for new research on the activities of OUN-UPA during the War. In the same year, he created the Ukrainian National Memorial Institute (NMI), which was tasked with investigating the Great Famine of 1932–33 and evaluating its status as a genocide, but also with researching the activities of OUN-UPA during the war.³¹ After the rehabilitation of Shukhevych at the end of 2006, the academician Ihor Yukhnovskiy, director of the NMI, asked his historians to focus on Stepan Bandera. Historical research by that time was increasingly directed by state-led institutions: the NMI, the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (established in 2002 in L'viv and directed by the young historian Volodymyr Viatrovych), and the Security services (SBU), which controlled access to the relevant archives. The question of disproving the participation of OUN-UPA leaders and men in anti-Jewish massacres or the Holocaust loomed very large, it seems, in the research priorities of the government.

In November 2007, Yushchenko traveled to Israel and paid a visit to the Yad Vashem memorial, an experience that led him to intensify the commemoration of the Holodomor and to implement methods of commemoration of the genocide that mimicked those in use at the Israeli memorial (lighting candles, planting trees).³² His visit also appeared to be aimed at proving to Israeli historians Shukhevych's innocence. At the same time, Volodymyr Viatrovych, the director of the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement, linked the "Legend around Nachtigall" to a 1959 Soviet attempt to discredit the Adenauer government by exposing the past of then-Minister for Refugees and Expellees Theodor Oberländer, who had been the German liaison officer of the battalion Nachtigall.

During Yushchenko's visit to Yad Vashem, Council Member Yosef Lapid asserted that Shukhevych and the entire Battalion Nachtigall had been guilty of massacres. Viatrovych then made the journey to Yad Vashem himself, and asked to see the "Nachtigall and Shukhevych file." The director of the archives, Haim Gertner, responded that Yad Vashem had collected no such dossier; testimonies were scattered throughout the archives and first needed to be collected and evaluated.³³ Viatrovych returned triumphantly to Kiev, announcing that Yad Vashem held no "Nachtigall file" and concluding that the leaders in question, and thus OUN at large, were innocent.³⁴

As the SBU declassified more and more archival materials, the apparent goal of nationalist historians seemed to shift toward demonstrating that the Ukrainian national movement had been defamed for decades on the basis of documents entirely forged by the Soviets. In 2008, Oleksandr Ishchuk, a historian working in the State archives of the SBU, claimed to have uncovered documents that in his eyes would preclude the possibility of OUN participation in the pogroms. According to this supposed chronicle of the OUN's activities in March–September 1941, the Nazis had invited the Ukrainian elites at the beginning of 1941 to launch a pogrom, but the OUN leadership formally forbade its members to indulge in what they saw as a provocation.³⁵ This was precisely the kind of document that national historians needed to rehabilitate the memory of the OUN-UPA. In a sharp study, the Canadian historian John-Paul Himka called the reliability of this document seriously into question. The quote was probably truncated; it was also dated from after the first pogrom, and possibly even written or re-written after 1943, when the OUN issued an order to gather documentation so as to show that the Germans and not the Ukrainians were responsible for the pogroms.³⁶ The document was most likely a fake, but it was widely publicized as the proof that exonerated the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Yushchenko could now continue his politics of legitimizing and making heroes of war criminals. Two years later, a few days before leaving office, he bestowed the posthumous title of Hero of Ukraine on Stepan Bandera.

CONCLUSION

Although there are a number of monuments to the memory of the Shoah in western Ukraine, all were erected with private funds. To my knowledge, nowhere in Galicia is there a plaque commemorating victims of the Ukrainian pogroms. It is ironic that the exhibits at the Zolochiv castle and at the museums in L'viv and Brody present several pictures showing victims of the NKVD and those of the pogrom lying almost side by side, but there are no captions to explain what is shown. In Drohobych the memorial to the nationalist leader Stepan Bandera stands in the middle of a park that extends over the perimeter of the former ghetto, which is left unmarked.

The extermination of the Jews and the culpability of Ukrainian nationalists seem to disappear into a black hole of collective amnesia. In Western Ukraine, to this day, it appears that this memory is suppressed so as not to compete with the narrative of national martyrdom. That narrative serves as a basis for the unification of the Ukrainian

nation, seen as twice victim of the Soviet power—once during the *Holodomor* (Great Famine) in the 1930s and a second time during the massacres perpetrated by the NKVD in 1941.

Will a new generation be more open to confronting past? Nothing seems more remote. Although the defeat of the Orange coalition at the elections in 2010 has put the Party of Regions back in power, and some of the most controversial decisions of President Yushchenko (such as awarding the title of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych) have been repealed, no serious progress has been made in local historiography. The Svoboda party and OUN supporters have been able to prevent any scholarly debate on Bandera in Kiev without triggering any reaction from the government.³⁷

It is telling that one of the few articles on this topic penned by a Ukrainian citizen was published back in 2005 by a graduate student, Sofia Grachova, under the title “Did They Live Among Us?”³⁸ The youth of this researcher, her intellectual honesty, her roots in Eastern Ukraine, and the fact that she had worked for years as an assistant to Omer Bartov help explain how this author came to pen the first widely available article to seriously question Ukrainian historians on this subject. She analyzed the weaknesses of some of the previous research and called on her Ukrainian colleagues to exercise “collective moral responsibility,” a plea that constituted a major milestone in Ukrainian popular consciousness about coexistence between Ukrainians and Jews. One can only agree with her assertion that: “When the memory of the dead is not honored and people continue to bow before criminals as if they were heroes, ‘we’ [Ukrainian civil society] are held responsible for it.” I similarly expressed the strong wish that one day, not far off, either the Zolochiv castle massacres or the Zamarstinivska Street pogrom will be openly discussed in a public debate in which the entire Ukrainian nation will participate—an exchange that would become the “Ukrainian Jedwabne.”³⁹

NOTES

- ¹ Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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- ⁵ See Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, “Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton. The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada,” *Kakanien Revisited*, 29 December 2010, available online at www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/GRossolinski-Liebe2/?page=2&alpha=r (accessed 21 December 2012); Per A. Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths,” *Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies* 2107 (21 December 2011).
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- ⁸ Jarosław Hrycak, “Stosunki ukraiñsko-żydowskie z post-radzieckiej historiografii ukraiñskiej,” in *Historycy polscy i ukraiñscy wobec problemów XX wieku*, ed. Piotr Kosiekiewski and Grzegorz Motyka (Cracow: Universitas, 2000); Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za nationalizmom* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004).
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¹⁴ Hrytsak, *Narys*, 239, n76.

¹⁵ Hrytsak, *Narys*, 238; Kovba, *Liudianist'*, 238; Nakonechny, *Shoa u Lvovi*, 6.

¹⁶ Kovba, *Liudianist'*, 74–79; Nakonechny, *Shoa u Lvovi*, 108.

¹⁷ Hrytsak, *Narys*, 232.

¹⁸ Kovba, *Liudianist'*, 74; Nakonechny, *Shoa u Lvovi*, 108, 143.

¹⁹ Hrytsak, *Narys*, 237–38.

²⁰ Nakonechny, *Shoa u Lvovi*, 122, 125; Kovba, *Liudianist'*, 78; Hrytsak, *Narys*, 240.

²¹ Hrytsak, *Narys*, 232–39; Nakonechny, *Shoa u Lvovi*, 143.

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²³ Ibid., 255.

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²⁶ Volodymyr Boyko, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba Ukraïny u viys'kovykh pam'yatkakh 1914–1950 rr.* (L'viv: Historical Museum, 2007).

²⁷ Several monuments to the victims of UPA have been erected in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea.

²⁹ Interview with Boris Voznitsky at the Zolochiv castle, Summer 2001. See also the Web page: <http://www.castles.com.ua/?zolocow> (accessed February 20, 2013).

³⁰ In the local elections in 2010, Svoboda obtained between 20 and 30 percent of the votes in former Galicia and one-third of the seats on the municipal council in L'viv.

³¹ In 2006, a law was passed that qualified the Holodomor as genocide and condemned any questioning of this classification. The term "Holocaust" is used in Ukraine for the massacre of Ukrainians at the hands of the Soviets, equating these crimes to the genocide of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis. More recently, the concept of a "double Holocaust" surfaced in Ukraine, as well as in Lithuania and Latvia, often leading to a competition of victimhood and to an inflation of numbers. The number of victims of the genocide of Ukrainians is often quoted, including by President Yushchenko, as 10 million.

³² "Yushchenko laid path in commemoration of Holodomor victims," *forUm*, November 26, 2007, <http://en.for-ua.com/news/2007/11/26/175430.html>; "Holodomor commemoration marks breakthrough," *Kyiv Post*, November 29, 2007, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/holodomor-commemoration-marks-breakthrough.html?flavour=mobile> (accessed February 20, 2013).

³³ Author's interview with Haim Gertner, 2007,

³⁴ Volodymyr Viatrovych, "Yak tvorylasya lehenda pro Nachtigall," *Dzerkalo tyzhnya* no. 6 (16 February 2008); and "The end of the legend about Nachtigall," *Den'*, April 5, 2008. Yad Vashem responded in a press release of March 19, 2008: http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/pressroom/pressreleases/pr_details.asp?cid=180 (accessed February 20, 2013).

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³⁶ John-Paul Himka, "True and False Lessons from the Nachtigall Episode," *Brama*, March 19, 2008, http://www.brama.com/news/press/2008/03/080319himka_nachtigall.html (accessed February 20, 2013).

³⁷ Per A. Rudling, Jared McBride, "Ukrainian Academic Freedom and Democracy under Siege," *The Algemeiner*, <www.algemeiner.com/2012/03/01/ukrainian-

academic-freedom-and-democracy-under-siege/>, March 1, 2012, accessed August 21, 2012.

³⁸ Sofia Grachova, “Vony zhyly sered nas?” *Krytyka* no. 4 (2005).

³⁹ Delphine Bechtel, “De Jedwabne à Zolotchiv,” 92.

VISUAL HISTORY ARCHIVE INTERVIEWS ON THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE

Crispin Brooks

“In those days, death was a way of life.”

—Milton Turk, a survivor from Sernyky, Ukraine¹

There has been a marked increase in the study of the Holocaust in Ukraine in recent years as new resources have become available to researchers. Although it used to be the case, as Karel Berkhoff states in *Harvest of Despair*, that “[Jewish] survivor[s]’ accounts are very rare” and “there seems to be no account by a Romani survivor from Ukraine,”² the newly accessible audiovisual interviews of the USC Shoah Foundation’s Visual History Archive go a long way toward addressing this situation. This paper aims to give a sense of the scope, nature, and relevance of this collection in the hope that it can significantly assist historical research and shed light on the Holocaust in Ukraine as experienced by its eyewitnesses.

While audio recordings of Holocaust witnesses’ statements began to be collected virtually as soon as World War II had ended (e.g., by David Boder), videotaping started in earnest in 1979, with the Yale Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies. In April 1994 film director Steven Spielberg established the Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation (now the USC Shoah Foundation—The Institute for Visual History and Education) to preserve on videotape the firsthand accounts of surviving Holocaust victims (Jews, Roma, political prisoners, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, survivors of Nazi eugenics policies) and other witnesses (rescuers, liberators, participants in war crimes trials). By 2001, the USC Shoah Foundation had recorded nearly 52,000 audiovisual testimonies in 56 countries and 32 languages.

In Ukraine alone, the USC Shoah Foundation conducted more than 3,400 interviews over four years, 1995–1999. Although it is not the only organization to have interviewed Holocaust witnesses in Ukraine, the extent of its interviewing made this collection an “unprecedented survey.”³ Some 57 interviewers were sent to 268 locations all over the country (see Appendix 1). Local Jewish organizations provided lists of Holocaust survivors, and additional names were found during the interview

process. Most of the interviews were scheduled in advance and conducted at an arranged time. Occasionally, in very obscure villages, USC Shoah Foundation representatives knocked on doors and asked residents if they knew of any Holocaust survivors or rescuers in the area. In addition to facing technical difficulties such as limited electricity schedules in smaller towns, interviewers found that, at that time in Ukraine, many Holocaust survivors were still afraid to talk about their pasts. Encouraging them to talk at all was a major challenge.⁴

The full Ukrainian collection, though, is much larger and reveals a story of emigration. Approximately 10,000 Visual History Archive interviewees were born in what is today Ukraine,⁵ meaning that, by the time of their interview, almost two-thirds had emigrated to Israel, the United States, or other countries. The emigration occurred in three waves: the first immediately after the war, the second in the 1970s, and the third in the early 1990s. Hence, this collection was gathered in 45 different countries and is in 23 different languages (see Appendix 2A). As a rule, interviewees hailing from pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine gave their interviews in Russian;⁶ those from Galicia and Volhynia spoke in English, Hebrew, or Polish, and only occasionally in Russian; and those from Carpathian Ruthenia in English or Hebrew, with a handful in Rusyn (Ukrainian). Interviewees who remained in Ukraine after the war usually spoke Russian (see Appendix 2B). Most of the collection consists of interviews with Jewish survivors and with far smaller numbers of rescuers and Roma survivors; however, because Ukrainian was rarely a language of first choice for Jews, the proportion of rescuers among the Ukrainian-language interviews is higher (see Appendix 2C). Each interview is on average 2–2.5 hours long and typically follows the same pattern. Interviewees chronologically recount their prewar, wartime, and postwar experiences. (Discussions of prewar and postwar life often are lengthy and detailed.) At the end of the testimony, interviewees showed photographs and documents, and family members were introduced on camera; occasionally there were also walking interviews to mass grave sites and locations of former ghettos.

As with all the interviews, the Ukrainian testimonies have been digitized and indexed minute by minute, considerably facilitating the process of looking through the many hours of video material. Researchers can explore sections of interviews for a huge range of historical, geographical, and other subjects; there are, for example, indexing terms for 340 ghettos in what is today Ukraine (see Appendix 3). The Visual History Archive, then, is a collection of digitized audiovisual interviews accompanied by a searchable electronic index describing the places, time periods, people,

organizations, events, activities, and actions discussed in the interviews. (Appendix 4 shows selected indexing terms relating to Ukraine.)⁷

Although the Visual History Archive is based at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, a growing number of institutions worldwide also have access to the entire archive on a subscription basis via Internet2. Among these is the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.⁸ The public internet version of the Visual History Archive has the same searchable data and a selection of interviews viewable (approximately 1,100 of the 52,000 total).⁹ As part of its tolerance education work worldwide, the USC Shoah Foundation has used its testimonies to produce a documentary film on the Holocaust in Ukraine—*Nazvy svoie im'ia* (Spell Your Name, 2006), directed by Serhii Bukovs'kyi—and a multimedia educational guide, *Nazustrich pam'iaty* (Encountering Memory), intended for 14- to 18-year-old students.¹⁰

Because of the Visual History Archive's size, there are often numerous interviews referring to a single place, even a relatively obscure one, making it possible to piece together a fairly complex narrative of events in that place, capturing nuanced descriptions and expressions of diverse opinions often unrecorded elsewhere. For example, among the 20 or so accounts of the arrival of the German forces in Ozaryntsi, a village and shtetl near Mohyliv-Podil'skyi, survivor Lazar' Lozover recalls how his grandfather and another man went to meet the invading army with bread and salt, as was the custom.¹¹ Viewing his and other accounts, we learn that the Jewish population of Ozaryntsi was rounded up by the Germans and Ukrainian police into one of the synagogues used by that time only as a kolkhoz (collective farm) warehouse—while the able-bodied men were selected “for work” and led away (later, *kolkhozniki* gathering the harvest came across the corpses of the men, around 30 in all, covered in flies).¹² Although all those crowded into the stiflingly hot synagogue believed they were going to be blown up,¹³ they were, in fact, released. Returning to find their homes looted (either by the local police or by local civilians, depending on accounts), most survivors from Ozaryntsi express their outrage. One survivor, though, is more conciliatory, explaining that he somewhat understands the locals' actions: the peasants had always been extremely poor, had nothing, and thought the Jews were gone.¹⁴ Ozaryntsi subsequently came under Romanian control, and deportees from Bessarabia began to arrive; the recorded perspectives of 16 local Jews who lived in the ghetto can be compared with the accounts of eight of the newly arrived Bessarabian Jews.

The testimonies have much to say on the collaboration of some Ukrainians in the events of the Holocaust. The role of the local police in anti-Jewish actions is

described in detail. For example, Simon Feldman remembers when 10 men, including his father, were arrested and later shot by local police in Boremel (western Rivne oblast):

The reason they kept them, they said, was because they were communist or communist-inspired. On Friday afternoon, that particular day, which was two or three weeks after the invasion, they took my father out and nine other men to the Polish church, *kościół* ... behind, and they shot all ten of them. And the ones that did the shooting, and the ones that did the arresting, and the ones that carried out these atrocities were not Germans. This was the local Ukrainian police. I'm sure that it was under German orders or with the German sanction. But they did it. They killed [them]. The first ten people that they killed, for no reason whatsoever, they just took them out. And then one of the Polaks that used to work for us came Friday night, knew we were gathered, were very sad. We were hoping that it didn't happen but basically knew that it did. Everybody heard the shots. When they arrested my father, it wasn't Germans who arrested; it was two Ukrainians who came with pistols. And my father was sitting in the bedroom of my grandfather's house, and we all were kind of concerned. I really didn't understand what was happening. And these two Ukrainians came for "Ios'ka," and they took my father to that cellar. And basically the reason they said they took him was to make sure that the Jewish population didn't start anything, and, as soon as it was over, they would let him go.¹⁵

Testimonies show that, while the Ukrainian police could be fairly lax guarding the ghettos and could be bribed, they were often extremely brutal when it came to implementing the liquidation of the ghettos.¹⁶ Although their overall portrayal is overwhelmingly negative, there are occasional instances of a member of the local police giving assistance to Jews. One interviewee was helped by his friend who served in the police in Buchach.¹⁷ Another reports that a Ukrainian policeman, a friend of her father, transported her family on his cart from Murovani Kurylivtsi to Romanian territory in return for the family's remaining possessions.¹⁸

A similar picture emerges of the local administrations established under German occupation. Iulii Rafilovich, a survivor from Bar, a village in Vinnytsia oblast that fell into *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, recalls that members of the intelligentsia were drawn to these roles:

The Ukrainians mostly had a narrow outlook. They didn't get involved—"none of our business." Many were sympathetic. But there were many beasts—the police in particular—and all these beasts rose to the surface. This was especially true of the intelligentsia. I went to the second school, a Ukrainian school. My class teacher Kulevepyrk ... became the head of the *uprava*. The history teacher became the editor of the fascist newspaper, *Bars'ki visti*. Zinaida Ivanovna, the Ukrainian language teacher, became some big shot. And, of course, they treated the Jews terribly.¹⁹

Evidently, there were those who abused their position of authority. In Pavelky (Zhytomyr oblast), one survivor was regularly beaten by the *starosta* (a mercenary man), who blamed Jews for his 10-year imprisonment.²⁰ Other testimonies, suggesting “practical” motivations, describe what happened in locations after the Jews were gone. For example, after the massacres in Tomashpil’, the Ukrainian starosta (who commandeered the maternity building for his own house) ordered the Jewish houses dismantled and demolished for firewood, which was in short supply that winter; he then hired a surviving Jewish woman to cook for him, thus protecting her.²¹ Nevertheless, some testimonies indicate that there were those who were sympathetic to the Jews,²² or at least so uncomfortable with the bloodshed that they tried to offer some help.²³

The testimonies contain much discussion of the activities of Ukrainian nationalists in various areas of Ukraine. Interviewees from the Khust region recall the short-lived proclamation of independent Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939, before the Hungarians assumed control there. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the nationalists were encountered farther east. A survivor from Sernyky (northern Rivne oblast, close to the Belorussian border), for example, recalls nationalist activists arriving in the village ahead of the German advance:

I remember before that killing, there was three Ukrainians ... because Germany promised Ukraine independence, three Ukrainians came to town, to the marketplace. And mostly Jews and some Ukrainians were there gathering. And they had speeches. They were all uniformed with guns, and they had the Ukrainian insignia on their hats. I remember it like now, it was like a yellow fire, camp fire. They were having speeches, speeches. But the only [part] that still now is vivid in my mind: in Ukrainian, “Kill *zhydiv* (Jews), *liakhiv* (Poles), and communists!” And take over their factories and whatever they have. I’ve had many nightmares, it’s like now I’m standing there listening to that. One was saying all the speeches and two, one on each side, standing. So we sort of knew what to expect.²⁴

After the three activists left, a group of Ukrainians from outside Sernyky killed a number of Jewish men including the survivor’s uncle and cousin and other relatives.²⁵ Connections between the German-appointed police and the main Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary organization are also confirmed. For example, a survivor from Hodovychi (Volyn oblast) reports that most Ukrainian *politsai* left to join the *Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia* (UPA), with only the most committed ones remaining behind.²⁶ Judging from most accounts, members of the UPA, the *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv* (OUN), and related groups in West Ukraine were extremely hostile toward the Jews, usually violently so, and are implicated in conducting an ethnic

cleansing campaign against the region's remaining Jews and Poles especially.²⁷ Some interviews maintain that they ceased killing remaining Jews sometime in 1943,²⁸ but the return of Soviet forces to the areas with a strong nationalist presence seems to have caused the UPA to liquidate many of the Jews working for them.²⁹ On rare occasions, interviewees related that Jews were sheltered by OUN-UPA, although this was often when the people in question were posing as non-Jews.³⁰ A number of Jewish survivors witnessed the 1943–1944 Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia, whether as onlookers³¹ or occasionally as participants, usually on the Polish side;³² the postwar OUN-UPA insurgency against Soviet authorities is also discussed.³³ Needless to say, there are complex issues surrounding the Ukrainian nationalists, local police, and administrations. The interviews cited here, only a fraction of the total dealing with these subjects, indicate the typical experiences and viewpoints expressed in the testimonies.³⁴

At the same time, the active involvement of some Ukrainians in Jewish survival is also a major theme. The USC Shoah Foundation conducted 413 interviews with rescuers in Ukraine, more than in any other country. Some of the rescuers have been recognized by Yad Vashem, but most have not. Occasionally, the archive contains the interviews of both the rescuer and the rescued. Many survivors talk about being hidden by Ukrainians. Sometimes, in fact, a single survivor may have been helped by several different individuals or families on different occasions—such were the prerequisites of survival. On rare occasions, family members of policemen or local officials would provide help.³⁵ All manner of motivations are offered for giving help: perhaps simply out of humanity, perhaps because it was an opportunity to make money. In many cases, religious convictions were an important factor. Lidiia Pavlovskaia, a Baptist, talks about why her family and neighbors hid Jews in Boiarka (Rivne oblast):

My father had always taught us and himself believed that Jews were God's people. And we as evangelical Christians were God's people, too. So the people who came were like brothers to us. Thus, we had to hide our brothers. We were all in danger of capital punishment, because they would kill all of us [had they found the Jews]. My father, though, believed God would protect us.³⁶

In some testimonies from Galician survivors, the role of the Greek Catholic Church, and in particular that of Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts'kyi, is highlighted. The mother of Edward Harvitt, for instance, was helped by two non-Jews in L'viv to get an appointment with Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, and as a result they received false documents.³⁷ Another survivor, Faina Liakher, was hidden by the church and later converted and became a nun.³⁸ Kurt Lewin relates that his father, the chief rabbi in

L'viv, knew Sheptyts'kyi before the war and that their relationship helped him be placed in various monasteries. About the monks sheltering Lewin, he notes:

- Some [monks] were [antisemitic] ... They didn't like Jews.
- Did they know you were Jewish?
- Yes.
- Were you ever betrayed, or did you think you would ever be betrayed?
- No ... no. You see, the fact they liked or disliked Jews had nothing to do [with it]. They resented the fact Jews were being killed. They resented the bestiality, and they tried to help. Because they felt, within their limited circumstances, they couldn't in their conscience sit quiet on the sidelines. Some objected to having Jews in the monastery, quite openly ... They said so. They said the community was being endangered. But they never betrayed a Jew, you see, never interfered with it.³⁹

There are also rescuer interviews with several Ukrainian Orthodox Christians,⁴⁰ Baptists,⁴¹ Pentecostals,⁴² Piatidesiatniki,⁴³ Seventh-Day Adventists,⁴⁴ and Muslims.⁴⁵ Not only were those with strong religious convictions motivated to help; at least 15 Ukrainian rescuers in the archive are professed atheists.⁴⁶

The Visual History Archive contains a particularly significant collection of about 3,500 interviews with Transnistria survivors, whose stories have been relatively undocumented in the past.⁴⁷ From both prewar Romania and Ukraine, these survivors recount the massacres conducted by the Germans and the Romanians, the involvement of the local police, the typhus epidemic in the region, the relations and rivalries between the Romanian deportees and the local Jews, the role of bribery in survival, and the transport of Jewish orphans from Transnistria to Palestine, among other topics. One of the unique aspects of this experience is what we have termed the “Romanian colony.”⁴⁸ Unlike purpose-built camps or areas of larger settlements demarcated for Jews (ghettos), these “colonies” typically were unused farm buildings where groups of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jews were deposited—sometimes left virtually unguarded—on the outskirts of villages and towns or in remote locations. Iuliia Oklander, a survivor from Rybnitsa (today in Moldova), discusses one such colony outside an unnamed village to which the Romanians marched her in 1941:

Finally they brought us to a place. It was fenced in, and they forced us in there. It was a kolkhoz building or cattle shed—that kind of place on the outskirts of a village. And there was a barn or something, some kind of structure, because people would shelter there from the rain. But basically everyone was outside, under the burning sun. Peasants would pass by, on their way to work to bring in the harvest, to scythe. They took pity on us and would try to throw us a piece of bread ... they [the guards] didn't permit it. In the evening, when they were

coming back from work, they would quietly throw us something under the fence, and we children would go and get it.⁴⁹

Currently the archive has records of at least 16 camps and 75 ghettos in Transnistria. Colonies are referenced in more than 300 testimonies (the number of different colony locations is not recorded), and it may well be that the Visual History Archive interviews are virtually the only sources of information on their existence.

Two other regions of Ukraine are of special interest, the first being Carpathian Ruthenia, modern-day Zakarpattia oblast, which was annexed by Hungary during the war and which the Germans subjected to the full force of the “Final Solution” in 1944. Although more than 2,300 of the archive’s interviewees were born there, only 91 interviews were recorded in the region, in Russian or Ukrainian (Rusyn). Second, a number of interviews relate to the Holocaust in Crimea; these include the 152 conducted there.⁵⁰ Of particular interest here are the interviews with Krymchaks who managed to survive the mass shootings. In addition, a handful of interviews with Karaites were conducted in Crimea. On the evidence of these interviews, the Germans initially did not know what to do with the Krymchaks and the Karaites but ultimately decided the former were Jews and the latter were not. Obviously, this variation in German policy had a profound impact on these communities. The Karaites in Crimea were apparently safe from the wave of massacres that destroyed the region’s Ashkenazi and Krymchak Jewish populations. In some cases, half-Jewish–half-Karaite interviewees were able to survive by acquiring papers stating they were Karaites.⁵¹ Another survivor, of mixed Krymchak-Crimean Tatar heritage, survived the war by living as a Crimean Tatar. In 1944, after liberation, the NKVD deported her along with other Crimean Tatars to Central Asia.⁵²

Because of the rarity of Roma survivors, the Visual History Archive’s 135 interviews with them conducted in Ukraine are particularly important. They are quite different from those of Jewish survivors. On one count, it is harder to point to consistent German policy regarding the Roma; some interviewees describe surviving massacres or being interned in ghettos and camps, while others seem to have lived under occupation comparatively untouched. On another count, the Roma testimonies can be harder to follow, in part linguistically, in part because interviewees are sometimes less precise about places and times. That said, these interviews offer valuable insights into the fates of numerous Roma communities. The following excerpt is from the testimony of Bairam Ibragimova, a Muslim Roma survivor from Kherson oblast:

My father and we suffered the same way in the war. Whatever happened to him, happened to me ... and to the other children, too. We suffered, we didn't see a thing. And the Germans tormented us, there's no other way to say it. They dug a pit about this big. They put the children and the adult Gypsies. They gave the kids something, something to smell, and the kids fall in. They killed some, wounded others. And they covered them with earth and the earth breathes like this.

- Where did this happen?

- This was in Khrestovka, Chaplinka district ... in Kherson oblast.

- You saw this?

- Of course. How could I tell you if I didn't see it?

- How did it happen, what happened?

- So, how did it happen ... They gathered all the Gypsies, whoever they had captured wherever, and rounded them all up. And they dug this small pit, so it was deep enough. And they put the children around the pit, gave them something to smell, they fall in. They shoot the adults. Some they killed, some they wounded. And they covered them.

- Where were you all this time? Did you witness this?

- We were hiding the whole time. They wanted to capture us too, but my father gathered us and we escaped to the steppe and hid in haystacks.⁵³

Other major topics in the Ukrainian testimonies include Soviet prisoners of war (there are at least 250 interviews of Soviet-Jewish POWs who hid their identity), those involved with the partisans in Ukraine (approximately 800 interviews), the recruitment of *Ostarbeiter* (about 100 interviews with Jews who were deported to work in Germany using Ukrainian papers and a small number with non-Jewish Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter*), Babi Yar witnesses,⁵⁴ and NKVD investigations of suspected collaborators in Ukraine after the Soviet reoccupation.⁵⁵

In the last twenty or so years, Holocaust history has moved into the “era of the witness” (to borrow from Annette Wieviorka), with testimonies of various kinds being increasingly integrated into the historiography. The USC Shoah Foundation’s archive contains the most extensive collection of Holocaust witness audiovisual testimonies ever gathered and is a rich source of material for historians of World War II Ukraine in particular. This is not to say, of course, that these interviews are a fully comprehensive source or that they should be treated uncritically. But it is to suggest that—in conjunction with documents in German archives, Soviet Extraordinary State Commission reports and witness statements, war-crimes trial materials as well as a range of other testimonies and records—they should be considered an indispensable source. In some cases, the Visual History Archive interview may be the only source of information on a particular place or subject. Furthermore, as both a visual and sonic

medium, audiovisual testimonies have a capacity to convey the expressions, emotions, psychology, and language of Holocaust witnesses and to bring history to life in a unique way. It is to be hoped, then, that our work has enabled eyewitnesses of the Holocaust to convey their experiences to future generations and, in doing so, contribute significantly to the understanding of what happened in Ukraine during World War II.

NOTES

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¹ Milton Turk, interview code 1979, segment 65; *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, accessed June 2009 (hereafter VHA).

² Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 62, 59.

³ Boris Zabarko, ed., *Holocaust in the Ukraine*, trans. Marina Guba (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), xxvi.

⁴ Anya Yudkivska (formerly the USC Shoah Foundation's regional coordinator in Ukraine), e-mail message to author, August 25, 2007.

⁵ That is, not only the Soviet republic of Ukraine but also former parts of eastern Poland, eastern Czechoslovakia, and northern Romania.

⁶ Some of these testimonies are in fact in a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian (*surzhyk*), but they are usually listed as Russian.

⁷ For access instructions for the USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, see <http://libguides.usc.edu/vha>.

⁸ For the list of places with access to the full Visual History Archive as well as locations of subcollections of interviews, see <http://dornsife.usc.edu/vhi/testimoniesaroundtheworld/>.

⁹ The online Visual History Archive can be accessed at <http://vhaonline.usc.edu/>.

¹⁰ See the USC Shoah Foundation's Ukrainian Portal at <http://dornsife.usc.edu/vhi/ukrainian/>.

¹¹ Lazar' Lozover (interview code 40581, segment 37, VHA).

¹² Liba Lozover (interview code 23829, segment 26, VHA).

¹³ *Ibid.* (segment 25); Iosif Menishen (interview code 39324, segment 11, VHA).

¹⁴ Boris Khandros (interview code 26745, segment 65, VHA).

¹⁵ Simon Feldman (interview code 28387, segment 17, VHA).

¹⁶ For example, Aron Baboukh (interview code 26557, segments 71–73, VHA). It should also be noted that the testimonies paint an extremely negative picture of Ukrainian guards outside Ukraine, in ghettos and camps in Poland and Germany especially. Survivor Jack Honig notes that conditions even improved for prisoners when the SS took over from the Ukrainians in the Mielec labor camp in 1943 (interview code 18869, segment 26, VHA)

¹⁷ David Ashkenaze (interview code 38119, segments 69, 73, VHA).

¹⁸ Riva Goikhman (interview code 47296, segments 46–52, VHA). A different perspective is expressed by Ivan Bogach, who served in the local police, having infiltrated as a Soviet partisan (interview code 40375, segments 40–42, VHA). A similar situation is recounted secondhand by rescuer Pavel Mikitenko (interview code 41255, VHA).

¹⁹ Iulii Rafilovich (interview code 19351, segment 41, VHA).

²⁰ The starosta's wife, however, called the victim to their house and gave him food. She also asked her husband to release him: Grigorii Tsarovskii (interview code 45330, segments 80–81, VHA).

²¹ Dora Goldiak (interview code 41031, segments 60–62, VHA).

²² For example, Shifra Ganzburg (interview code 26971, segments 49–52, VHA).

²³ For example, Elizaveta Khorunzhaya (interview code 104, segments 50–51, VHA).

²⁴ Milton Turk (interview code 1979, segments 38–40, VHA).

²⁵ Ibid. (segments 36–37).

²⁶ Dmitrii Omelianiuk (interview code 36160, segment 171, VHA).

²⁷ Emil Goldblaten, (interview code 7722, segments 62–63, VHA): “When there was the action [in Mizoch in 1942], they ran away from our town—many, many young Jewish people and girls—into the woods. Our woods—no German soldier had the courage to go to our woods. All the people were killed by the Banderovtsy, the Ukrainians. They killed them all.” Max Grosblat, (interview code 11957, segments 40–41, VHA): “The Bulbovtsy, they were the same kind of group [as the Banderovtsy] but different leaders ... They were two different groups, but they were all Ukrainians. And they were all trying to clear out the [Dubno] area free of Jews. They kept on attacking

us in the woods.” Boleslaw Kornatowski, (interview code 32895, segments 79–80, VHA), a survivor from Stepan’, recalls: “In early spring [1943], the Ukrainian militia were running into the woods and created their own nationalistic terroristic bands like Bandera, Bulba, and maybe other names. And their policy was to kill anybody who was not Ukrainian. So they were killing Polish people, Polish villagers, Jewish remainders. They were against the Germans, too, but all the rifles, arms, they stole from the previous stations where they were serving first before.” Anna Grosberg (interview code 39448, segment 85, VHA) remembers that the Ukrainian sheltering her in Ivanivka (Ternopil Oblast) refused to allow Banderites to take her to sew for them and reports that the Banderites killed all the other Jews they took.

²⁸ Semën Velinger (interview code 44509, segment 113, VHA); Joseph Grossman (interview code 40248, segment 24, VHA). Mark Brandman (interview code 2709, segments 83–84, VHA) reports that Jews were approached by Ukrainian partisans for help in 1943 near Murafa.

²⁹ Rochelle Gelman (interview code 38038, segment 25, VHA) relates that “Jewish boys” used by the “Ukrainian guerillas” in Volhynia to fight the Germans were killed when the Soviets approached. In January 1944 Emil Goldblaten (interview code 7722, segments 65–68, VHA) was discovered in hiding by Banderites but managed to escape after overhearing their plans to kill him. Vasilii Mel’nichuk (interview code 46709, segments 156–157, VHA) reports that in 1943–1944: “UPA-Banderovtsy” shot three Jews they had captured in Vlasyntsi (Lanivtsi raion, Ternopil Oblast) because they feared the Jews would betray them to the Soviets; they then demanded that Mel’nichuk admit he was Jewish but left abruptly as the front neared.

³⁰ See Miron Demb (interview code 30123, Russian, segments 134–137, VHA); Simon Feldman (interview code 28387, segment 32, VHA); Arkadii Fishman (interview code 43260, segment 42, VHA); Joseph Grossman (interview code 40248, segments 28–29, VHA); Anna Kavalerchik (interview code 50760, segment 140, VHA); Kirill Kindrat (interview code 37436, segments 61–64, VHA); Faina Liakher (interview code 45446, segments 113, 143, 185, 200, VHA); Etká Lustman (interview code 41399, segments 78–100, VHA); Berta Müller (interview code 8280, segments 42–43, VHA); and Max Sitzer (interview code 3685, segment 39, VHA).

³¹ For example, Beatrice Sonders (interview code 19902, segments 13–14, VHA); Jack Glotzer (interview code 20586, segment 14, VHA).

³² Hiding as non-Jews, some survivors fought with the Polish partisans, for example, Adam Gajlo (interview code 36896, segments 123–145, VHA); Chaim Koenig (interview code 43377, VHA); Roman Faber (interview code 44510, segment 19, VHA).

³³ For example, Mariia Sova (interview code 25905, segments 143–156, VHA); Riva Semeniuk (interview code 29023, segments 128–139, VHA).

³⁴ It should be noted that the rather imprecise term *Banderovtsy* (“Banderites”) is common in survivor discourse, used not just for the Bandera wing of the OUN but also for Ukrainian nationalists of various stripes and even as a blanket term for any perceived Ukrainian collaborator. As with all historical documents, careful parsing of the testimonies and cross referencing with other sources is necessary.

³⁵ The mother of a Ukrainian policeman hid a survivor and his sisters (Igor’ Zal’tzman, interview code 21346, segments 86, 91, VHA); Emiliia Kessler was hidden in Khmil’nyk (Vinnytsia Oblast) by Vera Tarnavskaia, the sister of the chief of police (interview code 8048, segment 89, VHA).

³⁶ Lidiia Pavlovskaia (interview code 49671, segment 40, VHA).

³⁷ Edward Harvitt (interview code 44068, segment 17, VHA).

³⁸ Faina Liakher (interview code 45446, VHA). See also rescuer Mariia Gnativ (interview code 45044, VHA).

³⁹ Kurt Lewin (interview code 25423, segments 120–122, VHA). In the archive are interviews of twenty-one rescuers who list the Greek Catholic Church as their religious affiliation.

⁴⁰ In the archive, there are approximately 230 interviews with (Eastern/Russian) Orthodox Christians rescuers in Ukraine; some of the interviews specify the Kiev Patriarchate. Examples are those of Mariia Iermachenko (interview code 35776, VHA); and Viktor Hryhorenko (interview code 41371, VHA).

⁴¹ As well as Lidiia Pavlovskaia above, see also Iulian Bilets’kyi (interview code 50088, VHA); Mariia Bychkovskaia (interview code 43605, VHA); Fedor Kondratiuk (interview code 49528, VHA); and Maksim Vashchishin (interview code 47209, VHA); among others.

⁴² Mariia Blyshchik (interview code 49490, VHA); Liubov’ Ganovskaia (interview code 35539, VHA); Dariia Logatskaia (interview code 47350, VHA); Iakov Oshurko (interview code 45036, VHA); and Nikolai Oshurko (interview code 44962, VHA).

⁴³ Elena Glad’ko-Bondar’ (interview code 30805, VHA); Afanasiia Oshurko (interview code 49487, VHA); Vassa Samoilenko (interview code 46255, VHA); Nadezhda Shimchenko (interview code 43495, VHA).

⁴⁴ Eleonora Kalashnik (interview code 46988, VHA).

⁴⁵ Mirgazim Sabirov (interview code 37477, VHA); Alima Shatokha (interview code 45547, VHA).

⁴⁶ Mariia Chernetskaia (interview code 45570, VHA); Leonid Hrabovs'kyi (interview code 45850, VHA); Lina Shul'ga (interview code 34640, VHA); among others.

⁴⁷ The Transnistria testimonies are in different languages, predominantly Russian (2,906 interviews, or 84 percent); other languages include Hebrew, English, Romanian, Spanish, Ukrainian, and Portuguese. The USC Shoah Foundation interviewed Transnistria survivors in 28 countries, the majority in either Ukraine or Israel, but also in countries of North and South America, Western Europe, Asia, and Australia. At the time of their interviews, many of these Transnistria survivors were still living in the same areas of Ukraine (parts of modern-day Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, and Mykolaiv oblasts) and Moldova as they were during World War II. In some cases, survivors lived in the same city, town, or village.

⁴⁸ Vladimir Melamed, "Transnistria: A Penal Colony for Jews" (unpublished lecture, USC Shoah Foundation).

⁴⁹ Iuliia Oklander (interview code 32754, segments 35–36, VHA). Rachel Hersonsky describes the conditions in the disused barn in Tsybulivka (Vinnytsia oblast) in which she and about 2,000 Bukovinian deportees were left (interview code 432, segments 15–16, VHA).

⁵⁰ Mikhail Tyaglyy, a participant in the 2007 Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives conference in Paris, conducted 91 of the USC Shoah Foundation's interviews in Crimea.

⁵¹ For example, Savelii Alianaki (interview code 33342, VHA).

⁵² Betia Abras (interview code 33669, segments 32, 59–65, VHA).

⁵³ Bairam Ibragimova (interview code 49368, segments 4–6, VHA).

⁵⁴ For example, Raisa Dashkevich (interview code 8225, VHA). Shelia Polishchuk (interview code 23359, VHA) was helped by a non-Jewish woman in Kiev to avoid a German roundup for Babi Yar. As part of Sonderkommando 1005, Zakhar Trubakov (interview code 21778, VHA) was forced to burn corpses to conceal the mass shootings at the Babi Yar site in Kiev in 1943.

⁵⁵ For example, Nakhman Dushanski (interview code 32698, VHA).

Appendix 1¹

INTERVIEW LOCATIONS IN UKRAINE

The Shoah Foundation conducted a total of 3,425 interviews in Ukraine in 268 different locations. The largest numbers were recorded in Odesa (544), Kyiv (359), Vinnytsia (202), Chernivtsi (182), Mohyliv-Podil'skyi (162), Kharkiv (121), Zhmerynka (69), Kherson (65), Dnipropetrovs'k (62), Simferopol' (62), Sharhorod (58), Zaporizhzhia (50), L'viv (48), and Mykolaiv (46). The locations are listed here in their Ukrainian and Russian forms

¹ The information presented in the appendices was derived from USC Shoah Foundation Institute data in June 2009. Current data is subject to correction and refinement.

CHERKASY OBLAST

Buky (Buki)	1
Cherkasy (Cherkassy)	12
Horodyshche (Gorodishche)	1
Kam'ianka (Kamenka)	2
Katerynopil' (Katerinopol')	1
Kryvonosivka (Krivonosovka)	1
Shpola	1
Smila (Smela)	5
Uman'	23
Zolotonosha	1
Zvenyhorodka (Zvenigorodka)	1
TOTAL	49

CHERNIHIV OBLAST

Chernihiv (Chernigov)	28
Nizhyn (Nezhin)	4
Novhorod-Sivers'kyi (Novgorod-Severskii)	2
Oster	1
Pryluky (Priluki)	9
Shatura	1
TOTAL	45

CHERNIVTSI OBLAST

Chernivtsi (Chernovtsy)	182
Hlyboka (Glyboka)	1
Hlynytsia (Glinnitsa)	3
Kam'ianka (Kamenka)	1
Kel'mentsi (Kel'mentsy)	1
Khotyn (Khotin)	16
Nepolokivtsi (Nepolkovtsy)	1
Novoselytsia (Novoselitsa)	14
Putyla (Putila)	2
Stara Zhadova (Staraia Zhadova)	1
Storozhynets' (Storozhinets)	1
TOTAL	223

CRIMEAN REPUBLIC

Bakhchysarai (Bakhchisarai)	2
Feodosiia	21
Ialta	3
Ievpatoriia (Evpatoriia)	9
Kerch	27
Koreiz	1
Saky (Saki)	1
Sevastopol'	30
Simferopol'	62
TOTAL	156

DNIPROPETROVS'K OBLAST

Babaikivka (Babaikovka)	1
Dniprodzerzhyns'k (Dneprodzerzhinsk)	9
Dnipropetrovs'k (Dnepropetrovsk)	62
Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog)	23
Nikopol'	2
Novomoskovs'k (Novomoskovsk)	3
Zhovti Vody (Zhelyte Vody)	3
TOTAL	103

DONETS'K OBLAST

Donets'k (Donetsk)	41
Horlivka (Gorlovka)	16
Ienakiiievo (Enakievo)	3
Makeevka	2
Mariupol'	28
Torez	3
TOTAL	93

IVANO-FRANKIVS'K OBLAST

Chesnyky (Chesniki)	1
Dzvyniach (Dzviniach)	1
Ivano-Frankivs'k (Ivano-Frankovsk)	26
Kolomyia (Kolomiia)	4
TOTAL	32

KHARKIV OBLAST

Derhachi (Dergachi)	2
Kharkiv (Khar'kov)	121
TOTAL	123

KHERSON OBLAST

Beryslav (Berislav)	4
Bezvodne (Bezvodnoe)	1
Heniches'k (Genichesk)	11
Hladkivka (Gladkovka)	1
Kakhovka	6
Kherson	65
Kozachi Laheri (Kozach'i lageria)	2
Rivne (Rovnoe)	4
Skadovs'k (Skadovsk)	2
Tsiurupyns'k (Tsiurupinsk)	1
Velyka Oleksandrivka (Velikoaleksandrovka)	4
Vostochnyi	2
Vysokopillia (Vysokopol'e)	2
Zaozerne (Zaozerno)	1
TOTAL	106

KHMEL'NYTS'KYI OBLAST

Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi (Kamenets-Podol'skii)	20
Khmel'nyts'kyi (Khmel'nitskii)	22
Kubachivka (Kubachevka)	2
Polonne (Polonnoe)	8
Poninka	2
Shepetivka (Shepetovka)	6
Slavuta	10
Smotrych (Smotrich)	2
Stara Ushytsia (Staraia Ushitsa)	2
Starokonstantyniv (Starokonstantinov)	2
Tsvitokha (Tsvetokha)	1
TOTAL	77

KIROVOHRAD OBLAST

Haivoron (Gaivoron)	3
Kirovohrad (Kirovograd)	13
Oleksandriia (Aleksandriia)	5
Svitlovods'k (Svetlovodsk)	2
Zavallia (Zaval'e)	1
TOTAL	24

KYIV OBLAST

Bila Tserkva (Belaia Tserkov)	14
Boiarka	5
Borodianka	1
Bortnychi (Bortnichi)	2
Boryspil' (Borispol')	6
Brovary	8
Fastiv (Fastov)	5
Iahotyn (Iagotin)	2
Irpin' (Irpen')	8
Kyiv (Kiev)	359
Lub'ianka (Lubianka)	2
Nedra	1
Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi (Pereiaslav-Khmel'nitskii)	2
Petropavlivs'ka Borshchahivka (Petropavlovskaia Borshschagovka)	1
Rokytno (Rakitnoe)	1
Skvyra (Skvira)	1
Trebukhiv (Trebukhov)	2
Vorzel'	2
Vyshen'ky (Vishenki)	1
Zhytni Hory (Zhitnie Gory)	4
TOTAL	427

LUHANS'K OBLAST

Alchevs'k (Alchevsk)	7
Luhans'k (Lugansk)	16

LUHANS'K OBLAST

Pereval's'k (Pereval'sk)	1
TOTAL	24

L'VIV OBLAST

Boryslav (Borislav)	14
Drohobych (Drogobich)	5
L'viv (L'vov)	48
Rudne (Rudno)	1
Stryi	8
Truskavets' (Truskavets)	1
Zhovkva	2
Zolochiv (Zolochiv)	1
TOTAL	80

MYKOLAIV OBLAST

Kryve Ozero (Krivoe Ozero)	6
Mykolaiv (Nikolaev)	46
Pervomais'k (Pervomaisk)	8
Ternivka (Ternovka)	3
Voznesens'k (Voznesensk)	2
TOTAL	65

ODESA OBLAST

Anan'iv (Anan'ev)	3
Balta	34
Berezivka (Berezovka)	2
Bilhorod-Dnistrovs'kyi (Belgorod-Dnestrovskii)	6
Bolhrad (Bolgrad)	2
Illichivs'k (Ilichevsk)	3
Ivashkiv (Ivashkov)	2
Izmail	12
Kalantaivka (Kolontaevka)	1
Kodyma	9
Kominternivs'ke (Kominternovo)	1
Kotovs'k (Kotovsk)	5
Odesa (Odessa)	544
Poplavka	1
Reni	3
Savran'	4
Sofiivka (Sofievka)	3
TOTAL	635

POLTAVA OBLAST

Khorol	1
Kremenchuk (Kremenchug)	10
Lubny	1
Myrhorod (Mirgorod)	3
Poltava	13
TOTAL	28

RIVNE OBLAST

Dovhovia (Dolgovia)	1
Dubno	2
Dubrovytsia (Dubrovitsa)	2
Frankopil' (Frankopol')	1
Hoshcha (Goshcha)	1
Iurkovo khutor	3
Kostopil' (Kostopol')	2
Kvasyliv (Kvasilov-1)	1
Lypky (Lipki)	1
Mizoch	2
Mlynok	2
Mochulianka	2
Nevirkiv (Nevirkov)	1
Ostroh (Ostrog)	4
Ostukhov khutor	1
Ozhenyn (Ozhenin)	2
Radyvyliv (Radivilov)	1
Rivne (Rovno)	22
Sarny	4
Selets' (Selets)	3
Shubkiv (Shubkov)	2
Stepan' (Stepan)	1
Varkovychi (Varkovichi)	1
Velyki Telkovychi (Velikie Telkovichi)	1
Volodymyrets' (Vladimirets)	1
Zdolbuniv (Zdolbunov)	1
TOTAL	65

SUMY OBLAST

Konotop	5
Sumy	5
TOTAL	10

TERNOPIL OBLAST

Berezhany	1
Borshchiv (Borshchev)	1
Buchach	1
Chortkiv (Chertkov)	5
Klebanivka (Klebanovka)	1
Pidhaitsi (Podgaitsy)	1
Pidvolochys'k (Podvolochisk)	1
Strusiv (Strusov)	2
Ternopil (Ternopol')	21
TOTAL	34

VINNYTSIA OBLAST

Bar	19
Bershad'	18
Bratslav	4
Chechel'nyk (Chechel'nik)	4

VINNYTSIA OBLAST

Chernivtsi (Chernevtsy)	4
Derebchyn (Derebchin)	3
Dovhopolivka	1
Dubrivka	1
Dzhuryn (Dzhurin)	8
Dzyhivka (Dzygovka)	5
Haisyn (Gaisin)	13
Hnivan' (Gnivan')	11
Holod'ky	3
Honorivka (Gonorovka)	3
Horodkivka (Gorodkovka)	3
Hutsulivka (Chernivtsi raion, Vinnytsia oblast)	1
Iampil' (Iampol')	22
Illintsi (Ilintsy)	7
Kalynivka (Kalinovka)	5
Khmil'nyk (Khmel'nik)	23
Kirove (Kirovo)	5
Kopaihorod (Kopaigorod)	2
Kovalivka (Kovalevka)	1
Koziatyn (Kazatin)	2
Krasne (Krasnoe)	5
Kryzhopil' (Kryzhopol')	16
Ladyzhyn (Ladyzhin)	4
Lityn (Litin)	10
Lypovets' (Lipovets)	1
Mohyliv-Podil'skyi (Mogilev-Podol'skii)	162
Nemyriv (Nemirov)	16
Ol'hopil' (Ol'gopol')	3
Pishchanka (Peschanka)	4
Pohrebyshche (Pogrebishche)	7
Pysarivka (Pisarevka)	1
Rudnytsia (Rudnitsa)	1
Sal'nytsia (Sal'nitsa)	1
Selyshche (Selishche)	3
Sharhorod (Shargorod)	58
Shpykiv (Shpikov)	2
Teplyk (Teplik)	2
Tomashpil' (Tomashpol')	15
Trostianets' (Trostianets)	4
Tsybulivka (Nova Tsybulivka)	2
Tul'chyn (Tul'chin)	15
Tyvriiv (Tyvrov)	1
Udych (Udich)	1
Uladivka (Uladovka)	2
Vapniarka	3
Vapniarka Station	1
Vinnytsia (Vinnitsa)	202
Voronovytsia (Voronovitsa)	2
Zhakhnivka (Zhakhnovka)	1
Zhmerynka (Zhmerinka)	69
Zhornyshche (Zhornishche)	2
TOTAL	784

VOLYN OBLAST

Luts'k (Lutsk)	6
TOTAL	6

ZAKARPATTIA OBLAST

Berehove (Beregovo)	14
Bushtyno (Bushtino)	1
Khust	4
Mukacheve (Mukachevo)	28
Onokivtsi (Onokovtsy)	1
Storozhnytsia (Storozhnitsa)	1
Uzhhorod (Uzhgorod)	34
Veliatyno (Veliatino)	1
Velyki Luchky (Velikie Luchki)	1
Vynohradiv (Vinogradovo)	6
TOTAL	91

ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST

Berdians'k (Berdiansk)	2
Melitopol'	1
Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozh'e)	50
TOTAL	53

ZHYTOMYR OBLAST

Andrushivka (Andrushevka)	1
Berdychiv (Berdichev)	29
Chudniv (Chudnov)	3
Hul's'k (Gul'sk)	1
Ihnatpil' (Ignatopol')	1
Korosten'	7
Korostyshiv (Korostyshev)	2
Malyn (Malin)	1
Natalivka (Natal'evka)	1
Nova Chortoryia (Novaia Chertoriia)	1
Novohrad-Volyns'kyi (Novograd-Volynskii)	11
Olevs'k (Olevsk)	1
Ovruch	3
Terekhove (Terekhovaia)	2
Troianiv (Troianov)	1
Uzhachyn (Uzhachin)	2
Volodars'k-Volyns'kyi (Volodarsk-Volynskii)	2
Zakusilovka	1
Zhytomyr (Zhitomir)	22
TOTAL	92

Appendix 2

UKRAINIAN TESTIMONIES: BY BIRTHPLACE, INTERVIEW COUNTRY, AND LANGUAGE

2A. BIRTHPLACE: UKRAINE									
Experience Groups									
Language	Jewish survivors	Rescuers	Roma survivors	Liberators	Political prisoners	Misc.	Jehovah's Witnesses	War crimes trial participants	Totals
Interview Country									
Russian	4,596	249	57	35	12	7	6		4,962 (50%)
Australia	34			1					35
Belarus	15								15
Canada	13	1							14
Germany	35				5	2			42
Israel	991	1		4					996
Latvia	16								16
Moldova	92	2	4						98
Other	20								20
Poland	4								4
Russia	315	5		4	1	1	3		329
U.S.A.	586	2		18		2			608
Ukraine	2,453	238	53	8	6	2	3		2763

2A. BIRTHPLACE: UKRAINE

Experience Groups

Language	Jewish survivors	Rescuers	Roma survivors	Liberators	Political prisoners	Misc.	Jehovah's Witnesses	War crimes trial participants	Totals
Interview Country									
Uzbekistan	22								22
English	2,841	3		3	1	4			2,852 (29%)
Australia	190								190
Canada	281	1		1					283
France	3								3
Germany	3								3
Israel	18								18
Other	12								12
U.S.A.	2,310	2		2		4			2,318
United Kingdom	24				1				25
Hebrew	940	1							941 (10%)
Canada	8								8
Israel	924	1							925
Other	1								1
U.S.A.	5								5
United Kingdom	1								1
Venezuela	1								1
Ukrainian	101	145	40		2	1		2	291

2A. BIRTHPLACE: UKRAINE

Experience Groups

Language	Jewish survivors	Rescuers	Roma survivors	Liberators	Political prisoners	Misc.	Jehovah's Witnesses	War crimes trial participants	Totals
Interview									
Country									
Germany	29								29
Israel	10								10
Other	5								5
U.S.A.	2								2
French	62			1					63 (1%)
Canada	2								2
France	55			1					56
Israel	1								1
Other	4								4
Portuguese	58								58 (1%)
Brazil	58								58
Other	34								34
Israel	1								1
Other	33								33
Czech	31								31
Czech Republic	30								30
U.S.A.	1								1
Romani			13						13
Ukraine			13						13

2A. BIRTHPLACE: UKRAINE

Experience Groups

Language	Jewish survivors	Rescuers	Roma survivors	Liberators	Political prisoners	Misc.	Jehovah's Witnesses	War crimes trial participants	Totals
Interview									
Country									
Swedish	13								13
Sweden	13								13
Sign	1								1
U.S.A.	1								1
Totals	9,233 (94%)	430 (4%)	130 (1%)	40	15	12	6	2	9,868

2B. INTERVIEW COUNTRY: UKRAINE

Experience Group

Interview Language	Jewish survivors	Rescuers	Roma survivors	Liberators	Political pris.	Misc.	Jehovah's Witnesses	War crimes trial participants	Totals
Russian	2,734	264	73	11	7	5	3		3,097 (90%)
Ukrainian	103	149	42		2			2	298 (9%)
Romani			20						20 (1%)
Yiddish	5								5
Hungarian	3								3
Polish	1					1			2
Totals	2,846 (83%)	413 (12%)	135 (4%)	11	9	6	3	2	3,425

2C. LANGUAGE: UKRAINIAN

Experience Groups

Interview Country	Rescuers	Jewish survivors	Roma survivors	Political prisoners	War crimes trial participants	Misc.	Totals
Ukraine	149	103	42	2	2	1	299 (98%)
Israel		3					3 (1%)
U.S.A.		2					2 (1%)
Totals	149 (49%)	108 (36%)	42 (14%)	2	2	1	304

Appendix 3

GHETTOS IN UKRAINE

The Visual History Archive contains records for 340 ghettos in what today is Ukraine.² Here, each one is listed along with the number of interviews in which it is discussed. Note that the ghetto keywords are formulated according to the interwar spelling and country. Keywords beginning with “(u)” indicate that they are unverified using the historical sources at our disposal.

WESTERN UKRAINE: Carpathian Ruthenia	Interviews
Berehovo (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	232
Chust (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	145
Iza (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	52
Mukacevo (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	638
Rachov (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	9
Sekernice (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	40
Selo Slatina (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	78
Sevlus (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	184
Tacovo (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	79
Uzhorod (Czechoslovakia : Ghetto)	383
WESTERN UKRAINE: Galicia	Interviews
Bobrka (Poland : Ghetto)	5
Bolechów (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Borszczów (Poland : Ghetto)	28
Boryslaw (Poland : Ghetto)	75

² Note that the keywords *Dubossary (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)*, *Kamenka (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)*, *Rybnitsa (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)*, and *Tiraspol' (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)* have been excluded from this list as these cities are today part of Moldova.

WESTERN UKRAINE: Galicia	Interviews
Brody (Poland : Ghetto)	23
Brzezany (Poland : Ghetto)	16
Buczacz (Poland : Ghetto)	44
(u)Budzanów (Poland : Ghetto)	2
(u)Bukaczowce (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Busk (Poland : Ghetto)	12
Chodorów (Poland : Ghetto)	5
(u)Chorostków (Poland: Ghetto)	2
Czortków (Poland : Ghetto)	35
Drohobycz (Poland : Ghetto)	68
Gródek Jagiellonski (Lwów, Poland : Ghetto)	3
Gwozdzic Miasto (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Horodenka (Poland : Ghetto)	17
(u)Jagielnica (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Jasienica Rosielna (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Jaworów (Poland : Ghetto)	6
Jezierzany (Tarnopol, Poland : Ghetto)	3
Kalusz (Poland : Ghetto)	7
Kamionka Strumilowa (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Kolomyja (Poland : Ghetto)	39
Komarno (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Kopyczynce (Poland : Ghetto)	9
Kosów (Stanisławów, Poland : Ghetto)	6
Kozowa (Poland: Ghetto)	10
Lisko (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Lwów (Poland : Ghetto)	319

WESTERN UKRAINE: Galicia	Interviews
(u)Mielnica (Tarnopol, Poland : Ghetto)	2
Mosciska (Poland : Ghetto)	5
Mosty Wielkie (Poland: Ghetto)	4
Nadwórna (Poland : Ghetto)	5
Podhajce (Poland : Ghetto)	15
(u)Probuzna (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Przemyslany (Poland : Ghetto)	19
Radziechów (Poland : Ghetto)	7
Rawa Ruska (Poland : Ghetto)	16
Rohatyn (Poland : Ghetto)	15
Rudki (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Rzeszów (Poland : Ghetto)	100
(u)Sadowa Wisznia (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Sambor (Poland : Ghetto)	26
Skalat (Poland : Ghetto)	27
Skole (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Sniatyn (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Sokal (Poland : Ghetto)	11
Stanisławów (Poland : Ghetto)	59
Stryj (Poland : Ghetto)	29
Tarnopol (Poland : Ghetto)	45
Tlumacz (Poland : Ghetto)	6
Tluste (Poland : Ghetto)	47
Trembowła (Poland : Ghetto)	17
Tysmienica (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Zaleszczyki (Poland : Ghetto)	2

WESTERN UKRAINE: Galicia**Interviews**

Zbaraz (Poland : Ghetto)	9
Zborów (Poland : Ghetto)	11
(u)Zimna Woda (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Zloczów (Poland : Ghetto)	13
Zolkiew (Poland : Ghetto)	13
(u)Zukow (Zloczow, Tarnopol, Poland : Ghetto)	1
Zurawno (Poland : Ghetto)	2

NORTH WESTERN UKRAINE: Volhynia & W. Polesie**Interviews**

Berezne (Poland : Ghetto)	15
Berezów (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Boremel (Poland : Ghetto)	2
(u)Czterwertnia (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Dabrowica (Poland : Ghetto)	9
Demidówka (Poland : Ghetto)	3
Derazne (Poland : Ghetto)	1
(u)Druzkopol (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Dubno (Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	20
(u)Holoby (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Horochoów (Poland : Ghetto)	5
Hoszcza (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Kamien Koszyrski (Poland : Ghetto)	2
(u)Kisielin (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Kolki (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Korzec (Poland : Ghetto)	12

NORTH WESTERN UKRAINE: Volhynia & W. Polesie	Interviews
Kostopol (Poland : Ghetto)	2
Kowel (Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	15
Kozin (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Krzemieniec (Poland : Ghetto)	1
(u)Kupiczów (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Lokacze (Poland : Ghetto)	3
Luboml (Poland : Ghetto)	6
Luck (Poland : Ghetto)	24
Ludwipol (Poland : Ghetto)	7
Maniewiczze (Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	6
Miedzyrzecz (Równe, Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	7
(u)Mielnica (Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	1
Mizocz (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Młynów (Poland : Ghetto)	12
Olyka (Poland : Ghetto)	2
(u)Osowa Wyszka (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Ostróg (Poland : Ghetto)	12
Ostrozec (Poland : Ghetto)	6
Radziwillow (Poland : Ghetto)	5
Rokitno (Poland : Ghetto)	12
Równe (Poland : Ghetto)	17
Rozyszcze (Poland : Ghetto)	8
Sarny (Poland : Ghetto)	6
Serniki (Poland : Ghetto)	10
(u)Sienkiewiczówka (Poland : Ghetto)	4
Stara Rafalowka (Poland : Ghetto)	6

NORTH WESTERN UKRAINE: Volhynia & W. Polesie**Interviews**

Stepan (Poland : Ghetto)	16
Stolin (Poland : Ghetto)	3
Szumsk (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Torczyn (Poland: Ghetto)	3
(u)Troscianiec (Luck, Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	1
Tuczyn (Poland : Ghetto)	7
Warkowicze (Poland : Ghetto)	5
(u)Werba (Dubno, Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	2
Wisniowiec (Poland : Ghetto)	1
Włodzimierz (Poland : Ghetto)	51
Włodzimierzec (Poland : Ghetto)	3
Wysock (Polesie, Poland : Ghetto)	2
Zdolbunów (Poland : Ghetto)	10
Zofjówka (Luck, Wolyn, Poland : Ghetto)	7

SOVIET UKRAINE**Interviews**

Aleksandrovka (Kirovograd, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Annopol' (Slavuta, Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Bar (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	44
Baranovka (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	8
Berdichev (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	16
(u)Chaul'sk (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Chernyi Ostrov (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Chervonoarmeisk (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Chudnov (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2

SOVIET UKRAINE	Interviews
(u)Dashev (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Derazhnia (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Dunaevtsy (Dunaevtsy, Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
(u)Fraidorf (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Fraileben ((Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Gaisin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	7
(u)Genichesk (Zaporozh'e, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Gorodok (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Gritsev (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Ialtushkov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR: Ghetto)	19
Ianov (Kalinovka, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Ianushpol' (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Iarmolinty (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Iarun' (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Il'inty (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	24
(u)Ingulets (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Iziaslav (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Kalinovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Kalius (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Kamenets Podol'skii (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	14
Kamenka (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
(u)Kamenka (Stalindorf, Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Katerinopol' (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Kazatin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Khar'kov (Khar'kov, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	42
Kherson (Nikolaev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	8

SOVIET UKRAINE	Interviews
Khmel'nik (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	68
Krasilov (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Krasnyi Gorodok (Stalino, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Kul'chiny (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
(u)Kupel' (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR)	1
Letichev (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Liakhovtsy (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Lipovets (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Litin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	28
(u)Liubar (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Mariupol' (Stalino, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
Medzhibozh (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
(u)Mezhirov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Mikhalpol' (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Minkovtsy (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Miropol' (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Monastyrishche (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Murovani Kurylivtsy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	9
Nemirov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	31
Novaia Ushitsa (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
(u)Novogeorgievsk (Kirovograd, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Novograd-Volynskii (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	8
(u)Novomoskovsk (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Novyi Put' (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Olevsk (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Ol'shana (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6

SOVIET UKRAINE**Interviews**

(u)Ostropol' (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Pavlovichi (Ovruch, Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Piatigory (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Pikov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Pliskov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Pogrebishche (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Polonnoe (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Pomoshnaia (Kirovograd, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Priluka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto) (generic)	1
(u)Priluki (Chernigov, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Proskurov (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	12
Raigorod (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Raigorodok (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Repki (Chernigov, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Rogachev (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Romny (Chernigov, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Ruzhin (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Samgorodok (Kazatin, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
(u)Sen'ki (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Shepetovka (Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Shpola (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
(u)Siniava (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Skvira (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Slavuta (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	7
Slivino (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Snitkov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	11

SOVIET UKRAINE	Interviews
Stalino (Stalino, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Starokonstantinov (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Takhtaulovo (Poltava, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Tal'noe (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR: Ghetto)	1
(u)Tarashcha (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Teplik (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	10
Ternovka (Dzulinka, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	29
Ulanov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	9
Uman' (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	21
(u)Vcheraishe (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
(u)Velikii Zhvanchik (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Vin'kovtsy (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Vinnitsa (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Vinozh (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
(u)Voroshilovsk (Stalino, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Voznesensk (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Zhitomir (Zhitomir, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	11
(u)Zhornishche (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
(u)Zhvanets (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Zin'kov (Kamenets-Podol'skii, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
Zvenigorodka (Kiev, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	10
CRIMEA	Interviews
Feodosiia (Crimea, Russia, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Simferopol' (Crimea, Russia, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Voikovo (Crimea, Russia, USSR : Ghetto)	1

BUKOVINA**Interviews**

Cernauti (Romania : Ghetto)	379
Storojinet (Romania : Ghetto)	24
Zastavna (Romania : Ghetto)	2

TRANSNISTRIA**Interviews**

(u)Baibuzovka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Balanovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	19
Balin (Smotrichi, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Balki (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	21
Balta (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	356
Berezovka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	16
Bershad' (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	606
(u)Bobrik (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Bondurovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Brailov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	14
Bratslav (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	27
(u)Britavka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Byrlovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Chechel'nik (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	157
Cherna (Cherna, Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	7
Chernevtsy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	120
Derebchin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Dzhurin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	160
Dzygovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	63

TRANSNISTRIA	Interviews
Golta (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	14
Gorai (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Goryshkovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	15
Iampol' (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	68
Iaruga (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	31
Iaryshev (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
Ivashkovtsy (Shargorod, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Kapustiany (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	11
Karlovka (Domanevka, Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	47
Karlovka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)(generic)	3
Katashyn (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Katsmazov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	7
Katuzeia (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
(u)Khoshchevatoe (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Kodyma (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	27
(u)Kolodenka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Komargorod (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	13
Kopaigorod (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	190
Kosharintsy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	11
Krasnoe (Tyvrov, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	61
(u)Krasnye Okny (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Krivoe Ozero (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	19
Krushinovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Kryzhopol' (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	62
Kuz'mintsy (Bar, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Liubashevka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	13

TRANSNISTRIA	Interviews
Luchinets (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	73
Marinovka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
(u)Martynovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Miastkovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	37
Mogilev-Podol'skii (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	635
(u)Moldavka (Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Mostovoe (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	7
Murafa (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	135
Nemerche (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Obodovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	187
Odessa (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	144
Ol'gopol' (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	73
Ol'shanka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Osievka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Ozarintsi (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	27
Pavlovka (Obodovka, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Pechora (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Peschana (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	41
(u)Peschianka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Popovtsy (Kopaigorod, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	50
Rogozna (Shpikov, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Savran' (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	31
(u)Semikhatka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Shargorod (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	240
Shpikov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	37
Skazintsy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	13

TRANSNISTRIA	Interviews
Sledy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
Sobolevka (Teplik, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	4
(u)Solobkovtsy (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Sosnovka (Shargorod, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Stanislavchik (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	17
Staraia Tsybulevka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	9
Sumovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	9
Tarkanovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	3
Tomashpol' (Tomashpol', Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	103
Topaly (Moldavian ASSR, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	5
Tropova (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	10
Trostianets (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR: Ghetto)	12
(u)Tsybulevka (Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Tul'chin (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	105
Tyvrov (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	31
Ust'e (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
(u)Velikaia Kosnitsa (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Vendichany (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Verbka (Kryzhopol', Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	2
Verkhovka (Obodovka, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	37
Voroshilovka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	30
Vradievka (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	13
Vygoda (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1
Zatish'e (Odessa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	6
Zhabokrich (Kryzhopol, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	24
(u)Zhabokrich (Tul'chin, Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)	1

TRANSNISTRIA

Interviews

Zhmerinka (Vinnitsa, Ukraine, USSR : Ghetto)

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Appendix 4

SELECTED INDEXING TERMS

The following is a selection of some of the main indexing terms in the USC Shoah Foundation's thesaurus that are relevant to the Ukrainian testimonies (excluding time periods and places).

HOLOCAUST & WAR-RELATED TERMS

attitudes toward Germany and/or Germans

Axis-appointed local administration

Axis-appointed local administrative personnel

Bandera, Stepan

Bukovinskii Kuren'

Carpathian Sich

civilian evacuations

civilian labor conscription

collaboration suspicion

collaborator treatment

*deportation to Transnistria*³

Einsatzgruppen

gas vans

German armed forces

German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941)

German soldiers

ghetto insignia

hostages taking

Jewish community extortion

Jewish population roundups

Jewish resistance fighters

Jewish resistance groups

Koch, Erich

Kovpak, Sidor Artemevich

looting

*mass executions*⁴

mass graves

³ See also the many *deportation to [specific location]* and *deportation from [specific location]* terms.

⁴ See also *camp mass executions*, *ghetto mass executions*, *prison mass executions*, and the terms for specific massacres, e.g. as *Babi Yar Massacres* and *Drobitskii Iar Massacres*.

mass murder awareness
mass murder coverups
nationalist propaganda
official registration
Orhanizatsyia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv
persecuted group insignia
*pogroms*⁵
Polis'ka Sich
*property seizure*⁶
Romanian colony
Rosenberg, Alfred
Sheptytskyi, Andrei
Shootings
Sonderkommando 1005
Soviet armed forces
Soviet civilian laborers
Soviet prisoners of war
Soviet resistance fighters
*Soviet resistance groups*⁷
Soviet soldiers
suspected collaborator arrests
Transnistria
Transnistrian Jewish children rescue
Ukrainian civilian laborers
Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Ukrainian police and security forces
Ukrainian prisoners of war
Ukrainian resistance fighters
Ukrainian resistance groups
Ukrainian soldiers
Ukrainian units
Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia
Volksdeutsche civilian laborers
Volksdeutsche police and security forces
wartime experience concealment
wartime experience verification

GENERAL UKRAINE-RELATED TERMS

anti-political opponent measures
attitudes toward Joseph Stalin and/or Stalinism
attitudes toward the Soviet Union and/or Soviets
attitudes toward Ukraine and/or Ukrainians
Catholic clergy and monastics
communist regime everyday life

⁵ See also specific pogrom terms such as *Petliura Days* and *Zloczów Pogrom*.

⁶ See also *camp property seizure* and *ghetto property seizure*.

⁷ See also names of specific resistance groups such as *Kovpak Partisan Formation*, *Fiodorov Partisan Formation* and others.

GENERAL UKRAINE-RELATED TERMS

Eastern Orthodox Churches

Eastern Orthodox clergy and monastics

*Hasidism*⁸

information restrictions

Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich

Karaites

Khrushchev, Nikita

Kolkhoz

Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Sovetskogo Soiuz (KPSS)

Komsomol

Krimchaks

nationalization

political opponent arrests

political opponent legal prosecutions

Russian Civil War

Russian Orthodox Churches

Russian Revolution of 1917

Russo-Polish War (1919–1920)

Soviet antireligious measures

Soviet Communist Party membership

Soviet Famine (1921–1922)

Soviet government officials

Soviet history

Soviet labor units

Soviet occupation conditions

Soviet police and security forces

Soviet political police

Soviet political rehabilitation

Soviet political repression awareness

Soviet propaganda

Soviet psychiatric hospitals

Sovkhoz

Stalin, Joseph

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

Ukrainian Famine (1932–1933)

Ukrainian Famine (1946–1947)

Ukrainian history

Uniate Churches

⁸ See also the terms for specific Hasidic dynasties, for example *Trisk Hasidism*.

GERMAN GHETTOIZATION IN OCCUPIED UKRAINE: REGIONAL PATTERNS AND SOURCES

Martin Dean

INTRODUCTION

How many ghettos did the German occupation forces establish in Ukraine? What types of ghettos were they, and how long did they exist? It is perhaps surprising that these questions still have not been answered definitively by historians. Both Dieter Pohl and Wendy Lower have stressed the problems historians face in reconstructing Nazi ghettoization policies in Ukraine, owing to the sparse and disparate nature of the sources.¹ Not only are there gaping holes in the German documentation, which make it very difficult to discern German motives and policy decisions, but the other possible sources, such as Soviet Extraordinary Commission reports, postwar trial records, survivor and bystander testimonies, memoirs, *yizkor* (memorial) books, journals, and other publications, are widely scattered and in various languages. Even when these sources specifically mention the existence of a ghetto, they seldom give a detailed description and may be unreliable.

The survey of ghettos in Ukraine presented by Il'ia Al'tman, based in part on the Handbook (*Dovidnik*) of ghettos and other camps prepared by the State Committee of the Ukrainian Archives, was perhaps the first to attempt to provide a coherent survey of regional patterns and numbers.² However, it fails to match the more detailed analysis of the admittedly fewer ghettos on Russian territory provided by Vadim Doubson, which lists all ghettos with rough numbers of inmates, and establishment and liquidation dates.³

The ambitious aim of volume 2 of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's Center of Advanced Holocaust Studies' Camps and Ghettos Encyclopedia Project, devoted to German-run ghettos, is to document and describe all the ghettos established on German-occupied territory between 1939 and 1945. With the assistance of Alexander Kruglov, Alexander Prusin, and many other contributors, the team has completed its survey of ghettos in Ukraine, although inevitably a few unresolved questions remain.

DEFINITION

A major problem facing the project has been to define a ghetto, since the Germans themselves adopted widely differing definitions across time and space. For example, some labor camps for Jews are occasionally described as ghettos, so that a choice may have to be made between conflicting sources. The following four defining characteristics of ghettos reflect some of the main criteria used in the volume:⁴

1. resettlement and concentration into area only for Jews
2. restrictions on entering and leaving area
3. in existence for at least two weeks
4. defined as ghetto or “Jewish residential area” in sources

TYOLOGY

The Germans established both “open” and “enclosed” ghettos in occupied Ukraine, and witnesses do not always discriminate carefully between the two.⁵ For the purposes of this presentation, I have identified three main types of ghettos (see Appendix 1):⁶

1. open ghettos (Jewish residential areas)
2. enclosed ghettos (surrounded by barbed wire, wooden, or stone fences)
3. destruction ghettos (existed for less than two months)

A fourth category that will be mentioned briefly is that of remnant ghettos, established after a deportation or mass shooting, usually for selected Jewish craftsmen or laborers (and their families). Such ghettos were sometimes also employed to lure other Jews out of hiding, to expedite their destruction shortly afterward.

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

In mapping out the structure of the volume, a geographical framework has been used, reconstructing the German administrative districts during the occupation. This approach has been used to identify which towns had ghettos and to determine the fate of Jews

from nearby villages. In January 1942, *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* consisted of the following regions (*Generalkommissariate*): Wolhynien-Podolien in the west; with Shitomir (Zhytomyr) lying to its immediate east; and then Kiev (Kiev) further to the east; with Nikolajew in the south; and finally Dnepropetrowsk in the southeast (which has been linked with Nikolajew for convenience as there were few ghettos in either region). The parts of Ukraine to the east of the Reichskommissariat were under German military administration in 1941–1942, as was the Crimea. (It should be noted that Generalkommissariat Tschernigow and the eastern part of Generalkommissariat Kiev existed only briefly in the latter part of 1942.) In addition, Distrikt Galizien formed part of the Generalgouvernement in western Ukraine.

GENERALKOMMISSARIAT WOLHYNIEN-PODOLIEN (VOLHYNIA AND PODOLIA REGION)

The German authorities established more than a hundred ghettos in those areas of Generalkommissariat Wolhynien-Podolien that currently belong to Ukraine. Here the pattern of ghetto formation was fairly comprehensive. Ghettos were established in most *raion* (district) centers, with the Jews from the outlying villages often being brought into the ghettos at the time of formation or shortly thereafter. The ghettos were mainly established in two waves, first in October–December 1941, or later in March–May 1942, although a few were set up earlier, in the summer of 1941, while others, such as those in Aleksandria or Mielnica, were created only a few weeks before their liquidation in the summer of 1942⁷ (see Appendix 2).

The vast majority were enclosed ghettos, although some started out as open ghettos and were subsequently enclosed. This is illustrated well on the basis of the Łokacze ghetto diary, kept and subsequently published by the survivor Michael Diment.

At the beginning of November 1941, the 1,400 Jews of Łokacze were forced into an open ghetto, around one of the synagogues. About half of the Jewish houses in the town were confiscated. In addition, about 800 Jews from nearby villages were forced into the ghetto, causing terrible overcrowding. The new arrivals had to leave most of their property behind. On January 5, 1942, the town authorities requested that the *Judenrat* (local Jewish council) construct a fence around the ghetto. The work was completed about one month later. The wooden fence was two meters (6.5 feet) high,

wrapped in barbed wire. The enclosure of the ghetto made trading with local peasants more difficult, and punishments for leaving the ghetto also became more severe. The Ukrainian police began to shoot on sight Jews caught outside the ghetto. When one Jew was shot on March 16, 1942, black-market prices suddenly rose by 50 percent. Thanks to Michael Diment's rare diary, we can reconstruct a detailed chronology of events in this ghetto.⁸

A considerable amount of survivor testimony is available for many of the ghettos in Volhynia. This information is mainly in Yiddish, Polish, or Hebrew. Memorial books, known as *yizkor* books, about specific towns, prepared by groups of survivors and emigrants living in Israel, the United States, and South America, include Holocaust testimonies alongside other essays on the Jewish heritage of the town. The majority of these are now accessible on the Internet via the New York Public Library, and a growing number are being translated into English (in whole or in part) on the JewishGen website. The regional study by Shmuel Spector for Volhynia includes a detailed table listing the establishment and liquidation of most ghettos in the region.⁹

The *yizkor* books sometimes include information for neighboring communities and even evidence of otherwise undocumented ghettos. For example, the *yizkor* book for Rożyszcze includes a testimony by Fany Rosenblatt, who was probably the only survivor of a small rural ghetto in the village of Czetwiertnia, which existed for several months before it was liquidated on October 10, 1942, almost two months after the liquidation of the Rożyszcze ghetto. Under the Soviet occupation, a *kolkhoz* (collective farm) had been established in the village on the lands formerly belonging to a Polish noble family. When the ghetto was set up, Jews were also brought in from other nearby villages, including Susk, Łukow, Hodomicze, Łyszcze, and Sławatycze,¹⁰ such that up to one hundred Jews were concentrated there.¹¹

Representative of many ghettos in the Volhynian region is the history of the ghetto in Wiśniowiec, which can be reconstructed by cross-referencing different sources. On March 16, 1942, the German authorities ordered the establishment of a ghetto within three days, taking two hostages to ensure compliance.¹² Several hundred Jews from the surrounding villages, including Świniuchy, Wyzgródek, and Oleśkińcy, were relocated to Wiśniowiec around this time. Once the Jews had constructed the ghetto, some 4,000 Jews were forced inside and a *Judenrat* was established.¹³

In Wiśniowiec the Jews were ordered to choose their officials from among their own ranks; however, initially no one agreed to serve. In the end, a few Jews drew up a list of candidates, and when the candidates did not consent, the Jews entreated them to accept the positions, lest the Germans punish the town's Jews for not choosing representatives.

The first German order transmitted by the Judenrat, as recalled by Zev Sobol, was that “in a few hours, we would hear the sound of the siren at the mill, which would be a sign that from then on no Jew may leave the ghetto or walk around in the streets. The world was closed off to us.”¹⁴

The ghetto consisted of a narrow area of the town and extended along the length of one street—from the house of Alter Leyter to the house of the Mazurs. A high fence surrounded it, and any windows along the perimeter were blocked off. Every day the Judenrat had to send between 50 and 70 Jews for forced labor. They were not permitted to walk on the sidewalk and had to bow down before any Ukrainian policeman who passed by. At times the Jews were subjected to brutal and arbitrary beatings from the Ukrainian police.

The houses in the ghetto were dark and very overcrowded. Dozens of people lived in one room. Cleanliness was impossible to maintain, and everyone became infested with lice. Hunger was great, and there were few possibilities of getting food. Initially the Jews received 140 grams (4.9 ounces) of bread per day, some salt, and water. However, the rations were progressively reduced to 100 grams (3.5 ounces), then 60 grams (2.1 ounces). The children became swollen from prolonged hunger, and the women in particular got abscesses on their skin, which bled incessantly. Every day, there were four or five funerals—all for victims of hunger and disease.¹⁵

Jews working outside the ghetto were able to smuggle some food in, but they had to run the gauntlet of the Ukrainian guards, who took special pleasure in breaking any eggs they found and beating up the offender. Some Ukrainian guards also exploited the hunger of the Jews and made a vast profit by selling small amounts of food or accepting bribes. Even one well-meaning gentile youth who threw a package into the ghetto was arrested and probably shot by the Ukrainian police for this transgression, since he had no money to pay the fine.

On August 11, 1942, 10 SS men arrived from Krzemieniec and brought with them scores of armed Ukrainian policemen from the entire district. According to Sobol's account in the yizkor book, one of the SS men, who stood close to Herr Steiger, the scourge of the Jews of Wiśniowiec, gave a brief speech: "Today, we are putting an end to all the Jews in the ghetto. Go and bang on every window and door, and say, 'Get out, Jews, communists, traitors! Out of your houses!' Beat with clubs and whips the Jews who do not want to come out. But pay attention not to kill them in the ghetto. Take them outside of the town, to the assigned place, and annihilate them there."

The Jews were beaten severely as they were gathered together and then marched out of town under close escort. As they went along, a truck circled around them and the elderly, infirm, and children were brutally loaded onto it, thereby separating children from their parents.

The Jews were taken to the valley beneath the old city, in the direction of Zbaraż. The Germans used the valley as a grave—prepared carefully for this purpose. The victims were led to the pit in groups. Two policemen ordered them to strip down to their underpants. The clothes were placed together in a pile on the side. The victims were made to lie face down in the pit, where Ukrainian police fired on them with automatic weapons, shooting them in their heads. At the end, the police also checked to make sure everyone was dead. The Ukrainian collaborators carried out their work most diligently and were rewarded with some of the clothes of the people who were shot.¹⁶

According to a German report prepared by SS-Untersturmführer Selm for the commander of the Security Police and SD in Równe, during this first Aktion against the Wiśniowiec ghetto on August 11–12, 1942, the Germans and their Ukrainian collaborators shot 2,669 people (600 men, 1,160 women, and 909 children).¹⁷

This description based mainly on survivor accounts is corroborated by testimony given at the trials of several local policemen after the war. In 1984 one witness drew a sketch map for the Soviet investigators showing the route taken from the ghetto to the mass killing site. The Gendarmerie and Ukrainian police murdered the remaining Jews in follow-up Aktions over the ensuing weeks. By November 1942 the ghetto area had been almost completely destroyed and no more Jews were living in the town.¹⁸

The main archival repositories for survivor testimonies are at the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, Yad Vashem, and the United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum. The latter two archives also have copies of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission reports and much captured German documentation, copied from many archives in Central and Eastern Europe.

An example of captured documentation, from the State Archive for the Vinnitsa oblast, is the order for the establishment of ghettos in the Bar raion, signed by the Ukrainian head of the raion administration.¹⁹ Unfortunately copies of such key orders have rarely survived, especially for ghettos in Ukraine. The Podolia region, which belonged to the Soviet Union before 1939, does not have as rich survivor materials as the former Polish areas because survivors from Podolia were much less likely to emigrate in the years just after the war or record their stories within the Soviet Union. Thus there are very few yizkor books for this area, although since 1990 some more recent memorial books, such as those for Letichev and Polonnoye, have been produced, which include survivor testimonies by former ghetto inmates, sometimes reproduced from archives or other publications.

Published survivor memoirs also offer a useful source, including some published in Yiddish just after the war. A brief description of the ghetto in Serniki (close to the border with Belarus) can be found in the partisan memoir of Meylekh Bakalchuk-Felin. He claims that the Jews of Serniki had some forewarning of an impending Aktion in the late summer of 1942, as most other ghettos nearby had already been liquidated. Among the warning signs was the fact that Jews were no longer sent to work outside the ghetto and that owners of items given to Jewish craftsmen for repair came to collect them, regardless of whether the work had been finished. By early September there were also rumors that pits were being prepared nearby. Then local policemen, reinforced by the German Gendarmerie, surrounded the ghetto at night.²⁰

Statements by Jewish survivors indicate that the SD organized the liquidation of the Serniki ghetto in September 1942.²¹ According to an eyewitness who filled in the pit, some 50 Germans and local policemen escorted the Jews, with the Germans at the head and rear of the column, while Ukrainian police guarded its flanks.²² As the column made its way to the pit, two Jewish boys broke away and fled toward a nearby river, but the armed escorts gunned them down as they ran.²³

Forensic investigations, conducted by the Australian Special Investigations Unit in 1990 for the war crimes trial of Ivan Polyukovich, conducted in Adelaide, revealed

that the victims were herded down a ramp into the pit. One group turned to the left, where they were shot, and the others turned to the right and were shot as well. The majority had been shot in the head, but some were clubbed to death. The bodies were found lying face down, parallel and in rows. At one end the bodies were disorganized, suggesting that there had been some panic. The bodies that lay in the middle tended to have fewer bullets to the head. Clothing was found scattered throughout the mass grave, which suggested that after the executions the grave had been picked over. The investigations revealed that the perpetrators used German ammunition manufactured in the years 1939–1941.²⁴

GENERALKOMMISSARIAT SHITOMIR (ZHYTOMYR REGION)

The video and oral testimonies of Jewish survivors taken by the Shoah Foundation and others since the end of the Cold War have added considerably to our knowledge of ghettoization, providing many detailed and convincing descriptions. These have proved especially valuable in helping to identify some ghettos in central Ukraine for which little or no German documentation is available. For example, on July 15, 1941, a week after the occupation of the town, the German commandant established a “Jewish residential district” (or open ghetto) in Chudnov (Generalkommissariat Shitomir) in a part of town that had been severely damaged during the fighting. One main street and a few side streets were reserved for the Jewish population, but there was no barbed wire.²⁵ Another early ghetto established by the Germans in the Zhytomyr region was in Baranovka. According to Shoah Foundation testimony, it, too, was an open ghetto (“Jewish residential district”) created at the end of July 1941 by the German military administration in the center of the city, comprising a few small houses on Zhaboritskaya Street.²⁶ The Germans conducted several shooting Aktions in Baranovka during the summer of 1941, but they did not liquidate the ghetto until January 6, 1942.

According to the Soviet Extraordinary Commission Report and also German Einsatzgruppen reports, the Germans established an open ghetto in Radomyshl in August 1941. A detachment of Einsatzgruppe C used this ghetto primarily to concentrate the Jews for their rapid destruction in a series of Aktions within a few weeks.²⁷

The most striking feature about the Zhytomyr region is the difference between the northern part, where there were few ghettos (mostly short-lived), and the southern

part, where more than ten ghettos existed for several months up to the “Second Wave” of mass killings in spring and summer of 1942. However, there was also some overlap with the Transit Highway 4 (Durchgangsstrasse IV) forced labor camps in the area, which were formed initially with Jews from the ghettos and were replenished later with Jews brought from Transnistria during 1942 and 1943.²⁸

In Samgorodok the ghetto was established only in mid-May 1942, shortly before its liquidation at the beginning of June.²⁹ This was an example of a destruction ghetto, established during the Second Wave. As Wendy Lower notes, some large ghettos, such as those in Berdichev and Zhytomyr, were more or less established with the idea of destruction in mind and liquidated within only a few weeks. Yet the existence of ghettos for much longer in places such as Khmelnik, Brailov, Teplik, Ternovka, and Zhornishche indicates some concern to exploit Jewish labor; and a number of Jewish craftsmen remained even after Generalkommissar Klemm had reported that the Jewish Question was settled for the most part in the region.³⁰

A mass killing Aktion preceded the establishment of the ghetto in Litin, creating a remnant ghetto. On December 19, 1941, a squad of German Security Police from Vinnitsa organized the shooting of some 2,000 Jews in the town. The German authorities selected about 200 craftsmen and their families, who were placed into a ghetto comprising a few houses on two narrow streets.³¹ The Germans also brought into the ghetto those Jews who had hidden during the mass shooting. Around 300 Jews were concentrated in the ghetto surrounded by a fence. The Jews were prohibited from leaving on pain of death. Although food was scarce and hunger severe, no one was allowed to go to the market to obtain food.³²

In all there were more than 50 ghettos in Generalkommissariat Shitomir, including 19 open ghettos.

GENERALKOMMISSARIAT KIEW (KIEV REGION)

Despite the massacre of more than 30,000 Jews in Kiev at the end of September 1941 without the establishment of a ghetto, at least 20 ghettos have been identified in Generalkommissariat Kiev. Two relatively well-documented cases are the ghettos in Olshana and Zvenigorodka, for which several survivor testimonies have been gathered, including some by the Shoah Foundation. In Zvenigorodka the Germans established an

open ghetto (“Jewish residential district”) on several streets a few weeks after they captured the town in September 1941.³³ Jews were also brought into the ghetto from the surrounding villages, and several families had to share each house. The ghetto was not surrounded by barbed wire, but Jews were prohibited from leaving or communicating with the local population. Ukrainian police guards manned checkpoints around the ghetto to enforce these regulations. The Ukrainian policemen and German officials often entered the ghetto and robbed the Jews in their houses.³⁴ In early October 1941, Einsatzkommando 5, which was then based in Zvenigorodka, shot about 100 Jewish men.³⁵

German regulations prohibited the Jews from buying products from local Ukrainians. However, some Ukrainian civilians still came to the ghetto to exchange food for Jewish clothing and furniture. Conditions in the ghetto were very overcrowded, with several families sharing each house. Due to lack of food and heating materials, some inmates died of starvation and disease; others died from police brutality. In the ghetto there was a Jewish council, which organized daily forced labor details for repairing the roads and cleaning duties.³⁶ At the beginning of May 1942, the German authorities brought in about one hundred Jews from the ghetto in the nearby town of Ol’shana. Soon afterward, the able-bodied Jews were transferred to forced labor camps. The Germans shot the remaining Jews, liquidating the ghetto, in June 1942.³⁷

Other ghettos in Generalkommissariat Kiew include those in Uman, Lokhvitsa, Cherkassy, and Piryatin.

GENERALKOMMISSARIAT NIKOLAJEW AND GENERALKOMMISSARIAT DNEPROPETROWSK (NIKOLAEV AND DNEPROPETROVSK REGIONS)

In these two most southerly and easterly regions of Reichskommissariat Ukraine there were only a handful of ghettos. In the absence of much in the way of survivor testimony or German documentation, historians are forced to rely on other sources to identify some of the few ghettos here. For example, information on the short-lived ghetto in Bobrinets comes from a postwar report by the NKVD chief for the Bobrinets

raion from March 1946.³⁸ Details about the open ghetto in Novomoskovsk can be found in the interrogation of an ethnic German collaborator conducted in Siberia in 1947, a copy of which can be found in the Bundesarchiv Aussenstelle Ludwigsburg.³⁹ From captured German documentation, it is known that the Wehrmacht (Feldkommandantur 240) made preparations for the establishment of a ghetto in the city of Dnepropetrovsk in October 1941, but the rapid massacre of some 15,000 Jews by the SD soon rendered this unnecessary.⁴⁰

Only with respect to the destruction ghetto in Kherson, which existed for only two weeks, is it possible to provide a more detailed account, based on contemporary German reports, survivor testimony, Soviet Extraordinary Commission materials, postwar German investigations, and some published accounts. Here Sonderkommando 11a issued orders that the Jews could only reside on certain streets, establishing a ghetto on September 7, 1941. The ghetto was located in a remote section of the city, near the intersection of Frunze and Rabochnaia Streets; a Jewish police also functioned within the ghetto. Overseeing the ghetto was SS-Scharführer Baron Leo von der Recke of Sonderkommando 11a. On a daily basis the Jews were summoned to perform various forms of humiliating and heavy physical labor.⁴¹

On September 24–25, 1941, Sonderkommando 11a organized the liquidation of the ghetto.⁴² Prior to the Aktion, Jews in the ghetto were informed that they would be resettled to Palestine. A few Jews managed to escape in time, but most of them were subsequently captured and killed. When the Aktion started, the Jews were first marched to a factory site on the edge of the city. From there they were conveyed in groups on trucks to an antitank ditch seven kilometers (4.3 miles) northeast of the city, near the settlement of Zelenivka. The Jews were shot in groups of 10 to 12 by two rifle squads of the same size into two mass graves simultaneously. Those waiting their turn could hear the shots. Women and children screamed and clung to each other.⁴³ Soviet forensic experts estimated in 1944 that more than 8,000 people were buried in the mass graves.⁴⁴

AREAS UNDER GERMAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION: EASTERN UKRAINE AND CRIMEA

In eastern Ukraine, the story of the destruction ghetto in Khar'kov is fairly well known, having been recently documented by the Second Wehrmacht Exhibition in Germany. The existence of a ghetto in Stalino (Donetsk) is barely mentioned in available German wartime documentation but has been reconstructed in some detail by Tanja Penter, mainly on the basis of Soviet trial materials from the SBU (former KGB archives). At the end of February 1942, Einsatzkommando 6 ordered the city mayor of Stalino, Petushkov, and his deputy, Eichmann, an ethnic German, to establish a Jewish ghetto. The intended location for the ghetto was a settlement named Belyi Kar'er at a former quarry on the outskirts of the city. During his interrogations before a Soviet military tribunal in 1946, Eichmann recalled: "At the end of February 1942 ... Heidelberger [head of the executive department and deputy chief of Einsatzkommando 6] arrived from Berlin at the SD. Together with Graf [head of the intelligence section of Einsatzkommando 6], he came to the city administration to Petushkov and I. During a joint meeting with the police chiefs and the mayors of the city districts, it was decided to create a Jewish ghetto at a special place, where the entire Jewish population, including children and old people, would be sent." The existing inhabitants of Belyi Kar'er were evicted from their cottages within two days. A barbed-wire fence was erected around the quarry, and police guards were posted. In March 1942, the police chiefs and the mayors of the city districts were ordered to transfer the Jews into the ghetto. All families had to take their valuables, their best clothes, and food for five or six days. The apartment keys were handed over to the policemen who carried out the resettlement. During the resettlement Aktion, children and people with infirmities were supported or carried on the arms of others. The policemen drove the Jews before them with whips and rifle butts, accompanied by groaning, screaming, and the weeping of children. Due to the limited number of cottages, part of the population remained under the open sky. All valuables and property were collected and handed over to the SD.⁴⁵ The ghetto in Stalino existed for less than two months. As witness testimonies confirm, it was liquidated during the night of April 30–May 1, 1942. The city deputy mayor, Eichmann, recalled: "At that time the whole Jewish population—more than 3,000 people—were shot or taken away in special gas vans. The dead bodies were thrown into a coal shaft at the Kalinovka mine. Then the cottages were destroyed by the police."⁴⁶

In Crimea, the ghettos established in Dzhankoi and in Yalta are mentioned in German documentation, the Black Book, and other sources.⁴⁷ For example, records of the German War Booty Office (*Reichshauptkasse Beutestelle*) mention a number of items confiscated from Jews by the field gendarmes, who had arrested them and placed them in the “Jewish camp” in Dzhankoi between December 5, 1941, and January 3, 1942.⁴⁸

Another ghetto in the village of Voykovstat was documented recently in an article published in the Ukrainian journal *Tkuma*. Immediately upon occupying the Jewish village, the German authorities registered the population. People had to wear the Star of David, and all their livestock was taken. At the end of November 1941, the Jews were forcibly brought to a building, which was surrounded by barbed wire. It was located on the outskirts of the village and served as a small enclosed ghetto. Every night a roll call was held to ensure that no one was missing. Romanian soldiers guarded the ghetto.⁴⁹ On December 26, 1941, Soviet forces landed on the Kerch’ peninsula, and on December 29 the Red Army liberated the city of Feodosia. This compelled the German forces to flee Kerch’ and the neighboring raions of Lenin and Mayak-Salinski. As a result, Voikovshtat, like the ghettos of Kaluga and Il’ino in Russia, was one of the very few where the Red Army managed to liberate most of the inmates during its offensive in the winter of 1941–1942.⁵⁰

DISTRIKT GALIZIEN (EASTERN GALICIA REGION)

The chronology of German ghettoization was somewhat different in Distrikt Galizien, which formed part of the *Generalgouvernement*. Many of the more than 50 ghettos there were not formally established until December 1942, quite late in the process of concentration, deportation, and destruction. A few ghettos, most of them open ghettos, were established much earlier, in the summer and fall of 1941. The open ghettos established in Mosciska, Rohaytn, and Bukaczowce are good examples of this. Accompanying the ghettoization process was the progressive concentration of the Jews from the smaller towns and villages into the larger towns, where most of the ghettos were established. This proceeded in a series of waves from the fall of 1941 to the fall of 1942, accompanied also by large-scale killing Aktions (such as that conducted in Stanisławów in October 1941) and deportations, mostly to the extermination camp in

Bełżec (from March 1942 onward). A number of different types of forced labor camps also existed alongside the ghettos in this region.

The Germans established a large ghetto (c. 20,000 inmates) in Stanisławów in December 1941, and the first attempt at ghettoization in Lwów (involving up to 80,000 Jews) was also conducted at this time. Further ghettos were set up during the spring and summer of 1942, such as those in Borszczów (initially an open ghetto in April 1942); in Tłumacz in April and May 1942 (initially an open ghetto); and in Trembowla between September and November 1942.

The main wave of ghettoization in the region is documented in the order of Higher SS and Police Leader for the Generalgouvernement Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger issued on November 10, 1942, proclaiming the establishment of 32 Jewish residential areas (*Jüdische Wohnbezirke*), although slightly more than this were in existence by the set date (*Stichtag*) of December 1, 1942.⁵¹ The actual intent of this order, as many commentators have noted, was to clear the entire region of Jews except for those concentrated in these few ghettos or other labor camps. In view of the massive wave of deportations from the region that had been proceeding since the end of July 1942, the remaining Jews in the smaller towns were considerably unnerved by the demand to move into the ghettos. In Gliniany, according to the yizkor book for the town, the Jewish council tried to bribe German officials in Złoczów for permission to establish a ghetto in Gliniany, to avoid the cruel fate of resettlement. This was denied, but when the Jews left Gliniany for the nearby ghettos, Ukrainians robbed them on the way, not permitting them to take their property out of the town.⁵²

The history of the remaining 30 or so ghettos in Distrikt Galizien from December 1942 to June 1943 is one of successive *Aktions* resulting in their liquidation by the late summer of 1943. Many Jews tried to defy the Germans by hiding in bunkers in the ghettos, escaping to the forests, or surviving on the Aryan side, but only a few were successful. The last ghetto to be liquidated in Ukraine was actually not in Distrikt Galizien but was the remnant ghetto in Włodzimierz-Wołyński (Generalkommissariat Wolhynien-Podolien), which was cleared of its last Jewish workers only in December 1943.⁵³

The history of the ghettos in Ukraine is paradoxically one of the most visible aspects of the Holocaust and also one of the least remembered. The fate of the Jews in the ghettos in the cities and smaller towns could not be concealed from the local

population, which continued to trade with the Jews illegally. Yet the ghettos were mostly short lived and were usually dismantled or put to other use soon after the murder of the inmates. The example of the Kul'chiny ghetto in Podolia is typical. After the Jews had been removed from the ghetto, the German district commissioner (*Gebietskommissar*) assumed responsibility for the empty houses. Most were dismantled, and the materials were taken to nearby Antoniny to be used by German officials as firewood. The local Ukrainian authorities also sold a few of the houses to local residents to live in.⁵⁴

Since 1990 the larger towns have seen considerable new development, making it very hard now to uncover where the ghettos once stood. The sites of many mass graves are marked by monuments, but few plaques exist to inform inhabitants about the sites of former ghettos. Therefore, it has become more important than ever that, through the work of teams such as that of Father Patrick Desbois and others, efforts are made to document the history of the German-run ghettos that existed in Ukraine during the Holocaust in as much detail as possible, before it is too late and all memory of these sites is lost.

NOTES

¹ Wendy Lower, “Facilitating Genocide: Nazi Ghettoization Practices in Occupied Ukraine, 1941–1942,” in *Life in the Ghettos During the Holocaust*, ed. Eric J. Sterling (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 121, describes the task as “seemingly impossible.” See also Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 155.

² Il’ia Al’tman, *Zhertvy nenavisti: kholokost v SSSR 1941–1945 gg.* (Moscow: Fond Kovcheg, 2002), 77–87. See also *Handbuch der Lager, Gefängnisse und Ghettos auf dem besetzten Territorium der Ukraine (1941–1944)* (Kiev: Staatskomitee der Archiven der Ukraine, 2000).

³ Vadim Doubson, “Ghetto na okkupirovannoy territorii rossiiskoy federatsii (1941–42),” in *Vestnik. Evreyskogo Universiteta. Istoriya. Kultura. Tsvilizatsiya* 3 no. 21 (2000): 157–84.

⁴ Certain other features, such as the existence of a Jewish self-administration, are common to many ghettos but can also be found in nonghetto situations. Some marginal cases are discussed in the volume, either as separate entries or in the regional overview essays, as these can help to clarify the boundaries on the basis of specific examples.

⁵ Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 155; Al’tman, *Zhertvy nenavisti*, 71–75.

⁶ Some ghettos fit into more than one of these categories. The main aim has been to identify those ghettos that lasted for less than two months, which were concerned mainly with destruction, and to identify those open ghettos that lasted for more than two months and therefore had a somewhat more permanent character. Open ghettos that lasted less than two months will be categorized as destruction ghettos in Appendix 1, and those that subsequently became enclosed will be included as enclosed ghettos. In some cases it is still not known whether the ghetto was enclosed or not.

⁷ See Appendix 2, Chronology of Selected German-Run Ghettos in Ukraine; and Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem and the Federation of Volhynian Jews, 1990), 366–67.

⁸ Michael Diment, *The Lone Survivor: A Diary of the Lukacze Ghetto and Svyniukhy, Ukraine* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1992), 38–72.

⁹ Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, 366–67.

¹⁰ In 1921 the population of Czetwiertnia was only 23, but in Susk there were 32 Jews, in Łukow 14, in Hodomicze 11, and in Łyszczce 15.

¹¹ Fany Rosenblatt, in *Roz'ishts' `ayarati/Mayn shtetl Rozshishtsh*, ed. Gershon Zik (Tel Aviv: Irgun yots'e Roz'ishts' be-Yi'srael veba-irgunim be-Artsot ha-berit, Kanadah, Brazil, ve-Argentinah, 1976), 45–46. See also her account in the Hebrew section of the same volume; that section includes more details about the ghetto.

¹² “The Nazi Horrors in Wiśniowiec,” by a survivor (in Yiddish), in *Vishnivits: Sefer zikaron li-kedoshe Vishnivits she-nispu be-sho'at ha-natsim*, ed. Chaim Rabin (Tel Aviv: Irgun `ole Vishnivits, 1979), 311–25.

¹³ The figure of at least 4,000 is given both by the Jewish survivor Sobol and also the Ukrainian policeman Yakov Ostrovsky. According to the Soviet Extraordinary Commission Report, the ghetto initially held about 4,000 Jews but then expanded to as many as 6,000 as Jews arrived from the surrounding villages; see State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), 7021-75-3, pp. 28–32. The anonymous survivor, who appears to have been linked to the Judenrat, also estimates more than 4,000 Jews in the ghetto, including some 1,000 from Wyzgródek; see “The Nazi Horrors in Wiśniowiec.”

¹⁴ Zev Sobol, “The Ghetto in Wiśniowiec,” in *Vishnivits: Sefer zikaron*, 298–310.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (Institute for National Remembrance, Warsaw)—Komisja ścigania zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu: Zbiór zespołów szczątkowych jednostek SS i policji, sygn. 77, pp. 2–3, transcription of a Security Police report dated Rowno, 15 August 1942, on the “special treatment” of Jews in the Krzemieniec district.

¹⁸ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Washington, DC, RG-31.018.M (KGB Archives Ternopol region), D-7719, Case against Kyrylo F. Filyk, statement of Yakov Y. Ostrovsky (frame 8602), D-27414, Case against Aleksandr V. Khomits'kiy, Soviet Extraordinary Commission Report from 1944 (frame 9417); and reel 24, Arch. no. 33533, D-91, Case against Aleksandr Ivanovich M'inzar (1984), vol. 1, p. 174 (sketch map).

¹⁹ USHMM, RG-31.011M (State Archives of the Vinnytsya Oblast), reel 3, 1358-1c-1, Order no. 21, signed by Kol'veptryk.

²⁰ Meylekh Bakalchuk-Felin, *Zikhroynes fun a Yidishn partisan* (Buenos Aires, 1958), 9–19. Together with other escaped Jews, Bakalchuk-Felin formed a Jewish partisan

unit in the Svarytsevichi forest. That unit later was incorporated into the Soviet “Voroshilov” detachment, subordinated to the Rovno regional partisan command.

²¹ Bakaluch-Felin (*ibid.*, 18) dates the mass shooting on September 9, 1942 (three days before Rosh Hashanah). Other sources give the date as September 29, 1942.

²² Australian National Archives (ANA), Canberra, Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation into the case of Ivan Polyukovich (Ivanechko), witness statement of Stepan Sidorevich Polyukovich. Ivan Polyukovich (Ivanechko) was acquitted by a court in Adelaide in 1993 on two counts of murder that had been charged under the Australian War Crimes Act.

²³ Mark Aarons, *War Criminals Welcome: Australia, A Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2001), 480.

²⁴ ANA, SIU investigation into the case of Ivan Polyukovich. Excavations by the SIU in 1990 determined that the pit in which the Jews were murdered was some 40 meters (43.7 yards) long, 5 meters (5.4 yards) wide, and about 2 meters (2.2 yards) deep. The bodies in the pit were stacked like wood.

²⁵ See the testimonies of P. Pekerman and M. Sandal (Askes), in *Holocaust in the Ukraine*, ed. Boris Zabarko (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), 268–73, 195–205; Central State Archive of Ukrainian Social Associations (TsDAHOU), 57-4-225, p. 33.

²⁶ Testimony of Eva Gladkaia, in *Zhivymi ostalis' tol'ko my: Svidetel'stva i dokumenty* (Kiev, 1999), 96–97; available also in English as *Holocaust in the Ukraine*, 53–57.

²⁷ GARF, 7021-60-309, p. 21 (witness testimony of S. K. Boguslavs'kyi on May 26, 1945); Ereignismeldung UdSSR no. 88, September 19, 1941, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA-BL), R 58/217; according to Wendy Lower, the Jews brought in from the surrounding areas by the SD had been crammed into an old school, where they began to die of hunger and disease. Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005), 87.

²⁸ See Bundesarchiv Aussenstelle Ludwigsburg (BA-L), B 162, AR-Z 20/1963 (Ermittlungen wegen Verbrechen im Generalkommissariat Shitomir und an der DG IV). I am grateful to Andrej Angrick for this reference.

²⁹ BA-L, B 162, II 204a AR-Z 188/67, Verfahren gegen Richter u.a. (Samgorodok), pp. 221–24. German translation of Extraordinary Commission Report of October 26, 1944.

- ³⁰ See Martin Dean, “The German *Gendarmerie*, the Ukrainian *Schutzmannschaft* and the ‘Second Wave’ of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941–44,” in *German History* 14, no. 2 (1996): 168–92; BA-BL, R 6/310, p. 17, report of Generalkommissar Shitomir for May 1942, June 3, 1942.
- ³¹ Yad Vashem Archives (YVA), M-33/196, pp. 6–16; BA-L, B 162, II 204a AR-Z 135/67, pp. 556–57 (Abschlussbericht). This report indicates that 300 men, 500 women, and 1,186 children were murdered.
- ³² YVA, O-3/7372; YVA, O-3/6401; interview with David Irilevich on April 5, 2005, in the possession of Albert Kaganovitch; see Kaganovitch’s entry for Litin in vol. 2 of *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2012), pp. 1542–1544.
- ³³ Pinchas Agmon and Iosif Maliar, *V ognе Katastrofy (Shoa) na Ukraine: svidetel’stva evreev-uznikov kontslagerei i getto, uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniia* (Kiryat Haim, Israel: Beit lokhamei ha-gettaot, 1998), 151, testimony of Lubov Krasilovskaya; see also USHMM, RG-50.226*0016, oral history with Lubov Krasilovskaya.
- ³⁴ Testimony of Fanya Shubinskaya (Sapozhnikova), in *Holocaust in the Ukraine*, 363–64.
- ³⁵ Verdict of LG Düsseldorf on August 5, 1966, *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen* (Amsterdam: UPA, 1979), XXIV, Lfd. No. 636a, p. 523; Testimony of L. Kraslovskaya, *Evreiskie vesti* (Kiev), no. 1–2 (1994): 4; “Nur wir haben überlebt,” in *Holocaust in der Ukraine: Zeugnisse und Dokumente*, ed. Boris Zabarko (Wittenberg: Dittrich, 2004), 278.
- ³⁶ Testimony of L. Kraslovskaya, *Evreiskie vesti*; Testimony of Fanya Shubinskaya (Sapozhnikova), in *Holocaust in the Ukraine*, 363–64.
- ³⁷ Testimony of T. E. Shnaider (Pipkina), in Iu. M. Liakhovitskii, *Perezhivshie katastrofu: spasshiesia, spasiteli, kollaboranty, martirolog, svidetel’stva, fakty, dokumenty* (Khar’kov and Jerusalem, 1996), 139. According to the deposition of I.T. Nesterenko, the former chief of police in the Ol’shana raion, there were 103 Jews; see GARF, 7021-148-11.
- ³⁸ See the correspondence of the NKVD chief for the Bobrinets raion, March 30, 1946, in *Evreyskiye vesti* [Jewish News], Kiev 1994, 23–24, p. 15.

³⁹ BA-L, B 162/7177, p. 343, interrogation of Vasiliy V. Han, April 12, 1947 in Ufa, specifically mentions the existence of a ghetto in Novomoskovsk, established between October and December 1941 by the local police. The other witnesses in this file do not mention the ghetto, but they were asked only about the mass shooting of the Jews.

⁴⁰ USHMM, RG-11.001M.13 (former Special Archive [RGVA]), reel 92, 1275-3-666, report of Feldkommandantur 240, Dnjeprpetrowsk, October 19, 1941, p. 3.

⁴¹ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Sk 11a in Cherson vom 22.8. bis 10.9.1941* (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], Nbg. Dok. NOKW-636); Oleksandr Ivanovych Melnyk, “Behind the Frontlines: War, Genocide and Identity in the Kherson Region of Ukraine, 1941–1944” (M.A. thesis in history, submitted to Edmonton University, published by the Library and Archives Canada, 2004), 49–53. Melnyk cites State Archive for the Kherson Oblast, R-1479-1-11, p. 26, regarding the types of forced labor imposed; *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, Bd. 33, pp. 452, 458–59; *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life before and during the Holocaust*, ed. Shmuel Spector and Geoffrey Wigoder (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem; New York: New York University Press, 2001), 618.

⁴² GARF, 7021-77-421, pp. 11, 13 and reverse.

⁴³ *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, Bd. 33, pp. 448–49.

⁴⁴ See the report of the court medical experts on March 23, 1944, in *Zverstva nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov: dokumenty*, vypusk 13 (Voennoe izdatel'stvo NKO, 1945), pp. 59–62. According to the sworn testimony, given under oath on September 12, 1947, of former SS-Hauptscharführer Robert Barth, Sonderkommando 11a with the support of Sonderkommando 10b executed approximately 5,000 Jews in Kherson. See NARA, Nbg. Dok. NO-4992.

⁴⁵ See the Eichmann case in Archive of the Ukrainian State Security Service for the Donetsk Oblast (ASBUDO), Fond 1, file 60090, vol. 1, pp. 32–33. Regarding the ghetto in Stalino, see also Tanja Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass unter deutscher Okkupation 1941–43,” in *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 19, Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939–1945* (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein, 2003), 183–223; and also BA-L, B 162, AR-Z 370/59, vol. 10, pp. 531–36, 573–605, 641–46, 713–16.

⁴⁶ See Eichmann case, in ASBUDO, Fond 1, file 60090, vol. 1, pp. 32–33.

⁴⁷ See the diary of Yalta inhabitant O.I. Shargorodskaya, entries from November 28 and 29, 1941, in *Holokost v Krymu: Dokumentalniye svidetelstva o genitside yevreyev Kryma v period natsistskoi okkupatsii 1941–1944*, ed. M. I. Tyaglyi (Simferopol: BETS

“Hesed Shimon,” 2002), 89–90; and also M. Tyaglyi, “Yevreiskiye komitety v okkupirovannom natsistami Krymu: Postanovka problemy,” in *Holokost I suchastnist. Naukovo-pedagogichnyi buleten’ Ukrainskogo tsentru vyvchennya istorii Holokostu*, no. 11 (2003). See also Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941–1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 349, citing Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Film WF-03/7503, pp. 497ff., OK II/662 activity report, December 10, 1941; and BA-L, B 162, 213 AR 1898/66 vol. 18, statement of Paul Zapp, January 10, 1968.

⁴⁸ BA-BL, R 2104/15, p. 556.

⁴⁹ M. Goldenberg, “Kerchensko-Feodosiiskaia desantnaia operatsiia b sud’be evreev i kr’imchakov Vostochnogo Kr’ima,” in *Tkuma. Vestnik nauchno-prosvetitel’skogo tsentra “Tkuma”* nos. 4–5 (47–48) (Dnepropetrowsk, 2004): 2.

⁵⁰ Doubson, “Ghetto na okkupirovannoy territorii rossiiskoy federatsii (1941–42).”

⁵¹ *Polizeiverordnung des HSSPF Krüger über die Errichtung jüdischer Wohnbezirke*, Nov. 11, 1942, *Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouvernements*, November 11, 1942.

⁵² *Hurbn Glinyane: Lezikoren unzere kedoyshim* (New York: Emergency Relief Committee for Gliniany and Vicinity), 260–61.

⁵³ Dieter Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine: Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im Reichskommissariat 1941–1943,” in *Ausbeutung, Vernichtung, Öffentlichkeit: Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik*, ed. Norbert Frei, Sybille Steinbacher, and Bernd C. Wagner (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2000), 135–74, here 163.

⁵⁴ BA-L, B 162, II 204 AR-Z 442/67, I, pp. 199–203, statement of Mikhail A. Grinchuk in his own case, March 30, 1947.

Appendix 1**GERMAN-RUN GHETTOS IN UKRAINE (PRESENT BORDERS) BY GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, 1941–1944**

<u>German Admin. Region</u>	<u>EG^a</u>	<u>OG^b</u>	<u>DG^c</u>	<u>Total</u>
Volhynia- Podolia	86	22	4	112
GK Shitomir	26	19	8	53
GK Kiew	14	7	5	26
GK Nikolajew and GK Dnepropetrowsk	7	6	5	18
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea	5	6	8	19
Distrikt Galizien	41	15	1	57
Totals	179	75	31	285

Source: *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos 1933–1945*, vol. 2 *Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe*, vol. ed. Martin Dean, series ed. Geoffrey Megargee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2012).

^a Enclosed ghettos

^b Open ghettos (unfenced)

^c Destruction ghettos (short-lived, 2 to 8 weeks)

Appendix 2

CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED GERMAN-RUN GHETTOS IN UKRAINE

<u>Ghetto</u>	<u>(GK)^a</u>	<u>Type^b</u>	<u>Established</u>	<u>No. of inmates</u>	<u>Liquidated</u>
Chudnov	(ZH)	OG	mid-July 1941	2,000	Nov. 1941
Liubar	(ZH)	OG	July 1941	1,380	Sept. 13, 1941
Baranovka	(ZH)	OG	end July 1941	1,000	Jan. 6, 1942
Brailov	(ZH)	EG	July/Aug. 1941	1,400	July 1942
Hoszczka	(WP)	OG	July/Aug. 1941	900	Sept. 1942
Medzibozh	(WP)	EG	July/Aug. 1941	up to 2,000	Sept. 22, 1942
Gritsev	(WP)	EG	early Aug. 1941	up to 1,000	May 1942
Boguslav	(KW)	DG	Aug. 15, 1941	322	Sept. 15, 1942
Berdichev	(ZH)	EG	Aug. 26, 1941	15,000	Nov. 1, 1941

Beresteczko	(WP)	EG	Oct. 1941	2,000	Sept. 9, 1942
Cherkassy	(KW)	EG	Oct. 10, 1941	900	Nov./Dec.1 941
Polonnoye	(WP)	EG	by Nov. 1941	1,250	June 25, 1942
Horochów	(WP)	EG	early Nov. 1941	3,800	Sept. 15, 1942
Borzna	(MO)	OG	Nov. 1941	108	Feb. 1942
Gorodnia	(MO)	OG	Nov. 1941	82	Dec. 20, 1941
Kamenka	(NI)	OG	Nov./Dec. 1941	380	March 1942
Stanisławów	(GA)	EG	Dec. 1941	20,000	Feb. 1943
Dzhankoi	(MO)	DG	mid-Dec. 1941	443	Dec. 30, 1941
Horodenka	(GA)	EG	Dec. 1941	2,400	Sept. 10, 1942
Bobrinets	(NI)	DG	end Dec. 1941	344	Feb. 1942
Khmelnik	(WP)	EG	Jan. 2, 1942	4,500	March 3, 1943
Brody	(GA)	OG/EG	Jan. 1942; Nov. 1942	10,000	June 1943
Wiśniowiec	(WP)	EG	March 16, 1942	4,000	Aug. 12, 1942

Serniki	(WP)	EG	by April 1942	1,100	Sept. 1942
Kamien-Koszyrski	(WP)	OG/EG	fall 1941; March/April 1942	3,399	Aug. 10, 1942
Borszczów	(GA)	OG/EG	April 1, 1942; Dec. 1, 1942	4,800	June 9, 1943
Tłumacz	(GA)	OG/EG	April 1942; May 1942	3,500	Sept. 8, 1942
Rokitno	(WP)	OG	May 1, 1942	1,638	Aug. 26, 1942
Demidówka	(WP)	G	May 1942	700	Oct. 8, 1942
Aleksandria	(WP)	EG	July/Aug. 1942	1,100	Sept. 23, 1942
Mielnica	(WP)	EG	mid-Aug. 1942	1,200	Sept. 3, 1942
Drohobycz	(GA)	EG	Oct. 1, 1942	3,700	June 6, 1943
Bobrka	(GA)	EG	Dec. 1, 1942	1,700	April 13, 1943
Busk	(GA)	EG	Dec. 1, 1942	2,000	May 21, 1943
Gródek	(GA)	EG	Dec. 1, 1942	1,600	Feb. 3, 1943

Jaryczów	(GA)	DG	beginning Dec. 1942	2,500	Jan. 16, 1943
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^a Generalkommissariate: GA= Galizien; KW = Kiew; MO = Military Occupation;
NI = Nikolajew; WP = Wolhynien-Podolien; ZH = Zhytomyr

^b EG = confirmed ghetto (mostly enclosed); OG = open ghetto (unfenced);
DG = destruction ghetto (short-lived, 2 to 8 weeks)

THE WITNESSES OF UKRAINE OR EVIDENCE FROM THE GROUND: THE RESEARCH OF YAHAD—IN UNUM

Father Patrick Desbois

Between 1941 and 1944, more than 1.5 million Jews were murdered in Ukraine during the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. Almost everywhere, Hitler's squads surrounded cities and towns and rounded up Jewish men, women, and children. They were first forced to undress and then slaughtered before being buried in mass graves. Despite accounts from rare survivors and the work of historians, the violence of this Holocaust was long hidden by the Iron Curtain. A vast program of investigation—a work that is inseparably memorial and historiographic—began in 2004 with the purpose of discovering the conditions and, in a manner of speaking, the day-to-day experience of what I call the “Holocaust by bullets.”

Do we know the exact methods of the murderers or the precise stages of this carnage? Do we know the attitudes of local populations or the local authorities, from the mayor of a village to the head of a kolkhoz (collective farm)? To tell the truth, when viewed closely, our knowledge of the subject proves to be relatively incomplete. So much so that in certain places—and it doesn't take long to realize this on the ground—the facts themselves remain undiscovered.

This is why, in one region after another, from village to village, and almost house to house, the Yahad—In Unum team that I manage has started to crisscross Ukraine to gather the testimony of those who saw everything: villagers mostly, usually children or adolescents during the war. Villagers who—so shocked by what they saw—have never talked because no one has ever asked. It turns out that, contrary to popular belief, these executions of extraordinary brutality were not at all secret.

I had become aware of this myself bit by bit during my first visit to the Ukrainian town of Rawa-Ruska, near the Polish border. I had been trying to find traces of Camp 325, at first for a very personal reason: my grandfather had been deported and interned there for being a member of the Resistance. When I was there in 2003, the new mayor of the town proposed taking me to the mass grave of the last Jews of Rawa-Ruska. There, complete amazement. On our arrival at the site, 70 old people were waiting for us, drawn together by the mayor. And there in front of the grave site, with

their goats, geese, or barking dogs, these witnesses came forward one by one to tell aloud what they had seen at this place in 1941. Accounts of astounding precision. I realized then that in the East, the memory of the Holocaust was still very real. And that it was carried by these humble people. Thereupon, the mayor of Rawa-Ruska told me that he could repeat what he had just done in this village in hundreds of others.

This moment, therefore, marked the beginning of an ambitious investigation, initially led in an experimental and empirical fashion. Due to the interest in the first results obtained and the considerable scale of work to be carried out, it soon became essential to adopt a more scientific structure to our approach. With this in mind, I began to refine my method of investigation on the ground, as well as to professionalize my team. After five years and almost 800 witnesses who were filmed and archived by Yahad, what have we discovered?

SEVERAL METHODOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS

Before addressing the content of the testimonies, let me proceed with several clarifications regarding my methodology. The question of testimony brings up two types of problems: the first, a classic and recurrent one, concerns the thorny issue of the relation between history and memory. Even though an apparent conflict between these two things often results from somewhat complicated academic quarrels, my position on this point consists, rather, of trying to build a bridge, as much as possible, between the history of historians and the memory of witnesses. The second problem, more specifically, concerns the validity or the reliability of accounts collected 60 years after the events. Completely aware of this, I will address these two issues with respect to my methodology.

The Interview: A Rigorous Protocol

First, a clarification: to prevent someone from going astray with exaggerated or flowery language, the interviews we carry out in the villages of Ukraine with witnesses to the extermination of the Jews follow an extremely precise protocol. The questions we ask, always the same with several slight variations, are phrased in as simple and concrete terms as possible. From these forgotten witnesses of the Holocaust, we are

searching above all to obtain a firsthand or secondhand account in order to piece together, as much as possible, the unfolding of the murders, with their different conditions and sequences. It is a question, then, of guiding our speaker, step by step, in the evocation of their memories, which isn't necessarily easy, especially as we must succeed in bypassing a certain sense of guilt, for example, from Jews' clothes "received" or from the simple fact of having been present at the moment of the crime. We must also take account of the unspeakable acts that they witnessed and overcome their fear, as it is this fear that paralyzes the mind. And it's precisely that which the perpetrators of genocide count on. In this sense, to give in to fear would present them with a posthumous victory.

At the beginning of an interview, we seek, in a subtle way, to recreate the familial environment of the witness. For example, we ask if there was a Jewish school in the area, a question that often leads them to recall their classmates and, more generally, their shared existence with the Jews. We only address the arrival of the Germans in the second half: *By which road did they arrive and in what kind of vehicles? What color were their uniforms?* Little by little, we move closer to the subject of the executions: *What happened to the Jews? How was the ghetto—open, closed, surrounded by barbed wire?* Other factors trigger memories; childhood hiding places, colors, wagons, rain, or even horses. *What was your reaction when you saw the blood?* This simple question can stimulate the witness to describe the scene to us, adding new elements. In a general way, during all the interviews, it is a question of keeping the focus on what the person saw or heard. To that end, an inalterable rule: to remain fixed on the objects of everyday life, all the while respecting the viewpoint of the witness in such a way that does not bias the witness's account. That, incidentally, is the irreplaceable contribution of oral history, which offers precisely the possibility of "looking" through previously unseen points of view.

These testimonies are often very detailed, but they inevitably only reflect a facet of the crime. Thus, we tie them together with the others recorded in the same place. The fatal error, of course, would consist of wanting to steer the speaker toward a global, predetermined account.

Verification by Archives: Upstream and Downstream

Second clarification: of course, for my team it is not a case of entering a Ukrainian farm “nose to the wind.” Solid historical preparation is an essential condition for a successful interview, for asking the right questions, and for being able to decipher the responses. That is why a rigorous documentary search is at the heart of these missions, both upstream and downstream.

Upstream, several members of the team, involved in the background research, dissect German and Soviet archival collections, notably the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission reports of 1944–1945, which are the sole focus of one of my full-time staff members. The trials of war criminals or even the reports of the Romanian police force of Transnistria can also enrich this information. To the preliminary research of these primary sources and the already existing testimonies of survivors are added the secondary historiographic sources. These are the materials that, once classified and translated, allow us to approach each ground investigation with as accurate an idea as possible of each region affected by the Nazi genocide. This upstream research enables us as well, before each departure, to specify a site in a zone of occupation, to know which units were stationed there, to locate the sites of extermination, to estimate the number of victims, and to determine the dates of events.

Downstream, if it appears that the information presented to us by an oral history consists of very obvious contradictions to the written archives, another job begins: to return to the original archives, complemented then by a return to the sites and a widening of the search at the grave site. Within each team, made up of several interpreters, a photographer, a cameraman, a ballistics expert, and several historians, nothing is left to chance. With respect to the convergence of evidence (of all types, including material evidence such as cartridge cases and the like), our golden rule: every piece of evidence or source of information can lead to a complete picture of the facts only when complemented by a diversity of other resources.

FROM DISCOVERIES TO DISCOVERIES

One of our first discoveries, which I mentioned at the very beginning, was the almost public nature of the majority of these shootings. Like many others, I was convinced when beginning these investigations that all the mass graves were hidden in forests and

that the Jews had been killed completely out of sight. In truth, it was nothing of the sort; the majority of victims were openly and publicly massacred right in the middle or just on the outskirts of villages. I suspect that this was not any easy thing to admit; all the more, given that thousands of bodies still rest under the wheat fields or tomato gardens of these rural areas. In this regard—our second discovery—we quickly understood that hundreds of unidentified graves still existed in Ukraine. Furthermore, they were a long way, a very long way, in fact, from being fully recognized by memorials. Finally, we understood that each village is a place of a different type of murder; each case remains unique, even if a certain number of constants are clear from one region to another.

THREE CATEGORIES OF WITNESS: TYPOLOGY

This research has driven me to distinguish three types of witness. The first is the *indirect* witness: those who saw their Jewish neighbors being rounded up by the Germans, who describe at length the passing of these continuous human columns escorted toward the ghetto or site of execution, or who heard talk of it.

The second type: the *direct* witnesses, for the most part aged between 6 and 16 at the time of events. They were present at the moments of execution, sometimes with the best view in the house, hidden in the bushes or staying glued to their windows, which, in many cases, looked out onto the exact place of execution. Others were there because they were simply scrounging for mint sweets from soldiers during the shootings. This group of direct witnesses makes up the majority of our interviewees.

The third type: *the requisitioned civilians*. This concerns a category of witnesses, often children or adolescents at the time, of whom one finds no trace in official reports or archives. Neither victims nor executioners, these people were often requisitioned at their homes on the morning of the execution by an armed man; sometimes they were requisitioned because they had a wagon, a shovel, cooking utensils, a bag, or a sewing needle. This invisible group, undoubtedly, make up one of our principal discoveries, all the more so as they appear nowhere in written documents. At most, they are referred to in the passive form: “The graves were dug,” “the clothes of the Jews were taken off,” and so on. But by *whom* and *how*? These requisitioned civilians were not hiding at their windows watching the columns of victims marching toward the graves. Neither were they perched on trees in the distance. They were at the place of the crime, very often well before the Jews were brought there. And this

anonymous labor assisted the executions from start to finish, beside the victims and their murderers, sometimes sitting on the grass, only several meters from an open and screaming grave.

A vital point is that these requisitions were not simply improvised. They were made an integral part of the implementation of the crimes. At times more than 150 children were used. Forced actors, these requisitioned locals shine a light on these dark events and allow us to gain an accurate understanding of what happened. All those whom we have met talk in fact—for the first time—of the infamy they had been unwillingly associated with for several hours, days, or a week. We are continuing to measure the scale of the phenomenon in our research, which constitutes a historiographic revolution in that it shatters the classic divisions among victims, executioners, and bystanders.

The “Small Death Jobs”

I was able to mark out, over the course of this research, more than 20 of these “small death jobs.” And their number, on each research mission, tends to increase. Here are several examples:

The grave diggers: this refers to the men or women who were requisitioned along with their shovels and often forced to wait, at a distance, for the end of the execution to refill the grave.

The transporters of Jews: the route from the ghetto or the camp to the site of execution was often traveled on foot or in trucks, but not always. At times villagers were requisitioned with their carts to make the trip back and forth.

The transporters of bodies: these are the Ukrainians, also requisitioned with their carts, who were charged with transporting the bodies of massacred victims here and there, more or less sporadically, before burying them in graves.

The transporters of hemp, of hay, or of sunflowers: we encounter sometimes situations where the dismal corteges escorted to the site of execution were immediately followed by a flurry of carts transporting various combustibles to facilitate the cremation of the bodies.

The clothes sorters: the clothes of Jewish families who were forced to undress before being murdered were most often sorted by the requisitioned locals. The old clothes were generally burned, the “good ones” taken to the local school or elsewhere, after which other requisitioned locals put them into bundles and loaded them onto carts.

The dressmakers: at this stage many women come into play, obliged to mend the clothes, then send them to the Reich, distribute them locally to Ukrainian police, or sell them in the villages.

The clothes sellers: these are those who, in the days following the massacres, were charged with selling the clothes in the markets.

The cooks: as unbelievable as it sounds, the killers, in certain sites, were keen to supply themselves with food during the killings, especially during those that lasted several days in a row. It would even happen that these feasts, often flowing with alcohol, turned into veritable banquets. We also have seen cases of requisitioned locals forced to grill chickens less than ten meters from the mass graves. “At the end of the meal,” as one witness explained to us, “there were a thousand Jews at least . . .”

The grave “cleaners”: these were country people roped in to “clean” the graves with sand, ashes, chlorine, or lime.

The fillers: these requisitioned locals had to fill in the graves with soil. They are often those who find it the most difficult to talk about these events. One can understand this difficulty when we hear the accounts they give, the same almost everywhere. After the shootings, they say, “the ground moved for three days,” sometimes more.

The body pressers: often young girls, they had to throw sand on the “first layer” of bodies so that the later Jewish victims would agree more easily to lie down in the graves. On the signal of the executioners, they were ordered to run all together into the grave and press down the bodies with their feet. This was done to the bodies, sometimes those of their classmates or their neighbors, even when many of them were only injured.

The teeth pullers: those who pulled out the gold teeth of the Jews while they were waiting to be executed. The teeth were then gathered together to be given to Germans in the evening.

The musicians: while a very rare occurrence, the killers would sometimes summon musicians and force them to play to cover the noise of the shootings.

And this list is far from exhaustive.

Every one of these accounts plunges us into the absolute, day-to-day horror of the Holocaust by bullets. They confront us also with a new situation; that the point of view of each of these three groups has characteristics that encompass both victim and murderer in a single glance. An unbearable point of view.

THE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER

Over the course of the testimonies and the ground investigations, it is still the unexpected diversity of the ways of killing that is shocking. We have discovered that, in one of the adopted killing procedures, the Jewish men, women, and children were shot standing or sometimes kneeling on a board placed on the edge of the grave before being killed by a bullet to the head. Those who failed to fall into the grave were sometimes “helped” by “pushers.” In another method, sinisterly called “the can of sardines,” the executioners first made each person go down into the grave (by stairs carved from earth on the side) and forced to lie down beside the bodies of previous victims. This was considered an “economical” procedure, which allowed the killers, always conscious of efficiency, to avoid “tidying up” the corpses afterward. Very often, the children were thrown into the grave still alive, as this was also seen as a way to conserve ammunition. Many victims died by asphyxiation, suffocated by the sand thrown between two “layers” or by the piling up of bodies.

These executions by bullets, however, were far from the only method of killing. From one village to another, we have identified many more of them. At the town of Sataniv, several hundred Jews were walled up in a huge basement located under the market, where they were left to die. During four days, the entire village heard the cries and the wails of agony. Elsewhere, as at Yarmolintsi, it was a mine that served as the place of murder. More than 3,000 Jews were shut inside before the mine, along with its occupants, was blown up with dynamite. This was done with a detonator that we found in pieces at the site.

It is also important to examine the Holocaust by hanging, by starvation, by death marches, by forced labor, by beatings, by isolated executions, by fire, and by drowning. Indeed, many subjects have hardly been covered at all, such as the Holocaust of children, often thrown alive into the pits, as I mentioned earlier, or the Holocaust of women, another chapter still hardly explored in the context of the genocidal process in the East. These Jewish women were selected by the Germans as sex slaves and often were not killed until the end of the war. This is something often talked about by witnesses, yet they are not mentioned in any German archives.

These various discoveries on the Holocaust in Eastern Europe, which I cannot develop further here, show how the evidence on the ground—from oral testimonies and the study of material evidence—is simply irreplaceable. We cannot be content with merely protesting the rigor of historians who denounce the so-called vague and subjective memories of witnesses. If one proceeds with an extremely rigorous methodology, as I have attempted to show, the evidence on the ground and archival evidence, far from being conflicting, in fact reinforce each other. This issue of the convergence of evidence, which I have underlined throughout, has forced us to invent a new method of working. Undoubtedly this is present in what I call the “golden rule” and is the brand mark of the research carried out for several years by Yahad—In Unum.

DIVISION OF LABOR AND COOPERATION: THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN UKRAINE, 1941–1944

Markus Eikel

INTRODUCTION

German occupation policy in the Soviet Union sought to completely restructure the occupied territories through the extermination of Jews and Communists, the resettlement of large groups of the local population, and the total exploitation of all available resources. To implement this wide range of policies, only a relatively small number of German administrators, military, civilians, or police were deployed to work in the “East.” It was, therefore, imperative for the occupiers to secure significant support from certain segments of the local population.

In occupied Ukraine,¹ the Germans did not allow a collaborationist regime or any other local representation beyond the regional (oblast) level. However, both in urban centers and in rural areas, a Local Auxiliary Administration (*Hilfsverwaltung*) was established, headed by a city mayor (*Bürgermeister*) in the towns, a *raion* chief (*Rayonvorsteher*) in the districts, and a village elder (*Starost*) in the villages. The Local Auxiliary Administration had considerable manpower: the city administration in Kiev employed up to 19,000 people and the one in Stalino (Donetsk), 6,500.² Ukrainians, Russians, and ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) worked in the auxiliary administration and were also employed in the administrative bodies of the German military and civilian administration.

This paper focuses on the *Hilfsverwaltung* in occupied Ukraine. It is largely based on primary research conducted in regional archives of central and eastern Ukraine. In recent years, perpetrator research on the Holocaust has moved away from central Nazi institutions in Berlin and has focused more on responsible actors in the field. This includes studies on both German occupation personnel as well as research on the role of locals supporting the German occupation apparatus.³ For Ukraine, the research conducted by Father Patrick Desbois has demonstrated that the involvement of many locals in the implementation of the Holocaust was much broader than previously perceived.⁴ Research on administrative cooperation of locals in Ukraine has so far intensely focused on members of the various forms of Ukrainian auxiliary police

formations.⁵ The activities of members of the Local Auxiliary Administration in Ukraine, however, have not been the specific topic of any research.⁶ In this regard, Ukraine differs from other parts of the Nazi-occupied Soviet Union, where local administrators have become the subject of research.⁷ Dieter Pohl has come to the conclusion that the participation of the local administration in Ukraine in organizing the mass murder of the Jewish population still remains “to a large extent unclear.”⁸

This paper is organized into four parts:

1. A first section examines the functioning and the modus operandi of the *Hilfsverwaltung* under German occupation.
2. A second section describes the involvement of the *Hilfsverwaltung* in supporting the extermination of the local Jewish population, mainly in 1941 and 1942, and in providing assistance for the deportation of forced laborers to Germany, mainly in 1942 and 1943.
3. A third section tries to determine why locals in occupied Ukraine joined the local auxiliary administration.
4. A final section summarizes the role of the *Hilfsverwaltung* within the framework of the German occupation and tries to establish a link between administrative cooperation and responsibility for crimes committed under the specific circumstances of the German occupation.

FUNCTIONING AND MODUS OPERANDI

Before June 1941, the German leadership had no detailed plans as to what the future administrative shape of a Ukraine under German occupation would look like.⁹ Shortly after occupying the territory, the arriving military and police authorities established a local administration from “reliable” segments of the local population. These local administrative units were supposed to pass on the orders of the occupiers and, at the same time, to secure public order.¹⁰ By the end of August 1941, Security Division (*Sicherungsdivision*) 444 regarded the process of installing the heads of the local administration as more or less completed.¹¹ In some cases, as in Vinnytsia and Kiev, oblast administrations were initially established but dissolved after only a few months.¹² It seems that political and ethnic reliability and professional competence were the most important criteria for the Germans in appointing heads of the local administration. At times the Germans left the acting administrative heads in power; at

other times the military commandant traveled within his area of responsibility to select and appoint appropriate candidates from within the local population.¹³ It appears that the rank-and-file personnel were usually transferred from administrative structures from the preceding Soviet period.¹⁴

German security police/SD (*Sicherheitspolizei*; Sipo/SD) units or the secret field police (*Geheime Feldpolizei*) ran regular security checks on candidates to be employed in leading positions of the local administration, including checks for possible links to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).¹⁵ In reality, it turned out to be difficult for the occupation authorities to always double-check information submitted in a CV or questionnaire.¹⁶

In the course of the military campaign, German local military commandos (*Ortskommandanturen* [OKs] and *Feldkommandanturen* [FKs]), moved successively eastward and, when arriving in their new areas of responsibility, rechecked the political reliability and professional competence of the heads of the local administration. For example, in June 1942, FK 200, arriving in the Kremenchuk region, replaced mayors and village elders in 133 rural districts. The raion chief of Kremenchuk was discharged because he was judged to be incompetent for the job. The Sipo/SD arrested the mayor of the city of Kremenchuk because he had shown resistance to murdering the local Jews (“*hat versucht, Juden den geplanten Massnahmen zu entziehen*”).¹⁷ In general, the occupation authorities considered the potential for recruiting appropriate candidates as very limited: “Naturally, it is very difficult to find appropriate forces due to the complete lack of intelligence.”¹⁸

In the fall of 1941, representatives of both factions of the OUN (Bandera and Melnyk) were fairly successful in placing their candidates into key posts within the local administration. This policy showed success predominantly in Ukraine west of the Dnieper, especially in rural areas.¹⁹ The OUN had set so-called *pokhidni grupy* (marching groups) from western Ukraine in motion in advance, parallel to or behind the German army.²⁰ Frank Grelka has described how these OUN groups gained influence, at least temporarily, within the local administration of cities such as Kiev and Chernigiv.²¹ In some cities the Germans favored the appointments of locals over arriving OUN groups. For example, in Zaporizhzhia in October 1941, an OUN-B group arrived only after the occupiers had already appointed two ethnic German city mayors and did not gain influence within the local administration.²² Initially, in the summer and

early fall of 1941, the German authorities were tolerant toward the presence of these OUN representatives, but starting in the fall of 1941 and finishing at the latest by spring 1942, they systematically eliminated from the local administration everyone suspected of having ties to Ukrainian nationalists.²³

In Kiev the city administration (*mis'ka uprava*) was initially controlled by members of the OUN-M, who arrived in the city shortly after the Germans in September 1941. Following their suggestion, the occupation authorities appointed the historian Oleksander Ohloblyn as city mayor; he served from the end of September to the end of October 1941. On October 29, the Germans replaced Ohloblyn with his deputy, Volodymyr Bahazii, who also was a loyal member of the OUN-M. While in power, Bahazii brought other OUN-M members into key posts within the auxiliary administration, including the auxiliary police and the propaganda section. Bahazii's decrees included, among others, the introduction of Ukrainian as the official language, the establishment of a Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute, and the founding of a publishing house for Ukrainian school books. In February 1942 the Germans murdered Bahazii, as they did not trust him anymore.²⁴

Bahazii's politics have been considered a success of nationalistic policy, which he was able to disguise for a while by his demonstrative loyalty to the German city commandant.²⁵ Both Ohloblyn and Bahazii also headed the local administration in Kiev when the massacre in Babi Yar occurred, and the city administration became involved in administering the belongings of the murdered Jews. The German Sipo/SD's Event Report USSR (*Ereignismeldung*) mentioning Babi Yar included a reference to the fact that the valuables of the murdered Jews had been processed by the city administration.²⁶ The local auxiliary police in Kiev, headed by OUN-M member Roman Bidar,²⁷ became a key organ in implementing forced labor deportations in the city.

Analyzing the role of OUN members in the local auxiliary administration and auxiliary police under German occupation, one has to consider their role in following and implementing a nationalistic agenda as well as in supporting crimes that were an integral part of German occupation policies.

In regions of Ukraine with large settlements of ethnic Germans (for instance, around Zhytomyr, Melitopol, and Zaporizhzhia), a large percentage of ethnic Germans

were promoted to high positions within the local administration. The occupiers supported a policy of appointing local Germans, as Volksdeutsche were considered to be reliable both politically as well as ethnically (*volkstumsmäßig*).²⁸ However, local occupation bodies soon complained about professional incompetence and lack of appropriate attitude on the part of the ethnic Germans.

Many duties that the Local Auxiliary Administration fulfilled from 1941 to 1944 were routine administrative tasks that would have been performed by every local administration. Situation reports written by city mayors and raion chiefs focused on questions such as agricultural production; budget problems; health issues; monthly birth rates; cattle diseases; the state of roads, sidewalks and bridges; and housing issues. These “ordinary” functions of administration also were reflected in the structure of the local auxiliary administration (with subsections for labor, passports, police, finance, schools, industry, and commerce, agricultural matters, housing, and health care).²⁹ Only in some larger cities, as in Dnepropetrovsk, did a desk officer designated specifically for Jewish questions (*Judenreferent*) demonstrate that the city administration was directly involved in implementing the specific goals of German occupation policies.³⁰

For the city of Zaporizhzhia (with about 300,000 inhabitants during the occupation), many of the regular reports of the city administration have been preserved. In the early days of the occupation, they were drafted by Oberbürgermeister Jakob Heinrich Wiebe (who was replaced by the Russian S. Kolessnikov in late 1942). Wiebe’s reports show that, at the beginning of the occupation, the city administration mainly had to deal with the aftermath of the destruction caused during the fighting or by the Soviet authorities before they retreated and with food shortages in the city.³¹

In his April 1942 report, Wiebe also referred to the deployment of the local auxiliary police during the “Jewish action” (*Judenaktion*) in the city in March 1942.³² Formally, the auxiliary policemen were directly subordinate to the city mayor or raion chief; in reality, however, German police units issued direct orders to the indigenous police, thereby considerably reducing the role of local administrative units.

It should be stressed that members of the Local Auxiliary Administration only in very exceptional cases directly participated in the mass shootings of the Jewish population.³³

However, local administrative units were essential to providing preparatory and follow-up work to support the extermination of the local Jewish population. As the Germans lacked manpower and knowledge of specific local situations, the occupation authorities would have encountered difficulties in implementing the policy of mass murder without the assistance of the local administration.

Within the framework of a division of labor, the occupation authorities assigned the local auxiliary administration the tasks of identifying and isolating the local Jewish population. Before and after the mass executions, the local authorities were tasked with the administration of Jewish property, thereby providing mayors and raion chiefs the opportunity for personal enrichment.

In some parts of central Ukraine, local administrative units began to issue decrees discriminating against the local Jewish population even before the arrival of the occupying forces. At the end of July 1941, in Lityn, west of Vinnytsia, a local militia prohibited free movement of the local Jewish population in the fields and villages of the raion. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee of the Raion Spikhiv ordered in early August that, within five days, all local Jews had to wear a white armband with a blue Star of David.³⁴ In the context of isolating the Jews, the raion administration in Spikhiv (since August 1941 incorporated into Romanian-controlled Transnistria) ordered all Jews to move away from the town center.³⁵ A few weeks later, the raion chief ordered that Jews were forbidden to use all main roads. The Jewish elder also was advised that all Jews had to wash themselves on a regular basis, as every “dirty Jew” would from now on be shot.³⁶

FACILITATING AND SUPPORTING CRIMES: THE EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION

In the summer of 1941, one of the “immediate tasks” (*Sofort-Aufgaben*) assigned by the German military administration to local mayors and raion chiefs was the establishment of a local Jewish council (*Judenrat*) and a thorough registration of the whole local population, identifying Jews and ethnic Germans in separate categories.³⁷ The registration lists compiled by the local auxiliary administration enabled the occupation authorities to quickly and precisely identify the local Jewish population. For example, Mayor Wiebe of Zaporizhzhia reported in mid-October 1941, only about two weeks

after the arrival of the Germans, that his office had identified 4,000 Jews as living within the city limits.³⁸ Some of the lists had separate entries for Jewish skilled workers.³⁹ In this way the local auxiliary administration supported the Germans in identifying a certain segment of the Jewish population that the occupiers had designated for forced labor. The registration process of the Jewish population continued throughout the occupation period. In the summer of 1943, the local Registration Office in the city of Vinnytsia still registered “three half Jews” (*3 Halbjuden*).⁴⁰

In the bigger cities, Jewish survivors of the first killing wave in the summer and fall of 1941 were transferred to a ghetto and thereby further isolated from the rest of the population.⁴¹ Contemporaneous documents indicate that these ghettos were, in some cases, established and coadministered by the local administration.⁴² The city mayor of Zhytomyr was advised to sell food for the ghetto population to the Jewish elder.⁴³ In Bar, west of Vinnytsia, in December 1941, the raion chief ordered the whole Jewish population to move to three ghettos within the town limits. One of those ghettos was specifically established for Jewish craftsmen, based on a list that had already been submitted to the Jewish council. The housing department had to register all houses “vacated” by the Jews and was, at the same time, responsible for assigning new accommodations for those who were, at the time of the order, residing on the premises of the newly designated ghettos.⁴⁴ In Stalino, in February 1942, the Sipo/SD ordered the local administration to organize a Jewish ghetto in the city. The city mayor created the ghetto with the support of the district city heads and the auxiliary police. The local Jews were transferred to the ghetto in March 1942 and were killed in early May 1942.⁴⁵

It seems that some local administrators ordered the internment of the Jews on their own initiative. The FK in Kremenchuk reported in October 1941: “The mayor, without the participation of the FK, has moved part of the Jews (1,100 persons) to a camp of barracks, 2 kilometers [1.2 miles] outside the city.”⁴⁶

The local auxiliary administration also was directly involved in exploiting Jewish-owned property before and after the murder of the Jews. The occupiers gave the town or village administration the authority to determine a specific amount that the local Jewish community had to transfer into the local budget (*Busszahlung*).⁴⁷ Apparently, these payments were intended to balance the budgets of towns and raions. In October 1941, the FK in Dnepropetrovsk complained that the Sipo/SD had killed 15,000 Jews without consulting the military authorities. One negative side effect of this

measure was, in the eyes of the FK, that the Jews would no longer be able to make the intended payments into the city's budget and, therefore, alternatives for the revenues of the city administration would have to be found.⁴⁸ Administrative forms for the raion budget in 1941 had an entry for "Jewish tax" (*Judensteuer*) or "Jewish contribution" (*Judenabgabe*).⁴⁹ Part of the salary paid for the forced labor duty performed by Jewish workers in the occupied territory was directly transferred into the village or town budget as "saving salary" (*Sparlohn*).⁵⁰

After a mass shooting, personnel in the local auxiliary administration were supposed to register and provisionally administer the remaining property and then either transfer it to the occupation authorities⁵¹ or, as in the case of Babi Yar, distribute it to local inhabitants. In some cases, members of the local administration directly profited from "sold goods" (*realizovane majno*) or "unattended goods" (*realizovane bezgospodarche majno*). The buyer paid directly to the village head, who was supposed to transfer the money into the bank account of the raion finance department.⁵² The local administration also determined the selling price for items from "Jewish assets" (*Judennachlass*). For that specific purpose, in June 1942, the Vinnytsia city mayor hired an additional 10 to 15 employees. A complaint by the finance department of the town administration indicated that the process of registering and selling Jewish property had led to irregularities, as it was likely that some of the involved personnel used the process for personal enrichment.⁵³ The German authorities remained suspicious that local administrators, and especially members of the auxiliary police, would keep these belongings to themselves.⁵⁴

One of the reports from the city mayor of Zaporizhzhia demonstrated how important selling "Jewish property" was for the city budget. From October 1941 to February 1942, a third of the city's revenues came from selling "unattended goods." Selling Jewish property, for this period, replaced taxes as the main source of revenue for the city budget.⁵⁵

Vacated "Jewish houses" (*Judenhäuser*) also became an asset of interest for locals who wanted to move to a better or more prestigious location. The example of Bar quoted above shows that the local administration was in charge of administering houses. In Rostov many housing administrators informed the Germans of where Jews and Communists resided.⁵⁶ In Vinnytsia, on 16 April 1942, while about 5,000 local Jews were being shot,⁵⁷ the housing department received first requests from local

residents who wanted to move into vacated (*freistehend*) or released (*freiwerdend*) houses. Only four days after the killing, an ethnic German family moved into one of the houses formerly owned by a Jewish family. The city administration normally approved these requests, especially for ethnic Germans and privileged professional groups (for instance, an auxiliary criminal policeman in September 1942).⁵⁸

When the Germans started deporting young Ukrainians for forced labor in Germany in 1942, they relied heavily on local auxiliary administration and local auxiliary police:⁵⁹ “For the deportations, even more than for the Holocaust of the Jews and Roma, the Nazis needed native-born officials to become closely involved.”⁶⁰ Initially, the Germans assigned recruitment quotas to districts and raions; later, they intended to recruit whole years of young Ukrainians (born in 1924, 1925, and 1926); and finally, when retreating, they forcibly took many local inhabitants with them for labor. While implementing these methods of forced labor recruitment, raion chiefs and village elders acted as direct executive agents of the occupation regime. They were not in a position to influence the dimension of the forced labor program, but, within their raions and villages, were made directly responsible for the selection of the deportees. Because of this involvement in the forced labor deportations, the Soviet authorities arrested many former village elders and raion heads after the war.⁶¹ As with the implementation of the mass murder of the Jews, without the cooperation of the local auxiliary administration, the occupation authorities would have encountered great difficulties in implementing the forced labor measures to the extent that they intended; city mayors, raion heads, and village elders greatly facilitated, not always voluntarily, the deportation of about 1.7 million Ukrainians to Germany from 1942 to 1944.

MOTIVES

Available sources provide only limited information as to why certain inhabitants of occupied Ukraine joined local administrative units. Surviving archival documents of the local auxiliary administration ordinarily consist of orders and decrees issued by the city mayor or raion chief, and nearly nothing is said in them about the professional background or motives of their authors. The reports of the occupation authorities, however, do contain some information regarding the more senior local administrators. Especially in the beginning of the occupation period, the respective military or police authority described how a local administration was established and why certain

individuals were deemed suitable or not for the position of mayor. These documents, though, are written from the ideologically extremely prejudiced view of occupation personnel who might not have been able to truly identify motives and attitudes within the population, including members of the local administration.⁶² Memoirs of former administrators, another relevant source group, tend to overemphasize a genuinely nationalistic agenda⁶³ or do not cover at all the former role within the local administration.⁶⁴

The use of Soviet investigative and trial material is also problematic.⁶⁵ Investigations from the immediate postwar period were almost always conducted in a very prejudiced and one-sided way. As a consequence, investigative files provide only very limited insight into the motives of a former local administrator. Entire villages were condemned as collaboration nests; inhabitants, including former mayors and village elders, were rounded up en masse; some were killed, others deported.⁶⁶ Finally, testimonies of victims also might provide insight into the motives of individual local administrators.⁶⁷

Notwithstanding the source-related limitations, the following motives likely played a role in locals joining administrative units during the German occupation:

- The most common motive was likely to be the prospect of material gain and social promotion. Working in the local administration guaranteed job security, a decent salary, food, the chance to help family and friends, exemption from forced labor deportations, and an opportunity for personal enrichment.⁶⁸ In some cases, former tsarist civil servants reemerged. The mayor of Berezovka, for example, a Ukrainian, had already been mayor of the same town in tsarist times.⁶⁹
- Interethnic motives: ethnic Germans, especially, had suffered from discrimination under the Soviet regime in the 1930s and were now treated with preference by the new occupation powers. Ethnic Germans might have regarded the new regime as an opportunity for promotion and possibly also for seeking revenge for the discrimination they had earlier suffered. Zaporizhzhia city mayor Wiebe had been a tsarist administrator with a university degree and then worked as an accountant during Soviet times. His deputy, Isaak Reimer, had lost his job as a teacher under the Soviets and had, according to the FK, “greatly

suffered under the bolshevist reign.”⁷⁰ Some documents indicate that the occupiers tried to pursue a policy of preferring the appointments of Ukrainians to Russians.⁷¹ Orders issued by local administrative units discriminating against the local Jewish population indicate an existing antisemitism in place around the time of the arrival of the Germans, but further clarification is needed to determine to what extent antisemitism was a relevant motive in joining the local administration under German occupation.

- Nationalistic motives: as outlined above, for at least an initial period in 1941, representatives of both wings of the OUN occupied key posts in the local auxiliary administration, especially west of the Dnieper. The leadership of the OUN had encouraged its members to join the local administration (and police) to improve their material situation and to use the local administration as a vehicle for implementing a Ukrainian-nationalistic agenda.⁷² Official German tolerance for this strategy ended by the fall of 1941, but in some cities of central and eastern Ukraine, nationalistic groups seemed to have maintained their influence on the local administration far beyond that time.⁷³ Further research should analyze how these administrations functioned after the end of 1941 within the framework created by the occupiers.
- Dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Soviet regime: especially in the early days of the occupation, the Germans were greeted by the population with expectations that they would improve the standard of living and would help to correct some of the failures of the Soviet system.⁷⁴ This attitude, especially dominant in rural areas, might explain why individuals, even including members of the Communist Party, initially volunteered to join the local auxiliary administration. For the Zhytomyr region, Wendy Lower described indigenous leaders of this early period as having the following characteristics: mostly over 40 years old; with middle-school education; from the local professional class of teachers, doctors, priests, and bookkeepers; previously in a leadership position; with a few of the older ones having been middle-ranking civil servants during the tsarist period.⁷⁵ This group might initially have been motivated to work toward better governance and a more effective economic system; their anti-Soviet sentiment might not have been motivated primarily by the experience of repression.⁷⁶ The head of the oblast administration in Vinnytsia, Kezar Bernard, an engineer by training, in the fall of 1941 provided his superiors with numerous suggestions as to how to improve the working and

functioning of the administration of the district, thereby demonstrating that he was clearly interested in making the system of governance more effective.⁷⁷ Sooner or later it became clear to these local administrators that the occupiers would not fulfill expectations, but, by that time, most of them had already become involved in supporting some of the crimes committed by the Germans.

The turnover among local administrators apparently was high,⁷⁸ and, if a mayor was deemed unreliable the Germans did not hesitate to kill him (as was likely the case of Mayor Bahazii in Kiev). It was, therefore, difficult and dangerous for locals to avoid carrying out orders issued by the Germans. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, it seems that when the occupation authorities gave orders to identify and isolate the Jews and, in some cases, to establish and administer ghettos, to administer the belongings and houses of the murdered Jews, and later to select and physically collect young Ukrainians for forced labor deportations, some locals were, as part of the *Hilfsverwaltung*, available and willing to carry out these measures.

CONCLUSION

Within a framework of a division of labor, the German occupation authorities in Ukraine assigned many tasks to be executed by local administrative units. The German occupation authorities regarded local administrators as supporters and executors of German interests rather than as equal partners. The discretion of the local administrators was therefore very limited, and city mayors and raion chiefs often used the little discretion they had to personally enrich themselves rather than to support or protect the indigenous population.

An occupation situation implies that, up to a certain level, the occupying power and the locals have to work together in order to guarantee the survival and well-being of the indigenous population in the areas of occupation.⁷⁹ The problem of using the term *collaboration*, with all its negative connotations for this kind of administrative “working together,” has been discussed in publications before.⁸⁰ The term *cooperation* seems more appropriate to capture the realities and necessities of the occupation situation. Administrative cooperation under the specific circumstances of the German occupation in World War II, however, automatically asks for involvement in the crimes

that were an integral part of this very occupation. In the case of the local administration in occupied Ukraine, cooperation led, in most cases, to involvement in those crimes, foremost in facilitating the murder of the local Jewish population and later in carrying out the deportation of forced laborers to Germany.

NOTES

¹ This article focuses on the areas of Ukraine that were part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (RKU), administered by a civilian administration, and the areas of German military administration, primarily to the east of the RKU. The focus is not on the parts of Ukraine being incorporated into the Generalgouvernement (administered from Cracow) or the Romanian-controlled Transnistria (the region between the rivers Dniester and Bug).

² Numbers quoted in Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 151; Tanja Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass unter deutscher Okkupation,” in *Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939–1945*, ed. Christoph Dieckmann et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 201.

³ Summarized by Johannes Hürter and Jürgen Zarusky in their edited work, *Besatzung, Kollaboration, Holocaust: Neue Studien zur Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden. Mit einer Reportage von Wassili Grossman* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), VII–X. For occupied Ukraine, see the study on German Security Police/SD personnel by Alexander V. Prusin, “A Community of Violence: The SiPo/SD and Its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiew,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 1–30.

⁴ Father Patrick Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets. A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁵ Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000); Dieter Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden,” in *Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?* ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 205–34; Frank Golczewski, “Organe der deutschen Besatzungsmacht: Die ukrainischen Schutzmannschaften,” in *Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), 173–96. Indigenous police formations have also been the topic of research for other regions of the occupied Soviet Union; see, for Estonia, Ruth Bettina Birn, *Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland 1941–1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); for Lithuania, Knut Stang, *Kollaboration und Massenmord: Die litauische Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996).

⁶ They have been best dealt with in the general works on German-occupied Ukraine by Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 39–41, 51–53, 118, 151–52, 259–61 passim; and Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005), 11–12, 45–52, 105–6, 180–81, 189–90 *passim*.

⁷ In a concise overview: Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 178–180. For the occupied parts of the Russian Federation, B. N. Kovalev, *Natsistskaja okkupatsija i kollaboratsionizm v Rossii, 1941–1944* (Moscow 2004). For Belarus, Bernhard Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weißrußland 1941–1944* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998); Leonid Rein, “Local Collaboration in the Execution of the ‘Final Solution’ in Nazi-Occupied Belorussia,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 20, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 381–409. For Latvia, Katrin Reichelt, “Der Anteil der Letten an der Enteignung der Juden ihres Landes zwischen 1941 und 1943,” in *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, 224–42.

⁸ See Dieter Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine: Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im Reichskommissariat 1941–1944,” in *Ausbeutung, Vernichtung, Öffentlichkeit: Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik*, ed. Norbert Frei, Sybille Steinbacher, and Bernd C. Wagner (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2000), 135–74, here 168.

⁹ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 98; Frank Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung unter deutscher Besatzungsherrschaft 1918 und 1941/42* (Wiesbaden: Harrosowitz, 2005), 357.

¹⁰ For Vinnytsia region, see the following examples: Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vinnitskoï Oblasti (DAVO) 1311s/1s/8, pp. 80–82: Fieldkommandant, Administrative Order no. 1, n.d.; *ibid.*, p. 309: Administrative Order no. 2—Summary of most important measures, n.d.

¹¹ Central’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv (CDAVO), Kopyia mikrofilymy (KMF) 8/2/33, frame 570: Security Division 444, Abt. VII, Situation report, 28 August 1941.

¹² See the documentation of the Vinnytsia Oblast Administration, kept in DAVO, fond 1311s, headed by the ethnic German Kezar Bernard. For Kiev, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 52.

¹³ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 48.

¹⁴ Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft,” 204.

¹⁵ CDAVO KMF 8/2/53, frame 359: OK I/833, Situation report, 13.10.1941; KMF 8/2/55, frame 763: Befehlsstelle Kdt. des rückwärtigen Armeegebietes 553, 17 October 1941; Rossiyski Gosudarstvenny Voyenny Arkhiv (RGVA) Moskau 1275/3/666,

frame 14: Field Kommandantur 240, Abt. VII: Situation report, 19 October 1941; Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 370.

¹⁶ For Belorussia, see Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front*, 124.

¹⁷ CDAVO KMF 8/2/33, frame 348: FK 200(V), Situation report, June 17, 1942. Further examples for the discharge of city mayors and raion chiefs, CDAVO KMF 8/2/53, frame 387: OK I /853 to Korück 553, Situation report for the period October 20–30, 1941, October 29, 1941 (“*Der Bürgermeister musste jedoch abgesetzt werden, da sich nachher herausstellte, dass seine Frau eine Jüdin ist.*”); KMF 8/2/33, frame 246: FK (V) 248, Situation report for the period April 16–May 15, 1942 (“*auf Grund der bis jetzt vorliegenden Erkenntnisse wurden der Polizeichef von Oposchnia erschossen, die Rayonchefs von Kischenka und Oposchnia sowie der Leiter der Finanzabteilung in Novo Senshary ihres Amtes enthoben.*”).

¹⁸ “*Vorläufige Bürgermeister und Rayonchefs sind . . . durchweg eingesetzt, die Auffindung geeigneter Kräfte macht naturgemäss bei dem Fehlen jeder Intelligenz grosse Schwierigkeiten.*” CDAVO KMF 8/2/33, frame 348: FK 200 (V), Situation report, June 17, 1942; with the same tenor: frame 605: Situation report of Military Administrative Group in Walki, June 16, 1942; frame 570: Security Division 444, Section VII, Situation report, August 28, 1941.

¹⁹ Frank Golczewski, “Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine,” in *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, 168–70; for Zhytomyr region, see Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 38–40.

²⁰ Franziska Bruder, *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben! Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 128.

²¹ Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 401–12.

²² Bundesarchiv (BA) Berlin R58/218: Event Report UdSSR no. 143, December 8, 1941. For Dnipropetrovsk, R58/218: Event Report USSR no. 132, November 12, 1941.

²³ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 52, writes that the Germans started to kill Melnykites in November 1941 (examples from Zhytomyr and Bazar). The first Banderites were shot in early September 1941; the Einsatzgruppen, as official policy, shot all Banderites by late November 1941. As examples from the local administration: the mayor of Poltava (OUN-M) was shot in 1942; the deputy city mayor of Kherson (OUN-M) was liquidated in late 1941; see John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 262, 270.

²⁴ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 52; Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 406; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 102–3.

²⁵ Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 408.

²⁶ “Money, valuables, underwear and clothes were seized. Some were given to the NSV to be passed on to ethnic Germans, some to the provisional municipal administration for transfer to the population in need, “*In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Gruppenstabe und 2 Kommandos des Polizei-Regiments Süd hat das Sonderkommando 4a am 29. und 30.9.33 771 Juden exekutiert. Geld, Wertsachen, Wäsche und Kleidungsstücke wurden sichergestellt und zum Teil der NSV zur Ausrüstung der Volksdeutschen, zum Teil der kommissarischen Stadtverwaltung zur Überlassung an die bedürftige Bevölkerung übergeben.*” See BA Berlin R58/218: Event Report UdSSR no. 106, October 7, 1941.

²⁷ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 103.

²⁸ See, for instance, the guidelines issued by CDAVO KMF 8/2/33, frame 1156: Befehlshaber Rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Süd, Situation report, February 17, 1942.

²⁹ See the monthly reports of the ethnic German mayor of Zaporizhzhia, Derzhavny Archiv Zaporiskoi Oblasti (DAZO) 1433/3/7. For the structure of the city administration of Stalino, see Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft,” 201; for the *raion* administration in Lityn (September 1941), see DAVO 1311s/1/5, pp. 35–40: Report about the work of the Litynski raion administration; for Vinnytsia Oblast administration, see 1311s/1s/270: Bernard (Head of Vinnytsia Oblast Administration) to FK, November 6, 1941; for the raion administration in Poltava, see CDAVO KMF 5/2/33, frame 168: Report about the administrative structures as discovered in the Raion Poltava, January 6, 1942.

³⁰ Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte,” 213. See for Belorussia, the existence of a “Department for Jewish Affairs” in the city administration of Minsk, quoted by Leonid Rein, “Local Collaboration,” 392.

³¹ DAZO 1433/3/7, Situation report of the city administration of Zaporizhzhia for the period October 1941 to February 1942; February 1942.

³² DAZO 1433/3/7: Situation report of the city administration of Zaporizhzhia for March 1942, April 10, 1942. On March 24, 1942, 3,700 Jews were killed in Zaporizhzhia. See Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 149.

³³ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 77, quotes as an example the ethnic German city mayor of Berdychiv, who participated in the execution of the local Jews in September 1941.

³⁴ DAVO 1416s/1c/1, Order no. 5 of Lityn militia, July 31, 1941; and 1417/3/1, Order no. 1, 4 August 1941.

³⁵ DAVO 1417/3/1 Raion administration Spikhiv, Order no. 14, September 12, 1941.

³⁶ DAVO 1417/3/1 Raion administration Spikhiv to Jewish elder, October 10, 1941.

³⁷ *Merkblatt über die Sofort-Aufgaben der Rayonvorsteher und Bürgermeister* (probably Fall/Winter 1941), cited by Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941/1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 227.

³⁸ RGVA 1275/3/661, FK 676, Abt. VII, Report, October 21, 1941.

³⁹ DAVO 1417s/8s/10, Prefect Tulcin to Raion Head Spikhiv, December 29, 1941 (example from Romanian-controlled Transnistria).

⁴⁰ DAVO 1312s/1s/15, List of inhabitants according to ethnicity (*Volkszugehörigkeit*).

⁴¹ See the order of Reichskommissar Koch to establish ghettos in bigger cities from early September 1941, quoted by Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 69.

⁴² For the short-term character of the ghettos in occupied Ukraine, see Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 86–90; for the administration of ghettos by the local city council in occupied Belorussia, see Rein, “Local Collaboration,” 391–92.

⁴³ CDAVO KMF 8/2/34, frame 43: FK 197, Situation report for September 20, 1941.

⁴⁴ DAVO 1358s/1s/1 Raion administration Bar, Order no. 21, December 15, 1941.

⁴⁵ Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft,” 206.

⁴⁶ FK 239, Situation report September 15–October 15, 1941; October 24, 1941; quoted by Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte,” 213.

⁴⁷ *Merkblatt über Sofort-Aufgaben*, cited by Angrick, *Die Einsatzgruppe D*, 227.

⁴⁸ RGVA 1275/3/666: FK 240, Abt. VII, Situation report, October 19, 1941.

⁴⁹ DAVO 1312/2/1341: Report regarding the distribution of taxes for the oblast budget in the raions for August to December 1941.

⁵⁰ DAVO 1411s/1s/9: Town administration Lityn to Agricultural Bank Lityn, March 26, 1942.

⁵¹ Angrick, *Die Einsatzgruppe D*, 229.

⁵² DAVO 1411s/1s/9: Town administration Lityn, Receipt for money, February 19, 1942.

⁵³ DAVO 1312s/1s/1333: Starosta Vinnytsia city to City Commissar, June 2, 1942. For an example from Stalino, see Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft,” 210.

- ⁵⁴ Martin Dean, “Jewish Property Seized in the Occupied Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942: The Records of the Reichshauptkasse Beutestelle,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 91.
- ⁵⁵ DAZO 1433/3/7: Activity report of the city administration of Zaporizhzhia for the period October 1941 to February 1942, February 1942.
- ⁵⁶ Jones, “ ‘Every Family Has Its Freak.’ Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948,” *Slavic Review* 64, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 754.
- ⁵⁷ Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 158.
- ⁵⁸ Documents related to this paragraph are in DAVO 1312/1/977.
- ⁵⁹ For a detailed description of the German forced labor measures in occupied Ukraine with the corresponding sourcing, see Markus Eikel, “Weil die Menschen fehlen. Die deutschen Zwangsarbeitsrekrutierungen und –deportationen in den besetzten Gebieten der Ukraine 1941–1944,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 53, no. 5 (2005): 405–33; for the role of the local auxiliary administration, 427–32.
- ⁶⁰ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 261.
- ⁶¹ Eikel, “Weil die Menschen fehlen,” 427–28.
- ⁶² See, for example, the stereotypical description of the city mayor of Dnepropetrovsk by the FK: “*Dass bei allen Arbeiten, die ausgeführt werden müssen, infolge der stammeseigenen Schlappeheit ein gewisser Druck dahinter gesetzt werden muss, ist wohl eine in der Ukraine überall gemachte Erfahrung.*” RGVA 1275/3/666, pp. 14–18: Field Kommandantur 240, Section VII: Situation report of Field Kommandantur, Abt. VII, October 19, 1941.
- ⁶³ For example, the memoirs of the deputy city mayor of Kharkiv: Oleksander Semenenko, *Kharkiv, Kharkiv . . .* (Munich: Suchasnit, 1976).
- ⁶⁴ For example, the published version of the memoirs of the city mayor of Smolensk, Boris Georgievich Menshagin, *Vovpominaniia, Smolensk . . . Katyn . . . Vladimirskaia tiurma* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1988). The former city mayor of Kiev, Oleksander Ohloblyn, immigrated to the United States after the war but never published anything about his time as a mayor. See the Wikipedia entry for Oleksander Ohloblyn: (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleksandr-Ohloblyn, accessed September 21, 2012), according to which “politics under the Nazis was not to his taste and he quickly retired from his public positions and returned to his scholarly work.”
- ⁶⁵ Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 170, estimates that the total number of Soviet investigations against former members of auxiliary administration and auxiliary police was in the tens of thousands. The total number of Soviet citizens arrested in the Soviet

Union between 1942 and 1953 was 320,000. See Tanja Penter, “Collaboration on Trial: New Source Material and Soviet Postwar Trials against Collaborators,” *Slavic Review* 4 (Winter 2005): 783.

⁶⁶ Wendy Lower, “Local Participation in the Crimes of Holocaust in Ukraine: Forms and Consequences” (lecture, a conference organized by the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, Berlin, January 2009; <http://www.bpb.de/files.Z55Z90.pdf> [accessed September 25, 2009]).

⁶⁷ See, for example, Crispin Brooks, “Video History Archive Interviews on the Holocaust in Ukraine” (this volume), for an example from the *uprava* in Bar, Vinnytsia oblast.

⁶⁸ Golczewski, “Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine,” 174–75; Penter, “Collaboration on Trial,” 785.

⁶⁹ CDAVO KMF 8/2/53, frame 195: OK II/939 to Korück, August 15, 1941.

⁷⁰ RGVA 1275/3/661: FK 676, Abt. VII, October 21, 1941.

⁷¹ CDAVO KMF 8/2/33: Situation report Administrative Group for the period 16 May to 15 June 1942, Walki, June 16, 1942.

⁷² Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 383, 397.

⁷³ Examples quoted by Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, are the city administrations of Proskurov (256), Kharkiv (260), Krivoj Rog (267), and Kherson (270).

⁷⁴ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 114–17; Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 36–38.

⁷⁵ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 50.

⁷⁶ Penter, “Collaboration on Trial,” 786.

⁷⁷ See his proposals kept in DAVO fond 1311s.

⁷⁸ For village elders, see Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 118; for occupied Belorussia, see Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front*, 124.

⁷⁹ Editorial, in *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, 11.

⁸⁰ See, for a summary of the research, Editorial, *Kooperation und Verbrechen*, 9–14.

“THE JEWS ARE COMPLETELY DESTROYED”: THE FATE OF JEWISH MINORITIES IN THE CRIMEA IN WORLD WAR II

Norbert Kunz

The Third Reich’s killing machine was unable to attain the National Socialists’ professed objective: the utter annihilation of the European Jews. In microcosm, however, the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” did indeed become a sad reality in regions such as the Crimea.¹ The peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea was wholly or partially under German military administration for about two-and-a-half years, from fall 1941 to spring 1944. German planning for the postwar period provided for incorporating this ancient settlement area of the Germanic Ostrogoths into the Reich under the name *Gotengau* (Goth District), and Germanizing it completely. For the Germans, allegedly a “people without space” (*Volk ohne Raum*),² a space free of all non-Germans was to be created on the Crimean Peninsula.³ On the Black Sea coast, therefore, the National Socialists’ hatred of the Jews, rooted in racism, at a very early stage included an element of *Raumpolitik* as well. The removal of all Jews was considered an indispensable prerequisite for the planned postwar order. To reach that point, however, the occupiers in the Black Sea area had to determine just who was to be considered a Jew.

THE JEWS ON THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA

In the Crimea in 1941, the German occupiers encountered demographic conditions that were not comparable with those in other occupied regions. On this peninsula with a highly multiethnic flavor, the composition of the Crimean population, which numbered at least 1.1 million, included more than 70 different national minorities before the war began in 1939. In addition to a two-thirds majority of Slavs, who were Russian and Ukrainian in origin, and a comparatively large share of Crimean Tatars (19 percent), at least 65,000 people living on the peninsula were classified as Jews.⁴ Like the Crimean population in general, however, the Jews of the peninsula were not homogeneous. On the contrary, resident there were several population groups who could be considered Jewish minorities or who had a close association with Judaism.⁵ Because in the Third

Reich the racial stereotype of the enemy focused on Jews as such, life and death in the Crimea thus depended largely on the racial credentials assigned to a particular collective. To some extent, however, the ethnic definition of the groups concerned remains a ground for debate to this day. This is attributable to various factors, including different derivations of historic roots, the extent of foreign influence, the degree of assimilation, and the question of religious practice. As a result, mix-ups with some astonishing consequences for categorization occurred on occasion.⁶

The oldest roots of Jewish settlement in the Crimea date to the first century BCE and are related to the Hellenistic colonization of the Black Sea coast.⁷ In the following centuries, immigration of both Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews and multiple processes of assimilation produced a Jewish community whose members were referred to from the eighteenth century on as Krimchaks (or as Crimean Jews). In 1941 members of this nationality represented one of the Crimea’s longest-resident ethnic groups. Rooted in the rabbinic tradition of Judaism, the Krimchaks of the twentieth century exhibited a strong Crimean Tatar influence in their cultural characteristics. Their language, for example, was a Tatar dialect written in Hebrew characters.⁸ As late as the 1970s, however, the *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, for example, defined their ethnic origin as “not conclusively resolved.”⁹ Though some scholars erroneously held the opinion that the Krimchaks were ethnically Tatars who in the intervening years had adopted the Jewish faith,¹⁰ the membership of the Krimchaks in the Jewish community is virtually uncontested today.¹¹

The situation was different, however, with regard to the so-called Karaims (Karaites, Qarays) in the Crimea. When the war broke out, Karaim settlements existed also in Lithuania, North America, and here and there in Europe. The main area of settlement, however, was the Crimea, where Evpatoriia was the primary cultural center. By 1941 the Karaims, like the Krimchaks, also were heavily assimilated into the Tatar culture. The everyday customs and language of the Karaims were closely associated with the Turkic cultural element, though their script uses the Hebrew alphabet. In matters of religious practice, however, the Karaim community rejected the Talmud and instead based its faith exclusively on the Old Testament. This circumstance also is responsible for the classification of the Karaims as a “Jewish sect,” according to the current scholarly consensus.¹² Thus, the ethnic roots of the nationality may be found in Babylonian Jewry. According to this same theory of origin, the Karaims turned away from the doctrines of Babylonian Judaism in the eighth century, rejecting the authority

of the rabbinic tradition. By circuitous routes, the splinter group reached the Crimea in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹³ In opposition to this prevailing view is the opinion that the Karaims of the Crimea are an ethnic Turkic community of Khazar or Kipchak origin, which converted to the Karaite faith only at some later time. Ironically, today most Crimean Karaites also avow their allegedly ethnic Turkic roots.¹⁴ The “Ashkenazim”—members of so-called *Ostjudentum* (“East European Jewry”)—were by far the largest Jewish group in the Crimea. For a long time, the new Jewish settlers in the Crimea were assimilated into the Krimchak culture, and only at the end of the nineteenth century did an independent Ashkenazic community arise.¹⁵ Before the twentieth century, about 30,000 East European Jews already had settled in the Crimea. In the 1920s and 1930s, in the course of the so-called Crimea Project and with support from American Jewish organizations as well, additional immigrants came to the Black Sea, where they were expected to establish agricultural colonies. Generous amounts of land were made available to them under a settlement program. As a result, two Jewish national districts, Fraidorf (1930) and Larindorf (1935), were organized, as well as several Jewish agricultural settlements, including Simferopol’, Evpatoriia, and Dzhankoi.¹⁶ At the same time, the program gave rise to resentment and anger against the local Jews (and against the Russians and Ukrainians) on the part of the Crimean Tatars as well as the ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*), because the Soviets’ selective settlement policy had resulted in large-scale confiscation of the lands of Tatar and ethnic German farmers. Moreover, both ethnic groups had lost enormous political and demographic influence because of the new “neighbors.”¹⁷

Not until 1939, immediately before the outbreak of war, were a small number of so-called Mountain Jews (“*Juhuro/Juvuro*”) settled on the peninsula, also with American assistance.¹⁸ The Mountain Jews originally were inhabitants of the Caucasus. Because of their periodically close coexistence with the Tats, a Muslim people in the Caucasus whose language and other features they adopted, the Mountain Jews repeatedly were conflated with the Tats: a misapprehension to which the local German occupying power on the Crimea also was subject.

In 1941 their involvement in traditional agrarian occupations led the Crimea’s Mountain Jews to settle in the remote Shaumian Kolkhoz near Evpatoriia. Thus far, historical scholarship has almost completely overlooked the fate of this small group.¹⁹

THE NAZIS’ PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

Under the Third Reich, the approach to determining who was a Jew was quite different in the Reich itself than the *modus operandi* in the occupied Soviet territories, where the Jewish population was heterogeneous and certificates of parentage frequently were unavailable.²⁰ The German line of action there was quintessentially grotesque. Employees of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (*Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete*; RMO), which bore responsibility for the civil administration of the conquered Soviet areas, were still working, for example, on a definition of Jewishness at a time when the extermination of the Jews not only was a settled matter, but had long since begun to be carried out by Himmler’s death squads in the *Einsatzgruppen* (task forces) in the East.²¹ How tragically abstruse the criteria for ethnic classification, and thus the decision on the life or death of an individual, is illustrated by the alleged “factual evidence” compiled in an RMO plan: “Thus, it is certain that Jews cannot pronounce various Russian words correctly, such as the word *kukuruza* [corn]. This, in combination with the external appearance of the person concerned should . . . be sufficient to declare the person concerned to be a Jew.”²² Therefore, unless identity had already been substantiated by acknowledgment or by ancestry, the pronunciation of a single word was to be the decisive criterion for ethnic classification and thus for the fate of the individual concerned. The extent to which the local German decision makers would be capable of judging what constituted correct pronunciation in Russian, a language with which they were not exactly conversant, was left open in this context.

As they advanced toward the Black Sea, the German Eleventh Army and, in its wake, the infamous *Einsatzgruppe D*, generally encountered Ashkenazic Jews, whose Jewish identity was indisputable. Problems arose only in the Crimea, where, besides the dominant Ashkenazim, other minorities also seemed to have at least a close association with Judaism. From a present-day standpoint, it is surprising that no doubts arose in connection with the Mountain Jews. Admittedly, the RMO, for example, unequivocally defined the members of this minority as Jews.²³ But even if the authorities in charge in the Crimea actually were aware of that, the unerringness with which the Mountain Jews were identified as such is still amazing. In the local setting, the Mountain Jews actually could not be differentiated from the Tats,²⁴ whose community in the Caucasus was not included in the Shoah.²⁵ In the Crimea, however, the small number of Mountain Jews

apparently was not deemed large enough to warrant taking on the burden of an elaborate racial investigation process.

The case of the Karaims and Krimchaks was different, however: here Himmler's local representatives vacillated, unable to decide whether these groups were Jews. SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Ohlendorf, the head of Einsatzgruppe D, was reluctant to make the decision on his own authority—a unique event for a high-ranking SS officer in the context of killing Soviet Jews. As for the Wehrmacht, the local commander of Feodosiia, Major Neumann, wasted no time on such qualms and found a simple formula. He viewed the Karaims encountered there as “Jews without the Talmud,” while he saw the Krimchaks, by contrast, as “Moham[edan] Jews.”²⁶ The latter, he reaffirmed four days later, were “racially perfect Jews.”²⁷ Neumann's discernment here undoubtedly stemmed less from his ethnological training than from his fundamentally racist views.²⁸

The circumstances encountered on the peninsula, however, plunged the technocrat Ohlendorf into a profound conflict. The “resettlement of the Jews” thus ran “into difficulties” at once.²⁹ At any rate, the head of the Einsatzgruppe was reluctant to implement an ad hoc solution on his own authority, as Neumann, between the lines, suggested he do. Instead, he endeavored to take the “correct action”—as gauged by his ill-omened standards. The guidelines from Berlin were not adequate for reaching a straightforward solution in the field.³⁰ What weight should be assigned to ethnic origin, on the one hand, and to issues of religious affiliation, on the other? Ohlendorf seemed disinclined to equate Jewish religious belief automatically with being a member of the Jewish people. At all events, he conveyed to his superiors in Berlin the image of “non-Jewish inhabitants of Mosaic faith” among the residents of the Crimea.³¹ Ohlendorf's motives, however, certainly were not adequately described when his defense attorney in the postwar trial claimed that his client had tried to save both ethnic groups from certain death, and even claimed that in the case of the Karaims he had succeeded.³²

In fact, in the field, Ohlendorf resorted to an unusual racial investigation procedure. He made inquiries about the dubious minorities among the Crimean Tatars, among the Ashkenazim, who were certain candidates for death, and even among the threatened Karaim and Krimchak communities. He reported the result to Berlin on December 5, 1941, with a request for a decision: “The Karaims, by their own admission, have nothing in common with the Jews except their faith. In terms of their blood, they claim to be the descendants of a Mongol group that once lived in the Black

Sea region. In contrast to the Jews, in tsarist times they had full civil rights, a fact of which they remain proud to this day.”³³ In the findings, Ohlendorf thus laid stress on a distance from Judaism that could be explained at least in ethnic terms. This made sense for strategic reasons alone in view of the unstable military situation in the winter of 1941–1942. After all, the Crimean Karaims had powerful advocates in the Crimean Tatars, the Germans’ most important ally in the Black Sea area. Crimean Tatar representatives repeatedly made an effort to describe the Karaims to the new overlords as a “brother people” and thereby to work toward saving them. For example, the leaders of the Crimean Tatars in German exile wrote a memorandum especially for this purpose, emphasizing their cultural proximity to the Karaims. Despite the Soviets’ attempts at Russification, they pointed out, the Karaims had “on the whole retained their Turkic national ‘self.’” The Crimean Tatars even demanded for the Karaims privileges similar to those they themselves had obtained from the German holders of power.³⁴

The Krimchaks lacked such potent allies. On the contrary: they were “generally classified as Jews” and treated with hostility by broad segments of the Crimean population.³⁵ Perhaps that explains why Ohlendorf could not refrain from making his own evaluation: “The Krimchaks, according to the Jews, are Jews who emigrated from Italy, who came to the Crimea around 400 years ago and adopted the Tatar tongue as their colloquial language. The Krimchaks themselves claim to be a branch of the Tatar tribe. One can assume that both parties are correct and that they are Jews who emigrated from Italy, who over the course of the centuries intermingled with the Tatars to a great extent, adopted their language and customs, but retained their own faith.”³⁶

Thus, there can be no question of an attempt by Ohlendorf to work with Berlin toward saving both minorities. In fact, the head of the Einsatzgruppe even recorded rumors that were detrimental to the Krimchaks, and his own appraisal moved the affected groups closer to categorization as Jews by virtue of ethnicity and religion. It can be assumed that Ohlendorf’s verdict was not decisive for the “racial classification” of the two minority ethnic communities. Rather, the matter was decided at higher levels in the Reich Security Main Office (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*; RSHA) in Berlin. Whether the decision in principle actually traces back to Himmler himself³⁷ cannot be decided conclusively, but it is not unlikely. The result, in any case, must have been communicated to Ohlendorf by return mail, within only four days.³⁸ Henceforth the Krimchaks were to be considered Jews, the Karaims, at least for the time being, non-

Jews.³⁹ While the decision was tantamount to a death verdict for the former, it meant a temporary reprieve for the latter.

Little is known about how the findings were reached.⁴⁰ A German appraisal dating from 1939 may have been the decisive factor in the evaluation of the Karaims. At that time, the Reich Office for Genealogical Research (*Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung*) had officially classified the members of the nationality as non-Jews.⁴¹ Based on this, an RMO edict dated October 1, 1941, decided at least temporarily with regard to the *Ostland* (the Baltic States and Belorussia) “that the Karaims are not members of the Jewish religious community.”⁴² The Crimea had not yet been occupied at this time. Two months later, arguments, at a minimum, would have arisen if two Reich institutions had announced two contradictory decisions about the “racial affiliation” of a people. In the case of the Krimchaks, by contrast, the fact that they had distanced themselves from Judaism was ignored. All too obviously, they had done this out of fear for their lives, as their nationality until then had traditionally been treated as a Jewish minority group.⁴³ From the German view, quite pragmatic reasons in the Crimea also favored consigning the Krimchaks to the same fate as the Ashkenazic Jews. Jews across the board were viewed as potential spies or, as in the undersupplied Crimea, as useless mouths to feed.

THE MURDER OF THE ASHKENAZIM, KRIMCHAKS, AND MOUNTAIN JEWS, 1941–1942

The decision as to who was or was not to be deemed a Jew amounted to a life-or-death decision.⁴⁴ Under German occupation, a similar fate awaited everyone who was labeled a Jew. Immediately following the occupation of the Crimea, the new ruling powers implemented a systematic series of actions: registration, stigmatization, deprivation of rights, discrimination, robbery, forced labor, and, eventually, murder. Starting in fall 1941, the first massacres took place in the towns, often with hundreds, sometimes even thousands, of people murdered. Locally, the largest mass shooting occurred in the first half of December in the Crimean capital, Simferopol’, with about 5,000 Jewish victims, a figure that doubled by late February 1942.⁴⁵ In the countryside, the executions were carried out on a smaller scale. There the victims in the first weeks were mostly Ashkenazic Jews, in addition to other “classic” victim categories such as the Roma, Communists, partisans, “antisocial elements,” and others.

The Krimchaks were included in the killing process only after their official recognition as Jews.⁴⁶ Until their status was clarified, they had followed the systematic extermination of their Ashkenazic coreligionists in the capacity of observers; now they shared the fate of all Jews in shootings or in “gas vans.” The annihilation of the Krimchaks can be deduced from the statistics kept by Einsatzgruppe D. By mid-December 1941, the Einsatzgruppe recorded, for the first time, 2,504 Krimchaks, in addition to 17,645 Ashkenazic Jews. At this time, several towns—Simferopol’, Evpatoriia, Alushta, Karasubazar, Kerch, Feodosiia—and parts of the western Crimea had been “made free of Jews.”⁴⁷ In Simferopol’, unquestionably the home of most of the Krimchaks, subsequent Aktions involving manhunts and executions apparently were carried out as well, because on January 9, 1942, it was announced once again that the “Jewish and Krimchak question” was settled with regard to the Crimean capital.⁴⁸ Subsequently, to be sure, there still were killings of Krimchaks elsewhere,⁴⁹ in smaller numbers, but the bulk of the nationality had been exterminated by the end of 1941, within a period of approximately four weeks.⁵⁰

The 114 registered Mountain Jews in the Crimea met their fate in an even shorter span of time.⁵¹ In the initial wave of roundups, the fact that Jews were living in a remote kolkhoz near Evpatoriia was at first completely overlooked. The relatively new settlement simply was not yet marked on the maps of the new rulers. Thus the fate of the Crimean Mountain Jews is a good illustration of the extent to which the effectiveness of the killing operations also could depend on the assistance of non-Jewish natives in the area.⁵²

Presumably alerted to the presence of the local Jews by the non-Jewish village elder, the *Feldgendarmerie* (field police) of the Wehrmacht attended to the matter one day in February or March 1942. The extermination Aktion was arranged and facilitated by a militia made up of local residents and possibly of members of the Einsatzgruppe. At any rate, the *Feldgendarmerie* found the doomed Jews—without exception, elderly people, women, and children—already locked inside a “village community building.” A pit already had been dug as an execution site. Allegedly the non-Jewish residents indicated that they would be “pleased if the Jews were to disappear.”⁵³ Thereupon, the internees were shot in groups of 10 persons, one after another without interruption. In all, 98 people died in this massacre.⁵⁴ The 16 Jews not found in the village presumably were younger men, who were spared for the time being to serve as *Arbeitsjuden* (“work

Jews”). Obviously their services still were needed. It must be considered unlikely that any of them survived the German occupation.⁵⁵

In 1942 the reports of success with regard to the “final solution” in the Crimea came thick and fast. In March, that is, after just five months of German control, the Army High Command (*Oberkommando des Heeres*; OKH) received the information, given rather casually, that the Jews had “largely fled. Those still remaining in the locality were dealt with in accordance with general guidelines.”⁵⁶ The leaders of the Einsatzgruppe became even more explicit three weeks later, announcing that the peninsula had been “cleared” of Jews.⁵⁷ The local representative of the Foreign Ministry also passed on these tidings to his superiors in Berlin, with the drastic words, “The Jews are completely destroyed.”⁵⁸ Announcements of this kind, however, initially were reflections more of the Germans’ zeal for extermination than of actual conditions in the field. In fact, the systematic roundups and killings continued well into the fall of 1942.⁵⁹ The sad lot of the Jewish inhabitants of the Crimea quickly lost its news value, however, and by the following spring it merited nothing more than a marginal note, say, at the highest echelons of Wehrmacht leadership.⁶⁰ In any case, fairly large numbers of Jewish refugees or deportees from the Caucasus continued to fall victim to racist mania in the Crimea in 1943.⁶¹

Ultimately, the killing machine achieved its success only through the comparatively smooth interaction of the various forces of the occupation regime.⁶² Detachments of Einsatzgruppe D usually were responsible for organizing the bloodbaths. The Wehrmacht, however, provided energetic assistance in their implementation and, in some cases, even carried them out single-handedly. The tentacles of the investigative apparatus reached all the way down to the local level of community administration. In the Islam-Terek *raion* (district), for example, the German Ortskommandant Major Winterer, according to the record, personally asked the local mayors, “Are there still any Jews? Standard answer: no.”⁶³ At the senior level of the 11th Army, on the other hand, the endorsement of the killing of the Jews reached all the way up to the general staff. Now there are increasing indications that the commander-in-chief himself, General Erich von Manstein, had knowledge of the murder of the Jews in the Black Sea area.⁶⁴

The historical scholarship contains widely varying statements of the number of Jewish victims. This stems from the absence of any verified information about the

number of Jews actually encountered by the occupiers. Therefore, the dimensions of the Shoah on the peninsula can only be estimated. At least half of the Jews originally residing on the peninsula managed to flee before the invaders arrived.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the relentless German pursuers on the peninsula found numerous Jewish refugees from other regions, who were overtaken on the Black Sea coast by the foreign power. An approximate idea of their numbers can be ascertained on the basis of, for example, statistics regarding evacuated Soviet citizens, deportation of forced laborers, and other statistical “decrements.”⁶⁶ Accordingly, about 35,000 Ashkenazim, about 3,000 Krimchaks,⁶⁷ and 114 Mountain Jews fell into the occupiers’ hands. Under German occupation, all these people, with the exception of a very few who managed to hide for the duration, were murdered.

THE POSITION OF THE KARAİMS IN 1942–1944

Among the Karaims, the murder of people classified as Jews gave rise to great uncertainty. Even many non-Jewish inhabitants feared that the wave of killing was on the point of sweeping them away as well.⁶⁸ And, throughout the war, a kind of sword of Damocles did hover above their heads. Even the above-mentioned definition of the Karaims as non-Jews that was applicable in the *Ostland* had not been put in place as the conclusive ruling. Since it was believed that “an intermingling of individual Karaims with Jews” could be ascertained, the line taken at first was “to refrain from making a general decision on the racial classification of the Karaims that goes beyond the scope of separating the Karaims from the Jewish religious community.”⁶⁹ In October 1942, this provisional status was conferred on the parts of Ukraine under civil administration.⁷⁰ At first, of course, the corresponding decree had no validity in the Crimea, which was under military administration.⁷¹ It can be assumed with certainty, however, that the decree’s effect spread to occupation policy in the Crimea as well; after all, the decree affirmed the practice followed on the peninsula.⁷²

That still did not yield an ultimate solution, of course. On the contrary, the question of the racial assessment of the Karaims occupied, most notably, the two competing authorities in the East—the RMO and the RSHA—to some extent throughout the entire war. In pursuit of such an assessment, old writings were studied, ethnogenic research on Karaims was conducted, and studies were produced. Even three renowned Jewish scholars (Zelig Kalmanovich, Meir S. Balaban, and Itzhak Schipper)

were asked in the course of this endeavor for their evaluations of the splinter group. Those who were consulted sought to influence the general consensus by denying the Jewish origin of the Karaims, hoping thereby to save the Jews from the fate uniformly intended for them.⁷³

At the RMO, efforts were made in May 1943 to reach a conclusive solution to the Karaim question. To that end, Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Erhard Wetzel of the Department of Racial Policy produced the draft for a decree on the “Position and Treatment of the Karaims.” The paper reads as an argumentative corroboration of the previous arrangement: “The Karaims are different from the Jews in terms of religion and national characteristics. They are not descended from the Jews, but rather are to be regarded as a Turko-Tatar ethnic group and are fairly close to the Crim[ean Tat]ars. They are in essence a Middle Eastern Orientaloid race with Mongoloid admixtures and are considered unrelated to [the Germ]an people. Intermixtures of Germans [with] Karaims therefore are to be opposed on racial grounds.” Thus, this factual issue was handled in an extremely wide range of ways, because Wetzel, whose vote ultimately contributed to the decision on the status of the Karaims, not only suggested that the members of this nationality be spared, he even recommended that the Karaims be singled out from the rest of the population and given privileged treatment like that of the Crimean Tatars. Ultimately, he argued, “the nature of their treatment” could “have a political effect in the East.”⁷⁴

The “race expert” of the RMO thus was in full accord with the Crimean Tatars’ recommendations. In spring 1943, when the course of the war had long since turned to the disadvantage of the Germans, this was a weighty factor.⁷⁵ Thus, Wetzel used the abstruse logic of Nazi *Rassenkunde* (“racial science”) in an effort to rebut the claim “asserted especially by the Jewish side that the Karaims are the descendants of Jews who emigrated from Byzantium to the Crimea in the thirteenth or fourteenth century. If this were accurate, the Karaims would have to exhibit the same racial components as the [Ashkenazic] Jews.” He did not see these features as being present, however: “While substantial admixtures of Europoid races, in addition to the share of Middle Eastern and Oriental blood, are characteristic among the [Ashkenazic] Jews, such Europoid traces are absent in the case of the Karaims. On the contrary, clear Mongoloid racial components exist among them, in addition to the Middle Eastern and Oriental foundation.”⁷⁶ At the same time, Wetzel certainly did not conclude that by such logic a similar opinion would have been reached in the case of the Krimchaks, likewise heavily

assimilated, who meanwhile had been murdered as “Jews.” Instead, the “race expert” even managed to make inferences regarding the historical origin of the Karaims: “After all, therefore, in my view it must be assumed that the Karaims, in terms of origin, are a non-Jewish and, in fact, a Turko-Tatar ethnic group, which according to current determinations here was resident in the Crimea as early as the ninth and tenth centuries, that is, during the times of the Khazar kingdom.” The group evidently had been converted to Judaism by Jewish missionaries, he added. The fact that Karaims frequently had hired out as soldiers and agricultural workers in the past was evaluated by Wetzel as unmistakable proof of their Turko-Tatar roots. “Culturally, the Karaims rank considerably higher than the East European Jews . . . ; they are commonly regarded as honest and reliable. A process of selection increasing the prevalence of mercantile and parasitic qualities, as in the case of the Jews, is not to be observed among the Karaites.”⁷⁷

Wetzel’s “findings” are more a view seen through the glass of ideology and pressure-group politics than the result of scientific research. Nonetheless, comparable debates about the ancestry of the Karaims can be found well into the fall of 1944. Inside Himmler’s machine, which at first was responsible for the extermination *Aktions* in the East and later for their cover-up, basically the same logic was followed as at the RMO.⁷⁸ And representatives of the Karaims’ interests, too, perpetually hastened to emphasize their distance from the Jews.⁷⁹ Scarcely anything, however, is known about the actual position of the Crimean Karaims under German control. It must be assumed that the Karaims under German occupation, like the Crimean Tatars, actually occupied a position apart from that of the rest of the population. Ultimately, at least near the end of the war, no fewer than 500 Karaims even appear to have fought on the German side.⁸⁰

CONCLUSION

An especially paradoxical facet of German occupation policy in the Crimea is revealed in the Germans’ way of dealing with the various Jewish minorities. While the Ashkenazim, Krimchaks, and Mountain Jews—the groups officially defined as Jews—were murdered by the new machinery of power, the Karaims, as members of a “Jewish sect,” defended that very same murderous regime with their lives. The possibility that this blood toll paid by the Karaims would have been properly “appreciated” by the

victors in the event of a German *Endsieg*, a “final victory,” can be ruled out here with some certainty. Apart from the race-based reservations in the Reich regarding the Karaims, German plans designed to completely “Germanize” the Crimea existed at a very early stage. In the summer of 1942, deportation of all non-Germans from the peninsula already had been secretly ordered by the Germans, and the plan was postponed to the postwar period only with reference to “imperatives of war.”⁸¹ Conversely, the sparing of the Karaims basically rested on considerations related to alliance policy, and these would disappear in the event of a German victory. Therefore, it is not unlikely that ultimately the community of Karaims in the Crimea survived only because the cause that many of its members defended with their lives was, in the end, lost.

Translated from the German by Kathleen Luft.

NOTES

¹ On the genocide in the Crimea, see especially Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941–1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); and Norbert Kunz, *Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft (1941–1944): Germanisierungstypie und Besatzungsrealität* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005). For particulars regarding the minorities, see also Warren Green, “The Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities: Ashkenazim, Krimchaks and Karaites,” *Jewish Social Studies* 46 (1984): 169–76.

² This phrase, adapted by the National Socialists, is derived from Hans Grimm’s novel of the same title (first published in 1926).

³ For details, see Kunz, *Die Krim*, 41–73.

⁴ Einsatzgruppe (EG) D, 10 April 1942, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg (BA-MA), RH20-11/488, p. 136; Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten (MBOG) no. 4, May 22, 1942, BA Berlin-Lichterfelde (BAB), R58/697, p. 66; compare A. I. Kruglov, *Unichtozhenie evreiskogo naseleniia Ukrainy v 1941–1944 gg., Khronika Sobytii* (Mogilev-Podol’skii, Ukraine: Mogilev-Podol’skoe Zemliachestvo “Dnestr” v Israele, 1997), p. 7. Different information (c. 47,000 inhabitants) is found in Yehuda Slutsky, “Crimea,” in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, ed. Fred Skolnik et al., 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA in association with the Keter Publishing House, 2007), 5:300; Michael Zand and Dan Kharuv, “Krimchaks,” *ibid.*, 12:358. Rudolf Loewenthal, however, used a figure of 85,000 Jews; see Rudolf Loewenthal, “The Extinction of the Krimchaks in World War II,” *The American Slavic and East European Review*, no. 10 (1951): 132.

⁵ The *Jüdisches Lexikon* of 1927 distinguishes among three currents in the Crimea: followers of the Babylonian rite (Karaims), the Romaniote rite (Krimchaks), and the Polish-Lithuanian rite (Ashkenazim); “Krim,” in *Jüdisches Lexikon: Ein enzyklopädisches Handbuch des jüdischen Wissens in vier Bänden*, ed. Georg Herlitz et al. (1927; repr., Jüdischer Verlag: Königstein am Taunus, Germany, 1987), 3:899.

⁶ Compare, for example, Gert Robel, “Sowjetunion,” in *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), 535.

⁷ Avrahm Yarmolinsky, “Crimea,” in *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York: The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Inc., 1941), 3:414.

⁸ Loewenthal, “Extinction of the Krimchaks,” 131; Zand and Kharuv, “Krimchaks,” 357–60; “The Crimean Jews,” *The Red Book of the Peoples of the Russian Empire*, http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/crimean_jews.shtml (accessed June 8, 2007);

“Krymchaki,” in *Elektronnaia evreiskaia entsiklopediia* (Jerusalem: Assotsiatsiia po izucheniiu evreiskikh obshchin, 2005), <http://www.eleven.co/il/print.php?id=12248> (accessed June 8, 2007).

⁹ The origin of the Krimchaks here was traced back to the original population of the Crimea, which later allegedly converted to Judaism; “Krymchaki,” in *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, ed. A. M. Prochorov (Moscow 1973), 13:518. See Abraham N. Poliak, “Crimea,” in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 5:299.

¹⁰ Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1968), 256. Raul Hilberg also originally classified the Krimchaks as non-Jews; see Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1974), 241.

¹¹ See, for example, Shmuel Spector, “Krimtschaken,” in *Enzyklopädie des Holocausts: Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden* ed. Israel Gutmann (Berlin: Argon Verlag, 1993), 2:823ff.; Dieter Pohl, “Krim,” *ibid.*, 2:820.

¹² Shmuel Spector, “Karäer,” *ibid.*, 2:739; “Karaimy,” in *Elektronnaia evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, <http://www.eleven.co/il/print.php?id=11972> (accessed June 8, 2007); Daniel J. Lasker and Eli Citonne, “Karaites,” in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 11:785. Compare also Loewenthal, “Extinction of the Krimchaks,” 131, who regards both the Krimchaks and the Karaims as Jewish sects.

¹³ “Hauptvölker zwischen Weissem und Schwarzem Meer in volkskundlicher Skizzierung,” n.d., BAB, R6/502, pp. 50, 52; Bruno Adler, “Die Krim-Karäer in geschichtlicher, demographischer und volkskundlicher Beziehung,” in *Baessler-Archiv* 17 (1934), no. 3, 106; Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 170.

¹⁴ Ken Blady, *Jewish Communities in Exotic Places* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aaronson, 2000), 115–30; Lasker and Citonne, “Karaites,” 795. On the discussion, see also the overview in Poliak, “Crimea,” 299.

¹⁵ Zand and Kharuv, “Krimchaks,” 359.

¹⁶ According to Slutsky (“Crimea,” 300), in 1938 there were 86 Jewish kolkhozes in the Crimea, on which some 2,000 Jewish farmers cultivated about 160,000 hectares (395,368 acres) of land. See B. B. Berezhanskaia, “Evreiskie kolkhozy v Krymu,” in *Evrei Kryma, Ocherki istorii* (Simferopol’: E. Solomonik, 1997), 71–74.

¹⁷ Der OB der 11. Armeekorps, November 29, 1941, BA-MA, RH20-11/341; Einsatzgruppe D, 10 April 1942, BA-MA, RH20-11/488, pp. 136–37; MBOG no. 4, May 22, 1942, BAB, R58/697, p. 66; “Das bolschewistische Joch in der Krim,” second half of 1942?, BA-MA, RH20-17/713; see, in summary, Kunz, *Die Krim*, 207 and n. 17.

¹⁸ Feldkommandantur (FK) (V) 810, March 16, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/79. According to other sources, the settlement of the Mountain Jews in the Crimea occurred as early as the 1920s; Mordkhai Neishtat and Michael Zand, “Mountain Jews,” in *Encyclopaedia Judaica* 14:583. On the Mountain Jews in general, see *ibid.*, 579–84; and “The Mountain Jews,” in *The Red Book of the Peoples of the Russian Empire*, http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/mountain_jews.shtml (accessed June 8, 2007).

¹⁹ Kunz, *Die Krim*, 190ff.

²⁰ In the Reich, the Nuremberg Laws included a comparatively unambiguous provision, based essentially on proofs of ancestry.

²¹ Compare the formulations of the RMO bureaucracy in BAB, R6/74.

²² RMO, Fall 1941?, *ibid.*, p. 15.

²³ *Ibid.* According to a Karaim scholar, the Mountain Jews, by contrast, could not be regarded as Jews; compare Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 175.

²⁴ FK (V) 810, March 16, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/79.

²⁵ Compare Peter Kleist, *Die europäische Tragödie* (Göttingen: K.W. Schütz, 1961), 165; Otto Bräutigam, *So hat es sich zugetragen . . . Ein Leben als Soldat und Diplomat* (Würzburg: Holzner Verlag, 1968), 535ff. In the Caucasus, too, German offices proceeded on the assumption of Mountain Jews/Tats, but here it obviously was a question of authentic Tats.

²⁶ Ortskommandantur (OK) I/287, November 12, 1941, BA-MA, RH23/72, p. 70.

²⁷ OK I/287, November 16, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁸ Neumann thus was by no means an exception among the representatives of the military administration on the peninsula; see also Norbert Kunz, “Die Feld- und Ortskommandanturen auf der Krim und der Judenmord 1941/42,” in *Täter im Vernichtungskrieg: Der Überfall auf die Sowjetunion und der Völkermord an den Juden*, ed. Wolf Kaiser (Berlin and Munich: Propyläen, 2002), 60–70.

²⁹ Bericht von Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat (OKVR) Donner und Major Seifert, March 10, 1942, BA-MA, RW31/17, p. 145; compare also Ereignismeldung (EM) no. 145, 12 December 1941, BAB, R58/219, p. 290.

³⁰ The extent of the confusion surrounding the Karaims and Krimchaks can be seen from a report by two military personnel with whom Ohlendorf had met in early December 1941. According to the report, “the presence of Middle Eastern ethnic components of non-Semitic character . . . , which strangely had adopted the Jewish

faith” was registered in the Crimea. This assessment was debatable. Things became completely muddled, however, when the claim was made that Jews of the Muslim faith were living on the peninsula. Bericht von OKVR Donner und Major Seifert, March 10, 1942, BA-MA, RW31/17, p. 145. Possibly this relates to the tragic confusion with circumcised Tatars. See Kunz, *Die Krim*, 210.

³¹ EM no. 142, December 5, 1941, BAB, R58/219, p. 249. Presumably he meant the Karaims.

³² Rudolf Aschenauer, “Otto Ohlendorf—Ein Versuch, Gegebenheiten wahrheitsgemäß darzustellen,” n.d., BA Koblenz, All. Proz. 5/4, p. 46.

³³ EM no. 142, December 5, 1941, BAB, R58/219, pp. 249f.

³⁴ Bericht “Die Karaimen der Krim,” 1942, BA-MA, RH20-17/713.

³⁵ Einsatzgruppe D, April 10, 1942, BA-MA, RH20-11/488, p. 143. To some extent, even the killing of Krimchaks is said to have been “universally welcomed”; EM no. 157, January 19, 1942, BAB, R58/220, p. 210. In this regard, it must be noted that the population also had been deliberately stirred up against the Jews by German propaganda; see “Period zhidovskogo zasil’ia v Germanii,” in *Golos Kryma* 41, no. 35 (May 5, 1942): 4.

³⁶ EM no. 142, December 5, 1941, BAB, R58/219, pp. 249f.

³⁷ On the decision process at the RSHA, see Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 327–30, who places the ultimate decision on the matter with Himmler.

³⁸ Compare *ibid.*, 339.

³⁹ Compare Kunz, *Die Krim*, 189ff.

⁴⁰ A reflection of the arguments is provided by the much more precise characterization of both nationalities in a subsequent Einsatzgruppe report; compare MBOG no. 4, May 22, 1942, BAB, R58/697, p. 70.

⁴¹ Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 170.

⁴² Der Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, October 1, 1941, BAB, R6/142, p. 1. On the decision, compare RMO, May 1943, *ibid.*, p. 7a. In the RMO at this time, officials were struggling to reach agreement on a comprehensive definition of the term *Jude* and on the criteria for establishing Jewishness. A draft edict already named peoples that categorically were to be treated as Jews. Among them were the Mountain Jews, the Krimchaks, and the Bukharan Jews. “The question of whether the Karaites

(also known as Karaims or Crimean Qarays) also are to be regarded as Jews has not yet been conclusively decided. A special regulation on this matter will be enacted.” Der Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Fall 1941?, *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴³ Compare, for example, Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 170.

⁴⁴ On the following, see in particular Kunz, *Die Krim*, 179–204.

⁴⁵ Urteil des Landgerichts München I in der Strafsache gegen Zapp u.a., February 26, 1970, Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg (BAL), 213 AR 1900/66, p. 66; EM no. 170, February 18, 1942, BAB, R58/220, p. 384.

⁴⁶ On the following, compare Kunz, *Die Krim*, 190.

⁴⁷ EM no. 150, January 2, 1942, BAB, R58/219, p. 378. In a later Einsatzgruppen report, the boast was made that the Krimchaks had been “for the most part” wiped out by early December; MBOG no. 4, May 22, 1942, BAB, R58/697, p. 66.

⁴⁸ EM no. 153, January 9, 1942, BAB, R58/220, p. 64. About 1,500 Krimchaks lived in Simferopol’ alone; Shmuel Spector, “Simferopol,” in *Enzyklopädie des Holocausts*, 1318. They evidently were killed on December 9; compare Bericht von J. J. Gopstein, in *Das Schwarzbuch: Der Genozid an den sowjetischen Juden*, ed. Wassili Grossmann and Ilja Ehrenburg (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), 763.

⁴⁹ See EM no. 190, April 8, 1942, BAB, R58/220, p. 267.

⁵⁰ Only a very few Krimchaks appear to have survived the Shoah. On the peninsula, some 700 to 750 reportedly remained. In all, about three-fourths of the entire ethnic group thus fell victim to murder. Zand and Kharuv, “Krimchaks,” 358.

⁵¹ In the German files, the Aktion is reflected in two activity reports; compare FK (V) 810, March 16, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/79; Feldgendarmerie FK 810, March 13, 1942, *ibid.* Warren Green, however, proceeded on the erroneous assumption that “Judeo-Tats” generally had not been murdered. See Warren Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 175; and Warren Green, “The Nazi Racial Policy Towards the Karaites,” *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 8, no. 2 (1978): 37. After the war, the massacre was the subject of a trial involving Feldgendarmerie personnel; compare Kunz, “Feld- und Ortskommandanturen,” 67–70. The extent to which forces of the Einsatzgruppe, whose participation is mentioned in the reports, actually were accomplices could not be ascertained in the proceedings. Even so, it is conceivable that the mention of SD participation at the time was merely a self-serving declaration by the field commander, because individual initiative on the part of military personnel in the matter of killing Jews was officially forbidden. On the following, see in particular: Urteil des Landgerichts Düsseldorf in der Strafsache gegen Karl Rudolf Pallmann u.a., August 21,

1969, BAL, 213 AR-Z 29/61, pp. 89–93; Anklageschrift in der Strafsache gegen Karl Rudolf Pallmann u.a., January 17, 1968, *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 289–91; Aussage Kurt Ernst K., January 9, 1964, *ibid.*, vol. 5; Aussage Fritz S., January 17, 1964, *ibid.*; Aussage Carl B., March 10, 1964, *ibid.*; Aussage Rudolf Pallmann, September 23, 1964, *ibid.*, vol. 7; Aussage Rudolf Pallmann, September 24, 1964, *ibid.*; Aussage Erich D., October 29, 1964, *ibid.*, vol. 8; Aussage Carl B., November 5, 1965, *ibid.*, vol. 10.

⁵² See also Einsatzgruppe D, Tgb. no. 1118/42, April 16, 1942, RH20-11/488, p. 126.

⁵³ Thus the statement of an accomplice; see Aussage Carl B., March 10, 1964, BAL, 213 AR-Z 29/61, vol. 5, p. 153.

⁵⁴ FK (V) 810, March 16, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/79.

⁵⁵ Urteilsschrift des Landgerichts Düsseldorf in der Strafsache gegen Karl Rudolf Pallmann u.a., August 21, 1969, BAL, 213 AR-Z 29/61, pp. 92–93; Kunz, *Die Krim*, 191. The trace of these individuals is found in a German “Zusammenstellung der Volkstumgruppen auf der Krim nach dem Stand von 1942” (in BA-MA, RH24-42/226), in which 16 Tats are listed.

⁵⁶ Bericht des Sonderführers Siefers über die “Aufstellung von Tataren- und Kaukasierformationen im Bereich des A.O.K. 11,” March 20, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA), R60739. That the procedure mentioned ultimately meant the killing of the Jews must have been regarded as an open secret in its day.

⁵⁷ Einsatzgruppe D, Tgb. no. 1118/42, April 16, 1942, RH20-11/488, p. 126.

⁵⁸ Hentig erroneously reported that the Karaims living in the Crimea also had “in the majority shared the fate of the Jews.” Actually, this statement was based on a mix-up of Karaims and Krimchaks; Bericht no. 297 des Vertreters des Auswärtigen Amtes beim AOK 11, April 27, 1942, PA, R60740.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Befh. Krim, Abt. VII, October 23, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/101.

⁶⁰ “Jews, who previously made up 7% of the population, are no longer present.” Der Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes im OKW an Chef W Pr, March 14, 1943, BA-MA, RH2/2558, p. 73.

⁶¹ Thus, for example, a local commandant’s office stated in an activity report: “The Jews in the area of the Kerch Peninsula are completely neutralized. As to how far this can be said of the Kuban Peninsula, inquiries are still ongoing. At all events, weeks ago a party of Jews from Taman’ [in the Kuban’ area] were rounded up and brought to Kerch, and handed over to SK [Sonderkommando] 10b again.” Tätigkeitsbericht (TB) OK I (V) 287, October 16, 1942, BA-MA, RH23/90.

⁶² See Kunz, *Die Krim*, 74–99, 179–87.

⁶³ Protokoll über Bürgermeisterversammlung des Rayons Islam-Terek am 10.6.42 um 10 Uhr, BA-MA, RH23/90.

⁶⁴ So reported Ulrich Gunzert, a former Wehrmacht captain, in an interview around 1998; Gunzert had witnessed a shooting of Jews at the entrance to the Crimea and said that he had reported these events to Manstein at the time. Manstein, however, allegedly “completely withdrew to his military sphere” in his reasoning, pointing out that he had no influence on political issues and had “other worries” besides. In addition, the army commander forbade Gunzert to speak about the extermination of the Jews. In the same contemporary-witness interview, Gunzert described Manstein’s behavior at the time as a “flight from responsibility.” See *Hitlers Krieger, Manstein—der Stratege*, a ZDF television production (1998). On other instances that point to Manstein’s knowledge of the systematic murder of Jews, see Aussage Nikolaus P., November 21, 1962, BAL, AR 1905/1966, Hauptakte vol. 1, p. 130; Oliver von Wrochem, *Erich von Manstein: Vernichtungskrieg und Geschichts-politik* (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 2006), 71.

⁶⁵ For the number of Jews who fled, Zand and Kharuv (“Krimchaks,” 360), accept an estimate of about 50 percent. Mordechai Altshuler, however, thinks 60 percent is correct (“Escape and Evacuation of Soviet Jews at the Time of the Nazi Invasion,” in *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945*, ed. Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 99.

⁶⁶ On calculation, see in detail Kunz, *Die Krim*, 203 and 376, n. 215. The estimate of about 38,000 victims in total corresponds roughly to the figure of about 40,000 Jews in the Crimea given by the Einsatzgruppe; EM no. 145, December 12, 1941, BAB, R58/219, p. 290.

⁶⁷ Even the 1939 population figures estimated for the Krimchaks in the scholarly literature vary quite widely. According to Zand and Kharuv (“Krimchaks,” 358), about 9,000 Krimchaks lived on the peninsula before the war began. The Einsatzgruppe gave an estimate of 6,000; MBOG no. 4, May 22, 1942, BAB, R58/697, p. 66. Loewenthal (“Extinction of the Krimchaks,” 132), used a figure of only 3,000 Krimchaks for 1939.

⁶⁸ EM no. 157, January 19, 1942, BAB, R58/220, p. 210.

⁶⁹ Der Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete (RMO), October 1, 1941, BAB, R6/142, p. 1.

⁷⁰ See also RMO, May 1943, *ibid.*, p. 7a.

⁷¹ See (incorrectly, however) Lasker and Citonne, “Karaites,” 794.

⁷² It is not unlikely that the edict even originated in the expectation of a transfer of the peninsula to the civil administration and with the Crimean Karaims in mind. In fact, on the Ukrainian mainland, there were at most smaller Karaim communities in Galicia and Volhynia.

⁷³ Lasker and Citonne, “Karaites,” 794.

⁷⁴ The draft was sent, among other places, to the High Command of the Wehrmacht for reaction where appropriate. Thus its contents probably also reached the highest military authority in the Crimea; RMO, May 1943, BAB, R6/142, p. 6. In the Ministry for the Occupied East (*Ostministerium*), therefore, the return of Lithuanian Karaims to the Crimea also was favorably viewed overall; *Stellungnahme von Dr. Holtz, März? 1943*, *ibid.*, pp. 3f.

⁷⁵ The fact that Wetzel’s estimate in 1943, supposedly based on his expertise in ethnogeny, actually resulted from situational considerations related to alliance policy is made clear by his attitude one year later, already far less unambiguously expressed. Reacting to a publication by Dagmar Brandt, in which she championed the “theory of the Jewish origin of the Karaims in the most forceful way,” Wetzel, too, now took the view that it could “still be left completely undecided whether the Karaims are to be classified as Jews or not.” Because the presence of a “Jewish admixture” in the Karaims could not be ruled out, he now spoke out vehemently against sheltering Karaim refugees in the Reich. *Führungsstab Politik*, July 20, 1944, *Nürnberger Dokument NO-1868*, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München.

⁷⁶ RMO, May 1943, BAB, R6/142, p. 7.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷⁸ Compare Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 330.

⁷⁹ For example, in a corresponding statement in August 1944, the Ashkenazim and Krimchaks are defined as Jews with regard to race; the Karaims, however, as well as the Mountain Jews, who by this time had already been wiped out in the Crimea, were defined as non-Jews. See Green, “Fate of the Crimean Jewish Communities,” 175.

⁸⁰ Green (*ibid.*, 174) suspected that their recruitment was carried out at about the same time as that of the Crimean Tatars. Thus the Karaims would have been in the service of the Germans since January/February 1942. The sources on the recruitment of the Tatars, however, do not make it apparent that Karaims were involved at this early date. On local recruitment practice, see Kunz, *Die Krim*, 208–13.

⁸¹ See, in detail, Kunz, *Die Krim*, 41–73.

ANTI-JEWISH VIOLENCE IN WESTERN UKRAINE, SUMMER 1941: VARIED HISTORIES AND EXPLANATIONS

Wendy Lower

For the past 15 years, research on the Holocaust has focused in large part on the Nazi-occupied territories of the former Soviet Union—facilitated by the collapse of the Union and access to the regional archives in the newly independent states, and driven by new questions about the implementation of the genocide at places other than the killing centers such as Auschwitz. Besides changing our understanding of the center and periphery of the Nazi empire in Europe, this research shift has also deepened our understanding of the nature of group violence. The entire discussion of collaboration has been broadened by social historical research at the regional and micro levels, epitomized by Jan Gross’s work, *Neighbors*, which reignited the debate on Jewish-Polish relations. Whereas earlier work almost exclusively characterized the perpetrators as Nazis or Germans, now one asks, in reference to Jedwabne, was the Germans’ presence a requisite condition, and are they entirely to blame for the Holocaust?¹

Of course the “Final Solution” was a Nazi-imposed and sinisterly managed policy of genocide.² But its most violent aspects occurred in Eastern Europe, in the open, and involved the indigenous populations. Thus events that comprise “the Holocaust” represent an intersection of German history and the varied local and regional histories of Europe. Such a statement is not meant to trigger accusations of collaboration or minimize the role of Nazi Germany; it is intended, rather, to throw light on the fact that genocide—the collective, sustained killing of an entire group by another—is very much a social phenomenon. The focus of this paper is Nazi-occupied Ukraine and whether acts of collective violence such as the Jedwabne massacre occurred in a similar manner in Ukraine, and, if so, where and why.³

As you may well know, in Jedwabne, Poland, on July 10, 1941, as Jan Gross wrote, “half the population of [this] small East European town murdered the other half—some 1,600 men, women and children.”⁴ The victims were all Jews. Seven survived the massacre. Gross’s microstudy spawned a discussion of macroissues, such as the history of Jewish-Polish relations. It brought into sharper relief the importance of geographic, interethnic settings, and the timing of the violence.⁵ Beyond the small town of Jedwabne, in a swathe of territory that comprised the rimlands of the Nazi and Soviet empires, the occurrence of anti-Jewish violence fell into a pattern. In the interwar Polish, Romanian, and Baltic territories that were under Soviet control and were

subjected to NKVD deportations and massacres in 1940 and 1941, pogroms became a common feature of the first days and months of the Nazi “liberation” in the summer of 1941. The role of the Germans and other Axis forces (Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians) in inciting the violence varied from place to place. However, western Ukraine saw some of the worst cases, not only in the region’s capital of L’viv, but also across the villages and towns extending eastward and southward. What details about, and explanations for, this violence have emerged in recent research? Did certain situational factors or an interethnic dynamic cause or aggravate tensions that led to massacres? Once the Red Army had left, did local populations attack Jews before the Germans arrived? Did the recent history of Sovietization and the longer history of pogroms in Ukraine influence events in the summer of 1941?

GALICIA

In the small eastern Galician town of Peremyshliany, 40 kilometers southeast of L’viv, the Germans arrived on July 1, 1941. During the Soviet occupation, the Jewish population had doubled, reaching 6,000, causing a strain on local resources and housing that was borne mostly by the local Jews. Jews were more visible than before in town, especially because the Soviets had deported a large part of the Polish population. The trend of assimilation continued apace in the interwar period here, and many Jewish youth attended the Polish gymnasium. There was a Jewish school, but the Soviets shut it down in 1940. Most Jews in the area were educated and lived in the town; they were prime recruits for the Soviet administration. The communist ideology was also intellectually appealing and the Soviet state a better alternative to the antisemitic platforms of the radical nationalist movements in Poland, Ukraine, and Germany.

Three days after the Germans arrived, a “Ukrainian mob” lashed out at the leadership of the Jewish community. The Belzer Rebbe (the head of a historic Hasidic dynasty), who had sought refuge in Peremyshliany from Nazi-occupied Poland, barely escaped. However, his son was thrown into the burning synagogue during the pogrom.⁶ Many Jewish homes were destroyed and plundered. In households where Jewish heads did not come forward, women were seized, brought to the local prison, and brutalized by Ukrainian militia. Lucy Gross Raubvogel, who survived the pogrom, wrote her account of it just after the war:

Our large synagogue and all of its annexes were burnt. The flames were rising up high, parched window frames and benches on which our grandfathers, fathers, and brothers used to sit now crackled. Fire turned into an awesome element. A throng of peasants gathered around the fire with their sacks ready to plunder; a mass of devoted Christians, their children and the Germans who recorded this overwhelming sight on the film. The wind carried sparks from one building to another, the fire crackled and soared into the sky mercilessly, and the bones of the first victims crunched. An enthused mob of shrieking peasants, just like locusts, pounced on everything that belonged to the Jews. They plundered, stole, and in some incredible ecstasy they destroyed within minutes what had sometimes survived the generations.⁷

Jacob Litman, a refugee from Nazi-occupied Poland residing in Peremyshliany, recalled that “as soon as the Germans came in they burned the synagogue and threw Jews into the fire of the synagogue, especially the religious Jews, who had been picked up off the streets by virtue of their looks and beards. There was a big Hasidic population in Przymyslany before the war.... The Russians had not bothered them much during the previous two years, they kept to themselves. Germans lashed out at them first.”⁸

A diarist named Samuel Golfard, who witnessed events in Peremyshliany, wrote during the war:

The participation of Ukrainians in the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews is beyond any dispute.... At the German invasion, they themselves initiated terrible massacres in comparison to which even the cruelty of the Germans seemed pallid. It is a fact that the Germans took pictures of Jews being hurled into the flames of burning houses. In Przemyslany the perpetrators of this were the Ukrainians. Had they been allowed, they would even today cut down the entire ghetto in their passion for plunder.⁹

After the July pogrom, a German security detachment and gendarmerie unit organized a mass shooting of 500 Jewish men; this occurred on November 5, 1941, at the edge of town in the Brzezina (birch tree) forest.¹⁰ Ghettoization, forced labor, and waves of mass shootings followed until the last Jews of Peremyshliany and the surrounding villages were killed in the summer of 1943. Many who had managed to escape to the forests were killed in the context of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and Soviet-German partisan warfare that was waged in the area in 1943–1944.¹¹

Historian Dieter Pohl estimates that in other parts of eastern Galicia more than 12,000 Jews died in pogroms, the largest occurring in the city of L’viv, where

approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Jews were brutally murdered between June 30 and July 25, 1941.¹² As was the case in nearby Stanyslaviv, Zolochiv, Drohobych, Buchach, and Ternopil, in L'viv the Jews were blamed for the mass murder of political prisoners and others whose mutilated remains were found in NKVD jails. Many of these towns had a recent history of pogroms that occurred in connection with the advancing Russian army (under the tsar) in 1915 and 1916, suggesting that this territory's history of warfare and its geopolitical location as a multiethnic borderland might have contributed to the more extreme violence in 1941.¹³ But such violence was not a constant in these borderlands, but was rather ignited by a specific crisis. The pattern of events during the Second World War is clearer. The Soviets pursued a policy of mass murder of Ukrainian prisoners during the retreat, and the Germans and their Ukrainian allies used this policy to organize antisemitic "retaliation" campaigns. The fact that Jews, Russians, and Poles also were victims of NKVD atrocities in Galicia and Volhynia was conveniently suppressed. Typically, Jewish men were forced to exhume bodies of dead prisoners; in some cases they had to wash the corpses and dig the graves to prepare for a religious burial. While the Jews carried out these gruesome tasks, the local population was allowed to vent their rage against them, beating the Jews at random with clubs, rods, and other blunt instruments.¹⁴

In Boryslaw, a survivor, Anna Dichter, explained that the Germans arrived on July 1, 1941, and the pogrom started on July 3: "My father and I were forced to wash the bodies of prisoners slain by the NKVD. My father had to stay overnight in the prison; Ukrainians burned his body with sulphuric acid and ended up killing 400 Jews in those days. Killing them with sticks and stones, not with guns."¹⁵ Another survivor, Jozef Lipman, also from Borylsaw, stated that "the Germans gave the Ukrainians a free hand to take revenge on the Jews.... The Rusyns descended from the mountains [the Carpathians] and started brutal massacres ... using metal rods and sticks with nails.... Our family was in hiding, neighbors saved us."¹⁶

According to Philip Friedman's pioneering research, the involvement of Ukrainians cut across class, educational, generational, and political lines. Individuals acted upon various motives and with varying aims, which converged spontaneously or was cleverly harnessed by German and Ukrainian leaders. News that actions against Jews would occur in the towns was enough to cue peasants to arrive in town with carts, ready to load up the plunder. Memory of or rumors about pogroms in the wake of the First World War and earlier times provided onlookers and participants in 1941 with a precedent to follow, a pattern of response. But the stereotype of the rapacious

Ukrainian peasant distorts the reality. In Delatyn the pogrom was organized by the local music teacher, Slawko Washchuk, “and in Stanislaw, that of Professor Lysiak, of the local teachers seminary.” In Dubno, Ukrainian municipal administrators who had worked closely with Jewish colleagues in the government suddenly revealed their prejudice by organizing the pogrom. In Ternopil the leaders of the violence were a Ukrainian pharmacist, a teacher, and other local elites. The organization and implementation of the violence was not strictly “men’s business.” Women were among the attackers and among the organizers, such as the “daughter of a prominent attorney in Zlocow.” Ukrainian priests, judges, and school inspectors petitioned German authorities to start anti-Jewish measures. Antisemitic propaganda entered into the school curricula. In Zbaraz “secondary school students marched with song through the streets ... and to the Jewish cemetery, where they destroyed the tombstones.”¹⁷

In addition to nationalistic claims for the purging of the new Ukrainian state of “Jewish-Muscovite elements,” one finds in the propaganda the traditional canards: Jews are portrayed as Christ killers, foreign or Soviet agents, the source of epidemics, and swindlers. All of these accusations were meant to elicit responses, a call for action, usually that of revenge, expiation, or expected martyrdom. The Jews collectively were supposed to pay the costs for the suffering of Ukrainians, were supposed to be sacrificed for the “greater,” “legitimate” good of the majority. This sort of redemptive antisemitism (in Saul Friedländer’s words) was operative in Ukraine as well as elsewhere in Europe, such as Lithuania, where a non-Jew who was arrested as a Soviet criminal could be set free if he could present evidence that he had killed a Jew, which was deemed a laudable, redemptive act that demonstrated one’s loyalty to the Lithuanian nation.¹⁸ Historian Leonid Rein found a similar pattern in Belorussia, where some collaborators explained that they killed Jews “to prove their loyalty to the German authorities.”¹⁹

Thus, one finds among the participants in the violence and destruction in Galicia fanatical nationalists, devout Christians, secular professionals, youth, elderly, civic leaders, and rural farmers. This cross section of society contained “fringe” criminal elements or ruffians, thugs, and rabble-rousers, but these types were not the dominant force in summer 1941, which is one of the more troubling and puzzling aspects that has not been fully explored by scholars of Ukrainian studies.

VOLHYNIA-PODOLIA

A similar pattern of local anti-Jewish violence occurred in the neighboring region of Volhynia, which also had been occupied by the Red Army in September 1939 and had experienced the upheaval of rapid Sovietization until the Germans arrived in summer 1941. Shmuel Spector's pioneering research on this region identified 20 townlets where Ukrainian peasants murdered Jews and pillaged Jewish property. The methods were reminiscent of practices during the 1918–1921 riots, with the use of iron bars and boards spiked with nails. In a few cases, entire towns were wiped out, in Jedwabne fashion, but more typical were the “traditional” beatings, the raping, and the ransacking of Jewish homes, accompanied by the killing of one or two persons.²⁰ The exceptional case occurred in Kremianets, where a hundred or more Jews were killed by locals before a German Army commander intervened in response to a Jewish appeal. According to Yehuda Bauer (whose version of events differs from Spector's) in Kremianets, the Ukrainians “began to attack Jews immediately following [the onset of] the German occupation. There was a shortage of bread, and the Ukrainian militia, which organized itself after the Soviets left, prevented Jews from receiving any. The bodies of sixty Ukrainians who had been murdered by the Soviets just before they withdrew were discovered in the local jail. The Jews were accused, and, in response, a campaign of murder and rape was launched against them, led by Einsatzgruppe C.” The massacre lasted three days. An estimated 400 Jews were killed.²¹

According to historian Timothy Snyder's research, “In June and July 1941, the German police and the SS killed about 12,000 Volhynian Jews, mostly but by no means entirely young men.”²² Shortly after the Wehrmacht arrived in Lutsk on July 2, 10 dead German soldiers were discovered among the 2,800 dismembered corpses of former inmates of the NKVD prison. The Wehrmacht commander called for retaliation against the Jews, killing 1,000 Jewish male laborers plus 160 other Jews.²³ However, more Jews were killed at this time; the Sipo-SD Task Unit 4a “reported that it organized the murder of 2,000 Jews as retribution.”²⁴

The interaction of Germans and Ukrainians in carrying out the pogroms was demonstrated also in the Volhynian town of Klevan, where a pogrom had occurred during the Soviet-Polish war (1919–1921).²⁵ There, in 1941, Snyder explains, the “Ukrainians told the SS which homes were Jewish, and that all of the Jews were communists. About 700 of the 2,500 Jews of that shtetl were killed during the first days of the occupation, their bodies left on the street to be eaten by dogs and swine for three

days.”²⁶ Today visitors to Klevan will find the mass grave marked and Jewish victims memorialized. Local Ukrainian eyewitnesses remember the event in detail, even the day: July 6.

POLISSIA-ZHYTOMYR-VINNYTSIA

The Germans arrived in the city of Zhytomyr on July 9, 1941, on the way stopping in Novohrad Volynsk and Berdychiv. While stationed in Novohrad Volynsk, the Sipo-SD commander of Einsatzgruppe C reported that, “before leaving, the Bolsheviks, together with the Jews, murdered several Ukrainians; as an excuse, they used the attempted Ukrainian uprising of June 25 [sic], 1941, which tried to free their prisoners.”²⁷ The declaration of Ukrainian independence, this SS-policeman asserted, was the rationale for the Soviet atrocities. True, the Soviets wished to suppress Ukrainian autonomy and any possibility of a Ukrainian nationalist–German fascist alliance that might prevent a Soviet reoccupation of the region. In the rush of the evacuation and with limited railway cars to transport prisoners, the NKVD massacred “counterrevolutionaries” in prisons of L’viv, Dubne, and elsewhere.²⁸ It should be noted, however, that the declaration of Ukrainian autonomy occurred *after* the Soviets had left these parts of eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Hitler and German officials in the SS-police did not desire an independent Ukraine; on the contrary, their designs for the region were strictly exploitative.

Ukrainian nationalists (in both factions, loyal to Bandera, OUN-B; and to Melnyk, OUN-M) were useful, expedient local collaborators for securing the territory in the first chaotic months of the invasion. German military intelligence and field offices relied on Ukrainian nationalist activists (*pokhidni grupy*) who had joined them in the invasion, as well as local Ukrainians who stepped forward to join the local administration as militia forces, leaders in self-help, and other local governing committees. These Ukrainian officials and militia members became involved in anti-Bolshevik, anti-Jewish “security” measures. For example, in the Podolian towns of Bar and Shpykiv, the Ukrainian militiamen attached to OUN-B, who wore the nationalist symbol of the trident on their sleeves, issued the first security directive to the locals—Order no. 1: all Jews over seven years of age must wear the white star.²⁹ The Polissian Sich, supporting the nationalist faction under Taras Bulba-Borovets, was active until November 1941 in the “cleansing” of the Pripjet marshlands. According to Karel Berkhoff’s research, one 15-year-old-member of the Sich recalled, “we did everything

they asked. I went everywhere, rode everywhere, fought and shot Jews who had treated me badly.” The Sich had its own newspaper, in which it announced at the end of 1941, “now the parasitical Jewish nation has been destroyed.”³⁰ Jared McBride also documented Sich pogroms north of Zhytomyr at Olevs’k. In that case, the robbing, torture, and killing of Jews was done with no German involvement.³¹

Historian Franziska Bruder uncovered the autobiographical notes of an OUN-B member of the Nachtigall Battalion. The diarist described the battalion’s actions during its march in mid-July 1941 from L’viv to Vinnytsia: “During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish-Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so, after that, we shot all the Jews we encountered in 2 villages.”³²

In these cases, Ukrainian paramilitary and militia forces shot Jews independently of the Germans because they wanted to, and because they could.

In other locations where the Germans were stationed, Heinrich Himmler’s right-hand man in Ukraine, Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln, ordered anti-Soviet “cleansing actions,” for example, in Novohrad Volynsk at the end of July. Jeckeln specified that the available Ukrainian militia should be on hand to help. The First SS Brigade killed 1,658 men and women there, among them 800 Jewish men and women who were shot under Jeckeln’s direct supervision by the banks of the Zluch River.³³ In Berdychiv no German evidence has emerged that describes pogroms occurring prior to the Germans’ arrival. The German military commander and units of Einsatzgruppe C initiated the first attacks against the Jewish elders. When Jeckeln’s forces arrived in August, more systematic measures began, including ghettoization followed by mass shootings, with the worst massacres on September 15–16. It seems that no ruse or pretext was used in the destruction of Berdychiv’s Jews.

In Zhytomyr as in Kiev, the Jews were blamed for destruction in the town. In both cases the military commander demanded retaliation, and Jews were marched through town before being shot. One of the common antisemitic canards in these parts was that the “Jewish” NKVD had caused the famine. Also if any of the Jews could be found had a record in the Soviet government, they were publicly accused and tried for Stalin’s crimes, that is, blamed for the deportations and purges of the 1930s. Even without a paper trail to associate Jews with the Soviet government, denunciations flooded German offices; a secret police official in Kiev commented that his wastebasket was overflowing with such denunciations.³⁴

Nazi German forces sought out *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) as the new privileged elite. With their sudden power, they played a leading local role in the

perpetration of anti-Jewish violence. German officials, who were supposed to be “rescuing” their ethnic brethren and placing them in key administrative positions, found that the Jews offered a convenient scapegoat for the sad state of the Volksdeutsche who had suffered under Stalinism.³⁵ Of course, the fact that Jewish members of the Communist Party and NKVD were themselves targets of the purges or that Zionists and other Jews were found among the tortured victims in the NKVD prisons was suppressed or escaped their prejudiced thinking.³⁶

The clearest case of interethnic collaboration in the Holocaust in this region and elsewhere in Soviet Ukraine is documented in the Nazi recruitment of Ukrainians and Volksdeutsche into the SS and police units that initiated or were ordered to carry out anti-Jewish measures and massacres. German leaders found a sufficient number of Ukrainian volunteers to implement the various measures and tasks associated with the “Final Solution,” but they observed that pogroms were not widespread in the Zhytomyr region, to the disappointment of SD officials. An Einsatzgruppe C report from August and early September 1941 revealed, “Almost nowhere could the population be induced to take active steps against the Jews.” In order to involve the local population in the anti-Jewish campaigns, the Germans forced the Jews to march through town. This was a common practice across Europe whereby the expulsion of the Jews was turned into a parade or spectacle of sorts. Unlike the deportations in the Reich, however, the Jews in Ukraine were led to the edge of town, often so close to dwellings and collective farms that the sounds of the massacres could be heard.

Although, according to German reports, the number of pogroms decreased as the Wehrmacht advanced eastward, survivor testimony reveals that some did occur, particularly in the smaller localities where perhaps the Germans were not present or did not bother to report the event. In a village near Chudniv, the Jewish survivor Galina Pekerman recalled that after the Germans arrived at the end of July there was a pogrom. But the action was clearly organized and targeted one segment of the population. The Germans enlisted local Ukrainians to massacre the Jewish children in the village; this was followed by mass shootings carried out by the Germans at the local park (where 800 were killed).

A similar event occurred in Radomyshl, just north of Zhytomyr, where Ukrainian militiamen were employed for killing the children. In the case of Miropol, the postwar testimony of survivor Liudmila Blekhman and the wartime report of an OUN-B unit concur that the Ukrainian militia carried out the mass shootings. More shocking to Blekhman than the behavior of the drunken militia was the reaction of her

neighbors. As she recalled, when the Jews had been gathered, the Jewish men “decided to break through the police cordon and let people escape from the main square.” The stunned militia was thrown into disarray, and many Jews, including Blekhman, were able to escape, but few found refuge in Ukrainian homes. Blekhman heard a Ukrainian peasant woman yelling from her window, “Mr. Policeman, a Jewish kid ran into my house. I saw him!” One could also hear comments about the plunder, exclamations about finding a nice coat or a good Singer sewing machine. As the Jews were reassembled at the square, they were forced to walk through a cordon of locals, who tried to grab their bags and threw rocks at them. According to an observer from the OUN-B, all the Jews of Miropol were shot on September 9, 1941. Descriptions of the excessive alcohol consumption within the militia also appeared in these OUN-B reports.³⁷

Nazi leaders (among them SD Chief Reinhard Heydrich and Nazi ideologue and Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg) advised their subordinates in the police and civilian agencies to allow and even incite pogroms, but Nazi leaders also were concerned about creating an uncontrollable, chaotic situation. Such a situation might even play into the hands of Ukrainian nationalists who, according to the OUN-B’s prewar guidelines, deliberately took advantage of the unrest by advising their local agents, “at a time of chaos and confusion, liquidation of undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists is permitted, especially supporters of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism.”³⁸

SOUTHERN UKRAINE: THE BLACK SEA REGION

In the southern regions of Ukraine around the Black Sea, Romanians, Germans, Volksdeutsche, and Ukrainians engaged in acts of collective violence against “their” Jewish neighbors. The local population of Roma (Gypsies) was targeted and killed. Between the Bug and Dniester Rivers, Einsatzgruppe D commanders actively recruited ethnic Germans into the Sipo-SD to assist in the mass murder of the Jews and other so-called undesirables and security threats. In the historic ethnic German settlement at Landau, about 50 kilometers northwest of Nikolaev, Himmler’s agents in charge of race and resettlement matters coordinated cleansing actions with the Romanian occupation government. The settlements contained ethnic German policemen (*Selbstschutz*) who, with little prodding, began targeting the Jews and Roma for exploitation as forced

laborers and for killing. At the colony of Schoenfeld, the inhabitants formed vigilante bands, chased down the Roma, and burned them in the barns on their farms.

The remnant population of Odessa's Jews, about 30,000, was brought to this region in the winter of 1941–1942. Romanian and German documents as well as eyewitness accounts reveal that a combination of ethnic German militiamen, colonists and Ukrainian militia, and Romanian gendarmes shot 18,000 Jews at the camp of Domanivka on the Bug River.

In terms of the societal aspects of anti-Jewish violence in 1941, events in Odessa were perhaps more significant than those in Kiev. In October 1941 an estimated 34,000–35,000 were shot or burned alive in Odessa, a city with the largest urban population of Jews in Eastern Europe after Warsaw. Such a high death toll clearly was the result of a highly organized series of massacres. In fact, the killings were ordered by Marshal Ion Antonescu himself, who demanded (in Order no. 302.26) “immediate retaliatory action, including the liquidation of 18,000 Jews in the ghettos and the hanging in the town squares of at least 100 Jews for every regimental sector.” This order was issued after an explosion in Romanian military headquarters, which had killed dozens of occupation officials, including the commanding officer. Romanian killing methods included a mix of grenading and shooting of Jews who had been crammed by the thousands into wooden buildings. In an act reminiscent of the burning of Strasbourg's Jews in the fifteenth century, Romanians forced Jews into the harbor square and set them on fire. In this twentieth-century version, however, the Romanians did not allow Jews to save themselves through conversion (baptism). Thus the “barbarism” of the religious wars was outdone by these “modern” campaigns of colonization and national “purification.” Anti-Jewish massacres in places such as Bogdanivka and Domanivka continued into 1942 and were caused, in part, by Nazi expulsions of Jews across the Bug River; some Jewish refugees also tried to cross the German-Romanian border. Fear of the spread of typhus also was a factor that escalated the violence.³⁹

Though German officials in Ukraine liked to think that they were more civilized than the Romanians in their approach to the “Final Solution,” when one looks at the human butchery in Ukraine, the difference between the two Axis powers seems minimal.⁴⁰ The atrocities at Bogdanivka during Christmas 1941 were among the bloodiest in the history of the Holocaust; at least 48,000 died in mass shootings, an orgy of violence perpetrated by Romanian soldiers and Ukrainian and ethnic German

militia, among others. These were not spontaneous acts, but ordered by Marshal Antonescu.⁴¹ On the other hand, as Vladimir Solonari discerned in his research, there was an important difference between the Romanian occupation administration and the German one: “Returning Romanian officials [to Bukovina and Bessarabia] knew local realities incomparably better than newly-arrived Germans [in Poland or Ukraine] did, and they could and did rely on a much broader societal support than Nazis ever enjoyed.”⁴²

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE VIOLENCE

This sketch of anti-Jewish violence in Ukraine (west of the Dnepr) barely scratches the surface. There were many more documented incidents, and one can only venture a guess as to how many undocumented ones occurred. Such a gruesome catalog of atrocities must be explained or at least some analysis attempted. Jan Gross concluded: “When reflecting on this epoch, we must not assign collective responsibility. We must remain clearheaded enough to remember that for each killing only a specific murderer or group of murderers is responsible. But we nevertheless might be compelled to investigate what makes a nation (as in ‘the Germans’) capable of carrying out such deeds.”⁴³ Gross does not explain the root causes of such “national” capabilities, though his in-depth work on Jedwabne obviously supports his argument for specificity.

Several scholars of Ukrainian, Jewish, Romanian, German, Polish, and Holocaust history, as well as theorists from other disciplines, have offered various explanations. For example, Boghdan Musial, a historian of Nazi-occupied Poland, has argued in light of the Jedwabne discovery that the Soviets are really to blame for the pogroms, suggesting (this is a rough version of his argument) that Jewish overrepresentation in the criminal Soviet regime caused Poles, Ukrainians, and Germans to vent their anti-Soviet rage against the Jews.⁴⁴ Norman Naimark debunked Musial’s argument by referring to his “bloated claims about extensive Jewish participation in Soviet crimes and justifiable Polish resentment against Jewish perpetrators.” Yet, as Naimark emphasized, such perceptions and prejudices mattered above and beyond the fact that Jews were not overrepresented, but were rather more visible as a minority in the Soviet administration. Still, local populations were too quick to adopt and act on claims of a Jewish Bolshevik threat, and more welcoming of this antisemitic Nazi propaganda than they were ready to accept the Germans themselves as liberators.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the argument that the presence of NKVD prisons triggered

pogroms such as in L'viv does not explain how and why similar acts of anti-Jewish violence occurred on a smaller scale in localities where no prisons with corpses of NKVD victims were discovered.

In his work on Brzezany in eastern Galicia, survivor and historian Shimon Redlich concluded that “the initiation and conduct of the pogroms weren’t identical in the various localities.” In larger cities they were organized by German security units and various Ukrainian organizations; in smaller towns and in the countryside, killing was more spontaneous. The position of the Germans was “ambivalent.” However, there was one common element; as Redlich explains, “In most cases the murder of Jews by Ukrainians was linked to the NKVD executions. Both German and Ukrainian nationalist propaganda widely used the theme of Judeo-Bolshevism and alleged Jewish participation in the Soviet terror machine.”⁴⁶ Historian Dieter Pohl, who introduced some of the first systematic evidence of pogroms in eastern Galicia, also stressed the importance of the OUN network of expeditionary forces, which were operative in sparking and coordinating the pogroms with the German authorities as well as in spreading anti-Jewish propaganda and advocating “German methods” in “the struggle against Jewry in Ukraine.”⁴⁷ Their campaign was most effective in western Ukraine, where the anti-Soviet enmity was channeled against the Jews as a whole and exacerbated by the recent experience of NKVD deportations and atrocities.

Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer offers another explanation in his work on Buchach and Kremianets. He argues for a more differentiated picture of motives based on the urban and rural setting. As Bauer put it, the “stereotype of the hostile Ukrainian should therefore be amended, especially regarding Ukrainian peasantry, without denying the animosity and malice of the majority of the mainly urban Ukrainian public toward their Jewish neighbors.”⁴⁸ Though the pogrom in Kremianets was among the worst in Podolia, the behavior of the peasantry was not particularly or excessively violent. Plundering was common but did not necessarily precipitate unbridled physical aggression. The higher density of Jews in the towns and cities accounts for the more acute tensions and resulting violence, according to Bauer.

Survivor and historian Philip Friedman explained in his pioneering work on Ukrainian-Jewish relations that “anti-Jewish activities were the work of an inflamed populace” steered by a lethal mixture of Ukrainian organizations and German officials in the military and SS-police. In Ternopil the Germans summoned the Ukrainian Committee to help prepare a pogrom, while in Gliniany (neighboring Peremyshliany) the Ukrainian Committee appealed to the Germans to start an anti-Jewish campaign,

including suggesting the formation of a ghetto. Friedman stresses the particular dynamics behind the organization of pogroms in each locality and, like Gross, is careful to stress the specificity of each setting, the persons involved, and the events.

Ukrainian history scholar Frank Golczewski offers a nuanced explanation based on his broader approach to the history of Ukrainian-German and Ukrainian-Jewish relations. In Galicia, he finds, Ukrainians developed a longer history of cooperation with Germans that was part of the Habsburg (Vienna) legacy. Furthermore, Golczewski argues that “*Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence was rare in Galicia throughout the 19th century and immediately after the First World War.*”⁴⁹ Though there were pogroms in Galicia that were instigated by Russian army forces and also carried out by local Ukrainians and Poles during the collapse of the short-lived Ukrainian Republic, Golczewski’s downplaying of them in his thesis suggests that these WWI-era incidents were not significant enough to mark this territory as a hotbed of anti-Jewish violence. “By the start of the Second World War,” he argues, “this had changed—for the worse.”⁵⁰ During the Depression in the 1930s, the “decline in economic prosperity and collapse in prices for agricultural products exacerbated relations between Ukrainian peasants and Jewish wholesalers who bought Ukrainian produce, on the one hand, and between Ukrainian consumers and Jewish retailers on the other. Second, Polish discrimination policies toward the Jews, such as restricting the number of Jews who could attend university or excluding Jews from certain civic and social organizations, served to stigmatize and isolate the Jews from the rest of society.”⁵¹

Where the Germans and Ukrainians (and Poles) saw eye to eye was in the common desire to rid Ukraine of Bolshevism, regarded as a “Jewish” movement. Since, Golczewski points out, “the inclusion of Jews took place mostly at the communal level, Ukrainians in Galicia tended to encounter these Jews on an everyday basis.”⁵² The perception that Jews gained the most from the “detested” Soviet rule, combined with prewar antisemitic prejudices—religious beliefs, economic envy, and differences in education levels—put additional strain on the already tense relations between Jews and non-Jews; Soviet rule, which persecuted both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists as well as Zionists, was generalized as “Jewish rule” by both anti-Soviet Poles and Ukrainians.⁵³

Golczewski criticizes Ukrainian historians such as Wolodymyr Kosyk for overstating the German role in the pogroms and ignoring local participation.⁵⁴ This line of argument can be supported by a German document from June 1941. In it, the chief of the Sipo-SD Heydrich issued an order to his field men in the Einsatzgruppen that: “No

obstacles are to be put in the way of self-cleansing efforts on the part of anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles in the territories to be occupied. To the contrary, they are to be triggered leaving no traces whatsoever, to be intensified when necessary, and to be guided in the right direction, without these local ‘self-defense circles’ being able later to refer to orders or political promises made.”⁵⁵

However, this order could be interpreted differently—as Heydrich’s desire for locals to do the Germans’ “dirty work.” To a large degree the Germans had to rely on the local population because German manpower was lacking to do all the tasks needed to fully exploit the Jewish population and commit the genocide. One of our challenges, as historians, is to determine on the ground where German orders ended and local violence started, with or without direct Nazi oversight. Yet Golczewski finds that “even non-Ukrainian scholars have sometimes gone too far in minimizing the depth of anti-Jewish, anti-communist, and anti-Russian sentiment in these regions. Raul Hilberg, for example, argues that ‘truly spontaneous pogroms, free from Einsatzgruppen influence, did not take place,’ and that ‘all pogroms were implemented within a short time after the arrival of the [German] killing units.’”⁵⁶ “This, however, does not explain the pogroms that broke out in places such as Stanyslaviv (today, Ivano-Frankivs’k), Kolomyia, Horodenka, and Obertyn, towns that were in the Hungarian zone of operations and occupation in Galicia.”⁵⁷

Historian Omer Bartov also adopts a larger historical framework in his research on Buczacz, which, in contrast to Bauer’s analysis, sees the roots of the genocide in centuries of uneven development among the town’s different ethnic groups. He argues for a more nuanced re-creation of the social fabric and for the integration of more Jewish and Ukrainian sources. Indeed, detailed descriptions of the pogroms and of the behavior of Ukrainians rarely appear in the German accounts. Bartov contends that “only a meticulous reconstruction of life in towns such as Buczacz—whose mix of populations, division of economic roles, social stratification, and religious distinctions were typical of the borderlands of Eastern Europe—will provide clues as to why hundreds of thousands of Jews were butchered by their neighbors, or at least right next to them, without even token opposition and with a great deal of glee and relief. It may also help us understand why some people, often simple, illiterate peasants, saw the humanity of the persecuted and protected them from the killers.”⁵⁸

Historian Tim Snyder also prefers a broader historical context in explaining the violence that exploded in 1941, but ultimately he highlights the Germans as the main culprits. Snyder believes that anti-Jewish actions “ranged across a spectrum in which, at

one extreme, the local population killed Jews with (and sometimes without) the support of the Germans and, at the other, the Germans killed Volhynian Jews hoping to gain the support of the local population. As the summer 1941 progressed, however, the vast majority of mass murders came to be committed by the Germans.”⁵⁹ He explains how Jews in interwar Volhynia, which fell within the borders of the newly formed Polish state, initially became followers of communism in a partnership with the oppressed Ukrainian peasants: “Communism, in its various guises, was the most popular form of opposition politics in Volhynia ... [but] by 1940, it seems likely that few Volhynian Jews had any illusions about the Soviet Union. Jews were legal equals, in a legal system in which all were subject to deportation and terror.... Just as many Ukrainians were disillusioned by collectivization, so many Jews were disappointed by the end of private enterprise. While Polish landlords saw their estates expropriated, prosperous urban Jews lost their stone houses.... Savings accounts were liquidated, which ruined the Jewish middle class.”⁶⁰ On the eve of the Nazi invasion of Volhynia, the Soviet administration had little to no support among the indigenous population. Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews coexisted “in a kind of fearful general collaboration.... Distrust and denunciation were its ideal conditions.”⁶¹

So how was this generally tense atmosphere channeled against the Jews in summer 1941? As a geographical point of comparison, Lithuania and Bessarabia/Northern Bukovina also saw a surge in anti-Jewish popular violence during Operation Barbarossa. In Lithuania, where the pogroms in Kovno resembled those in L’viv, historian Saulius Sužiedėlis stresses the political and ideological role of the fascist nationalist groups, the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF), and the organized auxiliaries in the Rollkommando Hamann; the “Lithuanian contingent under Lt. Bronius Norkus accounted for at least half of the total number of persons” listed as murdered in the famous Jaeger report.⁶² Even if data prove that Jews were not dominant among the leadership of the NKVD and that a significant number of Lithuanian Jews were anti-Soviet, it would not change the fact that most Lithuanians *perceived* Jews as collectively pro-Bolshevik or pro-Polish, and Nazi propaganda reinforced that view. As in Ukraine, latent antisemitism persisted and appeared in a number of overt forms, most of them accusations of collusion with some “outside” enemy, be it Bolshevik occupiers, Polish nationalist aggressors, or international capitalists. Such accusations shared the underlying assertion that the Jewish minority was not “one of us” and, therefore, a natural target of discrimination, exclusion, and in times of crisis, even violence. Those who acted on such perceptions saw themselves as loyal patriots, not as immoral

criminals. In fact, Sužiedėlis argues, Lithuanian pogromists condemned the Jews as national traitors. In western Ukraine, a similar perception was common of Jews as “traitors” allied with the Poles or the Russians; more aggressively, they were portrayed as members of the Cheka, and the NKVD. In fact there were two images in circulation that were contrasted: the Jews welcoming the Red Army in 1939, and the Ukrainians welcoming Hitler the liberator in 1941.

Besides the important role of perceptions that motivated popular violence, another significant theme that requires more disentangling is the actual form of the violence. The term *pogrom*, even in its original Russian meaning, is metaphorical and vague. Historian Vladimir Solonari’s work on Bukovina and Bessarabia distinguishes between “whether the local Gentiles intended ‘just’ to plunder, loot” and humiliate Jews—“a type of violence that is well-known from the pre-modern time—or to actually systematically kill their Jewish neighbor.” As in other parts of the western borderlands under Soviet rule in 1939–1941, the crude equation of the Soviets with the Jews incited anti-Jewish violence in the summer of 1941. Vasile Crăciun, “a former Cuzist [follower of the antisemitic writer and politician Alexandru Cuza] and well-to-do peasant (kulak) appointed mayor of Onișcani in central Bessarabia, brutalized Jews in the summer of 1941 because, as he put it, ‘Soviet power deported all the good people from our village.... Now that the Romanians are here, we have to arrest and kill all Jews.’”⁶³ Solonari explains how two forms of violence reinforced each other: a highly organized one and a local one. The local perpetrators of the popular outbursts were thugs, rabble, illiterate outcasts, and those seeking property, power, and revenge. The educated, ambitious killers worked the system of the occupation administration to carry out the discriminatory measures, deportations, and killing. They perceived themselves as furthering a national project. Without the pressures of modern state building, Solonari finds, the genocide would not have occurred. As he concludes: “In either case the project in the name of which the mass murder and ethnic cleansing were to be accomplished was similar: a “purified” nation—a quintessentially modern vision. Left for themselves, out of the purview of these agents of modernity, non-indoctrinated local Gentiles engaged in more traditional forms of antisemitic rioting: beating, plundering, and humiliating Jews. But this behavior, though morally outrageous, would *not* amount to what we call the Holocaust.”⁶⁴

Solonari is not the first to explain the Holocaust as the by-product of “a modern vision” of the nation-state. Others have added another element to this modernization theory: the role of imperial expansion or imperial collapse. In *The Massacre in History*,

Mark Levene and Penny Roberts point out that the violence condoned and triggered by imperialists can be a sign of that state's lack of power and legitimacy.⁶⁵ Levene argues, similarly to political scientist Hannah Arendt in her study *On Violence*,⁶⁶ that strong states do not have to resort to violent terror tactics to gain the support and maintain control over the populace; massacres themselves are not a "finely tuned instrument of control"; they demonstrate a diffusion and fragmentation of power.

Applying this theory to the Ukrainian case in 1941, one could conclude that the involvement of the local population in the killing of Jews and other perceived threats manifested, on the one hand, the instability of the periphery of the Nazi empire, and, on the other hand, the precarious situation and immature form of the Ukrainian national movement. Following Levene's thinking, both perpetrators were in weak positions and used antisemitism to claim a historical legitimacy and hold over the newly occupied territories. Nazi "ethnic cleansing" was an imperialist's "civilizing process" meant to fortify the conqueror's position on claimed territory. Ukrainian nationalists or grassroots self-proclaimed patriots who coperpetrated the Holocaust did so in the name of ousting an enemy from "their" own territory, as part of the process of nation-state building and as a popular expression of self-determination.⁶⁷

Theorists outside of the discipline of history have published numerous studies on interethnic, intercommunal violence. Political scientist Roger Peterson stresses the role of emotions in inflaming group violence, especially individual feelings of fear and resentment that are shared by others during a crisis, such as the collapse of a state. In such a situation, as well as during war, regular societal constraints are loosened or fall apart.

A weakness of Peterson's study is that he does not explain how individual emotions become a group sentiment. Ethnic violence is, in his view, characterized by the following pattern: first the political elites, jingoists, seek to consolidate their ethnic identity, and these "calls for ethnic group solidarity trigger norms of exclusion in the mass population."⁶⁸ Such calls for solidarity are often done in the name of warding off a threat; they are motivated by fear. Peterson posits that a crucial element of ethnic violence is the pairing of elites with local thugs and fanatics, which was indeed demonstrated during the Nazi invasion when Ukrainian militias and ruffians joined forces with governing committees and German commanders.⁶⁹

Why the lure of ethnicity as a source of group identity and potentially a violent expression of it? Peterson explains that "cognitive categories based on race and ethnicity serve to simplify a highly complex world."⁷⁰ Two main features of ethnic

violence are collapsing empires and nationalizing states, developments that occurred in extreme form in the interwar period. A nation-state defined by the majority left the detested minorities, the Jews most particularly, open to assault.

Anthropologist Jack David Eller defines violence as a biological, psychological, and social phenomenon. Humans are violent, and groups “with ideologies and interests are the most violent of all.”⁷¹ This assertion is odd since most groups by definition have shared or collective interests, but that does not make them extremely violent. What about mob violence that seems leaderless? Eller believes that groups provide individuals with some affirmation of their own resentments, and that legitimation is all the more powerful if the target of that resentment is another group, thereby creating a threat and the moral rationale that one who “suppresses” the threat is acting in self-defense. Eller agrees with Roy Baumeister’s conclusion that “the idealism of groups, as opposed to the idealism of individuals, usually ends up conferring a right, a license, to hate.”⁷² As was manifested in Ukraine in the summer of 1941, regional German commanders, functionaries, and their non-German helpers were granted a license to hate and to kill.

Considering all of these historical and social-scientific explanations, the pogroms and escalating popular violence against Jews in Ukraine might be best understood as a convergence of several contingencies, phenomena, and events with long- and short-term causes. Such a rare explosion of collective and state-sponsored mass violence cannot be explained by a single factor, such as the modernizing state, the banality of evil, barbaric tribal hatreds, or the long fuse of Christian antisemitism. Intercommunal conflicts and tensions at this time were driven by overlapping socio-political developments and behavioral responses, including clashing ideologies, a scarcity of resources, a culture of violence, the Nazi-Soviet vise, and indeed a long history of anti-Jewish sentiment and actions. In the wake of World War I, the various ethno-racial versions of nationhood or ethnocentric states placed Europe’s minorities, especially the Jews, in an extremely vulnerable position. The communistic, internationalist alternative appealed to minorities and other marginalized groups but threatened the more established, but exclusive, capitalistic construct of the nation-state. Yet built into both the Nazi and Soviet alternatives were utopian notions of modernity, total revolution, and social engineering that contrasted with a threatening Feindbild. Political struggles for power and legitimacy were played out on the streets and by a desperate “mob” of the dislocated (as Arendt depicted them). It can hardly be overstated just how significant World War I was in fostering the rise of fascism, inuring

an entire generation of Europeans to violence and cheapening the value of individual life. The triumph of this tragic marriage of violence and mass politics was further demonstrated by the fact that pacifists such as Remarque, peace-aspiring organizations such as the League of Nations, and strategies such as appeasement ultimately failed. This was the general ideological, political context that the economic crises only made worse. By 1939 the economic divide between Eastern and Western Europe remained significant; the Nazis exaggerated and distorted this gap in their own stark depictions of a modernizing Germany vis-à-vis a backward Poland or degenerate Judeo-Bolshevized Russia, a contrast that was also depicted as the “superior Aryan” and “Eastern Jew.” In the post-Versailles mapping of the European nation-states, border restrictions made these economic and political differences more pronounced.

The mounting showdown between the fascist, nationalist approach, epitomized by the Nazi movement, and its totalitarian counterpart, the Stalinist version of Marxism, placed the inhabitants of “the” Ukraine in a precarious position. In the western regions of Galicia and Volhynia, Ukrainians were numerically the majority, but when placed within borders of the fledgling Polish state, they became a persecuted political minority. Most Ukrainians resisted outright Polonization. They did not envision flight to another homeland as an option, and assimilation was slowed by gaping socioeconomic differences. In the Soviet east, the Ukrainian majority fragmented into political and economic pieces as a result of the Stalinist revolution. There was much disillusionment about and even hatred of the Soviet experiment and its methods, but by 1941 the system had involved and implicated two generations of participants that cut across ethnic lines. Jewish activists could be “blamed” for the early period, but not the latter one. Inter-marriage and urbanization of Ukrainians, Jews, and Russians began to blur ethnic differences. Yet both the Polish and Soviet attempts at consolidating their power and hold over Ukraine did not foster strong intercommunal ties; on the contrary, they seeded more intense animosities, resentments, and uncertainties. A culture of denunciation flourished in Stalinist Ukraine as each tried to exploit a system that made big promises but offered little rewards. Within the different regions of Polish- and Soviet-controlled Ukraine, Jews and ethnic Ukrainians were divided socially and politically by the secularism, factionalism, and terrorism of modern politics.

The outbreak of the war, the early successes of the German military, and aggressive antisemitic policies of the Nazis added fuel to this fire. Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews suddenly found themselves in another major war that was more ideologically

divisive than the previous one. Generations now shared a collective memory of what was possible in a setting of total war. Jews understood their vulnerability, although not the genocidal proportions of it. Pogroms were by no means an automatic response to such political social crises in the upheaval of war, but the very fact that this history of anti-Jewish violence existed in the collective memory made it possible, if not likely, that pogroms would occur with the arrival of antisemitic Nazis. The German presence was decisive because during the upheaval of September 1939, with a few exceptions (such as the border area of Grodno, where the actual events have not been fully clarified yet), pogroms did not break out across Soviet-held territory. Then later, after years of antisemitic Nazi propaganda, when the Red Army returned to Ukraine, pogroms occurred again in 1944–1945, in eastern and western Ukraine, with the most publicized one in Kiev.⁷³

In comparing the violence in summer 1941 in Galicia and Zhytomyr, there was a decrease in the scale of Ukrainian-led pogroms, according to German observers. Survivor testimony reveals that Ukrainians betrayed Jewish neighbors, denounced them, stole their property, and brutalized them. But one cannot state with certainty that “no Jedwabnes” occurred in central and eastern Ukraine; this is because for many smaller Jewish communities that were destroyed we have no sources and because after the war Soviet investigations and war-crimes trials played up the role of Ukrainian nationalists as collaborators but minimized the popular antisemitism of ordinary “peaceful Soviet citizens.”⁷⁴

In *Neighbors*, Gross argued that we must see the Holocaust “as a mosaic composed of discrete episodes, improvised by local decision-makers, and hinging on unforced behavior, rooted in God-knows-what motivations, of all those who were near the murder scene at the time.”⁷⁵ The case of Ukraine shows that its significant regional variations necessitate a piece-by-piece approach. But can these micro, episodic histories be properly placed into a bigger “mosaic”? Moreover, Gross’s work forces us to question the notion of “neighborly” relations. In Ukraine and elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe, the Germans cleverly exploited and exacerbated weak interethnic ties by unleashing such “God-knows-what motivations” as greed and antisemitism, but these emotions and prejudices were not German inventions, and the Nazi occupation was one chapter in a much longer history of antisemitic thinking and behavior in Ukraine. More than a singular episode, the anti-Jewish violence of the summer of 1941 marked both a culminating moment as well as a historic break in a ritualistic response to political crises, military invasion, and civil war. The German-led mass shootings and

gassings were state-sponsored acts of genocide, distinctly different from the popular pogrom-like violence, which at the time might have seemed to be episodic and historically familiar but in retrospect contributed to the much larger, unprecedented genocidal violence of the Holocaust.

NOTES

¹ An expanded version of this essay, “Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations and Comparisons,” appeared in *Journal of Genocide Research* 13, no. 3 (2011): 217–46.

See John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Recently Kai Struve has explored (using the concepts of collective memory introduced by Reinhart Koselleck) the pogrom as a social ritual. See Kai Struve, “Ritual und Gewalt—Die Pogrome des Sommers 1941,” in *Synchrone Welten: Zeitenräume jüdischer Geschichte*, ed. Dan Diner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 228. William Hagen has also applied theories of social ritual to his study of the pogrom; see his “The Moral Economy of Ethnic Violence: The Pogrom in Lwow, November 1918,” in *Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland*, ed. Robert Blobaum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

² For a nuanced treatment of the center-periphery model that accentuates the role of regional German leaders in the summer of 1941, see Jürgen Matthäus, “Controlled Escalation: Himmler’s Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 218–42.

³ A recent article explores these questions as a study of collaboration. See Vladimir Melamed, “Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 37 (August 2007): 217–48.

⁴ Jan Gross, *Neighbors* (2001; New York: Penguin, 2002), xviii.

⁵ On the “Jedwabne Debate” and the importance of these rimlands of 1939–1941, see Joanna Michlic, “The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939–1941, and the Stereotype of the Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet Jew,” in *Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society* 13 (Spring/Summer 2007): 135–76; Andrzej Zbikowski, “Jewish Reaction to the Soviet Arrival in the Kresy in September 1939,” *Polin* 13 (2000): 62–72; Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth Cole, and Kai Struve eds., *Shared History—Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007).

⁶ The son’s name was Moishe. The Belzer Rebbe was hidden with a Polish family, then given a disguise and taken out of town by Hungarian counterintelligence officers. See Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive (Los Angeles): Basia K., video testimony, December 7, 1997, Brooklyn, NY, tape 1, segment 4; Israel L., video testimony, November 6, 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segment 33; Ida K., video testimony, September 24, 1996, West Orange, NJ, tape 1, segments 18–20. Yosef Israel, *Rescuing*

the Rebbe of Belz (New York: Mesorah Publications, 2005). Thanks to Vladimir Melamed for assisting with this interview research.

⁷ Lucy Gross (b. April 18, 1926), typed manuscript with corrections and notations, written by Lucy Gross just after liberation in Germany and then in Israel (c. 1946–1950). Polish original translated into English by Magdalena Norton. The author is grateful to Gisela Gross Gelin (Lucy’s sister) for allowing me to copy the manuscript.

⁸ Jacob Litman, transcript of audio interview, 1982, tapes 2–3; excerpts from “Autobiography.” The author is grateful to the Litman family for sharing the audio interview and “Autobiography” manuscript.

⁹ “Samek’s Testimony, 1943,” entry of March 6, 1943. Samek Golfard was shot in June/July 1943. Unpublished manuscript subsequently published as Wendy Lower, ed., *The Diary of Samuel Golfard and the Holocaust in Galicia* (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2011). I am grateful to the Litman family for sharing his diary with me.

¹⁰ This first action is described by Holocaust survivors and a Polish rescuer from the town, some of whom lost husbands, fathers, sons, and uncles in this massacre. There are slight discrepancies about the ages of the victims, varying from 14 to 65 years, and one testimony dates the massacre in October, and describes the gathering point as a Yiddish school, not the Polish gymnasium. See Interviews by Survivors, Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive: Basia K., video recording, December 7, 1997, Brooklyn, NY, tape 1, segment 4; Israel L., video recording, November 6, 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segments 30–32; Esther L., video recording, November 6, 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segment 35; Ida K., video recording, September 24, 1996, West Orange, NJ, tape 1, segments 28–30; Lynn W., video recording October 11, 2001, Del Ray Beach, FL, tape 1, segment 12; Michael S., video recording, November 14, 1997, Warsaw, Poland, tape 2, segment 46; Regina P., video recording, November 28, 1995, Miami Beach, FL, tape 1, segments 28–29; Jacob L., video recording, June 13, 1995, Union, NJ, tape 3, segment 87. The few published sources on the town, including additional Hebrew and Polish testimony, confirm that the massacre occurred but offer slight variations on its size and dating. See Danuta Dabrowska, Avraham Wein, and Aahron Weiss, eds., *Pinkas Hakehilot: Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Poland, Eastern Galicia* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), 2:442; “Przemslany,” in *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life Before and during the Holocaust*, ed. Shmuel Spector (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2001), 2:1035–36; “Peremyshliany,” in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1971), 13:277. The November shootings were also described by a German gendarme, Bruno Sämisch, who was tried and convicted by the East German justice system in the early 1950s. See Sämisch testimony, February 3, 1951 MfS BV Halle, Ast 5544, BStU# 00133-138, Urteilurschrift, Strafsache gegen den Arbeiter Bruno Sämisch aus Muehlanger Landesgreicht Dessau, and “Gründe,” pp. 1–5. BStU #00133-138, Archiv Staatsanwalt des Bezirkes Halle, Fach No. 2052.

¹¹ The Holocaust occurred in a context of extreme violence in Galicia between Poles and Ukrainians and between Ukrainians and Soviets, with the Jews often caught in the middle, killed for association with one of the “enemy” factions. The Red Army’s return and introduction of its own destruction battalions aggravated the situation in 1944. An estimated 500,000 Ukrainians were deported from western Ukraine between 1944 and 1949; 90,000 Ukrainians were killed, while the number of Poles runs from estimates of 10,000 to 100,000. See Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 144–47; Jeffrey Burds, “AGENTURA: Soviet Informants’ Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–1948,” in *East European Politics and Societies* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 89–130; Timothy Snyder, “‘To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All’: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 86–120; “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943,” *Past and Present* 179 (2003): 197–234.

¹² The estimate of 12,000 appears in Dieter Pohl’s *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), 67. Recent research has proposed a larger figure, ranging from 13,000 to 35,000, with 58 pogroms in western Ukraine and 35 in eastern Galicia. See Dieter Pohl, “Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine: A Research Agenda,” in *Shared History—Divided Memory*, 306. Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, “Deadly Communities: Local Political Milieus and the Persecution of Jews in Occupied Poland,” *Comparative Political Studies* (May 2011): 259–283.

¹³ Alexander Victor Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 59–62.

¹⁴ Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany*, 101–2. See also Omer Bartov, “White Spaces and Black Holes: Eastern Galicia’s Past and Present,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine*, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), 318–53.

¹⁵ Anna D., Interviews by Survivors, the Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, video recording, February 1996, Brooklyn, NY, tapes 1–2, segments 19–21, 23, 25–26, 28, 30, 41–43. Cited in Vladimir Melamed, “Reflections on Collaboration: The First Days of Pogroms in L’viv and Boryslav” (unpublished manuscript).

¹⁶ Vladimir Melamed, “Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context,” *East European Jewish Affairs*, August 2007: 230.

¹⁷ Philip Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation,” in *Roads to Extinction* (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1980), 275–76.

- ¹⁸ Kai Struve, “Ritual und Gewalt—Die Pogrome des Sommers 1941,” in *Synchrone Welten: Zeiträume jüdischer Geschichte*, ed. Dan Diner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 225–50.
- ¹⁹ Leonid Rein, “Local Collaboration in the Execution of the ‘Final Solution’ in Nazi-Occupied Belorussia,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 20, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 394.
- ²⁰ Thanks to Mark Levene for bringing this to my attention. Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jewry, 1941–1944* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), 64–65; also see chart, 66–67.
- ²¹ Yehuda Bauer, “Buczacz and Krzemieniec: The Story of Two Towns during the Holocaust,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 33 (2004): 263. Timothy Snyder concurs that “In Volhynia, the most deadly pogrom was apparently in Kremenets (Polish, Krzemieniec), where the NKVD had murdered some 100–150 prisoners before departing in haste, and where the disinterred bodies revealed signs of torture. Here the local population killed about 130 Jews”: Timothy Snyder, “The Life and Death of West Volhynian Jewry, 1921–1945,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine*, 91.
- ²² Estimate based upon A.I. Kruglov, *Entsiklopediia Kholokosta* (Kiev: Evreiskii sovet Ukrainy, 2000), 30, 146. Snyder, “The Life and Death,” 92.
- ²³ Hans Safrian, “Komplizen des Genozids: Zum Anteil der Heeresgruppe Süd an der Verfolgung und Ermordung der Juden in der Ukraine 1941,” in *Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg: Die Vernichtung hinter der Front*, ed. Walter Manoschek (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1996), 102.
- ²⁴ Snyder, “The Life and Death,” 92.
- ²⁵ The occurrence of pogroms in 1918 has not been compared systematically with the pogroms in 1941. However several significant connections have been explored in Mark Levene, “Frontiers of Genocide: Jews in the Eastern War Zones, 1914 to 1920 and 1941,” in *Minorities in Wartime*, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 83–117. On the 1918 pogrom in L’viv, see Hagen, “The Moral Economy of Ethnic Violence.” Also see Sarunas Liekis, Lidia Miliakova, and Antony Polonsky, “Three Documents on Anti-Jewish Violence in the Eastern Kresy During the Polish-Soviet Conflict,” in *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 14:116–49.
- ²⁶ Snyder, “The Life and Death,” 92.
- ²⁷ The declaration of Ukrainian independence occurred on June 30, 1941, in L’viv. The Einsatzgruppe C report (dated July 16, 1941) is available in part in Yitzhak Arad,

Shmuel Krakwoski, and Shmuel Spector, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989), 30.

²⁸ Marco Carynnyk, “The Palace on the Ikva-Dubne, September 18, 1939 and June 24, 1941,” in *Shared History—Divided Memory*, 273 n. 22, 278–83.

²⁹ Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005), 91.

³⁰ Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 64.

³¹ The Bulba-Borovest faction looked to the legacy of the nationalist movement in eastern Ukraine, specifically the Ukrainian People’s Republic formed in November 1917 but defeated by the Bolsheviks; in summer and fall 1941 Borovets and his recruits (in the Polis’ka Sich) operated independently of the OUN, and were based mainly in the border region of Ukraine and Belorussia. On Olevs’k see the excellent paper by Jared McBride, “Eyewitness to an Occupation: The Holocaust in Olevs’k, Zhytomyr Ukraine,” presented at “The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives,” Paris, October 1-2, 2007.

³² Author’s translation from German; original Ukrainian translated by Franziska Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben! Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948” (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 150.

³³ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 76.

³⁴ Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, War Crimes Investigation and Trial of Kiev Sipo-SD Office, statement of Erich Ehrlinger. See Alexander V. Prusin, “A Community of Violence: The Sipo/SD and Its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiev,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 1–30.

³⁵ Doris Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche’ and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–1945,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (1994): 569–82.

³⁶ In the Kieper and Kogan hanging of August 9, 1941, in Zhytomyr, the placards stated that the two “Jewish Cheka” men were responsible for the murders of Volksdeutsche and Ukrainians. A retaliatory mass shooting of 400 Jewish men, including boys and elderly people, followed the public hanging. See Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 79–80.

³⁷ Vladimir Melamed, “Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Context,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 37 (August 2007): 222. The

OUN-B reports were captured by the German Sipo-SD, and are available in the wartime German records held at the Zhytomyr State Archives, P1151c-1-2, and now at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's archives, RG 31. The testimony of a Slovakian photographer (stationed near Miropol) and his photos prove that in the massacre of Jewish women and children of October 13, 1941, Ukrainian militia, along with German Order Police (probably Battalion 303), shot the victims at close range. The Security Service Archive in Prague, H-770-3.0020; thanks to Peter Rendek for sharing the testimony and photographs.

³⁸ Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitudes Towards Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stetsko's 1941 Zhyttieyps," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23, nos. 3–4 (1999): 149–84, quotation cited in Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 95.

³⁹ I am grateful to Mark Levene for bringing the factors of expulsions and typhus to my attention. For a historical comparison beyond this time and place, see Mark Levene, "The Experience of Genocide: Armenia 1915–16 and Romania 1941–42," in *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah*, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 452–54.

⁴⁰ The modern versus premodern aspects of the Holocaust and their comparability to other cases of mass violence have been explored by Mark Mazower in his comparative analysis, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *American Historical Review*, October 2002: 1158–78.

⁴¹ These events are recounted in Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of the Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000), as well as the work of Jean Ancel and Dalia Ofer. Also see the Final Report of the International Historical Commission on the Holocaust in Romania: "Romania Facing Its Past," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/>.

⁴² On the local mass violence in Bukovina, see Vladimir Solonari's research on the Romanian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and German dynamic, and the importance of the local power hierarchies: "Patterns of Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941," *Kritika* 8, no. 4 (2007): 752; and Levene, "The Experience of Genocide," 423–62.

⁴³ Gross, *Neighbors*, 89.

⁴⁴ Boghdan Musial, "Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen." *Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin/Munich: Propyläen, 2000).

⁴⁵ Norman Naimark, “The Nazis and the ‘East’: Jedwabne’s Circle of Hell,” *Slavic Review* 3 (2002): 479.

⁴⁶ Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany*, 102. Scholar Leonid Rein established that Jews were not as a group beneficiaries of or dominant in the Soviet system; 25 percent of the Jews in the annexed Polish territories were deported, a higher percentage than their proportion in the population of these territories. See Leonid Rein, “Local Collaboration in the Execution of the ‘Final Solution’ in Nazi-Occupied Belorussia,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 20 (Winter 2006): 386. Dieter Pohl’s critique of Musial’s work (*Konterrevolutionnaere Element sind zu erschliessen*) is on the Web at: <http://www.fritz-bauer-institut.de/rezensionene/nl20/pohl.htm>.

⁴⁷ Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), 54–59. The quotation, from Yaroslav Stets’ko, is cited on 49. See also Frank Golczewski, “Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia,” *The Shoah in Ukraine*, 114–55.

⁴⁸ Yehuda Bauer, “Buczacz and Krzemieniec,” 305.

⁴⁹ Golczewski, “Shades of Grey,” 116–17.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 128.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁵⁴ Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).

⁵⁵ Quoted by Golczewski, “Shades of Grey,” 132.

⁵⁶ For Golczewski’s critique of Ukrainian historians and Raul Hilberg’s statement from *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 312, see Golczewski, “Shades of Grey,” 132.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁵⁸ Omer Bartov, “From the Holocaust in Galicia to Contemporary Genocide: Common Ground—Historical Differences” (Meyerhoff Lecture, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, December 17, 2002).

⁵⁹ Snyder, “Life and Death,” 92.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 82, 88.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁶² Saulius Sužiedėlis, “Lithuanian Collaboration during the Second World War: Past Realities, Present Perceptions,” in *Collaboration and Resistance during the Holocaust: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania*, ed. David Gaunt, Paul E. Levine, and Laura Palosuo (Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 158. I am grateful to Martin Dean for this source.

⁶³ Solonari finds that massacres of Jews were more common in Bessarabia than in Northern Bukovina, where the gendarmes organized their deportation. He does not explain whether the historical backdrops mattered in pointing out this difference, for example, whether memory of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 was influential in Bessarabia in 1941. For the Crăciun quote, see Solonari, “Patterns of Violence,” 774, which cites the Archive of the Moldovan Service of Information and Security, file 615, p. 715, USHMM RG-54-003M.

⁶⁴ Solonari, “Patterns of Violence,” 787.

⁶⁵ Mark Levene and Penny Roberts, eds., *The Massacre in History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 10–12. Since this edited collection on massacres appeared, Levene has published two volumes of his own exhaustive study, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State*, vols. 1 and 2 (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005).

⁶⁶ Arendt wrote, “Violence is by nature illegitimate, the tool that rulers use when they have lost or never had legitimate power.” As a political force, violence is the opposite of power, which is legitimate. Violence is distinguished by its instrumental character, like all other tools used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength. A movement can exert force without resorting to violence, Arendt argued. “Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction, but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention.” Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 79; quoted by Jack Eller, *Violence and Culture: A Cross-Cultural and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005), 7–10.

⁶⁷ Levene and Roberts, *The Massacre in History*, 10–12.

⁶⁸ Roger Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 73.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 74–75.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 46.

⁷¹ Eller, *Violence and Culture*, xiii.

⁷² Eller (ibid., 16), in part quoting Roy Baumeister. Baumeister found that ordinary people do violent things, because of: (1) a desire for material gain; (2) fear of an imminent threat, acted out as a form of self-preservation; (3) a drive toward an ideal or a utopia, enacted by a lone crusader or by a movement, with the obstacle to the greater good becoming the target of violence; (4) sadism, or bloodlust, which is less common. See Roy Baumeister, *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999), 375–78.

⁷³ On Soviet-controlled Poland, 1939–1941, see Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988; rev. ed. 2002); and Barkan, Cole, and Struve, eds., *Shared History—Divided Memory*. On postwar pogroms, see Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁷⁴ Early survivor testimonies from these parts are already documenting pogroms that were not evident in the German records and were inaccessible in Russian archives. See Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman, eds., *The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German Occupied Soviet Territories* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2007).

⁷⁵ Gross, *Neighbors*, 81.

THE REICHSKOMMISSAR IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE UKRAINIAN HOLOCAUST

Ralf Meindl

The Holocaust is without doubt one of the most abhorrent crimes in the history of mankind. It is, therefore, not surprising that an enormous amount of research has been conducted to illuminate its many aspects. However, research into those aspects that relate to the perpetrators of these crimes has progressed very slowly to date. As a consequence, very little of the perpetrators' roles or their motives are known.¹

One of these perpetrators was Erich Koch, Gauleiter (district head) and Oberpräsident (province head) of East Prussia, Chef der Zivilverwaltung (head of civil administration) in the Polish districts of Zichenau and Bialystok as well as Reichskommissar for Ukraine. In these positions, he was responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews. Koch is also a representative example of what Ian Kershaw has called "working towards the Führer."² Koch was not a fervent supporter of the National Socialist racial theory, and would not have ordered the murder of Jews and Slavs for ideological reasons alone. He was, however, a part of the social-revolutionary wing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (the "Nazi" Party; NSDAP). That he became one of the main protagonists of the Holocaust was partly due to his personality, but also can be explained by the dynamics of the National Socialist power system. This paper describes how the social-revolutionary Erich Koch turned into the brutal despot of Ukraine, highlighting his motives in carrying out the Holocaust in Ukraine.

Koch was born in 1896 in Wuppertal-Elberfeld, an industrial city in the Ruhr region. He was born into a nonpolitical, Protestant, petit-bourgeois family. Although he wanted to be a medical doctor, he became, instead, a civil servant with the Prussian railway company because his family could not finance his medical training. Because of this setback, Koch apparently felt betrayed by a society that denied him social and professional advancement. That feeling, it seems, paired with his experiences in both World War I and the November Revolution of 1918, led to his political involvement. The social-revolutionary visions of Gregor Strasser and the charisma of Adolf Hitler led him to make the NSDAP his political home.³

By then, Koch already was an antisemite, but the motives for his antisemitism are unknown and do not appear to have played any role in his decision to join the fledgling NSDAP. In contrast to Julius Streicher, Alfred Rosenberg, and Heinrich Himmler, antisemitism was less central to his ideological beliefs. We have no evidence that Koch believed in racial theories. He never talked of the purity of the Aryan race or the like. Rather, in a book from 1934, he saw the “racial mixture” of Prussians and Slavs as a “fountain of youth” for the German Reich.⁴ His antisemitism was rather conventional, closer to that of Strasser than that of Streicher and Himmler. Koch regarded the Jews as a sinister force responsible for those grievances in Germany for which there were no other explanations. Koch often talked about the struggle against these “*jüdische Machenschaften*” (Jewish machinations) but, as far as we know, never about the extermination of the Jews.⁵

Koch advanced in the NSDAP because of his closeness to Gregor Strasser. In the mid-1920s, he was deputy Gauleiter of the Ruhr region, and, in 1928, he became Gauleiter in East Prussia, where he was very successful. In 1932 and 1933, the NSDAP gained 10 percent more votes in East Prussia than its average elsewhere in the Reich.⁶

In 1933, Koch was made Oberpräsident of the province of East Prussia. He ruled the region like a viceroy and made the country a National Socialist *Mustergau* (model district).⁷ Koch’s advisers developed plans to tackle unemployment and to boost the economic development of the province, efforts that began to yield results quickly.⁸ Thus, in the first year of the Third Reich, he became a very important figure in early National Socialist propaganda. This enhanced his reputation with both Hitler and Göring.

Toward the end of 1935, Koch was dismissed from his position as Oberpräsident because of allegations of corruption. Although these charges were true, in a surprise move, Hitler reinstated him to his former position.⁹

Through this crisis, Koch gained in power since it became apparent that Hitler held him in high esteem. Koch’s dismissal, however, left a deep impact on him. Koch had publicly advanced his own ideological agenda, which was, in many cases, in opposition to those of the party. As noted earlier, in contrast to Himmler and Rosenberg, he did not possess a dogmatic racial doctrine. In fact, Koch was quite

undogmatic, adapting his ideology to the specific circumstances in East Prussia, a fact that made him very popular.¹⁰

Hitler's intervention on behalf of Koch made Koch realize that he could survive politically only if in the future he aligned himself with the dictator's expectations. He discarded his own ideological concepts and dismissed his advisers. From 1936 onward, he practiced a policy of "working towards the Führer," to use Kershaw's description—he no longer acted according to his own concepts but was, instead, guided by what he believed to be Hitler's wishes. This also meant an ideological turn toward a racial theory.

Koch could make this radical turn because he was not a creative thinker. The concepts for which he publicly stood were borrowed from other National Socialists, first from Otto and Gregor Strasser and later from East Prussian theorists. Koch portrayed these concepts as his own as long as they served his purposes. When Koch came under fire because of these concepts, he abandoned them, showing himself to be an opportunist and Realpolitiker.¹¹ In fact, by aligning himself even more with Hitler, he managed to accumulate more and more power.

After Hitler, Hermann Göring was Koch's most important patron. Göring tried to exploit Koch's abilities in the economic policy sector. In 1939, Göring supported Koch's wish to incorporate a part of Poland, the so-called Regierungsbezirk Zichenau (administrative district Zichenau), into East Prussia. In this district, Koch could rule even more absolutely than in the "old" East Prussia. He prepared the region to accommodate the sons of East Prussian farmers, thus averting the settlement plans of the SS.¹²

Needing the labor of the Polish and Jewish inhabitants of Zichenau, Koch did not implement measures against the Jewish population in 1940 and 1941. However, many Jews died because of the living conditions in the ghettos, for which Koch was directly responsible.¹³

Koch carried out a similar policy in the district of Bialystok. This area was assigned to him after the attack on Russia in June 1941. In the long term, it was to become a part of the German Reich. Here also Koch was placed in charge of ghettos in which the Jewish population lived in indescribable conditions while being exploited for labor by the occupying force. Thus, he had no interest in killing them swiftly.¹⁴

When in 1942 the SS started the so-called Aktion Reinhard—the systematic extermination of the Polish Jews—the Jewish population of Zichenau and Bialystok were among those to be murdered. Koch delayed the killings in his two districts until a Belorussian workforce was trained to replace the Jewish workers who were to be eliminated. When he determined that he did not need the Jewish workforce any longer, his administrative body assisted with the killings. The mass murder of the Jewish population of Bialystok lasted until August 1943—almost a year.¹⁵

Throughout his career, Koch was often at the helm of new developments. His economic and labor policies and the nazification of the state administration of which he was in charge are examples of this. This was a necessity if he was to stay ahead in the competition for the favor of the Führer. He was less active in his policy against the Jewish population. Whereas other Gauleiters such as Joseph Goebbels, Baldur von Schirach, and Robert Wagner actively pressed ahead with the extermination policy, Koch simply followed given orders without exposing himself. Even though Koch took less of an active role than other Gauleiters, the fate of the Jewish population of East Prussia differed little from that of the Jews in the German Reich, most of whom were deported in the summer of 1942.¹⁶

In the territories directly under his command, Koch did not take a leading role but nevertheless assisted the so-called Aktion Reinhard. In his eyes, the “Judenfrage” (Jewish question) had no priority either in these territories or in Ukraine. Yet Koch became one of the driving forces behind the Holocaust in Ukraine.

Erich Koch was appointed Reichskommissar for Ukraine in July 1941. He was sponsored by Hermann Göring, who valued Koch as a loyal follower and as an economic expert. It was Koch’s responsibility to exploit Ukraine economically for the German war effort, but he had no special order for the extermination of the Jewish population.¹⁷

Unlike in Poland, the Einsatzgruppen had already murdered the majority of the Jewish population in Ukraine before transferring the district to the civil administration. Areas to the east of the Dnieper River were handed over to Koch in the summer of 1942 with the remark, “*Judenfrage bereinigt*” (“Jewish question solved”).¹⁸ As in Poland, those Jews who had survived were crowded into ghettos and were under the custody of the German civil administration.

Koch assumed that the Ukrainians would deliver the desired goods and manpower only by force and thus applied extreme brutality. He cared little about the consequences of his actions: hundreds of thousands were killed as potential “troublemakers,” or died through starvation because food was diverted for the German occupying forces, or were abducted into inhuman slave labor. Unlike in the 1920s and 1930s, he now described the Ukrainians as “subhumans,” whose sole purpose was to work for Germany. Jews seemed to be even more worthless to him; in May 1943, he boasted in front of Hitler that he had “done away with” 500,000 Jews as “elements of rebellion” without regard to their manpower.¹⁹

Koch was criticized from the start for the brutality of his policies, since they created a growing resistance in Ukraine.²⁰ His arguments that he had to act in such a way had little substance. Policies in other districts produced food deliveries similar to what Koch could show for his districts.²¹ The strong criticism of his brutal regime also shows that had Koch pursued a more moderate—if far from humane—approach in his occupation policy, he could have gathered allies behind him. Had he done so, he could have influenced Hitler, who had no fixed position toward the Ukrainians.²² In addition to Koch, Martin Bormann influenced Hitler toward a policy of extreme violence as the only possible instrument of power in Ukraine. Koch insisted to Hitler on numerous occasions that his policy and Hitler’s vision of a pure Germanized Lebensraum could be realized only by “*Tatmenschen*” (doers) such as Koch. Hitler praised Koch’s policy and unleashed a spiral of violence that led to increased brutality in Ukraine.²³

Koch’s decision to use extreme force in Ukraine was less rooted in his ideological beliefs than in his power-political tactics. On the one hand, he thought it easier to take by force from the Ukrainians what he saw as necessary for the German war effort rather than make political concessions to them. On the other hand, he had to fulfill demands by Wirtschaftsdiktator (economic dictator) Göring and Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz (Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment) Fritz Sauckel if he was to solidify or even expand his position within the National Socialist hierarchy. Koch was aware of the mechanisms of power within the National Socialist system and knew that by accomplishing these tasks he could make a name for himself as an active and successful paladin of Hitler. He was also aware that by pointing out concerns or potential problems in fulfilling these demands, the National Socialist hierarchy would not only be unsympathetic but also blame him for those difficulties.²⁴

Koch responded that he could deliver all goods and materials in any quantities and that only haulage could impose a limit.²⁵ Although these claims were untrue, Koch told Hitler what he wanted to hear. While this helped him to solidify his position within the National Socialist hierarchy, it also put him under pressure since he now needed to fulfill his own promises or lose face and weaken his position. Thus, he was poised to take extreme measures. When, in August 1942, Göring and Hitler demanded increased deliveries of food from Ukraine, Koch decided to meet these demands regardless of objections from, for example, the Wehrmacht or the Ostministerium. Ukraine, he argued, had to deliver what Germany needed while, at the same time, the needs of the Ukrainians were “*gänzlich gleichgültig*” (entirely unimportant).²⁶ This was a death sentence for the remaining Jews, who were at the bottom of the racial hierarchy and thus were the first victims of this policy change. At a conference with the Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podolia at the end of August 1942, Koch’s deputy, Paul Dargel, disclosed that it was the “*emphatic wish*” of the Reichskommissar himself to solve the Jewish question once and for all and as soon as possible.”²⁷ The Jewish labor force as an economic factor was no longer an argument for Koch, who believed that shortages and other negative aspects of the wartime economy caused by the killing of the Jews could be solved within two months.

In September 1942, Koch ordered the liquidation of the Pinsk ghetto, one of the last remaining larger ghettos.²⁸ These two decrees (the killing of the Jews in Volhynia-Podolia and the liquidation of the Pinsk ghetto), together with measures by the SS, formed the beginning of the ultimate extermination of the Ukrainian Jews. The murder of the Jewish population in the other Polish districts under Koch’s purview began immediately after Pinsk. The developments in Ukraine that led Koch to order the killing of the Jews prompted him to press ahead with the Holocaust in his other districts.

The way in which the Jews in Ukraine were killed also shows Koch’s limited power. He had to rely on the police forces of the SS to execute the extermination orders. However, they were not under his command, but under that of Himmler. The SS tried to operate as independently as possible from the civil administration. Many of the murder campaigns were thus initiated by the SS and not by Koch. As I have briefly mentioned before, Koch had the power to delay mass executions and termination of ghettos, as in Bialystok. But he did this only when his own economic interests were under threat. In no instance was he concerned for the people themselves.

On the contrary, Koch had no qualms about using the mass murder of the Jewish population when it helped his own political agenda. Thus his administration supported the SS in its actions and even instigated some of them. In doing so, he not only wanted to eliminate “unneeded eaters” and prevent them from commandeering more food, but he also tried to outdo the SS to solidify his position within the National Socialist hierarchy. As a consequence, he often came into conflict with SS leaders.²⁹ Often his only tools were radical phrases, which Gerlach called “*Wortradikalismus*,”³⁰ since he lacked the executive instruments to carry out many measures, such as the complete evacuation of whole areas. Without the help of the SS, Koch could not execute larger measures. The aforementioned ghetto at Pinsk, for example, remained in existence for another seven weeks after Koch had ordered its evacuation. Only when Himmler ordered the ghetto’s dissolution was it carried out.³¹

In view of these findings, Koch remains a curious character in the genesis of the Holocaust in Ukraine. It was not because of his ideological point of view that he pressed ahead with the extermination of the Jewish population. He had not initially embraced the racial ideology of the National Socialist system, but would justify his actions by it in later stages. In Koch’s view, “*Untermenschen*” were subject to his will; he saw them as people he could use to his own advantage and murder when necessary.

Erich Koch had begun his political career under the flag of social equality. His actions in Ukraine show, however, that his philosophy of life was based not on a humanist worldview but on egotism. Early in his career, he adopted a policy of social equality because he saw his own prospects endangered. His long engagement within the NSDAP and his readiness to commit himself to the power mechanisms within the National Socialist system made him accept even the party’s racial ideology. In the power struggles in Ukraine over the extermination of the Jewish population, he was scrupulous. He ordered the murder of hundreds of thousands of people for economic reasons and to solidify his own political position.

In these *dynamisierenden Rivalitäten* (dynamic rivalries), the Jews were the first victims who were subjected to systematic extermination. Ukrainians and Poles escaped this fate only because the course of the war stopped the National Socialist ravages. While a German defeat was still off in the future, Koch had already begun to develop policies for a time after a German victory: the complete removal of the Polish and Ukrainian population in order to settle farmers of German stock in those areas. These

plans were yet again extremely radical measures with which Koch might have tried to outdo his rivals within the party. And again, he worked toward the Führer with such radical propositions. Reichskommissar for Ukraine Erich Koch was thus not just a small cog within the National Socialist system; in fact he played a key role in the Holocaust.

NOTES

¹ See Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002); Hannes Heer, *Vom Verschwinden der Täter: Der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner war dabei* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2004); Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, “Sozialisation, Milieu und Gewalt. Fortschritte und Probleme der neueren Täterforschung,” in *Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien*, ed. Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), 1–32.

² Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1936–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2000), 26, 436.

³ Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Z 42 IV 1909, pp. 23–26, Aussage Koch, 15.6.49; Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Warszawa, SWWW 746, pp. 40–71, résumé of Koch, undated (1959); Erich Koch, interview by Mieczysław Sieminski, (1986), transcribed by Christian Rohrer; manuscript in the possession of the author.

⁴ Erich Koch, *Aufbau im Osten* (Breslau: W. G. Korn, 1934), 81ff.

⁵ Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf, RW 23, passim; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin, XX. Hauptabteilung, Repositur 10, 36, 37, 240 passim.

⁶ Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, “Die Wende zum Nationalsozialismus im südlichen Ostpreussen 1930–1932: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Masurentums,” *Olsztyńskie Studia Niemcoznawcze* Bd. I (1986), 59–114; Bohdan Kozięłło-Poklewski, *Narodowosocjalistyczna Niemiecka Partia Robotnicza w Prusach Wschodnich 1921–1933* (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Ośrodka Badań Naukowych, 1995); Gerhard Reifferscheid, “Die NSDAP in Ostpreussen: Besonderheiten ihrer Ausbreitung und Tätigkeit,” *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte und Altertumskunde Ermlands* 39 (1979): 61–85.

⁷ Christian Rohrer, *Nationalsozialistische Macht in Ostpreussen* (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2006), 247–82.

⁸ Friedrich Richter, *Industriepolitik im agrarischen Osten: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Ostpreussens zwischen den Weltkriegen. Bericht und Dokumentation* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984), passim; *Das neue Ostpreussen: Rechenschaft über den Aufbau der Provinz*, adaption from Hans-Bernard v. Grünberg (Königsberg: Pädagogische Verlagsgemeinschaft Ostpreussen, 1938), passim; Bernd Martin, *Masuren: Mythos und Geschichte* (Karlsruhe: Verlag Evangelischer Presseverband für Baden, 1998), 80–82.

⁹ Ralf Meindl, *Ostpreussens Gauleiter—Erich Koch, eine politische Biographie* (Osnabrück, Germany: Fibre, 2007), 217–23; Rohrer, *Nationalsozialistische Macht*, 323–69.

¹⁰ Meindl, *Ostpreussens Gauleiter*, 172–94.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 223–37.

¹² Ralf Meindl, “Die Politik des ostpreussischen Gauleiters Erich Koch in den annektierten polnischen Gebieten als Ausdruck nationalsozialistischer Zielvorstellungen,” in *Niemcy i Polska w trudnych latach 1933–1990. Deutschland und Polen in schweren Zeiten 1933–1990*, ed. Bernd Martin and Arkadiusz Stempin (Poznań, Poland: Institut Historii UAM, 2004), 87–115.

¹³ Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 606; Frank Golczewski, “Polen,” in *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), 451.

¹⁴ Meindl, *Ostpreussens Gauleiter*, 297–322.

¹⁵ Sara Bender, “The ‘Reinhardt Action’ in the ‘Bialystok District,’” in *Bialystok in Bielefeld: Nationalsozialistische Verbrechen vor dem Landgericht Bielefeld 1958 bis 1967*, ed. Freia Anders, Hauke-Hendrik Kutscher, and Katrin Stoll (Bielefeld, Germany: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2003), 186–208; Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 385, 401, 535, 657, 661–72, 676, 711–15, 723–33.

¹⁶ Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, *Die jüdische Minderheit in Königsberg/Preussen, 1871–1945* (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 351–60; Alfred Gottwald, “Zur Deportation der Juden aus Ostpreussen in den Jahren 1942/1943,” in *NS-Gewaltherrschaft: Beiträge zur historischen Forschung und juristischen Aufarbeitung*, ed. Alfred Gottwald, Norbert Kampe, and Peter Klein (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 2005), 152–71.

¹⁷ International Military Tribunal, Bd. 38, S. 87, Document 221-L.

¹⁸ Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 6/302, Vortragsnotiz, 27.8.42; Dieter Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine: Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im Reichskommissariat 1941–1943,” in *Ausbeutung, Vernichtung, Öffentlichkeit: Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik*, ed. Norbert Frei, Sybille Steinbacher, and Bernd C. Wagner (Munich: K. G. Sauer Verlag, 2000), 150, 169ff.

- ¹⁹ *Lagebesprechungen im Führerhauptquartier: Protokollfragmente aus Hitlers militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945*, ed. Helmut Heiber (Munich: Dt. Taschenbuch Verlag, 1964), 257–63.
- ²⁰ See Bundesarchiv Berlin, NS 6/795; NS 19/1478, 1704; R 6/69, 70, 77, 242, 251, 259, 267, 302, 426, 491; R 55/1463; BDC, SSO 193A; SSHO 2280, Denkschriften 1942–44; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Z 42 IV 1909e, pp. 70–71, Erklärung Homeyer, n.d.; IMT, Bd. 41, S. 194–201, Dokument Rosenberg 19; Alfred E. Frauenfeld, “Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete, 10. Februar 1944,” *Deutsche Studien* 4 (1966): 493–517; Andreas Zellhuber, “*Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu...*”: *Das Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete und die deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941–1945* (Munich: Verlag Ernst Vögel, 2006), 191–96, 206.
- ²¹ Klaus Bästlein, “Völkermord und koloniale Träumerei: Das ‘Reichskommissariat Ostland’ unter schleswig-holsteinischer Verwaltung,” in *NS-Gewaltherrschaft*, 217–46; Hans-Dieter Handrack, *Das Reichskommissariat Ostland: Die Kulturpolitik der deutschen Verwaltung zwischen Autonomie und Gleichschaltung 1941–1944* (Hannoversch Münden: Gauke, 1981).
- ²² Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier* (Munich: Propyläen, 2003), 492ff., 649–52; Bundesarchiv Berlin, NS 19/544, Vermerk RuSHA, 16.7.43; Roman Ilnytskyi, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934–1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik. Ein Vorbericht*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Osteuropa-Institute München, 1958), 1:293–307; *Herbst 1941 im “Führerhauptquartier”: Berichte Werner Koepfens an seinen Minister Alfred Rosenberg*, ed. Martin Vogt (Koblenz, Germany: Bundesarchiv, 2002), XXXVII.
- ²³ *Lagebesprechungen*, S. 257–263, Besprechung vom 8.6.43.
- ²⁴ International Military Tribunal, Bd. 39, S. 384–425, Document 170 USSR.
- ²⁵ International Military Tribunal, Bd. 39, S. 406, Document 170 USSR.
- ²⁶ Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 6/70, pp. 17–18, Tagungsprotokoll, 26.-28.8.42; compare International Military Tribunal, Bd. 25, S. 318, Document 264 PS.
- ²⁷ Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 714; see also Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000), 93.
- ²⁸ Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 715.

²⁹ Bundesarchiv Berlin, BDC, O 217 II, pp. 127–29, Koch an Himmler, 25.2.43; Ebd., O 342, Aktenvermerk Prützmann, 27.9.42.

³⁰ Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 1018.

³¹ Bundesarchiv Berlin, BDC O 217 II, p. 134, Himmler an Prützmann, 27.10.42; see also Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde*, 719–22.

COLLABORATION IN UKRAINE DURING THE HOLOCAUST: ASPECTS OF HISTORIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH

Anatoly Podolsky

INTRODUCTION

This essay defines key aspects of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during World War II and the Nazi occupation of Ukraine and their reflection in postwar historiography. It first examines cooperation and/or collaboration of the non-Jewish population (that is, not only ethnic Ukrainians but members of other ethnic groups who assisted the Nazis in the murder of Jews) with the occupation regime on Ukrainian soil during the Holocaust.¹ The main forms of collaboration with the Nazis, including open or covert assistance in the extermination of individual Jews and entire Jewish communities in Ukraine during the Shoah (Holocaust), are analyzed in order to throw light on (1) the reasons and motives behind Ukrainian collaboration; (2) the behavior of collaborators during the occupation; (3) changes in attitude toward the Jews or Jewish communities during the process of the extermination; (4) the extent, scope, and influence of collaboration in Ukraine during the extermination of the Jews on its territory; and (5) the impact of Nazi antisemitic propaganda on the nature and level of collaboration. It also examines attitudes toward collaboration in present-day Ukrainian society, the connection between public and historiographic discourse, and the position of the state authorities toward this issue. Also assessed is the extent to which Ukrainian society and the regime have conceptualized this problem, the degree to which it is openly discussed in modern Ukraine, and the place it occupies (if any) in historical memory or in the collective national historical memory of Ukrainian society and culture.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JEWS DURING THE WAR

The attitude of the non-Jewish population to the Holocaust in Ukraine ranged from collaboration to neutrality to rescue. The prevailing tendency was indifference to the tragic fate of Jewish fellow countrymen. The occupation and the war, said well-known philosopher Tsvetan Todorov, was a period of extremes,² and the behavior of most people was directed first and foremost to saving their own lives and those of their

closest relatives. Yaroslav Hrytsak stresses that saving a Jew under the conditions of Nazi rule in Ukraine was a heroic act, and heroism is not a routine event—people had to live, or rather survive, and not perform heroic deeds.³

A look at the demography of Soviet Ukraine is relevant in a study of attitudes of Ukrainian citizens,⁴ under Nazi occupation, toward the Jews. The total population of the Soviet Ukraine before the German invasion was more than 30 million. About 5 million fought against Hitler in the Red Army; hundreds of thousands were evacuated or fled. According to Grigorii Krupnikov and Hrytsak, no fewer than 20,000–25,000 people collaborated with the Nazis, assisting them in the “Final Solution of the Jewish question.”⁵ Data at Yad Vashem show that the number of non-Jews (mainly, but not only, Ukrainians) who saved Jews during the Holocaust in Ukraine was slightly more than 3,000.⁶ Therefore, we cannot claim that collaboration with the Nazis in Ukraine was on the same scale (relative to the total population) as it was in occupied Lithuania, Croatia, Latvia, Estonia, or Poland. However, without the support of the local non-Jewish population, the extent of the Holocaust in Ukraine would undoubtedly have been reduced.

TYPES OF COLLABORATION

The position of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) toward the Jews will be dealt with below; however, there was almost no political collaboration between the Nazi regime and Ukrainian nationalist forces between 1941 and 1944. No puppet or collaborator government was set up in occupied Ukraine, unlike in Croatia (Pavelic) and Hungary (Szalasi), and, especially, in Norway and France. The Nazi leadership thought it would not be wise to raise the the Ukrainian nationalist movement’s hopes about gaining power. The Germans exploited Ukrainian nationalism to further their own interests on occupied Ukrainian territory, particularly Nazi antisemitic policy. Despite its opposition to the German occupation, a large segment of nationalist forces supported the Nazi genocide of Jews (see below).

Collaboration of the non-Jewish population of Ukraine during the Holocaust took place, most importantly, in units of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, most of whose members were recruited among volunteers (many of them people who joined in order to save their own and their families’ lives out of fear of the Nazi occupation) and others who joined for “ideological reasons”—hatred of the Soviet regime and antisemitism,

among other reasons. These units took part in, among other acts, the murder of Jews, guarding places of execution, accompanying victims to execution sites, sorting objects and valuables, and guarding confiscated property. However, members of the local Ukrainian police also were involved in the mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children, and in raping Jewish girls and women.⁷ On the other hand, some Ukrainian policemen released victims for ransom or simply gave them the opportunity to escape before an action or from a ghetto, without payment, and thereby saved their lives.⁸

The extent of collaboration in the territories of Transnistria and Galicia was considerable, but less so in Reichskommissariat Ukraine. An infamous case of Ukrainian collaboration took place during the mass murder at Babi Yar, Kiev. On September 29–30, 1941, when 33,771⁹ Jews were murdered, there were more units of the Ukrainian police¹⁰ than members of Einsatzgruppe C and other German units; however, the collaborators here functioned “only” as guards and collected the victims’ belongings.

According to a widely held belief, most Ukrainian policemen were recruited in western Ukraine. However, this is not entirely true. Collaborationist police battalions also were drafted from central Ukraine (in the Kiev region), from the Crimea, and from eastern parts of Ukraine (such as Zaporozhie, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk). Ukrainian police units also took part in anti-Jewish acts in Poland and Belorussia.

In addition to the collaboration of police units, there were spontaneous pogroms and murder of Jews by the local population, often initiated and supported by the Nazis. Such acts were motivated by one of the main antisemitic postulates of Nazi propaganda in the Soviet-occupied territories: implication of the Jews in the crimes of Stalin’s regime against Ukrainians, Poles, Belorussians, Russians, and others. Such propaganda had great success in the District of Galicia (L’viv, Stanislav, Drohobych, Ternopil, Zolochiv, Berezhany, Buchach, Kolomyia, Zhovkva, Stryi, and Skola). Thousands of Jews were murdered in these so-called retaliation acts.¹¹ Additionally, there were Ukrainian units within the German (Waffen-) SS and Wehrmacht, primarily consisting of young men of the SS Galichina division and Nachtigal Battalion. The latter was located in L’viv during the pogrom of July 1–2, 1941, and it is possible that members of this battalion participated in the anti-Jewish violence.

MOTIVES FOR COLLABORATION

A key focus of many researchers is to study the motives of those who collaborated with the Nazis and to study collaborators' participation in anti-Jewish actions. Several reasons may be discerned: to preserve one's life and the lives of one's relatives; to enrich oneself at the expense of the victims—the Jews; the influence of prewar antisemitism and Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda; and blaming Jews for the crimes of the Stalinist Bolshevik regime. The last two seem to be the most substantial and interconnected. In the Soviet territories, including Ukrainian lands, anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda heavily stressed the responsibility of Ukrainian Jews for Bolshevism. Stalin's policies in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s—including the “artificial” famine of 1932–1933 (*Holodomor*), the continuous repression of various social echelons, and the creation of the Gulag system with its concentration camps—set what was arguably the majority of Ukrainian society against the Soviet regime. It is well known that Nazi propaganda in the Eastern Territories maintained that Germany had liberated them from the criminal Bolshevik authorities, who had mistreated the local population; the propaganda also equated the Jews with that regime.

Jews were completely dehumanized in Nazi propaganda, primarily in German-controlled periodicals distributed in occupied Ukraine, but also in proclamations, leaflets, and other propaganda activities. In contrast to Western Europe or Poland, most of this material was directed not at racial degradation of the Jews (though this factor of Nazi anti-Jewish ideology was also present), but at blaming them for Bolshevism and the crimes of the NKVD, Stalin's security service; the regime and the authorities in Ukraine were labeled “Jewish” or “Jewish-Bolshevik.” This was an open call to kill Jews as representatives of Bolshevik ideology and practice, following which the liberation under the aegis of the Greater German Reich would take place.¹² Such propaganda played a major role in promoting Holocaust-related collaboration among the non-Jewish population of Ukraine. As is confirmed in the documentation,¹³ many people who opposed Stalin's regime volunteered for auxiliary police units, took part in anti-Jewish actions, and betrayed their Jewish neighbors. These people turned a blind eye to the fact that, like ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles, their Jewish fellow countrymen, too, were also victims of the Communist regime in prewar times. The same people also chose to ignore the fact that many Ukrainians, too, had served in Bolshevik persecution units. The belief that Jews, qua Jews, participated in Bolshevik crimes became the principal motive for collaboration, particularly in western Ukraine

(Galicia).¹⁴ During the interwar period, those lands were a part of Poland. Although Polish antisemitism existed, Jewish political and sociocultural life had flourished. In 1939 these lands were annexed to Soviet eastern Ukraine, and by 1941, all features of democratic life there had been destroyed by the Bolsheviks, only some of whom were Jews from the east. When the Nazis entered L'viv and other Galician cities in June 1941, they provoked and supported anti-Jewish pogroms organized by the local population. Tens of thousands of Jewish men, women, and children fell victim to them.¹⁵ In L'viv, Zolochiv, and other cities of western Ukraine, the Nazis opened the doors of penitentiaries that had been operated by the NKVD, and when the locals saw the dead bodies of their relatives, killed by the Bolsheviks before their retreat, the finger of blame was pointed at the Jews. Historian Marko Carynnyc notes an important detail in his study of the Zolochiv pogrom: the perpetrators had received a license from the Nazi authorities for “retaliatory action” but did not understand or did not want to understand that the guilty had left the city some time before and that among the victims were not only Poles and Ukrainians, but also Jews.¹⁶

ATTITUDES AFTER THE WAR: THE SOVIET ERA

The issue of collaboration of the non-Jewish population (including Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, Poles, Romanians, Moldavians, Hungarians, and Crimean Tatars) with the Germans in the persecution and murder of Jews in the occupied territories of Ukraine (1941–1944) is one of the most complex, ambiguous, and yet least-studied aspects of modern Ukrainian Holocaust historiography.

Before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the history of the Holocaust was barely researched in Soviet Ukrainian historiography and was not a subject for historical research in its own right. In the historiography of the Great Patriotic War,¹⁷ no studies were expressly dedicated to the persecution and genocide of the Jews by Nazi Germany on the occupied Soviet Ukrainian territories. Nevertheless, some collections of documents on Holocaust history were known to contain materials and testimonies about places of mass execution of Jews on the occupied lands.¹⁸ Most of these files were ruthlessly censored, and any mention of Jews was forbidden. In academic, pedagogic, and even journalistic literature, Jews exterminated solely because of their ethnic and national background were subsumed under the euphemism “peaceful Soviet citizens.” The history of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews on Nazi-

occupied lands was falsified. Needless to say, in Ukrainian historiography there could be no mention of the Holocaust. According to one of the maxims of Soviet wartime historiography, those who died were Soviet citizens, regardless of their national identification.

Nor did Soviet historiographic studies, apart from a few exceptions,¹⁹ deal specifically with collaboration. On the conceptual level, the following should be borne in mind: Soviet historiography (in keeping with official Soviet ideology and policy) categorically condemned any form of cooperation with the Nazis during the years of war and occupation. As a result, Soviet censure applied not only to obvious collaborators but also to those who remained in the occupied territories of Ukraine; those who survived captivity and returned alive became potential “enemies of the people” (an infamous phrase from Stalinist terminology of the 1930s—the period of repression by the Communist regime against virtually all levels of society). Yet at the same time, Soviet ideology never referred particularly to collaborators who took part in the murder of Jews, only to crimes against the Soviet state and the Soviet people. From the second half of the 1940s until the beginning of the 1960s, several trials took place, as a result of which many “Hitlerite accomplices” (to use “Soviet-speak”) received death sentences or long prison terms.

ATTITUDES AFTER THE WAR: THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA

Crucial changes took place after the collapse of the Soviet system. The Holocaust became a theme in modern Ukrainian historical studies. Over the first fifteen years of national independence, Ukrainian historiography has experienced the creation of a new branch—Holocaust studies—which has produced a range of academic works, articles, monographs, collections of documents, source guides, and memoirs. Most important, the conceptual approach to modern Ukrainian historiography has changed. Today the Holocaust is studied as a premeditated genocide against the Jews, a unique policy of the Nazis aimed at the extermination of a people based on their ethnic background or Jewish descent.

Incontestably, one of the most complex aspects of Holocaust studies in Ukrainian historiography is the issue of collaboration in Ukraine during the war. No specialized work on this issue has so far appeared, although the theoretical foundations for study of the collaboration of Ukrainians and other non-Jewish populations in

Ukraine have been more or less determined. In one of the first works on the topic, Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak²⁰ formulated a primary approach to the topic; his perspective serves as a guide for modern Ukrainian historians and philosophers. At its basis lies the dictum that, above all, it is necessary to admit the fact of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis during the Holocaust; that this fact should be neither rejected nor concealed; and that it is imperative to investigate the reasons for this phenomenon and the motives that drove various non-Jewish members of the population to collaborate with the Nazis in the Holocaust.

According to Hrytsak, it is only in this way that the history of World War II in Ukraine and the history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations of the period will not be falsified. Moreover, exposing as many factual, objective details as possible on this complex and tragic period of history will facilitate the restoration of political and sociocultural relations between Jews and Ukrainians.²¹ A range of well-known Ukrainian scholars in the country and in the diaspora support this view.²² In recent years, debates over Ukrainian collaboration during the Holocaust have appeared in the scientific and cultural journal *Krytyka*.²³ Among the scholars and public figures involved are Yaroslav Hrytsak, Zhanna Kovba, Sofia Grachova, Myroslav Popovych, Andrii Portnov, Sergei Grabovich, Myroslav Marynovich, Taras Vozniak, John-Paul Himka, and Marco Carynnyk. The point of this discourse is to find common ground and to relate the facts because, as Sofia Grachova wrote, “They lived amongst us.” They were part of our society, part of Ukrainian history and culture. The Holocaust practically destroyed Ukrainian Jewry, and today, perhaps, Ukrainian society needs to form an honest view about collaboration, not by presenting claims that might or might not justify collaboration, but rather by calling the phenomenon by its name. Currently, there is a discussion among Ukrainian researchers concerning levels of collaboration with the Nazi regime. Philologist Zynovii Antoniuk believes that those who betrayed Jews during the occupation or took part in the work of police units, extermination actions, or guarded the concentration camps (notably, the Treblinka camp was guarded by Ukrainians)²⁴ should be called not collaborationists but “toadies,”²⁵ as they were mostly people of low moral standards, motivated not by ideology but by primitive instinct. A second category included the Ukrainian formations within the German military force structure, e.g. the Halytchina (Galician) SS division, made up of Ukrainian volunteers in 1943.

Another controversial issue concerns the activities of Ukrainian nationalist groups during the occupation of Ukraine—OUN (consisting of two branches: OUN-Melnyk and the more radical OUN-Bandera) and UPA (created at the end 1942). These patriotic organizations, which were set up with the purpose of creating an independent Ukrainian state (the Ukrainian Independent Sovereign State),²⁶ fought simultaneously against two totalitarian regimes—that of Stalin and that of Hitler. However, OUN-M, and to some extent OUN-B, supported the Nazi genocide of Jews, and in their program documents accused Jews of cooperation with the Bolshevik regime and of crimes against the Ukrainian nation. Jews were equated with Communists, as in Nazi propaganda in the Eastern Territories.²⁷

CONCLUSION

Modern Ukraine, where the foundations of a civil and pluralistic society have only now begun to permeate, has so far neither conducted an objective evaluation of the role of Ukrainian national forces and their activities in World War II nor admitted to Ukrainian collaboration in the Holocaust. Neither have the Ukrainian authorities found a balanced approach to these phenomena and to this period of Ukrainian history. The government has been too busy declaring peace among all forces and assuming that the past is past. It seems that only the Ukrainian academic world has been continuing the discussion, and it is from here that some voices have been calling more loudly and distinctly for the truth—no matter how painful—to be told about Ukrainian history, including Ukrainian collaboration in the Holocaust. However, these debates and, more important, their conclusions, have not reached a wider audience, especially students and youth in general. Nor are they heard by the authorities. At the same time, contrary forces are at work, declaring that during the interwar period Ukraine was ruled by “Jewish-Bolsheviks” (thus repeating the maxims of Nazi propaganda and supporting collaboration and the Holocaust) and that they are solely responsible for the problems of modern independent Ukraine, which is now said to be in the “clutches of Zionism.”

In light of this insidious trend, it is imperative that the issues raised in this essay have an effect on modern Ukrainian historiography and be exposed to Ukrainian society in general. Only by telling the truth can we avoid a return of totalitarianism, which brought so much grief to Jews as well as to Ukrainians.

NOTES

¹ It is worth mentioning that during the first 20 years of the Communist regime (1918–1939) the Jewish communities in eastern Ukraine (i.e., Soviet Ukraine) were widely assimilated as a result of the Bolshevik policy of *Korenizatsiia* (transforming all ethnic groups into a unified community—a “Soviet nation”). The Hebrew language was banned, synagogues were closed, religious ways of life were forbidden, and the community structure was destroyed. When the Nazis occupied Ukraine, no Jewish community structure existed in the eastern part. Thus, when researching the Holocaust in this part of Ukraine, we cannot speak about the extermination of communities, only about the murder of Jews—Soviet citizens. A different situation existed in the western part of Ukraine in the interwar period: Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, and other areas were part of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Despite open antisemitism in these countries then (except for Czechoslovakia, where the Jewish community thrived during the 1930s), the structure of the Jewish community was not destroyed; on the contrary, it was very active. Thus, we can speak here about extermination of entire communities during the Holocaust and not just of individual Jews or of Jewish families.

² Tsvetan Todorov, *Oblichchiam do ekstremi* [Facing the Extreme] (L’viv: Litopys, 2000).

³ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Ukraintsy v anty evreis’kykh aktsiakh pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny* [Ukrainians in Anti-Jewish actions during the Second World War] (L’viv: Chasopys “Ji,” 1996).

⁴ It would be more accurate to say “citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” since before the Nazi occupation in June 1941 all of the historically ethnic Ukrainian lands other than the region of Transcarpathia were part of the USSR.

⁵ See presentation of Grigorii Krupnikov about collaboration in Europe: *Materials of the Conference on Holocaust Studies and Teaching in Europe* (Warsaw: Council of Europe, 1996). See also Hrytsak, *Ukraintsy v anty evreis’kykh aktsiakh*, 192.

⁶ Data of Yad Vashem (Jerusalem) as of January 1, 2009.

⁷ See Myroslav Popovich, “Evreiskii genotsid na Ukraine” [Jewish genocide in Ukraine], *Filosofs’ka i sotsiologichna dumka*, no. 4 (1994).

⁸ See Faina Vinokurova, “Osobennosti genotsida evreev na territorii Transnistrii” [Particulars of the genocide of the Jews on the territory of Transnistria], *Kholokost i sovremennost’*, nos. 4–6 (2003–2004).

⁹ See *Unichtozhenie evreev SSSR v gody nemetskoi okkupatsii, 1941–1944 godakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Annihilation of the Jews of the USSR during the German occupation, 1941–1944: Collection of documents and materials] (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1992).

¹⁰ There is a debate among historians over whether it was the Bukovinian unit, a Ukrainian police unit formed in northern Bukovina, or another Ukrainian police unit.

¹¹ Eliyahu Jones, *Evrei L'vova v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny i katastrofy evropeiskogo evreistva: 1939–1944* [The Jews of L'vov during the Second World War] (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Biblioteka Kholokosta, 1999); Iakov Khonigsman, *Katastrofa evreistva Zapadnoi Ukrainy* [Holocaust of the Jews of Western Ukraine] (L'vov: L'vivska Politehnika, 1998).

¹² Semën Averbukh, *Gitlerovskaia propaganda iudofobii v proklamatsiakh i karikaturakh* [Nazi propaganda of antisemitism in proclamations and caricatures] (Kiev: Ukrainskii tsentr izucheniiia istorii Kholokosta, 2005).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 142–44.

¹⁴ Khonigsman, *Katastrofa evreistva Zapadnoi Ukrainy* [Jewry's Catastrophe in Western Ukraine]; Maksym Gon, *Z krivdoiu na samoti: Ukrain's'ko-evrejs'ki vzaemyny na Volyni v 1926–1939 rokakh* [Injustice Alone: Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Volhynia, 1926–1939] (Rivne: Volyns'ki oberegy, 2005); Shimon Redlich, *Razom i narizno v Berezhnakh: Poliaky, evrei ta ukrainsi. 1919–1945* [Together and apart in Berezhany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945] (Kiev: Dukh i litera, 2003).

¹⁵ Jones, *Evrei L'vova v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, 1999).

¹⁶ Marko Tsarynnyk, “Zolochiv movshit' ” [Zolochiv is silent], *Krytyka* 8 (October 2005).

¹⁷ This was the term introduced into the academic and sociocultural lexicon denoting the events of World War II on the Soviet-German (Eastern) front from June 22, 1941, until May 9, 1945. This term was often used as a synonym for “World War II”; though now much less used in modern Ukrainian historiography and Ukrainian society, it remains in academic and cultural discourse.

¹⁸ For example, *Niurnbergskii protsess v dokumentakh i materialakh* [The Nuremberg Trial in documents and materials] (Moscow: 1957); *SS v deistvii: Dokumenty i materialy* [The SS in action: Documents and materials] (Moscow: 1959); *Sovershenno sekretno: Dokumenty i materialy* [Top Secret: Documents and materials] (Moscow: 1961). In the 1940s and 1950s, collections of documents existed on the Nazi

occupation; these collections were dedicated to certain regions of Ukraine: Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Dnepropetrovsk, among others.

¹⁹ Including several works by Mikhail Semiriaga, the most well known of which is *The Nazi Prison Empire and Its Collapse* (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1991). In the post-Soviet era, he published the book *Collaboration* (Moscow: Politizdat, 2000), but his concepts remained unchanged.

²⁰ Hrytsak, *Ukrainci v anty evreis'kykh aktsiiakh*, 194.

²¹ See Hrytsak, *ibid.*; and Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom: Istorychni eseï* [Passion for nationalism: Historical essays] (Kiev: Krytyka, 2004); Myroslav Popovych, "Evreiskii genotsid na Ukraine" [Jewish genocide in Ukraine] *Filosofs'ka i sotsiologichna dumka*, no. 4 (1994).

²² Including Ukrainian scholars Myroslav Popovych, Zhanna Kovba, Peter Potichnyj, John-Paul Himka, Zynovii Antoniuk, Sofia Grachova, and Ivan Dziuba.

²³ Materials and articles in *Krytyka* (Kiev) 4, no. 5 (2005).

²⁴ Martyna Rusiniak, "Paradoks Treblinky" [The paradox of Treblinka] *Holokost i suchasnist': Studii v Ukraini i sviti*, no. 2 (2007).

²⁵ Zynovii Antoniuk, www.holocaust.kyiv.ua (site discontinued).

²⁶ See Petro Mirchuk, *Dokumenty pro diial'nist' UPA* [Documents about the activities of UPA] (L'viv: Vydavnytstvo "Prosvita," 1991); Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).

²⁷ From the materials of the Second Krakow Summit of OUN in 1940. See, among others, Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*.

TEACHING HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES IN MODERN UKRAINE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

Viktorija Sukovata

Teaching the Holocaust and genocide studies at schools and universities in modern Ukraine is a difficult task for a number of reasons, some reaching back to the Soviet past and others rooted in Ukrainian society's present.

The Holocaust and genocide studies as academic disciplines developed in western European and North American universities after World War II as interdisciplinary fields that had both practical and theoretical significance. Many researchers in Holocaust studies aimed to keep alive the memory of this great tragedy; founders of genocide theory as a historical and sociological field were Raphael Lemkin, Frank Chalk, Leo Kuper, and Kurt Jonassohn, who were sensitive to the tragedies of other peoples or tried to comprehend a tragedy of their own people. Jonassohn was a Jewish-German scholar whose family perished in Auschwitz and Lemkin was a Jewish-Polish lawyer who was the first to introduce into political and academic discourse the term *genocide* to describe the systematic destruction of ethnic, religious, or other groups.¹ If the earliest research on Holocaust history began in the first decades after the war, genocide studies as an interdisciplinary field, which included investigation of and attempts to comprehend many significant bloody events in Africa, Asia, and Europe, was formed at the end of the 1980s.

Zygmunt Bauman was one of the first to assert that the Holocaust was not simply a "Jewish problem" and was not an event within Jewish history only. The Holocaust was conceived and executed by educated, rational Europeans on the high stage of our civilization, and "for this reason it is a problem of the whole society, civilization and culture."² Following Bauman's thinking we need to add that the Holocaust was not a kind of a "game" between Jews and Nazis; the Holocaust became possible because some segments of local populations collaborated with the Nazis, because European societies had traditions of antisemitism since medieval times, and because of the growth of nationalism before World War II.

Western theorists of Holocaust studies attempted to comprehend the Holocaust on philosophical, religious, political, and psychological levels in the contexts of “It happened to us” and “How could it happen?” For many German historians, there were also questions of “How could it happen in the land of Goethe and Beethoven?”³ or, more widely, “How could Auschwitz happen after two thousand years of Christianity, or in spite of two thousand years of Christianity?”⁴ They researched various aspects of the Holocaust, including the issue of responsibility; Judeo-Christian dialogue; nationalism and antisemitism as predecessors of the Holocaust; gender and cultural issues; literary and cinematic images of the Holocaust; the victim complex and psychotherapy; and the uniqueness of the Holocaust as the largest genocide in the history of mankind. An important focus of Holocaust studies was the restoration of moral validity to those who risked their lives to rescue Jews.

Horror at the Nazi genocide was so great that it stimulated American and Western European societies to create special foundations, academic centers, educational programs, and university courses for the study and the teaching of the Holocaust and other genocides of the twentieth century. Holocaust studies preceded genocide studies, which emerged later as a result of other influential trends such as “Philosophy after Auschwitz,” and “Theology and Ethics after the Holocaust.”⁵ The situation in the Soviet Union was completely different. In the Soviet period, the Holocaust was not studied or taught at schools and universities. The Soviet archives that were related to the problems of Holocaust were, for all practical purposes, closed to scholars, and the subject was not discussed openly or in the presence of a wide audience. This is surprising, because this genocide was carried out especially severely on the territory of Ukraine and other republics of the Soviet Union.

My own case can be presented as an example of Soviet schooling. I finished high school in the Soviet period, and, despite having been the best pupil in the humanities and having read much additional literature, I had never come across information about the genocide against the Jews (or the Gypsies) in historical literature. Even books famous in the West about the Holocaust in Ukraine, such as *The Black Book*, written by Soviet authors—and former military officers and journalists—Vasily Grossman and Ilya Ehrenburg, were not published in the USSR. Grossman’s great novel, *Life and Fate*, written in the 1950s and depicting a wide panorama of Stalinist and Nazi concentration camps, was published only in the 1990s. This reflects that the topic of Nazi crimes against Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and people with disabilities

was not only a blind spot in Soviet official history and schooling, but was also a target of Stalinist and post-Stalinist political and national repression and of antisemitic campaigns in the Soviet Union of the 1950s.

During my first trip abroad and during a fellowship at the University of Hamburg, I became familiar with the Western literature on the various aspects of Nazi atrocities—not only genocide against the Jews, but also persecution and even murder of homosexuals and people with disabilities; about medical experiments on Soviet and Polish prisoners of war; and about violence against Slavic women whom German soldiers raped in the concentration camps.

The new knowledge stimulated my interest in Holocaust and genocide issues, especially on the intersection of the history of the Second World War, gender theory, the politics of memory, and nationalism studies. For me World War II (even six decades later) was not only a historical construction: both of my grandfathers participated in the war and were killed by the Germans; many of my relatives from Kharkiv and Kiev were captured for compulsory (“slave”) labor in Germany and did not return from there; my grandmother survived in a starving Kharkiv during the German occupation; and my mother and father had a “war childhood.”

In 2001 I visited the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, while on a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. I had the opportunity to compare the Western and Soviet approaches to the Second World War. Western society views the Holocaust as an important aspect of the tragedy of the war and considers its impact on postwar changes in world consciousness; the Soviet education system, on the other hand, used the history of the war as a central part of a patriotic education and as propaganda in the communist struggle against fascism. Traditional Soviet schooling did not cast enough light on the Holocaust or on the survival of “ordinary people” in occupied territories and concentration camps. Education about the Second World War in the Soviet Union was connected mostly with battles and praise for the “unconquerable” Red Army and, to a much lesser extent, with partisan troops or East European slave workers in the Third Reich, but never with the Holocaust, survival in concentration camps and ghettos, or the horrible measures taken against homosexuals, Gypsies, and people with disabilities.

It is very indicative that the first analytical works on the Holocaust and on the life of “ordinary Ukrainian people” during the Nazi occupation were prepared by foreign scholars: American professor Aharon Weiss,⁶ American-Ukrainian professor Bohdan Vitvitsky,⁷ American professor Wendy Lower,⁸ Dutch professor Karel C. Berkhoff,⁹ Swedish professor Johan Dietsch,¹⁰ and others.

Why was the subject of the Holocaust unwelcome in the Soviet academy? We can enumerate several motivations. Including the subject of Nazi antisemitic policy in Soviet education inevitably would have provoked students’ attention to Soviet antisemitic policy and caused students to reflect on the similarities between Hitler’s and Stalin’s totalitarian regimes. Both totalitarian ideologies created an image of the enemy—in Hitler’s case, Jews, communists, and American capitalists, and in Stalinist propaganda, fascists, foreign capitalists, and “bourgeois nationalists.” If some motivated person had taught the Holocaust in a Soviet school it would have been necessary to explain many things that were forbidden to discuss in the USSR until the 1990s: Why had the Soviet government not done anything to prevent the Holocaust on Soviet territory? Why were memorials specifically mentioning Jews not erected after the war in the Soviet Union, in contrast to memorials and museums of the Holocaust that were constructed not only in many European countries occupied by the Germans but also in the United States, Argentina, and Great Britain? For example, the memorial in Drobizkiy Jar near Kharkiv—a place of mass executions of Jewish and other citizens of Kharkiv, as at Babi Yar, near Kiev—was erected only in the 1990s (almost 50 years after the end of the war!), and the money for this monument was collected by the Jewish community only.

Remembrance of the Holocaust and the mass deportations of Jews likely would have raised questions of terrible situations in recent Soviet history, among them the ethnic cleansings in western Ukraine and the Caucasus, deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the 1930s Stalinist actions against members of the intelligentsia, party members deemed disloyal, and some ordinary people as well.

When speaking of the Nazi death camps, a teacher should explain why thousands of German prisoners of war and Soviet soldiers and officers who had been liberated from German captivity were sent to Stalin’s concentration camps in Siberia or Kolyma. If we tell students about the Nazi death camps, it should evoke recollection of the Gulag and Stalinist concentration camps run by the NKVD. Unfortunately, after the

collapse of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet academia did not create anything like “Ethics after the Gulag” or “Philosophy after Babi Yar.”

We can observe two contradictory tendencies in post-Soviet memory regarding the war. The Second World War (the “Great Patriotic War” in Russian cultural discourse) is central to modern Russian identity and mass consciousness; it held a sacred place in Soviet culture, and it remains a sacred part of Russian memory today. Modern Russian popular and official culture emphasizes Soviet patriotism during the “Great Patriotic War” years and passes over in silence Stalinist and totalitarian crimes, and keeps closed the issue of Gulag and NKVD terror against national and social groups, events that are considered irrelevant in view of the “Great Victory” of the Soviet people against the Nazis. But on the political level, this is an obvious attempt to rehabilitate some forms of Soviet totalitarianism.

A contrary point of view, dominant in the modern Baltic countries and western Ukrainian regions, stresses local national struggle against Stalin and aspires to equate Nazi and Stalinist crimes; from this perspective, the next step is the justification of Nazi collaborators as “national liberators.” For example, in recent years western Ukraine has seen the creation of many museums devoted to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—Ukrainian nationalist organizations, which also participated in the Holocaust. But no museum or places of memory for the Holocaust victims has been created in those same territories.¹¹

Of course, these two contrary tendencies are equally dangerous for post-Soviet societies, as well as for academic development. They serve the creation of modern political mythology instead of the creation of independent historical or philosophical research, and they have an obvious antidemocratic character. That is why I believe that telling Ukrainian students about the various victims of the war and respecting all experiences of suffering is a cultural practice that teaches an aversion to human cruelty.

The liberal tendencies in Ukrainian academia take their origin from the declaration of Ukrainian independence; following that declaration, the first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, issued official apologies to the Jewish people for the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust. Since the middle 1990s, the subject of the Holocaust has been slowly introduced into public and academic discussion in Ukraine. But the educational situation in Ukraine is difficult and conflicting: Ukrainian state

universities do not have any areas of specialization, departments, or courses on Jewish or Holocaust history. The Holocaust, despite being covered widely in the media, still remains a nonexistent topic in education. This does not mean there is an absence of interest in this subject among students. From my own teaching experience, I know that many Ukrainian students, independent of their own ethnic origin, are interested in Jewish history. In my course “Culture of the 20th Century,” I give several lectures on the “Tragedy of the Holocaust and World War II in European Cultures.” As a supplementary lesson, we visit the Holocaust Museum in Kharkiv and watch movies such as *Schindler’s List* and *Life Is Beautiful* to compare different interpretations of the Holocaust in postwar culture.

The stronger antisemitism is in a region, the stronger are the attacks against schools and universities teaching the Holocaust. Some Ukrainian journalists and government officials affirm that Ukrainian educators should not emphasize the uniqueness of the Holocaust or try to make teaching about it obligatory in Ukrainian institutions, because that “could be offensive” to other Ukrainians, who had other “great national genocides” in their history, such as the deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian Holodomor (“Great Famine”). I respond that the Holocaust was not ordinary war violence but a *state-sponsored* “machine” for mass killing that continued for a long time, in the center of Europe, in the heart of human civilization. No one can be neutral about this mechanized violence, because if you are not on the side of the Nazis’ victims, you are on the side of the Nazi killers and their collaborators. That is why keeping silent about the Holocaust is more dangerous for morality and for the future of the Ukrainian nation than is speaking about the Holocaust’s horrors.

My other argument is that Ukraine has never been a monoethnic country, and Jews were autochthons on Ukrainian territory, as were Ukrainians, Russians, Tatars, Gypsies, and many other modern ethnic minorities. They all were Ukrainian citizens, and genocide against one people destroyed the whole nation as an integrated body. The Holocaust is not only a “Jewish problem,” as Ukrainian nationalists claim; Jewish people contributed much to Ukrainian culture, science, art, and social life. That is why I believe it is important to show students that destroying one part of the nation means destroying all national life and ethics.

If the Jewish population is a part of the Ukrainian nation, then the study of Ukrainian history without the Holocaust and without Jewish history as a part of the

history of the Ukrainian state is incomplete and inadequate. In addition, teaching the Holocaust can help inoculate Ukrainian youth against racism and chauvinism.

Related to this, we speak about non-Jewish people's responsibility for the Holocaust, especially on Ukrainian territory. The topic of the collaboration of local inhabitants with the Nazis was for a long time a blind spot of the Soviet social sciences and military history. And now this topic is "unpleasant" for many Ukrainian scholars and political groups. In trying to create an ideal image of Ukrainian history, some Ukrainian mass-media have made the absurd claim that Jews provoked the Holocaust because of their participation in the Communist Party, and this gave Ukrainians the moral right to participate in the Holocaust.¹² Such claims by "new Ukrainian historians" often recall the claims of Third Reich ideologists about the "guilt" of "Judeo-Bolshevism" as a cause of the war. For Ukrainians this is a reminder that history can repeat itself if we forget its lessons and that nationalism in Ukraine today is more dangerous than the Western world thinks.¹³

Some Ukrainian educators believe the Holocaust is not an appropriate topic for teaching because in a Holocaust course a professor would need to let Ukrainian students know that some Jews were betrayed to the Nazis by Ukrainian neighbors. In addition, the OUN and UPA took part in the annihilation of Jews in western Ukraine, and this knowledge can shock young Ukrainians.

It is true: I noticed the horror on the faces of my university students as they heard, on our excursion to the Kharkiv Holocaust Museum, the details of Jewish deportations to ghettos and the reaction of local inhabitants; many young Ukrainians could not believe it and asked a guide several times: "Is it really true that local *Ukrainians also* participated in the annihilation of Jews?" hoping to receive a negative answer. No one wants to recognize such existential faults in his own nation, but modern Ukrainian democracy needs not only the creation of national myths about Ukraine's "heroic history" but also the acceptance of responsibility for its shameful past. Creating the new Ukrainian state demands getting rid of all political lies about the past. I think that any lie related to the idea of the "nation" destroys the future and morality of that nation. The difficult road of repentance traveled by the German nation has helped to redeem it and consolidate it. Austria, France, and Germany have laws against Holocaust denial; I believe that in this regard Ukraine needs to appropriate the experience of its western neighbors.

History cannot be taught selectively. We need to explain to young Ukrainians that the silence of some groups within the population allowed the killing of other groups. And we need to prevent any repetition. Thus the study of the Holocaust stimulates discussion of a personal moral choice: what would my position be in a situation such as the Holocaust? We can teach the fundamental point that in a situation such as the Holocaust no one can be just a spectator and that true Christianity demands that we be Christians not just for a weekend. Addressing the issue of the Holocaust leads us to ask: what does it mean to be a Christian during and after the Holocaust?

In teaching about the Holocaust in Ukraine, we must recall that Nazi policy toward Ukrainians and other Slavic peoples during the German occupation of the Soviet Union was more brutal than toward western Europeans. It is important to emphasize the fact that rescuing Jews in Ukraine involved much more danger for the rescuers than for rescuers in Western Europe: a Slavic person who helped or rescued Jews was subject to death. Sometimes entire families and whole villages were committed to the flames for saving or helping a Jew. Western Europeans, on the other hand, could be spared death for the same “crime” and be sent to concentration camps instead or even go unpunished (as in the case of Anne Frank’s female shelterers).

We also need to stress that the Holocaust is not only about various mechanisms to exterminate people. In teaching the Holocaust to a Ukrainian audience, we have to mention several points that were hardly known in Ukraine during the Soviet period and that it remain so even now: Jewish resistance in ghettos, Jewish partisan troops, and heroic survival and solidarity between different nationalities in concentration camps. These topics are crucial because in post-Soviet education on the Holocaust we retain an unspoken idea from Soviet mass consciousness that all those taken to ghettos and concentration camps were simply victims who passively accepted their tragic fate. As a result, they were not considered “real heroes.” The Soviet and present-day Ukrainian students were not informed about the Warsaw uprising and Jewish armed resistance. To make the Holocaust more understandable to Ukrainian youth, we should stress that the Holocaust not only was a genocide; it also manifested many examples of heroism and courage on the part of the victims.

In my classes I tell students about the most amazing phenomena of the Holocaust: the theater productions that took place in the ghettos and concentration camps. Art is based on spiritual and creative freedom. But freedom itself was absent in

ghettos during the Holocaust. I see a link between the preservation of spirituality and the ability to resist, and I want to underline the role of Jewish theater in inspiring the Jewish community's survival. In spite of brutal conditions, the people in ghettos drew, painted, sang, and wrote poetry.¹⁴ This means that they did not plan to die in silence as lambs but tried to fight for life as hard as they could.

In my lectures I compare a story by Bruno Bettelheim about an “impossible” survival in a Nazi concentration camp with the plot of a famous book from Soviet times, *The Novel about a Real Man*, by Boris Polevoi. It is a classic Soviet book about pilot Alexei Mares'ev, who was wounded in an air battle with a German pilot. Mares'ev ejected from his airplane with a parachute, landed in a winter forest, and, on his broken legs, without any food or water, crept through the front to the Soviet line more than 15 days away. His foot was frostbitten and had to be amputated. But the most heroic part of this story was that, after this operation, Alexei Mares'ev with an artificial limb returned to the army as a pilot and continued fighting against the Germans.

In Soviet popular culture this living person and his literary image became a symbol of Soviet heroism and patriotism during the war. I compare this story, well-known to Ukrainian audiences, with a story of survival in a concentration camp described by the Austrian-Jewish doctor Bruno Bettelheim (*The Informed Heart*),¹⁵ who tried to show that heroism during the war was displayed not only in battle. Heroism can be “open”—such as in battle—or “hidden”—as in the struggle for survival, when even life and the preservation of morality is difficult. I use these literary materials to show the different kinds of heroism during the war and the value of all types of resistance against the Nazis.

The ideological task of teaching the Holocaust to Ukrainian students, in my opinion, is to underline the danger of any form of racism, chauvinism, nationalism, or xenophobia. And it means that in studying the Holocaust we investigate not only the past, but also modern society's attitude to the “Other,” the changing relations between Jews and Christians, and the growth of tolerance in Ukraine. In modern Western societies, the Holocaust is one of the basic issues of postwar democracy, because it symbolizes the need to accept “otherness” and multiculturalism, and the multiplicity of races, languages, and religions. The attitude toward the Holocaust is a litmus test for democracy, showing the quality of our professed liberal values.

NOTES

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¹ Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).

² Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), x.

³ Marie Fleming, "Genocide and the Body Politic in the Time of Modernity," in *The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 98.

⁴ Ignaz Maybaum, *The Face of God after Auschwitz* (Amsterdam: Polak & Van Genep, 1965), 61.

⁵ Josh Cohen, *Interrupting Auschwitz. Art, Religion, Philosophy* (New York: Continuum, 2003).

⁶ Aharon Weiss, "The Holocaust and the Ukrainian Victims," in *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, ed. Michael Berenbaum (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 109–15.

⁷ Bohdan Vitvitsky, "Slavs and Jews: Consistent and Inconsistent Perspectives on the Holocaust," in *A Mosaic of Victims*, 101–8.

⁸ Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005).

⁹ Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Culture* (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 2006).

¹¹ See Sofiia Grachova, “Vony zhyly sered nas?” *Krytyka* (Kyïv) 9, no. 4 (2005): 22–26.

¹² See Taras Hunchak, “Problems of Historiography: History and Its Sources,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 3/4 (December 2001): 129–42.

¹³ Per Anders Rudling, “Organized Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Ukraine: Structure, Influence and Ideology,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 48, no. 1–2 (March–June 2006).

¹⁴ Gila Flam, *Singing for Survival: Songs of the Lodz Ghetto, 1940–45* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

¹⁵ Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).

Appendix: Biographies of Contributors

DELPHINE BECHTEL is an associate professor at the University Paris-Sorbonne. She has published widely on Yiddish literature; the cultural history and political culture of East European and German Jews; interethnic relations in multicultural urban contexts, in particular in Galicia; and on historiography and commemoration in multicultural cities. She is the author of *La renaissance culturelle juive 1897–1930* (2000), and co-editor of, among others, *Villes multiculturelles en Europe centrale* (2008).

CRISPIN BROOKS is the curator of the USC Shoah Foundation's Visual History Archive. He holds a B.A. in Russian and Soviet studies from the University of Manchester, an M.Phil. in Russian literature from University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and a diploma in translation from the British Institute of Linguists. He has worked at the Foundation since 1998, becoming the curator in 2006. In this role, he is responsible for the indexing of the Foundation's audiovisual testimonies of witnesses of the Holocaust, the Rwandan Tutsi Genocide, and other genocides. His academic publications include two works on Russian avant-garde poetry; his current research interests include the Holocaust in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

MARTIN DEAN is an Applied Research Scholar at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies in Washington, DC. He received his PhD in history from Queens' College, Cambridge in 1989 and worked as the Senior Historian for the Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit in London from 1992 to 1997. He is the author of, among others: *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (2000) and *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (2008). He is the editor of *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos 1933–1945*, vol. 2 *Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe* (2012).

FATHER PATRICK DESBOIS has devoted his life to confronting antisemitism and furthering Catholic-Jewish understanding. As president of Yahad—In Unum, he has since 2004 led efforts to locate and identify undiscovered mass graves of Jews and Roma killed during the Holocaust. Father Desbois serves as Director of the Episcopal Committee for Catholic-Judeo Relations under the auspices of the French Conference of Bishops. He also advises the cardinal-archbishop of Lyon, and is an advisor to the Vatican on the Jewish religion. He served as personal aide to the late archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger. His book *The Holocaust by Bullets* is the winner of the 2008 National Jewish Book Award. Fluent in Hebrew and English, Father Desbois was awarded the Medal of Valor by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Humanitarian Award of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, and honorary doctorates from Hebrew University, Bar Ilan University in Israel, and Yeshiva University.

MARKUS EIKEL has worked since 2004 in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, The Hague. He previously held positions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague; and the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section at the Canadian Department of Justice, where he dealt with cases of alleged war crimes committed during World War II in the former Soviet Union. He is the author of “‘Weil die Menschen fehlen’: Die deutschen Zwangsarbeitsrekrutierungen und deportationen in den besetzten Gebieten der Ukraine 1941–1944” (2005); translated into Ukrainian as “‘Cherez brak liudiei...’: Nimets’ka polityka naboru rabochoi syly ta prymusovi deportatsii robitnykiv iz okkupovanykh oblastei Ukrainy 1941–1944 rr.” (2005).

NORBERT KUNZ has served since 2008 as deputy head of the Eastern European Section of the Bavarian State Library in Munich. From 2000 to 2002 he was a researcher with the team of the second so-called “Wehrmacht Exhibition.” From there, he went on to become head of the Library of the German Historical Museum in Berlin. His major fields of interest are the history of Poland, the history of the Soviet Union and its successor states, the Shoah, and Eastern European librarianship. He is the author

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RALF MEINDL is a member of the Historikerlabor Berlin. In his past positions he has served as a lecturer in the history department of the University of Freiburg, a curator at the museums of the city of Lüdenscheid, and a researcher at the Institute for History and Biographical Studies, Fern Universität, Hagen. His publications include: *Ostpreußens Gauleiter: Erich Koch. Eine politische Biographie* (2007); "'Schlesien ist meine Heimat, in Lüdenscheid bin ich zu Hause und ich fühle mich wohl': Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Lüdenscheid" (2012); and "Vorposten und Grenzland. Ostpreußische Identitäten 1933-1945" (2011).

ANATOLY PODOLSKY is the director of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies and is a senior research associate at the Institute of Ethnic and Political Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is the author of numerous publications on the history of the Jews in Ukraine, the Holocaust in Ukraine, and Holocaust education. Among his publications are "The Tragic Fate of Ukrainian Jewish Women under Nazi Occupation, 1941–1944" (2010); "A Reluctant Look Back: Jewry and the Holocaust in Ukraine" (2008); and the textbook *Lessons of the Past: History of the Holocaust in Ukraine* (2009).

PAUL A. SHAPIRO is director of the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. He is a member of the International Commission of the International Tracing Service; a member of the Academic Advisory Committee of the Center for Jewish History (New York); former editor-in-chief of the *Journal of International Affairs*; former associate editor of *Problems of Communism*; and a former member of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, chaired by Elie Wiesel. Shapiro is the recipient of the Verdienstkreuz of the Federal Republic of Germany; and of the Order of Merit, Commander Class, of the Republic of Romania.

VIKTORIYA SUKOVATA is a professor in the Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science Department, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. She has published more than 140 articles in areas including genocide studies, Holocaust studies, gender and visual arts theory, and Soviet and post-Soviet identity studies. Among her publications are: *Litsa drugogo: Telesnye obrazy drugogo v kul'turnoi antropologii* (The Face of the Other: Images of the Other in Cultural Anthropology) (2009); “The Holocaust, Racism, and the War as the Sources of the ‘Philosophy of Other’ and post-Modernist ethics” (2012); and “The Harvest of Despair: The Tragedy of Ukraine in World War II” (2009).

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