



INTER-FASCIST CONFLICTS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

The Nazis, the “Austrofascists,” the Iron Guard, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

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Introduction

The history of European fascism is characterized by both cooperation and conflicts between movements, regimes, and individuals. Hypernationalism and racism, two intrinsic elements of fascism, simultaneously united and divided the leaders, members, and adherents of movements and regimes. The Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, and a number of other similar movements and regimes wanted to unite and create Europe on their terms. They usually called it “New Europe,” but they did not agree on which countries ought to be included as self-governing nation-states, and which ones should be subordinated to the major regimes. A huge problem for the creation of a fascist Europe and also of a fascist European community was the obsession with violence, including the belief that conflicts should be resolved by war. Nevertheless, it was neither violence nor the ultranationalist and racist nature of fascism that caused the most brutal conflicts between fascists. As this chapter will demonstrate, inter-fascist clashes frequently resulted from pragmatic subjects, the desire to keep “order” in particular parts of Europe, and sometimes also from cultural and political misunderstandings.

All four movements analyzed in this chapter—the German National Socialists, the “Austrofascists,” the Romanian Iron Guard, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—had their own specifics that made them idiosyncratic. Notwithstanding this, they still show a large number of similarities. This demonstrates that despite cultural, political, and social differences they belonged to the same family of movements.

They were united by similar ideologies and orientations, and they wanted to eliminate the same kind of enemies in their states. The four movements shared a sense of belonging to each other, and emphasized this on various occasions. Yet they were not equal, and they pursued different geopolitical goals. In 1933 the National Socialists took power in Germany and became a regime controlling one of the most powerful European states. The “Austrofascists” took power as well, in a much smaller country but with a German language and a Germanic culture. The Iron Guard, a Southeast European movement united first of all by religion and religious mysticism, fascinated many young Romanians, but it ruled a state only in late 1940 and early 1941, sharing power with the military dictator Ion Antonescu, who remained skeptical about the revolutionary spirit of fascism. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsia Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv, OUN) aimed to establish a fascist regime, but it did not have a state in which it could implement its program. Thus, it combined the fight for an independent state with integration into the community of fascist regimes, similar to the Slovak Hlinka Party and the Croatian Ustaša.

Following Roger Griffin’s definition of generic fascism, and defining this phenomenon also according to futures typical of the ideal type of fascism, it makes sense to regard all four movements or regimes analyzed here as fascist or semi-fascist. Griffin has defined fascism as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism.”¹ Thereby he emphasized that fascist movements or regimes wanted to prevent the “degeneration” of a nation through palingenesis—a radical cultural, political, and ultranationalist “regeneration.” Some most important futures of an ideal type of fascism are the *Führerprinzip*, ultranationalism, populism, racism, anti-Semitism, antidemocratism, antiliberalism, anti-Marxism, anticonservatism, totalitarianism, and militarism or obsession with violence, which fascist movements regard as an extension of politics.² In general, movements or regimes absorbed these futures in different proportions, and they combined them with their national traditions or non-fascist other political orientation, such as conservatism or nationalism. Thus we should differentiate between fascist and semi-fascist movements, and try to explain the various forms of cultural amalgamations and political hybridizations.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain why some movements, despite their ideological similarities, did not collaborate with each other, but remained in unfriendly relations, detained the members of other organizations, or even combated one another. The inter-fascist conflicts investigated in this study had different causes, and they illustrate three

different types of encounter. By analyzing them, we will elaborate the aims and main features of the movements, and then work out what prevented the collaboration between them. Finally, the three examples will be compared in order to find out if there were some similar reasons for the conflicts or if they were accidental and resulted from random misunderstandings.

The Nazis and the “Austrofascists”

As a small, German-speaking country created from a central part of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, Austria was home to two fascist or semi-fascist movements. The first was the National Socialists, and the second the Home Guard (Heimwehr) and the Fatherland Front (Vaterländische Front). The latter became known as the “Austrofascists” after World War II. The Home Guard emerged from groups composed of vigilantes, peasants, and petit-bourgeois who sought to protect their property and defend “order” during the period of chaos after World War I. It was a paramilitary, far-right movement with sympathies for the Christian Socialist Party (Christlichsoziale Partei, CS). With the exception of the branches in Styria (Steiermark), the Home Guard supported the idea of Austrian independence, opposing the pan-German idea of the unification of Austria and Germany. The Home Guard regarded as its main enemies the socialists and the communists. Its most important aims were the protection of the *Volk* (people) against elements that could weaken its ethnic and national unity, and the strengthening of authoritarianism and corporatism in Austrian society. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Home Guard adopted many fascist elements from Italian Fascism, and elaborated Austrian fascism which was later absorbed by the Fatherland Front.³

The Austrian Nazi Party was a pan-German movement, but it was not the carbon copy of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP). It had been founded as early as 1903 as the German Workers’ Party (Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, DAP), years before the NSDAP was established in Germany in 1920. For several years it was called the Austrian German Nationalist Workers’ Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, DNSAP). In its beginnings it was not fascist but *völkisch*, anti-Semitic and pan-German. In the early 1920s, the Austrian Nazi party was relatively stronger than its counterpart, the German NSDAP. Like many other European fascist movements, the Austrian Nazis were divided into two generations. In 1926, the party split into a young

faction that accepted Hitler's supremacy and called itself the NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung. The other faction remained loyal to their leader Karl Schulz, preserved the name of DNSAP, and took socialism more seriously than nationalism. The two groups bitterly fought each other and remained equally weak until the late 1920s. By the early 1930s, the NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung had prevailed, largely due to the triumph of Nazism in Germany.⁴

The Austrian Nazi movement was composed of Austrian members (for example, Alfred Proksch and Hermann Neubacher) as well as Germans such as Theodor Habicht. The latter strengthened the Austrian Nazi party, which suffered from internal conflicts. The Austrian Nazis tried to recruit new members from the pan-German elements. Many of them were in the Home Guard, especially in the province of Styria where the organization even considered collaborating with the Austrian Nazis. The latter relied on a clearer ideology than the Home Guard, and they were politically more radical, anti-Semitic, and racist. The main point of disagreement between the Austrian Nazis and the Home Guard was the question of whether Austria should become a part of Germany or exist as an independent state. With the exception of the pan-German elements in Styria, the Home Guard voted for an independent Austrian state. Although the pan-German movement was quite strong in Austria, the first regime was established by the conservative Christian Socialist Party, which stood close to the Home Guard and opposed the Austrian Nazis.⁵

Unlike in Germany and Italy, the Austrian fascist regime continued to be based on conservative and right-wing elements. In May 1932, Engelbert Dollfuss (1892–1934), a member of the Christian Socialist Party, was appointed chancellor. A year later, he established the Fatherland Front which allied with the Home Guard, and prohibited or eliminated all other parties. Dollfuss, the youngest and shortest European leader, turned Austria into a clerical-fascist or semi-fascist state, which modeled itself on Italian Fascism but was more conservative than the Italian model. Austria's government sought the protection of Mussolini in order to preserve the country's independence. Fascistization of the regime was intended to improve these relations and to shield the country against Germany's plans for incorporation. The Fatherland Front invented Austrian fascist symbols and rituals, and militarized the society. The main sign of the Fatherland Front became the *Kruckenkreuz*, a kind of double-sided swastika. Dollfuss was appointed the leader (*Führer*) of the Fatherland Front and the dictator of the *Ständestaat* (corporate state), which was to "overcome the class struggle." Accordingly, it was glorified as "the personification of the whole *Volk*."⁶

The members of the Fatherland Front owed the Führer unconditional obedience, and Dollfuss and his follower Kurt Schuschnigg referred to their form of government as *Führerstaat* (leader state).⁷ The ideology of the Austrian regime was a form of “Germanism,” including elements of Italian Fascism. It defined as its enemies the Bolsheviks, socialists, communists, democrats, liberals, capitalism, individualism, and the democratic-parliamentary party system. The Fatherland Front was less anti-Semitic than the German and Austrian Nazis, but it did not hide its intention to “clean” the nation of political and national enemies. It combined corporatism, violent paramilitarism, and religious conservatism, as well as racist and anti-Semitic nationalism.⁸ Catholicism played an especially important role in the ideology of the “Austrofascists” because it emphasized their distinctiveness from the German Nazism, which was perceived in Austria as pagan or protestant, although there were many Catholics among the German Nazis, and Hitler even maintained his membership of the Catholic Church until his death. For this reason Dollfuss and Schuschnigg frequently called its authoritarian state, the *Christlicher Ständestaat* (Christian corporatist state).⁹

The politics of Dollfuss’s regime and of the Nazis were irreconcilable. In May 1933 Hitler decided to topple the Austrian dictatorship with the help of propaganda and terror. In July 1933, a series of eighty-four speeches by Nazis began to be transmitted from Munich, Leipzig, Breslau, and Stuttgart. They ridiculed the Austrian government and incited Austrian National Socialists to conduct terror acts. In addition, German planes dropped leaflets over Austria. They urged the population to withdraw their bank deposits, and called for a tax boycott.¹⁰ Moreover, Dollfuss was mocked for being short. The Nazis printed postcards that depicted the Austrian dictator as a uniformed boy with flowers standing next to Hitler who, together with some uniformed Nazis behind his back, could not help laughing while looking at the cute “little Kanzler.”¹¹ During the first waves of terror in the summer of 1933, there were several explosions in Austria each day. As a result, Habicht and 1,142 other Nazis were deported to Germany as early as 13 June 1933. On 19 June 1933 in Vienna, two Nazis armed with hand grenades killed one man and seriously wounded thirteen others. On the same day, Dollfuss outlawed the Austrian Nazi party, all its subordinate organizations, and the Styrian Home Guard. The deported Austrian National Socialists established their new headquarters in Munich. They also prepared further terror campaigns in collaboration with Hitler and his German Nazi followers. By April 1934, about fifty thousand Austrian Nazis had been convicted of various offenses, and in June 1934 the death penalty was reintroduced for the possession of explosives.¹²

The coup d'état against Dollfuss took place on 25 June 1934. It was initiated and approved by Hitler, but the German Nazis distanced themselves from it. The main organizers of the overthrow were Theodor Habicht, Rudolf Weydenhammer, a German industrialist and NSDAP member, Eduard Frauenfeld, the head of the Vienna NSDAP, and Fridolin Glass, the military leader of the coup. The principal aim of the overthrow was to establish the right-wing Christian Social Party member Anton Rintelen as the new leader of the country, as he would accept the German supremacy over Austria. Hitler, who during the putsch stayed in Bayreuth, ordered a special plane to be prepared, which would take him to Vienna where he would embrace the new regime. On the radio, some Nazi rebels announced the abdication of Dollfuss's regime as an incentive for an uprising. Yet Dollfuss was shot, apparently accidentally, by Otto Planetta, and he died a few hours later. The Vienna rebels were disarmed on the evening of 25 June 1934. In some other parts of Austria, the Nazis revolted for the next two days. These events extremely annoyed Mussolini, who ordered Italian troops to parade on the Austrian-Italian border and considered an intervention if Hitler should try to seize power in Austria. The coup d'état turned out to be a disaster for Hitler. Although one of main reasons for overthrowing the regime of Dollfuss was to improve Germany's international situation and break up its isolation, the rebellion brought opposite results. After the coup, Hitler forced the Austrian Nazis to claim that they conducted it on their own and without any orders from him. All documentary evidence was destroyed. Nevertheless, at least a number of people—including Mussolini, who had discussed the political situation in Austria with the Führer on 14 June 1934—were quite sure about the proceedings and the actual instigators of the rebellion.¹³

During the coup d'état, over two hundred people were killed, and thirteen Nazis were executed shortly afterwards. Many Nazis escaped from Austria to Germany, but hundreds were arrested and detained in camps. The largest and most famous of those sites was Wöllersdorf near the Wiener Neustadt. By October 1934, 5,302 people had been imprisoned in this camp, of whom 4,747 were Nazis.¹⁴ The British journalist G.E.R. Gedye, who visited the camp in April 1934, described life there as "easy if boring."

There were no cells, no plank beds. All the inmates, mostly young men, had photos of their best girls upon the walls. There were no restrictions on smoking and no hard labor to be done, as in the German camps ... Except for a few simple chores the time was their own and seemed to be devoted chiefly to football, sunbathing, or reading under the trees.¹⁵

Frauenfeld, who was imprisoned at Wöllersdorf from December 1933 to May 1936, described the conditions in the camp in a less favorable light and complained about the homosexual commandant of the camp, Emanuel Stillfried.¹⁶

Kurt Schuschnigg, the federal minister of justice and education up to 1934, became Austria's new leader. He continued the policies of fascistization that Dollfuss had pursued in Austria. In 1936 the organization Neues Leben (New Life), an equivalent to the Italian Dopolavoro (After Work) and the German Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy), was established. The same year the Frontmiliz (Voluntary Militia) was set up, whereas the Home Guard other old militia formations had to dissolve. In 1937, the Sturmkorps (Storm Troops), an elite military formation modeled on the Nazi SS, was created. Its slogan *Unser Wille werde Gesetz* (Our Will Shall Be Law) resembled the SS motto *Unsere Ehre heisst Treue* (Honor for Us Means Loyalty). Bruce Pauley, a specialist of Austrian Nazism, has called this politics "positive fascism."¹⁷ The Fatherland Front gained more and more supporters. By 1936 it counted about 2 million members, and by March 1938 3.3 million, almost half of the country's population, had joined.¹⁸ Some contemporary observers pointed out that fascism in Austria resembled German Nazism. On 2 February 1937, for example, Hermann Göring wrote to Guido Schmidt, the Austrian secretary of foreign affairs:

I have heard many Austrians who tell me that they cannot understand it when the [Austrian] government on the one hand rejects everything which is National Socialist and says National Socialism is not for Austria, and on the other hand copies German National Socialism in its own state structure, that is to say the same forms, the same organizations, the same expressions, the same laws, the same methods, only with reversed insignia. They say that in Austria one only has to substitute the Kruckenkreuz for the Hakenkreuz and the word patriotic [*vaterländisch*] for National Socialist in order to have in Austria the living mirror image of Germany.¹⁹

After the July coup, the Austrian Nazi movement was very weak but it gradually recovered. In October 1935, Italy started the war against Ethiopia. As it needed Germany's support, Austria lost its main defender. Schuschnigg started negotiations with Hitler. They resulted in the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936. The published part of this treaty said that Germany recognized the "full sovereignty" of Austria. In exchange, the Austrian Nazis were granted amnesty, equality of rights, and representation in the government.²⁰ In the following months, Schuschnigg gradually became more and more dependent

on Germany. On 11 March 1938, the German and Austrian Nazis pressurized him to resign. He gave in and announced his resignation on the radio on the same day.²¹ The Austrian Nazis had already occupied some offices in the capitals of provincial states such as Graz, Linz, and Innsbruck, and were present on the streets of many other communities. It was obvious that there would be a new takeover of power, but it was not clear if Austria would rescue some independence under the rule of Austrian Nazis. Moreover, it had not yet been decided if it would be incorporated into the German Reich and directly ruled by the German Nazis. Although the Austrian Nazis preferred the first scenario, the latter came true. On 12 March, the German Nazis invaded Austria and officially annexed the country on the next day (*Anschluss*). While marching into Austria, the German troops were greeted enthusiastically in Vienna and many other locations.²²

Another wave of arrests started on the same day, when a number of Austrian politicians of the Fatherland Front were detained and then deported to Nazi concentration camps together with Jews, communists, socialists, and other enemies of the new regime. In 1938, eight thousand Austrians were sent to Dachau; some of them were politicians of the Fatherland Front. Altogether, up to seventy-six thousand Austrians were arrested in the first weeks after the *Anschluss*, although many of them were released after a few weeks. Others remained in concentration camps much longer, some until the end of the war, and several died in the camps.²³

Schuschnigg was arrested on 12 March 1938. He was detained as a special political prisoner, *Sonderhäftling* or *Ehrenhäftling*, of the SS. First he was kept in the house of the gardener of the Belvedere palace in Vienna, and from May 1938 onwards in the Vienna Gestapo headquarters, the Metropol Hotel. He was imprisoned on the fifth floor in the company of the banker Louis Nathaniel von Rothschild, and was allowed to marry Vera Czernin von und zu Chaudenitz. The church marriage, however, happened by proxy; Schuschnigg was represented by his brother. On 29 October 1939, both moved to Munich, where their daughter was born on 23 March 1941. On 8 December of that year, they were brought to the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, in which they stayed until February 1945. They lived there in a one-family house together with a maidservant. The house was in a special area of the camp among other one-family houses for special political prisoners. His wife was allowed to go shopping in Berlin, and his son attended a high school. Nevertheless, Schuschnigg was not allowed to meet the other prisoners, although he knew who lived in other houses on the site. His brother Artur stayed in the same camp but as an ordinary

political prisoner, and he had to perform forced labor. On 7 February 1945, when the Red Army approached Berlin, Schuschnigg and his family were taken to the concentration camp Flossenbürg, where they stayed together with other special political prisoners. On 8 April 1945, they were brought to Dachau, where they met some other prominent prisoners including Miklós Horthy, the son of the Hungarian dictator. At the end of April 1945, they were moved to Niederdorf near Innsbruck, where the Americans were to liberate them.²⁴

The Providnyk and the Führer

Ukrainians had lived in two empires throughout the nineteenth century: about 80 percent of them in the Russian Empire and about 20 percent in the Habsburg Monarchy.²⁵ In November 1917 they proclaimed a separate state in Kiev, and a year later another one in Lviv, but they did not succeed to keep either of them. Their neighbors—Poles and Russians—were stronger, and the Ukrainian alliance with Germany made the winners of World War I skeptical about the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Thus, during the interwar period, about 20 percent of Ukrainians lived in Poland and 80 percent in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR).²⁶ The idea of restoring a separate state, however, became the central aim of the Ukrainian national movement, which radicalized and fascistized in this period. It was rooted in Poland, but its leaders and founders lived in exile. The Soviet Ukraine was not affected by this movement.²⁷

In 1920 in Prague, a group of Ukrainian veterans of World War I established the Ukrainian Military Organization (*Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatsiia*, UVO), and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*, OUN) was founded in Vienna in 1929. The UVO was at first a small group of war veterans who worked with the German military intelligence (*Abwehr*) and the Lithuanian government. During the 1920s, however, it absorbed more and more other political groups and attracted young Ukrainians who wanted to fight for the independence of their country. The OUN became a mass movement of several thousand members. It resembled the Slovak Hlinka Party and the Croatian Ustaša. In terms of ideology, it combined radical nationalism with anti-Semitism, racism, cult of war and mass violence, as well as contempt for democracy and communism. It saw itself as a fascist movement, but it called itself the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and not the Organization of Ukrainian Fascists. The members of the movement called themselves the Ukrainian nationalists,

too, but they claimed to be related to movements such as the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, the Ustaša, and the Iron Guard. Mussolini trained Ukrainian nationalists together with Ustaša revolutionaries in Sicily, and the OUN had offices in Berlin and Vienna.²⁸

The OUN was divided into two generations; the older one was born around 1890, and the younger one around 1910. The latter generation controlled the homeland executive in Poland, whereas the older members and founders of the movement lived in countries such as Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. The first leader of the OUN, Ievhen Konovalets, resided in Germany and Switzerland, among others. He was assassinated on 23 May 1938 in Rotterdam. His successor, Andrii Mel'nyk, also belonged to the older generation. Unlike Konovalets, he was disliked by the younger generation, most of whose favorite leader was Stepan Bandera. During the interwar period the OUN killed several Jews, Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians. The most famous victim of the organization was Polish Interior Minister Bronisław Pieracki. A central strategic plan of the Ukrainian nationalists was a "national revolution" or an uprising that would enable the OUN to take power and establish a state. In order to put this plan into practice, the OUN needed a convenient occasion such as an international conflict between Poland and Russian or a European war.²⁹

The OUN considered conducting a revolution after Germany's attack on Poland on 1 September 1939. However, the organization's leaders abandoned this plan because of the German-Soviet agreement that led to the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the USSR. Instead several hundred OUN members left the territories occupied by the Soviet authorities and went to the General Government (*Generalgouvernement*) in Poland where they collaborated with the Germans and prepared themselves for the invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1940, the OUN split into the OUN-B (leader Stepan Bandera, younger generation) and the OUN-M (Andrii Mel'nyk, older generation). In order to distinguish itself from the *Vozhd'*, Andrii Mel'nyk, the title of *Providnyk* was bestowed upon Bandera. Both factions prepared the "national revolution" which was planned to begin simultaneously with the German attack on the USSR ("Operation Barbarossa"). The nationalist underground in western Ukraine was largely controlled by the OUN-B, and it was this faction that established a state after the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. It also committed many crimes against Jews and other civilians.³⁰

An independent state was announced by the leading OUN-B member, Iaroslav Stets'ko, in Lviv on 30 June 1941. Bandera's representative thereby followed the examples of Slovakia, where the Hlinka Party had established a collaborationist state on 14 March 1939, and of Croatia,

where Pavelić's representative Slavko Kvaternik had proclaimed statehood on 10 April 1940. Bandera could not come to Lviv, because the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) forbade him to go to the "newly occupied territories." Nevertheless, his spirit was very much with the revolutionary nationalists in Lviv. Shortly after the proclamation, Stets'ko wrote letters to the Führer Adolf Hitler, the Duce Benito Mussolini, the Caudillo Francisco Franco, and the Poglavnik Ante Pavelić. He greeted them in the name of the Providnyk and asked them to acknowledge the new Ukrainian state. Yet Nazi Germany had different plans for the Ukraine and other territories released from Soviet occupation. Contrary to Slovakia and Croatia, the Nazis did not intend to allow any collaborationist states to be established in the former USSR. Bandera was arrested as early as 5 June and Stets'ko four days later. Both were taken to Berlin. They shared the fate of Kazys Škirpa, the leader of the Lithuanian Activist Front (Lietuvos aktyvistų frontas, LAF), who proclaimed statehood in Kaunas on 23 June 1941. The LAF organized pogroms together with the Germans, as the OUN-B did in western Ukraine.³¹

Bandera tried to negotiate with the Reich minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg. The latter, however, was not interested in any cooperation with the radical OUN-B, and ignored Bandera's offer.³² Hitler included eastern Galicia as "Distrikt Galizien" into the General Government, and central and eastern Ukraine became the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine." It was governed by Germans and submissive Ukrainian collaborators such as Volodymyr Kubiiovych, the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee (Ukrains'kyi Tsentral'nyi Komitet, UTsK). In the following months, the Germans arrested a further several hundred OUN members. Some leading OUN activists such as Bandera and Stets'ko were kept by the Gestapo as special political prisoners (*Ehrenhäftlinge* or *Sonderhäftlinge*) in Berlin, and in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen near the German capital where they resided in a building in a special area of the camp with solitary cells. At that time, Bandera's wife and daughter lived in Berlin-Charlottenburg, and they were allowed to visit Stepan on a regular basis. Bandera's contact with the movement in Ukraine was limited, and he does not seem to have made a major impact on politics in Ukraine, although the OUN members still regarded him as their spiritual leader. The majority of the other OUN activists who had been confined by the Germans remained as ordinary political prisoners in different German concentration camps, including Auschwitz. About thirty prisoners, or 20 percent of all OUN members who were confined in Auschwitz, did not survive this camp. Bandera's two brothers Vasyl' and Oleksandr

were not among the survivors. Bandera, Stets'ko, and several other leading members were released in September 1944, when Germany resumed collaboration with them. Others remained in concentration camps until the end of the war. According to Dmytro Shandruk, the head of the collaborationist Ukrainian National Committee (Ukrains'kyi Natsional'nyi Komitet, UNK) established by Rosenberg, Bandera promised the Nazis his "full support to the end, whatever it may be," in January 1945. In early February, however, he left Berlin and went to Vienna.³³

When Bandera and other OUN members were confined in Berlin and Sachsenhausen, the OUN-B in Ukraine remained underground and did not officially collaborate with the Germans. Nevertheless, the organization sent many of its members to the Ukrainian police, which helped the Germans to annihilate the Jews. Although the Nazis generally attempted to purge the police of OUN members, many remained in the police and more and more joined it. The Ukrainian policemen were involved in the annihilation of almost 1.6 million Jews, eight hundred thousand of whom were killed in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, the area of OUN activity.³⁴ In early 1943, the OUN formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, UPA), which in spring 1943 began to "cleanse" Volhynia of the Polish population. At that time, about five thousand Ukrainian policemen deserted and joined the UPA. They used the knowledge that they had obtained in the police to slaughter the Poles. Altogether between seventy thousand and one hundred thousand Polish civilians were killed by members of the OUN and partisans of the UPA, who called themselves "Banderites" (after Stepan Bandera), and were identified as such by their victims.³⁵

Iron Guard, Antonescu, and Hitler

Unlike Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Ukraine, and some other countries in which fascist movements came up after 1918, Romania had emerged victorious from World War I. Its territory had doubled. Nevertheless Romania became the home to the third largest European fascist movement.³⁶ In the beginning, it was shaped to a large extent by students. Its first charismatic leader, Corneliu Codreanu, had studied in Jena, Berlin, and at the University of Jassy, where the anti-Semitic professor, Alexandru Cuza, had served as his mentor and infused young Romanian radicals with his radical ideology. Codreanu admired Adolf Hitler and especially Mussolini, whose "March on Rome" in October 1922 popularized Fascism among many ultranationalist,

antidemocratic, and revolutionary movements in Europe. Codreanu and other young radical nationalist Romanians were first united in the National-Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Naționale Creștine, LANC*), an anti-Semitic party that had been established by Cuza in 1923. In 1927, Codreanu and some other young Romanians created their own fascist organization, the Iron Guard, known also as the Legion of the Archangel Michael and its members as legionaries. Its first and unquestioned leader became the charismatic Codreanu.³⁷

The Iron Guard was a typical East Central European fascist movement rooted in populism, religion, and peasant nationalism. Codreanu and many other legionaries frequently wore embroidered shirts which emphasized their connection to the people, soil, and the peasant culture, and served as their unofficial uniform. The core of the movement's ideology was religious mysticism, which the Iron Guard combined with anti-individualism, anti-Semitism, racism, hostility toward democracy and toward communism. The religious mysticism let the Iron Guard appear like a kind of heretical Christian sect of peasants who expected "The spiritual resurrection! The resurrection of nations in the name Jesus Christ!"³⁸ The main enemies of the movement were the Jews. In order to become a member, a candidate had to swear to obey six fundamental laws (discipline, work, silence, education, mutual aid, and honor), write oaths in his own blood, and pledge to kill when so ordered. By the late 1930s, the Iron Guard commanded over two hundred thousand members.³⁹ Nevertheless, the organization lacked the capacity to successfully conduct a coup d'état.⁴⁰

From 1918 to 1938, Romania was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. From 1930 to 1940 its ruler was King Carol II. In 1931, the Iron Guard participated in a nationwide general election, and Codreanu was elected to the parliament. Because of the regular clashes between the legionaries and state officials, however, the movement was banned over and over again. After suppressing the Iron Guard on 10 December 1933, Prime Minister Ion Duca was assassinated in retaliation.⁴¹

An important propaganda event in the history of the movement was the funeral of the legionaries Ion Moța and Vasile Marin, who had fallen on 13 January 1937 in the Spanish Civil War. This incident increased the popularity of the Iron Guard in Romania. In the parliamentary elections in December 1937, the Iron Guard gained 15.5 percent of the vote. In February 1938, however, Carol II, a person deeply disliked by the legionaries, dissolved the parliament and introduced a royal dictatorship. Codreanu was arrested in April 1938 and executed, together with thirteen other legionaries, on the night of 29/30 November

1938. The new leader of the movement became Horia Sima. He was another charismatic personality, albeit less popular.⁴²

The parliamentary elections in December 1937 were the last in interwar Romania. After dismissing the government and instituting a royal dictatorship, the king intended to fascistize his dictatorial state by borrowing many elements from contemporary fascist movements and regimes. A cult was established around the charismatic leadership of the king, and the Front of National Rebirth (Frontul Renașterii Naționale, FRN), a mass political organization, was formed on 15 December 1938. Because all parties and associations had been forbidden, the FRN was the single political organization in Carol II's dictatorial Romania. The FRN elaborated its own ideology, which was based on the cult of the monarch, the national idea, Christian and conservative family values, and corporatism. Further organizations established during the process of fascistizing the royal monarchy were: the National Guard (Garda Națională) of the FRN; Work and Leisure (Muncă și Voe Bună), an equivalent of the Nazi *Kraft durch Freude*; and the youth organization The Sentinel of the Motherland (Straja Țării), which followed the motto "Faith and Labor for the Fatherland and the King." The Sentinel of the Motherland gave military training to all citizens between the ages of seven and twenty-one, and held a monopoly over the education of the young. On 22 June 1940 the FRN was renamed Party of the Nation (Partidul Națiunii, PN). On 8 August 1940, in the course of fascistization, the Jews in Romania were stripped of their rights. Despite these efforts to fascistize Romanian society and to cooperate with the Iron Guard, Carol II's policies were unsuccessful and his popularity was restrained.⁴³

The legionaries were at odds with Carol II but they had good relations with some circles of the German Nazis, who regarded the Iron Guard as an organization spiritually related to them. Thus, the Nazis supported the legionaries' struggle against the old system and the Jews in Romania. Both the Nazis and the legionaries disliked Carol II, who was a royalist and not a fascist dictator, despite his attempts to fascistize his monarchy. On 21 September 1939, the legionaries assassinated another Romanian prime minister, Armand Călinescu. Carol II and his regime answered by executing 253 imprisoned legionaries. Sima, who was involved in the assassination of Călinescu, escaped to the German capital Berlin, which was the main foreign basis of the movement.⁴⁴

The Soviet–Nazi Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of non-aggression from 23 August 1939 weakened Romanian sovereignty. In order to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union, and under pressure from Germany, Carol II gave up several Romanian territories: Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina went in the summer of 1940 to the Soviet Union, Southern

Dobrogea was ceded to Bulgaria, and Hungary incorporated Northern Transylvania. This loss of territories led to mass demonstrations and caused a deep crisis of legitimation for Carol II's regime. Two days before his abdication, on 6 September 1940, the king had ordered former Defense Minister Marshal Ion Antonescu to establish a new government. The latter allied with the Iron Guard, and they formed the so-called National Revolutionary State, governed by two leaders: Antonescu and Sima. Although the marshal and the Iron Guard presented themselves in public as a harmonious team, conflicts between them emerged. Antonescu and Sima belonged to different generations, and they had dissimilar political interests and expectations.⁴⁵

The Nazis tried to mediate between the two groups of the National Revolutionary State, but legionaries' terror against Jews and other groups such as communists and socialists fuelled conflicts and made mediations difficult. At the end of November 1940, Antonescu initially considered his abdication but then decided to pressurize Sima to resign. The formal transfer and burial of Codreanu's remains, on 30 November 1940, which was turned into a huge public event with the attendance of German and other fascist representatives, postponed the resolution of the conflict. Antonescu was angry with Sima, because he did not control the radical groups of the legionaries who terrorized the Jews, marauded, and destabilized the country. Hitler needed to find a solution to this dissatisfying state of affairs in order not to lose an important ally in his upcoming war against the Soviet Union. He invited both Antonescu and Sima to a meeting in Obersalzberg on 14 January 1941. However, the marshal was the only guest who showed up. He informed the Führer that he had an obligation to rescue the country with, without, or against the Iron Guard. Hitler responded that organizations with a certain ideological profile do not suit all countries, and explained to Antonescu that the stability of the country was more important than ideology. Six days later, during a meeting with Mussolini, Hitler informed his Italian counterpart that one of the two Romanian leaders had to resign. The Duce assumed that it would not be Antonescu.⁴⁶

After the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, the military conflict between the legionaries and Antonescu's troops escalated. The marshal denounced Sima and the other leaders of the Iron Guard as rebels. Germany backed him up, but offered asylum to the legionaries. On the other hand, Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the RSHA, wanted to support Sima. Goebbels, too, sympathized with the legionaries, but the final decision was taken by Hitler.⁴⁷ According to Goebbels, the Führer supported Antonescu because he needed his military assistance. Hitler

was not convinced by Sima, and found him politically unsophisticated (*unterklassig*). The Iron Guard was for him too mystic, and insufficiently pragmatic.⁴⁸

In late January 1941, Antonescu formed a new government, banned the Iron Guard, and began forming his own cult of personality. Some less radical elements were integrated into the new regime, but over ten thousand legionaries were arrested and about 250 killed. About three hundred Romanian fascists, including Sima, fled to Germany; some twenty thousand went into hiding in Romania.⁴⁹ From May 1941 to December 1942, the fascist refugees were confined in Berkenbrück and Rostock. The RSHA was responsible for their well-being. Every legionary had to swear not to pursue any political goals, nor to intervene in the relations between Germany and Romania.⁵⁰ The fourteen leading members of the Iron Guard were settled in a villa in Berkenbrück, seventy kilometers from Berlin. About fifty further legionaries were detained in "Paul Nortmann," a recreational home of the SS in the same village. The other members of the Iron Guard stayed in Rostock where they worked in an aircraft factory. Professor Ernst Heinkel, who supervised them, praised their discipline.⁵¹

Although the legionaries were forbidden to intervene in the political affairs of Romania, they did so with the help of informal channels. Antonescu knew this, and arrested some further members of the Iron Guard in Romania.⁵² The marshal asked Hitler to extradite Sima, but the Germans expected Antonescu to kill the leader of the Iron Guard. This would have turned him into a martyr and complicated the already difficult state of affairs in Romania. Moreover, the Germans wanted to keep Sima in case the marshal and his regime started to cause problems, in which case they would need new Romanian allies.⁵³

On 16 December 1942, during the battle of Stalingrad, Sima escaped to Italy and attempted to meet Mussolini. His escape alarmed Antonescu and Hitler, who asked the Duce to deliver Sima to Berlin as soon as possible. The leader of the Romanian fascists was arrested in Rome on 27 December 1942 and transported to Berlin by plane on the next day.⁵⁴ According to Goebbels, Hitler was so infuriated by Sima's escape that he initially wanted to assassinate him, but in the end changed his mind.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, relations between the Iron Guard and the Nazis remained troubled. In mid-January 1943, Sima and his adjutant, Traian Borubaru, were interned in the concentration camp of Buchenwald, where they stayed as special political prisoners (*Ehrenhäftlinge* or *Sonderhäftlinge*) in a villa in a special area of the camp.⁵⁶ At the same time, 130 legionaries from Rostock were moved to Buchenwald as well. They lived in a barrack, but wore their own civilian clothes. On 24 April

1943 they were moved to a new camp constructed specially for them in Fichtenhain, where they lived in three barracks behind an electric barbed wire. The wives of the legionaries moved into a fourth barrack, which was finished in May 1943.⁵⁷

After the relocations, the Romanian legionaries stayed in Rostock, Dachau, Fichtenhain, Sachsenhausen, and Ravensbrück. Similar to the members of the OUN, they were confined as political or special political prisoners, and enjoyed much better treatment than ordinary prisoners of German concentration camps.⁵⁸ In late March 1943, Sima and Borubaru were confined in a special area of the camp in Sachsenhausen. Bandera and some other OUN members were arrested and placed in solitary cells in the same building. Sima and his adjutant, on the other hand, stayed in a part of the building composed of a living and sleeping cell as well as a washroom with a shower. One of the purposes of placing Sima there was to isolate him from the other legionaries and from prisoners who had connections to Romania.⁵⁹

Yet in 1943, relations between the Nazis and Antonescu began to deteriorate. The Germans suspected the marshal of seeking a ceasefire with the Allies in order to secure his interests in case Germany lost the war. Antonescu and his government, on the other hand, suspected the Nazis of supporting legionaries' plans for a plot against him.⁶⁰ A few months later, the relations between the Nazis and Antonescu seriously deteriorated. In April 1944, the Red Army reached North Bukovina, and on 23 August 1944 the Antonescu regime was overthrown.⁶¹ Just two days later, Hitler met Sima in his military headquarters, the "Wolfsschanze." The Führer was kind and warm toward the leader of the legionaries, who promised Hitler he would form a government that would mobilize Romanians to fight against the Red Army—the common enemy of all European fascists. On 26 August 1944, Sima proclaimed his new Romanian state on air from Vienna, and he kept mobilizing the Romanians in the following days in numerous radio broadcasts.⁶²

Sima was not the only fascist who continued this hopeless fight against the Soviet Army and the Allies. On 16 October 1944, the SS forced Miklós Horthy to abdicate in Hungary. Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the Arrow Cross Party, became the new leader of the country. He welcomed Sima in a letter as a comrade in their faith for the "New Europe."⁶³ Sima's possibilities were, however, limited. He planned to send a man to Bucharest in order to overthrow the government and to found a Romanian national army with the help of the Waffen-SS. But these efforts remained mere plans. Nevertheless, formally the Iron Guard leader and his government remained faithful to the fascist goal of a "New Europe," and supported Nazi Germany until the end of April 1945.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The three cases analyzed in this chapter show that conflicts are important elements of the history of European fascism. They need to be investigated as extensively as friendly encounters and all kinds of cultural, political, and military cooperation in order to understand the nature of transnational fascism. The history of inter-fascist conflicts can obviously not be reduced to the three examples presented here. It would require a group of experts from several parts of Europe to illuminate and write this kind of history. One point of departure could be the German concentration camps in which our three protagonists—Schuschnigg, Sima, and Bandera—were confined. Nevertheless, the history of European fascism appears to be so complex that several other approaches and methods would be necessary to unveil other forms of inter-fascist conflicts and misunderstandings.

Ideology was a crucial component of fascist movements and regimes. It provided them with orientation and facilitated transnational cooperation, despite the ultranationalist cores rooted in fascist ideologies. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the programs of the three analyzed movements were identical. Anti-Semitism was more essential in German Nazism than it was in the worldview of the Fatherland Front. Religion was absolutely essential for the Iron Guard, but not for the German Nazis. The struggle for an independent state was not the aim of the Austrian, German, or Romanian fascists, because they already had one. However, it was not, in the first instance, the ideological differences that caused conflicts between fascist movements. In fact, it was first of all pragmatic issues that led to or even caused the clashes, and that convinced Hitler to cooperate with military leaders and conservative elites like in Hungary and Romania, and not with fascist or semi-fascist movements. In the case of Austria, it was Hitler's determination to break up Germany's international isolation and to control a country which, as the Nazis believed, historically belonged to Germany. Ukrainian nationalists were not allowed to collaborate politically with the Nazis, because the Germans did not want to establish any states in the territories of the former USSR. Although the Iron Guard was a subject of admiration for many leading Nazi politicians, Antonescu could govern Romania more efficiently and provide stronger support for the war against the Soviet Union than the legionaries.

Thus, there is no universal answer to the question of what caused the conflicts among fascist movements and regimes, or of what facilitated their cooperation. The Nazis sympathized with fascists but they were

concerned more about pragmatic matters than about ideological or spiritual similarities. The worldview of authoritarian conservative leaders was also not entirely alien to the Nazis, and they could find enough similarities such as racism and nationalism to cooperate with them. Thus, when it was convenient for the Nazis, they collaborated with authoritarian conservative forces and imprisoned the fascists. Yet they repeatedly altered their position in different contexts, and initiated collaboration with fascists when they felt that they might lose the war or that conservative authoritarians might not want to support them anymore.

Contrary to their expectations, the Germans did not benefit from detaining and combating the fascists. Even if in the short run they took advantage of the collaboration with conservatives, in the long run they needed the fascist movements, who proved to be faithful and loyal, even after years of imprisonment. The conflicts also did not exclude any kind of collaboration. While the elite of the OUN were confined in concentration camps, Ukrainian policemen, including many OUN members, helped the Nazis annihilate the Jews. Some legionaries were integrated into Antonescu's regime and fought on the eastern front, even if many were persecuted. Numerous former members of the Fatherland Front and the Home Guard helped the Nazis on the eastern front as well, while some of them spent the war in concentration camps.

Apparently, all fascists who were imprisoned by the Nazis benefited from their "accidental" imprisonment. After the war, they could argue that they had opposed the Nazis and their genocidal policies toward the Jews. Bandera, for instance, presented himself as an opponent of Nazi Germany and as a freedom fighter during the Cold War. Stets'ko founded and led the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, which united veterans of several East European fascist movements, including the Ustaša, the Iron Guard, and the Hlinka Party. Some more Ukrainian nationalists, who were confined in Nazi concentration camps, worked as professors at Western universities. Horia Sima was not apprehended and executed like Antonescu, but died in Madrid in 1993. During his second life, he was one of the main anticommunist Romanian exile leaders. Schuschnigg moved to the United States in 1948, becoming an American citizen and a professor of political science at Saint Louis University. In 1968 he returned to Austria and published an almost 500-page book *Im Kampf gegen Hitler* (The Struggle against Hitler), in which he did not have much to say about the fascist nature of the Fatherland Front and the regime that he had headed, but a lot about his antifascist resistance against Nazi Germany.⁶⁵

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Notes

1. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London, 1991), 26.
2. Roger Eatwell, "The Nature of 'Generic Fascism': The 'Fascist Minimum' and the 'Fascist Matrix,'" in *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, ed. Constantin Iordachi (London, 2009), 136–39.
3. Gerhard Botz, "The Coming of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime and the Stages of its Development," in *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*, ed. António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis (London, 2014), 126–29.
4. Bruce Pauley, "From Splinter Party to Mass Movement: The Austrian Nazi Breakthrough," *German Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (1979): 7–9, 14–15; Bruce Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill, 1981), 246–47.
5. Pauley, "From Splinter Party to Mass Movement," 24–27.
6. Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge, 2004), 210.
7. Botz, "The Coming of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime," 121.
8. Mann, *Fascists*, 208–11; Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, 162.
9. Botz, "The Coming of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime," 121.
10. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, 114–15.
11. Kurt Bauer, *Hitlers Zweiter Putsch: Dollfuß, die Nazis und der 25. Juli 1934* (Vienna, 2014), 160.
12. Bauer, *Hitlers Zweiter Putsch*, 13; Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, 106–9.
13. Bauer, *Hitlers Zweiter Putsch*, 41–91, 127–57, 193.
14. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, 111.
15. Quoted in *ibid.*, 111.
16. *Ibid.*, 111–12.
17. *Ibid.*, 162.
18. Botz, "Coming of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime," 138.
19. Quoted in Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, 163.
20. *Ibid.*, 164–65.
21. *Ibid.*, 208–11.
22. *Ibid.*, 206. See also Peter Stachel, *Mythos Heldenplatz* (Vienna, 2002), 15–22.
23. Wolfgang Neugebauer and Peter Schwarz, *Stacheldraht, mit Tod geladen ... Der erste Österreichertransport in das KZ Dachau 1938* (Vienna, 2008), 5, 8, 24.

24. Ibid., 10; Volker Koop, *In Hitlers Hand: Sonder- und Ehrenhäftlinge der SS* (Cologne, 2010), 95–109. In general on Schuschnigg, see Anton Hopfgarten, *Kurt Schuschnigg: Ein Mann gegen Hitler* (Graz, 1989).
25. For the history of Ukraine, see Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich, 2009); Serhy Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford, 2007).
26. Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny: Formuvannia modernoi Ukraïn's'koï natsii XIX–XX stolittia* (Kiev, 2000), 111–59; Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939* (Paderborn, 2010), 414–21.
27. For the history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsia Ukraïn's'kykh Natsionalistiv*, OUN), see Franziska Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!” *Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948* (Berlin, 2007); Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* (Stuttgart, 2014).
28. Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer*, 547–69; Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen,” 32–51; Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*, 67–89.
29. Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer*, 561; Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*, 69–70. For the concept of revolution, see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism,” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 2402 (2015): 35–37.
30. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Der Verlauf und die Täter des Lemberger Pogroms vom Sommer 1941: Zum aktuellen Stand der Forschung,” *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 22 (2013): 207–43; John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* LIII, nos. 2–4 (2011): 209–43; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of Summer 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 86–95.
31. Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*, 194, 199, 247; idem, “The Ukrainian National Revolution,” 89.
32. “Stepan Bandera an Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg. Berlin, den 14. August 1941,” in *Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, series D, vol. XIII, ed. Walter Bußmann (Göttingen, 1970), 261–62; Bandera’s memorandum to Alfred Rosenberg, Berlin, 9 December 1941, in *OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty chastyna 1*, ed. Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi (Kiev, 2006), 564.
33. Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*, 249, 251, 285–88; Adam Cyra, “Banderowcy w KL Auschwitz,” *Studia nad faszysmem i zbrodniami hitlerowskimi* 30 (2008): 388–402.
34. Bohdan Kazaniv’s’kyi, *Shliakhom Legendy: Spomyny* (London, 1975), 263–66; Gabriel N. Finder and Alexander V. Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 34, no. 2 (2004): 103–12; Alexander Kruglov, “Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941–1944,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington, 2008), 273.

35. Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960: Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii* (Warsaw, 2006), 410–12.
36. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Wisconsin, 1995), 277.
37. Mann, *Fascists*, 265.
38. Quoted in Payne, *History of Fascism*, 288.
39. *Ibid.*, 277–85.
40. Constantin Iordachi, “A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments in Romania, 1937–1944” in *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*, ed. António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis (London, 2014), 246.
41. Armin Heinen, *Die Legion “Erzengel Michael” in Rumänien. Soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus* (Munich, 1986), 99–151, 252–57.
42. *Ibid.*, 309–10, 364–80.
43. Iordachi, “Continuum of Dictatorships,” 248–53.
44. Heinen, *Die Legion “Erzengel Michael,”* 364–79; Gerhard Köpernick, *Faschisten im KZ. Rumäniens Eiserne Garde und das Dritte Reich* (Berlin, 2014), 47–48.
45. *Ibid.*, 45–70; Iordachi, “Continuum of Dictatorships,” 253.
46. Köpernick, *Faschisten im KZ*, 70–79.
47. *Ibid.*, 94–100.
48. *Ibid.*, 102.
49. *Ibid.*, 129, 140, 142.
50. *Ibid.*, 110–11.
51. *Ibid.*, 113–15, 120, 142–43.
52. *Ibid.*, 148, 153.
53. *Ibid.*, 159.
54. *Ibid.*, 180–83.
55. *Ibid.*, 184, 191–93.
56. *Ibid.*, 194.
57. *Ibid.*, 194–95.
58. *Ibid.*, 201.
59. *Ibid.*, 205.
60. *Ibid.*, 211.
61. *Ibid.*, 216–17.
62. *Ibid.*, 223–24.
63. *Ibid.*, 234–35. Szálasi was a personal enemy of Horthy, like Sima of Antonescu. See, on this, Johannes Dafinger’s chapter in this volume.
64. *Ibid.*, 236–48.
65. Kurt Schuschnigg, *Im Kampf gegen Hitler: Die Überwindung der Anschlussidee* (Vienna, 1969).

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